



Today, about 1 billion people are estimated to live in ‘slums’ worldwide. This 
number will only grow and urban poverty worsen unless radical measures are 
taken. While it is generally acknowledged in the international development 
debate that breaking the circle of poverty requires multiple strategies, there is 
renewed attention for approaches that centre on the issue of tenure security. 
This means landholders are protected against involuntary removal from the land 
on which they reside, unless through due process of law and payment of proper 
compensation. The prevailing approach to the provision of tenure security is land 
registration. And while the land registration approach currently dominates policy, 
there has been little research into the effects of registration, particularly in urban 
areas. What research has been conducted, contests the benefits of this approach. 
As a result, we witness increasing interest in alternative approaches which gener-
ally combine protective administrative or legal measures against eviction with the 
provision of basic services and credit facilities.
The author describes and analyses the extent to which formal, semiformal, and 
informal tenure arrangements that can be found in kampongs (typical low-income 
settlements) in Indonesia provide tenure security to the country’s urban poor, 
particularly since 1998, when Indonesia embarked on an ambitious political 
and legal reform programme. The author reviews the current legal framework 
that applies to urban land tenure in Indonesia. In addition, based on rich mate-
rial that was acquired through empirical research in the city of Bandung, there 
are a number of case studies presented in which the urban poor’s tenure security 
was put to the test. Finally, drawing on statistical data, the author analyses the 
urban poor’s perceptions regarding their tenure security and whether and, if so, 
how this influences their housing investment behaviour. Following this analysis, 
the author evaluates the socio-economic benefits of current approaches to 
attaining tenure security. And with these findings, there are policy suggestions 
and contributions to theory formation presented to further the current inter-
national development debate on tenure security.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of Leiden University. The study is a part of the Law School’s research 
programme on Securing the rule of law in a world of multilevel jurisdiction 
and was conducted as part of a research project of the Van Vollenhoven Insti-
tute for Law, Governance, and Development.
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This book describes and analyzes the extent to which Indonesia’s urban 
poor applying different tenure arrangements enjoy tenure security. Tenure 
security can be defined in short as protection of landholders against invol-
untary removal from the land on which they reside, unless through due 
process of law and payment of proper compensation. Assessing the levels 
of tenure security these different tenure arrangements provide, it reviews 
the socio-economic benefits of current approaches to attaining tenure secu-
rity, particularly land registration. On the basis of these findings, it formu-
lates policy suggestions, and contributes to the current international devel-
opment debate on tenure security as well as to theory formation.
This introductory chapter comprises three parts. The following sec-
tions, which form the first part, critically discuss the current stage of the 
debate on tenure security. This part shows that with an increasing number 
of the developing world’s urban poor living in slums, there is now general 
agreement among scholars and practitioners about the importance of pro-
viding them with tenure security. Generally, two approaches to attaining 
tenure security can be discerned: a ‘functional’ approach, which is domi-
nant but also vehemently criticised, and a relatively new ‘rights-based’ 
approach. It is argued that both approaches ignore the importance of a rule 
of law environment in attaining tenure security. The second part of this 
chapter briefly discusses the issues of slums and urban poverty, land ten-
ure security, and the rule of law in the Indonesian context. It shows that 
these issues are highly relevant for Indonesia, and that recent reforms have 
made the country a fascinating case for research concerning tenure security 
for low-income ‘kampong’ dwellers. The last part of the Introduction for-
mulates the research questions, framework of analysis, methodology, limi-
tations, and outline of this study.
1.1 Urban poverty and informality
In 2003, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABI-
TAT) published the first global report on slums, from which a dismal pic-
ture emerged of urban growth and increasing poverty and inequality in 
developing countries. The report estimated that in 2001 some 924 million 
people – about 32 per cent of the global urban population – lived in slums, 
and this number was predicted to increase rapidly if adequate action is not 
taken (UN-HABITAT 2003a:2). No definition of the term ’slum’ has as yet 
been agreed upon, but generally such settlements have distinct socio-eco-
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nomic, physical and legal characteristics.1 From a socio-economic point of 
view, slums may be associated with capability and income poverty. Resi-
dents have low educational attainment levels. Commonly working in the 
informal sector, they have no secure jobs and low and unstable incomes. 
Poverty also affects the cohesion of the community, which in turn presents 
an obstacle to residents’ capacity to organise themselves. Physically, slums 
lack adequate access to basic services, such as safe water, sanitation, and 
electricity. Housing is of sub-standard quality and overcrowded. In legal 
terms, slums may be classified as informal, irregular, or extra-legal settle-
ments, as dwellers apply land tenure arrangements that either have no 
legal basis or actually contravene state law. The settlements can be informal 
with regard to both the occupation and the use of land. Dwellers have no 
legal title. Some may buy or rent land informally, often on the basis of cus-
tomary arrangements. Others may squat. Also, the residents of slums often 
fail to comply with spatial planning laws, building regulations or other leg-
islation pertaining to the use of land.2 The above three characteristics of 
slums are interdependent. Slums are thus manifestations of a vicious circle 
of urban poverty.
Informal land tenure is often associated with tenure insecurity. As the 
urban poor lack formal tenure they can lose their land easily – in theory at 
least. This threat can be ‘external’ or ‘internal’ and involve the state or pri-
vate parties. Von Benda-Beckmann notes that “the state in most Third 
World states has become a property monster” (Von Benda-Beckmann 
2003:189). The state may acquire the urban poor’s land in the public inter-
est, for instance for infrastructure purposes. Or the state may evict the 
urban poor simply because they occupy land that is owned or managed by 
the state or private parties. Finally, eviction may occur on grounds of spa-
tial planning law – residents may occupy land earmarked for other pur-
poses by zoning provisions, may violate building regulations, or may lack 
the permits needed to reside on the land. Eviction by commercial develop-
ers and the more well-to-do can also constitute an external risk. Slums are 
often located in strategic locations – the inner-city, for instance – which 
means that the land is commercially valuable. This may prompt attempts at 
commercial land clearance or, put negatively, so-called ‘market eviction’. 
The socio-economic position of the urban poor makes their situation even 
more challenging. Many lack insight into the value of the land, have poor 
negotiations skills, and are in difficult situations financially. Whatever the 
case, disproportionally powerful commercial parties are well-placed, often 
in collaboration with public authority, to pressure the urban poor into 
vacating land. Finally, the urban poor often face an internal risk of eviction. 
1 The term ‘slum’ is commonly applied in the international development debate. Gilbert 
argues that its use carries the imminent danger of reinforcing negative connotations 
regarding these settlements (Gilbert 2007). As will be illustrated in Chapter 5 and dis-
cussed in Chapter 9, this argument appears to hold true. Please also refer to footnote 14.
2 Compare UN-HABITAT 2003b:10-2.
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Neighbours and other members of the community may encroach on their 
land. Family members, particularly males, may take an undue share of 
inherited property. All of the above situations can and often do lead to dis-
putes over rights and compensation, in turn resulting in further difficulties.
An important question is how to break out of this poverty circle. While 
it is generally acknowledged in the international development debate that 
breaking the cycle requires multiple strategies, there is renewed attention 
for approaches that centre on the issue of tenure security – which we define 
simply as protection of landholders against involuntary removal from the 
land on which they reside, unless through due process of law and payment 
of proper compensation.3 This renewed attention owes much to the work 
of Hernando de Soto, who argued on the basis of research in slums in Peru 
that the poor are actually rich in assets, but because of informality cannot 
use them as collateral for capital accumulation (De Soto 1989,2000). To 
illustrate the importance of tenure security in approaches to alleviating 
urban poverty, the UN Millennium Development Goals contain a specific 
target on slums, i.e. Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 11, which 
aims to significantly improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 
by the year 2020 (UN-HABITAT 2003c). The proportion of slum households 
with secure tenure is one of the indicators for measuring progress towards 
this target (Indicator 32).
1.2 Tenure security, land registration, and alternative 
approaches
The dominant approach to the provision of tenure security to the urban 
poor, referred to as the ‘functional approach’, emphasizes the impact of 
tenure formalisation on specific ‘development’ objectives – particularly 
economic growth, poverty reduction, and slum upgrading. With respect to 
these objectives, proponents consider the legalisation of what de Soto calls 
‘extra-legal’ land tenure, by registering the land, to be of major importance 
(Durand-Lasserve & Selod 2007:14-5). Registration not only affords land-
holders legal protection against involuntary removal, by the state or pri-
vate parties, from the land on which they reside, but also has several other 
major socio-economic benefits. These include an increased willingness on 
3 Turner was the first to highlight the relationship between poverty and insecure tenure, 
as early as 40 years ago. See: Turner 1968. This book avoids applying the definitions of 
tenure security that are commonly used in the debate, as such definitions tend to con-
centrate on a single dimension of the concept; usually legal or perceived security. 
Instead, we introduce the neutral definition cited above; which allows us to elaborate 
on all three types of tenure security (namely legal, de facto, and perceived security), as 
will be discussed below.
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the part of the urban poor to invest in their land and consolidate their hous-
ing, and an enabled land market, because titles allow trading and improved 
access to credit from banks, with land serving as collateral (World Bank 
2003a:40-51).4
While the land registration approach currently dominates policy, there 
has been little research into the effects of registration, particularly in urban 
areas (Payne, et al. 2007:4-5). What little research has been conducted con-
tests the benefits of this approach.5 The basic criticism is that the rationale 
for land registration is oversimplified, as tenure status is assessed in black 
and white terms – namely legal versus extra-legal – and tenure status is 
equated with tenure security. Titled land is considered to offer legal protec-
tion against involuntary removal, while ‘extra-legal’ tenure is considered 
insecure by definition. Proponents of the registration approach thus disre-
gard the continuum of tenure categories, with varying degrees of legality, 
that exist in many slums (Payne 2001:416-8; Gilbert 2002:7-9; Varley 
2002:449-55). More importantly, ‘extra-legal’ tenure can offer significant 
actual protection against involuntary removal (Payne 2002b:301; Payne, et 
al. 2007:8). The extent to which such security exists will depend on the 
political commitments or administrative practices in place in the particular 
slum, and will often also be related to variables such as length of occupa-
tion, size of the settlement, level and unity of community organisation, and 
the level of support that landholders can get from civil society groups 
(Payne 1997:8/31; Durand-Lasserve & Royston 2002a:6-7; Durand-Lasserve 
& Selod 2007:4).
The possibility of actual protection arising from ‘extra-legal’ tenure 
calls into question the economic benefits of land registration. Also, housing 
consolidation and investment in land may depend on perceptions of tenure 
security, regardless of whether such security is based on legal or actual pro-
tection against involuntary removal (Varley 1987; Gilbert 2002:6-7; Payne 
2002b:301). At the least, it is clear that the relationship between the legal 
status of land and investment is not straightforward. There is even evi-
dence that people invest in their housing precisely because they lack formal 
tenure and aim to create actual protection against involuntary removal 
(Razzaz 1993:350-1; Payne, et al. 2007:14). Some argue that land registration 
does not in fact facilitate land markets, as property in many slums is 
already traded according to some form of de facto registration system, 
based heavily on official systems (Payne 2001:416-8; Gilbert 2002:7-9; Var-
ley 2002:449-55). As a rule, access to credit is the main argument for interna-
4 In his second book, “The Mystery of Capital”, which was published in 2000, de Soto 
goes one step further in claiming that property ownership is the reason “why capital-
ism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else” (De Soto 2000).
5 For specific criticism of de Soto’s work, please refer to the following reviews: Payne 
2001; Woodruff 2001; Fernandes 2002; Gilbert 2002; Payne 2002a; Benda-Beckmann 
2003; Otto 2009.
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tional donors and/or governments to engage in land registration pro-
grammes, though empirical evidence generally shows that registration 
fails to generate any significant improvement in access to formal credit. 
Banks tend to remain reluctant to give loans to slum residents, due to the 
high transaction costs and the risks assumed in respect to people on low 
and unstable incomes. The reverse holds equally true – the urban poor are 
suspicious of banks. In any event, alternatives to formal credit from banks 
do exist, for instance informal credit or micro-credit facilities (Payne 
2001:421-2; Fernandes 2002; Gilbert 2002:9-14; Payne 2002a:11; Durand-
Lasserve & Selod 2007:25; Payne, et al. 2007:17-21).
It has even been argued that land registration may have detrimental 
effects. It tends to override weaker claims on land, commonly held by 
weaker members of society; thus exacerbating inequality (Von Benda-Beck-
mann 2003:188-9). So some warn against the ‘downward raiding’ process of 
residents with already secure tenure arrangements buying land and prop-
erty from newly ‘entitled’ owners. Such sales may not always be voluntary. 
Tenants and sub-tenants, usually among the poorest residents, may be 
forced out by rent increases as newly ‘entitled’ owners seek to capitalise on 
their freshly acquired capital assets. Moreover, as the value of the regis-
tered land increases, so may the costs of residing there, such as through 
increases in land taxes. For governments this often forms an important 
argument for engaging in land registration programmes (Payne 2001:423-5; 
UN-HABITAT 2003b:40). Land registration can lead to many other forms of 
what is referred to as ‘market eviction’ (Krueckeberg & Paulsen 2002:235). 
It may also be accompanied by a surge in the number of land disputes 
(Jansen & Roquas 1998).
The above points partly explain why “demand [for land registration] is 
not reported as often [in tenure literature] as the need to obtain and main-
tain popular support for titling programmes” (Payne, et al. 2007:31). In any 
case, such programmes entail significant cost, are time-consuming, and 
impose a heavy burden on land administration agencies that are often 
already overstretched (Durand-Lasserve & Royston 2002a:10-14; UN-HAB-
ITAT 2003b; Durand-Lasserve & Selod 2007:8; Payne, et al. 2007:23-4/26-8).
As a result of the aforementioned criticism of the land registration 
approach, we can witness increased attention for alternative approaches 
that generally combine protective administrative or legal measures against 
evictions with the provision of basic services and credit facilities. This 
allows communities to consolidate their settlements, save money, and 
improve their tenure status incrementally. It also prevents dwellers to suf-
fer from market pressure or to fall victim to market eviction (Payne 
2001:427-8; Durand-Lasserve & Royston 2002a:14-5). The next step in ten-
ure upgrading often involves decentralisation of land management and 
community participation (McAuslan 2002:30-1; Durand-Lasserve & Roys-
ton 2002b:249-1).
Proponents of alternative approaches do not reject land registration 
altogether. It is often acknowledged that under many ‘informal’ arrange-
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ments, tenure security can deteriorate easily (Durand-Lasserve & Royston 
2002a:6; Payne 2002b:305-6). Tenure security does however not necessarily 
require (immediate) land registration, and, if it is done, can focus on local 
specific, tailor made registration arrangements (Durand-Lasserve & Roys-
ton 2002a:10-2; Payne 2002a:1-22; UN-HABITAT 2003b). Whether or not 
land registration plays a role in these approaches, they should always be 
part of an integrated package of measures which are not restricted to land 
policies (Krueckeberg & Paulsen 2002:233-4; Durand-Lasserve & Royston 
2002b:251-2; Payne 2002b:300).
Even the World Bank, once among the fiercest supporters of the neo-
liberal market-driven approach to (urban) development, has acknowl-
edged in its landmark policy research report ‘Land Policy for Growth and 
Poverty Reduction’ that formal individual titles are not always necessary 
or sufficient for high levels of tenure security (World Bank 2003a:39). It 
argues that in situations where institutions which enforce formal land 
rights are absent, or do not enjoy broad legitimacy, it is better to chose a 
gradual approach and build on existing systems of land tenure, such as 
local institutions (World Bank 2003a:33).6
Alternative approaches to land registration as a means to ensure secure 
tenure often draw support from international human rights law (Durand-
Lasserve & Selod 2007:14). The most important right in this respect is the 
right to adequate housing, which is for instance acknowledged in Arti-
cle 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).7 According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which monitors state compliance with the 
treaty, one of the seven criteria for determining whether housing is ade-
quate is that of legal security of tenure. Regardless of the type of tenure, 
all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure which guaran-
tees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats. 
6 It is not clear whether the World Bank here refers to state or also non-state institutions. 
In view of the World Bank’s shift in land policy, it can be assumed that it involves both 
kinds.
7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), adopted by 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966, 
entered into force on 3 January 1976. Other treaties that deal with the right to adequate 
housing include the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Art. 5 (c)); the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (Art. 14 (h)), and; the Convention of the Rights of the Child (Art. 27(3)). In addi-
tion, a great variety of international resolutions, declarations, recommendations and 
regional human rights instruments also deal with housing rights. For an overview, see: 
COHRE 2000; UN-HABITAT 2002; UN-HABITAT 2003e; UN-HABITAT 2005. The right 
to adequate housing was first recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Art. 25(1)), which although a declaration, is now considered part of customary 
international law (Leckie 1995:39).
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Forced eviction is defined as the permanent or temporary removal against 
their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes 
and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, 
appropriate forms of legal or other protection. The CESCR considers that 
instances of forced eviction are prima facie incompatible with the require-
ments of the ICESSR and can only be justified in the most exceptional cir-
cumstances. The prohibition on forced evictions does not, however, apply 
to evictions carried out by force in accordance with the law and in conform-
ity with the provisions of the International Covenants on Human Rights.8
The Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habi-
tat II) in 1996 in Istanbul made an important contribution to the recognition 
of the right to adequate housing. The conference resulted in the formula-
tion of the Istanbul Declaration and the Habitat Agenda, which constitute a 
framework where human settlements development is linked to the realisa-
tion of human rights in general and the right to adequate housing in par-
ticular. The 2001 Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements in the 
New Millennium reaffirms that the Istanbul Declaration and the Habitat 
Agenda will remain the basic framework for sustainable human settle-
ments development in the years to come.9
In practice, few governments are willing to pursue alternative 
approaches to land registration as a means to ensure secure tenure.10 Some 
progress is being made, however. At least, most governments, and also 
parts of the private sector, have now committed themselves to socio-eco-
nomic (second generation) human rights standards, including the right to 
adequate housing, which should guarantee secure land tenure. Govern-
ments recognise these rights in their legal systems, by ratification/acces-
sion of treaties, constitutional amendments, and other legal reforms. The 
implementation of this legislation at the national and local levels proves to 
be a gradual process, in which some countries have made more progress 
than others (Durand-Lasserve & Royston 2002b:247-9). Judicial review of 
the constitutionality of primary legislation can play a catalysing role in this 
process, as recent developments in South Africa show (Chenwi 2008). In 
any event, it appears that an increasing number of governments are reluc-
tant to evict landholders. In many countries this development coincides 
with a democratisation process (Durand-Lasserve & Royston 2002b:247-9).
8 General Comment by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights No. 
4 on the right to adequate housing (adopted at the Sixth session, 1991); General Com-
ment by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights No. 7 on Forced 
Evictions (adopted at the Sixteenth session, 1997); General Comment by the UN Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights No. 3 on the Nature of States Parties 
Obligations (adopted at the 5th session, 1990).
9 On these agreements, see: McAuslan 2002:23-6.
10 For some examples of countries that have embarked on rights-based strategies, see: 
Durand-Lasserve, et al. 2002:5-7.
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1.3 The need for a rule of law environment
The previous sections have shown that there are different approaches to the 
enhancement of tenure security. However, the success of these approaches 
depends on the enforceability of property and/or human rights. This 
requires more than just the recognition of such rights; it requires a rule of 
law environment, in which the urban poor are protected against arbitrary 
behaviour by the state or private parties. As the World Bank acknowledges, 
“examples abound of cases where legislation mandating strong formal pro-
tection of property rights was of limited value as it could not be enforced at 
the local level, where the institutional capacity to do so was lacking. Hav-
ing a legally defined right will be of limited value if, in case of violation of 
this right, access to the courts is difficult, the case will not be heard for a 
long time or will not be resolved without paying bribes, or court orders in 
relation to a specific piece of land cannot be enforced” (World Bank 
2003a:33). Surprisingly, this issue has received little (explicit) attention in 
tenure literature. As was stated in a strategic paper of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), “the enforceability of 
legal rights is the crucial unarticulated premise for most economic reason-
ing on the impact of property rights and formality” (Bruce, et al. 2007a:53).11
The rule of law may be ignored in tenure literature, but it is currently at 
the centre of the international development debate, being proposed as a 
solution to all kinds of troubles. Likewise, international donor organisa-
tions have persuaded governments of developing countries to initiate a 
great variety of rule of law reform initiatives. Carothers categorizes these 
initiatives into three types. The first type focuses on revising the constitu-
tion, laws, and regulations. These pieces of legislation often lie (partly) in 
the economic domain. The second type of reform initiative seeks to 
strengthen law-related institutions, particularly the courts, but also parlia-
ments and local governments. Employees are trained, their salaries are 
increased, ethics codes are formulated, and it is also common for alterna-
tive institutions of dispute settlement to be established. The third type of 
initiative has the deeper goal of increasing government’s compliance with 
law. Genuine judicial independence is a key step in attaining this goal 
(Carothers 2006:7-8).
A process that often seeks to contribute to the substantive formation of 
the rule of law at local levels is decentralisation. It has, for instance, been 
associated with democratic lawmaking, popular participation, and 
accountability of public officials to citizens. There are four basic types of 
decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatisa-
tion. These types, however, cannot always be easily distinguished in prac-
tice. Devolution is the most encompassing form, and can be defined as the 
11 While the World Bank and USAID refer to the enforceability of property rights, this 
issue is of course of just as much relevance in relation to the right to adequate housing.
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“strengthening […] of sub-national units of government, the activities of 
which are substantially outside the direct control of the central govern-
ment” (Rondinelli, et al. 1983:12-31; Herbert 2008). These units can be 
strengthened by the transfer of tasks, authorities, political power, and/or 
resources (Frerks & Otto 1996). This is why it is also common to refer to 
administrative, political (or democratic) and fiscal decentralisation.
Certain types of decentralisation in the land sector can support tenure 
security. As Durand-Lasserve concludes on the basis of a number of case 
studies, “the decentralization of responsibility for land management would 
seem to be a sine qua non for the implementation of tenure security poli-
cies: first, so that the problem of irregular settlements is handled by local 
authorities and, second, so that the populations concerned can be involved 
in the process” (Durand-Lasserve & Royston 2002b:250-1). However, the 
most far-reaching type of decentralisation – that is, devolution of tasks, 
authorities, political power and resources – may not always be the best 
option. For instance, as the World Bank notes in its report ‘Land Policy for 
Growth and Poverty Reduction’, “[w]hile low transaction costs and broad 
access to land administration are extremely important, this can be achieved 
by deconcentrating a central government agency rather than by establish-
ing decentralized units with independent decision-making power, which 
may lead to the absence of a national framework and of uniformity in the 
provision of land administration services” (World Bank 2003a:78).
In practice, the effects of legal and institutional reforms, including 
decentralisation, have often been disappointing. Rewriting laws may be 
relatively easy. Yet far-reaching reforms of institutions towards compliance 
are slow – if successful at all. It requires the reorganisation of legal institu-
tions, the retraining of its employees, even the transformation of society at 
large. Obviously this is not an easy process. As Carothers notes, the obsta-
cles are not only technical or financial, but also political and social (Caroth-
ers 2006:3-4). The deeper goal of increasing government’s compliance with 
law thus requires true commitment from the country’s political leadership. 
It is not a technocratic process, as some tend to assume.
The above mentioned sobering results have led scholars and practition-
ers to focus their attention away from the state-centred reforms of changing 
laws and strengthening legal institutions, towards bottom-up approaches 
in which the needs and preferences of the poor are central. Golub, for 
instance, has argued that the ‘rule of law orthodoxy’ “pays little heed to the 
reality that the legal problems and solutions of the poor typically reside 
outside the conventional ‘justice sector’, pertaining instead to administra-
tive law, non-judicial dispute resolution, civil society efforts, and a host of 
other forums and processes” (Golub 2005:298). He therefore pleads for a 
legal empowerment approach, which the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) defines as “activities aimed at strengthening people’s 
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capacities to seek out and demand justice remedies” (UNDP 2005:136).12 
These activities include legal aid and counsel, legal awareness pro-
grammes, and other activities that aim at overcoming legal obstacles. Relat-
ed development activities are any activities that complement legal services, 
but themselves are not inherently law-oriented in nature, including com-
munity organizing, group formation, political mobilisation, and use of 
media. Civil society organisations can play a major role in such activities, 
and prove particularly successful when forging partnerships with the state 
(Golub 2006:161-5).13 Legal empowerment activities are often part of broad-
er bottom-up programmes that aim to improve access to justice. These pro-
grammes also include the common activities of legal and institutional 
reforms, yet in contrast with ‘the rule of law orthodoxy,’ all focus on taking 
away the barriers of poor and disadvantaged groups to justice. Legal 
empowerment can however have a wider scope than access to justice in 
that it can also enable people to participate in public decision-making pro-
cesses (UNDP 2005:136).
1.4 Urban poverty, tenure security, and the rule of law in 
Indonesia
The previously discussed topics of urban poverty, land tenure security, and 
the rule of law are highly relevant for Indonesia. According to UN-HABI-
TAT, currently 23.1 per cent of Indonesia’s urban population, or a massive 
12 Golub himself less aptly defines legal empowerment as “the use of legal services, often 
in combination with related development activities, to increase disadvantaged popula-
tions’ control over their lives” (Golub 2006:161). There are many other definitions of 
legal empowerment, which all lack clarity. For example, and for comparison, according 
to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) legal empowerment “involves the explicit or 
implicit use of the law through training, counselling, litigation, representation in 
administrative procedures, advocacy before bureaucratic agencies, or other interven-
tions. These activities may also be combined with initiatives that are not inherently law-
oriented, such as community organizing or livelihood development” (Golub & 
McQuay 2000:8). According to the World Bank, “legal empowerment promotes safety, 
and access to justice and helps poor people solve problems and overcome administra-
tive barriers (Palacio 2006:15). Finally, according to USAID legal empowerment occurs 
“when the poor, their supporters, or governments – employing legal and other means 
– create rights, capacities, and/or opportunities for the poor that give them new power 
to use law and legal tools to escape poverty and marginalization” (Bruce, et al. 
2007b:29). An important discussion in legal empowerment literature is whether legal 
empowerment includes the supply side of justice. This book follows Golub’s interpreta-
tion of the concept. He argues that legal empowerment only focuses on the demand 
side (but in a broad sense, also in for instance public decision-making processes), 
whereas complementary rule of law programmes must address the supply side.
13 The legal empowerment approach promoted by Golub should not be confused with the 
efforts of the High Commission for Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) based on 
the ideas of de Soto, which seek to empower the poor by the provision of property 
rights. Golub’s approach obviously has a broader scope.
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20.9 million people, reside in ‘slums’, the catch-all term used in the interna-
tional development debate. In the Indonesian context the term also refers to 
kampongs (kampung), the country’s typical low-income settlements that 
can be found in any contemporary Indonesian city (UN-HABITAT 
2003d:80).14 It is likely that the present living conditions will worsen unless 
radical measures are taken. The country’s urban population continues to 
grow. Today the proportion of people living in cities exceeds 50 per cent 
and is expected to reach 60 per cent by 2025. The urban population is esti-
mated to increase by 70 per cent over the next 25 years, from 108 million to 
187 million (Sarosa 2006:158-60). This would mainly be the result of poor 
people from the countryside migrating to the city.
Over the past several decades, the Indonesian government has tried to 
improve the living conditions in kampongs by addressing their socio-eco-
nomic, physical, and legal characteristics. In order to strengthen the tenure 
security of the urban poor, the Indonesian government has initiated vari-
ous land registration programmes since 1981, providing hundreds of thou-
sands of certificates at low cost. However, at the same time Soeharto’s 
authoritarian New Order regime (1966-1998) showed little reluctance in 
clearing kampongs for the sake of economic development, without offering 
proper compensation to their residents. The regime also actively supported 
private developers to undertake similar practices. The prevalence of such 
actions illustrates the weak rule of law with which Indonesia contended 
during those years.
After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia initiated ambitious political 
and legal reforms. Reforms included four amendments to the Indonesian 
Constitution, which inter alia acknowledges the right to adequate housing.15
The right to adequate housing has been strengthened further by the acces-
sion and ratification of several human rights treaties, which – although 
applicable through Parliament-enacted laws – take precedence over 
any Indonesian law, including the Constitution. One of the most impor-
14 See also Davis 2006:24. Aside from carrying the imminent danger of reinforcing nega-
tive connotations (see footnote 1), the use of the term ‘slum’ to refer to kampongs is 
inaccurate. As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 2, kampongs generally 
have some, but not all characteristics of settlements qualified as slums. It should also be 
noted that the concept ‘kampong’ has different meanings, depending on the area in 
Indonesia where it is used, and by whom it is used (Krausse 1975:31-5). In West-Java, 
the area of study of this book, the word means low-income urban or rural settlement 
(Silas 1983:214). But it is quite possible to also find middle class inhabitants in some 
kampongs.
15 With the Second Amendment to the Constitution in 2000, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was fully incorporated. In his discussion of the amendments, Lindsey 
calls this “perhaps the most radical change to the original philosophy of the Constitu-
tion” (Lindsey 2004:301). Art. 28H(1) of the Amended 1945 Constitution refers to the 
right to adequate housing.
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tant treaties ratified by Indonesia is the ICESCR in 2006.16 Following these 
steps, in the same year the Indonesian government formulated a five-year 
National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (Strategi Nasional Penanggulangan 
Kemiskinan or SNPK), which, in line with UN Millennium Development 
Goals, takes an integrated, rights-based approach. This strategy forms the 
basis for the formulation of further policies and programmes.
The most important legislative initiative following the amendments to 
the Constitution was the enactment of the two 1999 Regional Autonomy 
Laws (1999 RALs), which were later revised by the 2004 Regional Autono-
my Laws (2004 RALs).17 These laws devolved tasks, authorities, political 
power and resources from Jakarta to the level of the Province (Propinsi), 
and notably also to the level of the Districts (Kabupaten)/Municipalities 
(Kota). The Districts and Municipalities in particular now have a large say 
in a number of important sectors, including the land sector. Finally, various 
pieces of land (related) law have been enacted, including the 2007 Spatial 
Management Law, the 2006 Presidential Decision on Land Clearance for 
Development in the Public Interest, and the 1999 Regulation of the Head of 
the National Land Agency (NLA) on Site Permits.18 These – to follow 
Carothers’ categorisation – first type reform initiatives were to contribute 
to the process of (local) rule of law formation, and in turn may contribute to 
a better enforceability of rights to land.
Aside from legal and institutional reforms, international donor organi-
sations, in collaboration with the Indonesian government, have set up 
access to justice initiatives that include legal empowerment components, 
16 Law No. 11/2005 on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (UU No. 11/2005 tentang Pengesahan International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak-Hak Ekonomi, Sosial 
dan Budaya)). The treaty came into effect on 23 May 2006. Indonesia has signed/acced-
ed/ratified several other human rights treaties that deal with the right to adequate 
housing.
17 No. 22/1999 on Regional Government (UU No. 22/1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah); 
Law No. 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the 
Regions (UU No. 25/1999 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Dae-
rah); Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government (UU No. 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan 
Daerah); Law No. 33/2004 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and 
the Regions (UU No. 33/2004 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan 
Daerah).
18 Law No. 24/1992 on Spatial Management (UU No. 24/1992 tentang Penataan Ruang) was 
replaced by Law No. 26/2007 (UU No. 26/2007 tentang Penataan Ruang); Presidential 
Decision No. 55/1993 on Land Clearance for Development in the Public Interest (Kep-
pres No. 55/1993 tentang Pengadaan Tanah bagi Pelaksanaan Pembangunan untuk Kepenting-
an Umum) was replaced by Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005, which was again 
revised by Presidential Regulation No. 65/2006; Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 
2/1993 on the Procedure to Obtain a Site Permit and the Right to Land for a Company 
for Capital Investment (Permen Negara Agraria / Kepala BPN No. 2/1993 tentang Tata Cara 
Memperoleh Izin Lokasi dan Hak atas Tanah bagi Perusahaan dalam Rangka Penanaman 
Modal) was replaced by Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999 on Site Permits 
(Permen Negara Agraria / Kepala BPN No. 2/1999 tentang Izin Lokasi).
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albeit still on a limited and experimental scale. The World Bank initiated 
the programme Justice for the Poor (J4P) in 2002, which includes activities 
concerning mediation, legal aid, legal training, and the strengthening of 
equitable non-state justice systems at the local level. In collaboration with 
Indonesia’s National Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional or BAPPENAS) the UNDP initiated the project Legal Empower-
ment and Assistance for the Disadvantaged (LEAD) in 2007. Activities con-
centrate on support to legal services, legal capacity development, legal and 
human rights awareness, and related development activities. The fact that 
these initiatives are supported by the Indonesian government at least sug-
gests that there is some commitment within the country’s higher policy cir-
cles to address the needs of disadvantaged groups like the urban poor.
The previously discussed developments render Indonesia as a fascinat-
ing case for taking a closer look at the issue of tenure security of low-
income kampong dwellers; all the more because little research has been 
conducted on this issue. Leiden University does have a long research tradi-
tion on Indonesian land law. A major role was played by Cornelis van Vol-
lenhoven, who produced a substantial research effort on adat law (the tra-
ditional, unwritten, and customary law of Indonesia) thus establishing the 
so-called adat law school (‘Adatrechtschool’).19 The purpose of this research 
was practical-ethical, namely to strengthen the legal position of the Indone-
sian population and to promote a fair administration of justice. Partly for 
that reason, much attention was paid to the empirical study of law and 
solutions to conceptual and methodological problems. Later, some of Van 
Vollenhoven’s students became highly influential jurists in independent 
Indonesia, including Soepomo, who drafted the 1945 and 1949 Constitu-
tion of the Indonesian Republic and made a major contribution to a reinter-
pretation of adat law. The independence of Indonesia resulted inevitably in 
a decline of research on Indonesian land law in the Netherlands. An anno-
tated translation of the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law was published by K.L. Tan 
at the Documentation Bureau of Overseas Law at Leiden. In 1978 this 
bureau was transformed into a research centre, the NORZOAC, directed 
until 1981 by F. von Benda-Beckmann.20 Research on Indonesian land issues 
resurfaced later, this time as part of a legal anthropology project, focusing 
on legal pluralism (by F. And C.E. von Benda-Beckmann, H. Slaats and 
K. Portier, the latter two from the Institute of Folk Law at Nijmegen Univer-
sity) (Griffiths 1992:90-99).21 However, as these researchers focused prima-
19 Van Vollenhoven was a professor of public law of the Dutch Indies and of adat law in 
the Faculty of Law at Leiden University from 1901 until 1933. On Van Vollenhoven, see: 
Holleman 1981.
20 NORZOAC is short for ‘Nederlandse Onderzoekscentrum voor het Recht in Zuid-Oost 
Azië en in het Caraibisch gebied’ (Netherlandse Research Centre for Law in Southeast 
Asia and the Caribbean).
21 A new researcher in this tradition is L. Bakker, who was involved in the INDIRA project 
as a PhD reseacher.
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rily on traditional adat law, they seldom addressed the issue of land law in 
an urban context. From 1983 onwards, the research at Leiden, where the 
NORZOAC was transformed into the Van Vollenhoven Institute, directed 
by J.M. Otto, has refocused towards comparative law, governance, and 
development.22
In recent years, much research has been undertaken on the effects of 
decentralisation in Indonesia, particularly by political scientists, anthropol-
ogists, and historians. In the first years after the end of the New Order, sev-
eral edited volumes were published, in particular by American, Australian, 
Dutch, and Indonesian researchers, with case studies from several of the 
country’s regions.23 As far as this research was linked to the issue of land, it 
usually focussed on the recent revival of adat law and reoccupation of 
plantation land, outside the cities.24
The research this book is based on was part of the INDIRA-project 
(Indonesian-Netherlands studies of Decentralisation of the Indonesian 
‘Rechtsstaat’ (Negara Hukum, Rule of Law) and its impact on Agraria), 
which focused on decentralisation and rule of law formation at the local 
level in the field of land.25 The project was funded by the Netherlands Royal 
Academy of Sciences (KNAW) and started in 2003 as a joint research effort 
of the Van Vollenhoven Institute at Leiden University and the Institute of 
Folk Law at Nijmegen (currently Radboud) University in collaboration 
with the Indonesian Parahyangan Catholic University (Bandung), Andalas 
University (Padang), and Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta). Six Indo-
nesian and three Dutch PhD reseachers participated in the project, focusing 
on different urban and rural areas in Indonesia.26
22 Since then, Indonesia-focussed socio-legal research has concentrated on spatial plan-
ning (by Niessen), courts (by Pompe and Bedner), and environmental law (in the frame-
work of the INSELA project by Arnscheidt, McCarthy, Nicholson, Takdir Rahmadi, 
Asep Warlan Yusuf, Niessen, and Bedner). In recent years there has been renewed 
attention for non-state legal orders and their interrelation with state law and authority. 
Similar research is conducted at Australian universities, although this is generally of a 
more legal character.
23 See for instance: Holtzappel, et al. 2002; Sakai 2002; Aspinall & Fealy 2003; Schulte 
Nord holt & Klinken 2007.
24 See particularly: Davidson & Henley 2007.
25 The study builds on explorative research, conducted in 1989/1990 as part of a joint 
research project by Ateng Syafrudin and Jan Michiel Otto, which resulted in several 
publications (see Otto & Syafrudin 1990; Otto 1991) and a research archive, consisting of 
among other things microfiches and key documents of Bandung’s colonial town admin-
istration; PhD research, conducted in the mid-1990s by Nicole Niessen, and; the urban 
part of the INDIRA research proposal.
26 These PhD reseachers were: Laurens Bakker, Saldi Isra, Tristam Moeliono, Sandra 
Moniaga, Myrna Safitri, the late Djaka Soehendera, Sulastriono, Kurnia Warman.
15Introduction
1.5 Research questions
In view of the above, the four main questions of this research are:
1) To what extent do urban poor in Indonesia with different tenure arrangements 
enjoy tenure security, particularly in the context of post-New Order reforms, 
including decentralisation, towards the rule of law?
2) In view of the levels of tenure security these different tenure arrangements 
provide, what are, given Indonesia’s contemporary rule of law environment, 
the socio-economic benefits of current approaches to attaining tenure security, 
particularly those in which land registration plays a pivotal role?
3) On the basis of these findings, what policy suggestions can be made to enhance 
tenure security of the urban poor?
4) What do these findings contribute theoretically to the international develop-
ment debate on tenure security?
1.6 Framework of analysis
To avoid the pitfalls of past research on tenure security, this study acknowl-
edges that there is a continuum of legality with respect to tenure arrange-
ments, and seeks to avoid the dichotomy of legal versus extra-legal tenure. 
However, in order to compare different tenure arrangements, a distinction 
is made between three analytical categories, based on the status of each of 
these arrangements according to state law. These categories are: formal ten-
ure, semi-formal tenure, and informal tenure. Formal tenure is based on 
formal rights recognized by the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-Undang 
Pokok Agraria or UUPA, hereafter the BAL). The second tenure category, 
semi-formal tenure, is based on colonial adat ownership rights (hak milik 
adat), of which the legal conversion to BAL-recognised primary rights has 
not yet been validated, but which can be validated on the basis of docu-
mentation and other evidence. In theory, this type of tenure can thus be 
turned easily into formal tenure. The last tenure category, informal tenure, 
involves tenure that is not recognised by the law in any form whatsoever. It 
is thus impossible to change informal tenure to formal tenure, unless the 
state grants new rights. Informal tenure is often the result of squatting.
Making a distinction between different tenure categories, this study 
then assesses the extent to which each category provides security and 
entails socio-economic benefits. In an attempt to alleviate some of the con-
fusion and weaknesses that have previously beset the international devel-
opment debate on tenure security, a specific distinction is made between 
legal, de facto, and perceived tenure security. Following our previously 
mentioned definition of tenure security, legal tenure security can be defined 
as the legal protection of landholders against involuntary removal from the 
land on which they reside, unless through due process of law and payment 
of proper compensation. De facto tenure security means the actual protec-
tion against involuntary removal, irrespective of the legal status of land 
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tenure. Finally, perceived tenure security means a sense of being secure, 
experienced by landholders. An indicator of perceived tenure security is 
the assumed legitimacy of tenure – that is, whether landholders think the 
authorities agree with them residing on the land they occupy. The assess-
ment of the socio-economic benefits of the different tenure categories con-
centrates on housing consolidation.
The prevalence of tenure security is further analysed from a rule of law 
perspective. The rule of law concept has been interpreted in many different 
ways, and to mean many different things (Clark 1999:28-44). The concept 
applied in the current study is a thick one, based on a definition of elements, 
which are categorised into procedural elements, substantive elements, and 
control mechanisms.27 With respect to its procedural elements, law should 
not only be an instrument of government action; rather, state actions should 
also be subject to law. Moreover, law should be general, clear, publicly prom-
ulgated, and relatively stable over time. Public consent should determine 
the content of laws and policies. Democracy and participation are key ele-
ments in this respect. Apart from these procedural elements, and perhaps 
more importantly, tenure security also requires substantive elements of the 
rule of law. All law and its interpretation should be subordinated to funda-
mental principles of justice and moral principles. Human rights (with regard 
to tenure security for the urban poor, particularly fundamental rights and 
social welfare rights) should be protected by the state. Finally, as part of the 
control mechanisms, there should be an independent, impartial and acces-
sible judiciary and other guardian institutions, such as an ombudsman and 
a human rights commission. Obviously, these elements should indeed ben-
efit the urban poor. In this book, each of the chapters will deal with these 
rule of law elements within the context of the specific topic addressed.
The prevalence of tenure security from a rule of law perspective is ana-
lysed against the background of Post-New Order reforms. To understand the 
effects of these reforms, a comparison is made between the period before they 
were initiated and the period after. The first period is limited to the last phase 
of the New Order, or what will be called in this book the late New Order, 
which historians like Ricklefs have delimited by the years 1989-1998 (Ricklefs 
2001:387). The second period is roughly limited to the first phase of the Post-
New Order, which in this book ends in August 2008 – the month when, in 
Bandung (the city where fieldwork was conducted for this study; to be dis-
cussed in Section 1.7 below), the first direct mayoral elections were held and 
the fieldwork was completed. Each period thus covers a time span of about 
10 years; an extensive enough duration to draw several significant conclu-
27 This interpretation was developed by Bedner, who drew inspiration from Tamanaha 
2004 and, to a lesser extent, Peerenboom 2004. See Termorshuizen-Artz & Bedner 2004; 
Bedner 2010.
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sions regarding the effects of Post-New Order reforms on rule of law forma-
tion and tenure security.28
1.7 Methodologies
The research underlying this book is based on an interdisciplinary 
approach that is common in a discipline that has come to be known as 
socio-legal studies (Banakar & Travers 2005). It involves legal doctrinal 
analysis as much as empirical research, which consists of both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. This study thus follows an academic tradition 
that was established more than a century ago by Cornelis van Vollenhoven.
The first eight months of my assignment – which followed my studies 
in law, and in Indonesian language and culture, at Leiden University – 
were spent on taking courses in sociological field research methodology, 
doing doctrinal legal analysis of Indonesian key legislation, reading avail-
able literature on the topic of this study, and the practical preparation of my 
fieldwork. Literature consisted of three types: i) international literature on 
the central topics of this study, including tenure security, decentralisation, 
and rule of law formation in developing countries; ii) Indonesia-specific 
literature, particularly on the effects of decentralisation; and iii) literature 
on methodology and fieldwork. On the basis of this material I drafted a 
research proposal, which was also used to apply for a research permit from 
the Indonesian government.
As an initial fieldwork location I selected Bandung, capital of West-Java 
Province and with about 2.3 million inhabitants Indonesia’s third largest 
city, located approximately 180 kilometres Southeast of Jakarta. Bandung is 
confronted with a process of rapid urbanisation. This results in a growing 
commoditisation of and, potentially, disputes over kampong land. Such 
processes not only occur in Bandung, but also in other large Indonesian cit-
ies like Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Semarang and Makassar. In this sense 
Bandung is representative for a major part of ‘urban Indonesia’ – like any 
of the other cities mentioned, except perhaps for the national capital Jakar-
ta, where developments are likely even more extreme. It was ultimately for 
practical reasons that I decided to conduct research in Bandung. The Van 
Vollenhoven Institute has a long relationship with various individual 
scholars and academic institutions in this city, including the Faculties of 
Law of Padjadjaran University and Parahyangan Catholic University. My 
choice for Bandung proved fortunate. During my fieldwork, there were 
indeed many land cases occurring, the most relevant of which were studied 
in-dept and are presented in this book.
28 In addition, the book discusses relevant legislative developments that took place 
between August 2008 and August 2011.
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My first fieldwork in Bandung consisted of mostly qualitative research. 
During the initial two months I interviewed various members of NGOs, 
and collected clippings about relevant topics from national and regional 
newspapers. On the basis of these activities I soon found out about a land 
dispute related to the construction of the Pasupati flyover, one of the big-
gest infrastructure projects in the city’s history, for which the land of hun-
dreds of kampong dwellers in a City Quarter (Kelurahan) called Taman Sari, 
which is located in the northern part of central Bandung, was cleared. 
Through my engagement with a local NGO, I made contact with a commu-
nity worker from Taman Sari. He introduced me to other community mem-
bers, who assisted me in finding a house in the kampong. I resided in this 
kampong in Taman Sari from September 2004 to February 2005. The resi-
dents of the kampong were not used to foreign researchers. Each time I 
showed my face, children used to yell “white guy entering the kampong“ 
(bule masuk kampung) at me, referring to the title of a popular soap series on 
the Indonesian channel Indosiar. Yet the residents proved friendly and 
open to me, thus allowing me to conduct participant observation. Two 
community workers were key informants, but ‘ordinary’ residents also 
provided valuable information. As will be discussed in the next section, 
some issues remained sensitive though.
Besides conducting participant observation I continued collecting 
newspaper clippings and interviewing people, now mostly officials and 
politicians, both in Bandung and Jakarta. In total I interviewed some 60 
people in this period. I also started to collect regional legislation and policy 
documents. Mohammad Ira Fitrian, a former law student from Padjadjaran 
University, assisted me in these activities. I also shared information with 
Tristam Moeliono. Towards the end of my fieldwork I realised that some of 
the research questions could best be studied by quantitative research. I thus 
developed a questionnaire, which I used for a pilot-study survey among 20 
households in my kampong.
In February 2005 I returned to Leiden to analyse my first set of field-
work data, conduct further reading and legal analysis, and prepare for my 
next fieldwork trip, for which I also improved my questionnaire.
My second fieldwork from September-December 2005 proved to be the 
most productive, but also the most challenging. During my first trip I had 
established contact with a community worker, who had introduced me to 
the informal leader of a kampong in City Quarter Cibangkong, which is 
located in the southern part of Central Bandung. As soon as I arrived in 
Bandung I chose to settle here because it has a character and location very 
different from the kampong in Taman Sari. Although the residents of this 
kampong were not used to foreign researchers, they again proved coopera-
tive. The informal leader, several community workers, and a local official 
were key informants, but again ‘ordinary’ residents also provided valuable 
information.
Most time during this fieldwork trip was spent on the organisation of 
a survey that covered representative kampongs situated in seven widely 
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dispersed City Quarters.29 As Map 1 (see p. 24) shows, some of these set-
tlements were centrally located, while others were situated towards the 
outskirts of the city. Each of the selected kampongs had developed incre-
mentally over a period of several decades, and housed several thousand 
low-income inhabitants and their offspring, most of whom had been living 
there for various decades. All kampongs had similar levels of infrastruc-
ture, and most residents had access to the same types of public utilities. 
Furthermore, all kampongs were composed of recognised Neighbourhoods 
(Rukun Warga or RW), and Blocks (Rukun Tetangga or RT) within these 
Neighbourhoods. As a result, the majority of dwellers were registered resi-
dents and held identity cards (Kartu Tandu Penduduk or KTP) that specified 
their address, allowing them for instance to vote. Finally, the different cat-
egories of formal, semi-formal, and informal land tenure were represented 
in all researched kampongs.
Prior to the survey, a pilot study among 30 households was conducted 
in one of the kampongs (Taman Sari) to test whether participants under-
stood the questions and whether adaptations to the survey were needed. 
Following the outcome of this pilot study, some final modifications were 
made to the survey.
The survey sample consisted of a total 420 households across three land 
tenure categories: formal tenure (100 households), semi-formal tenure (95 
households), and informal tenure (145 households). In addition, a smaller 
group of leaseholders (80 households) were surveyed. The surveys were 
also distributed approximately equally across the seven selected kam-
pongs, so that about 60 low-income households were surveyed in each 
kampong. Within each kampong, to obtain representative data several 
Neighbourhoods were randomly selected, and several Blocks were then 
randomly selected within each Neighbourhood. Within each Block, survey 
participants were selected to ensure representation across tenure catego-
ries. This was achieved with the assistance of Neighbourhood Heads (Pak 
RW) and Heads of the Neighbourhood Blocks (Pak RT), who were able to 
advise into which tenure category residents fell. Survey participants were 
either heads of household or their spouse.
The surveyors were a group of five anthropologists and undergraduate 
anthropology students from Padjadjaran University in Bandung under the 
supervision of Dede Tresna Wiyanti, a researcher from the Research Centre 
for Natural Resources and Environment (Pusat Penelitian Sumber Daya Alam 
dan Lingkungan or PPSDAL) of that same university.30 All surveyors were 
29 The survey covered the following Sub-Districts and Neighbourhoods: Babakan Sura-
baya (Neighbourhood 4, 5, 7, 14, 15), Cibangkong (Neighbourhood 5, 9, 11, 12), Ciro-
yom (Neighbourhood 1, 3, 4, 5), Kebon Lega (Neighbourhood 1, 2, 3, 5), Kebon Pisang 
(Neighbourhood 5, 6, 9, 10, 11,12), Lebak Gede (Neighbourhood 1, 3, 4, 7), Taman Sari 
(Neighbourhood 7, 13, 15, 16, 18).
30 The five anthropology students and anthropologists were: Ade Sudrajat, Yadi Suryadi, 
Ivan Rahadian, Deni Kurniawan, Helmi Suryanegara.
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experienced in survey research, and received additional training for this 
particular project. They approached the potential respondents individually, 
explained the purpose of the research and asked whether the person would 
be willing to participate.31 In order to minimise the risk that participants 
would associate surveyors with the authorities, it was explained that the 
survey was performed for academic purposes only, and that participation 
was anonymous. We estimate that more than 95 per cent of people who 
were approached were willing to participate in the survey.
Survey questions were developed based on the previously discussed 
tenure literature, as well as participant observation in City Quarters Taman 
Sari and Cibangkong, and interviews with NGO workers, government offi-
cials, and researchers in Bandung. To confirm the accuracy of information 
provided by participants regarding their tenure category, the survey con-
tained several questions related to land documentation (including the year 
such documents were issued, the issuing authorities, the involvement of 
any witnesses, and the period of document validity), and questions about 
the length of occupation and formal status of the land. Survey participants 
were also asked to show their land documentation to the surveyors, to ver-
ify whether it corresponded with the given answers. The surveys of any 
participants who gave totally inconsistent answers – only a small number 
– were excluded from analysis.
Apart from the survey, I conducted oral history research in my previous 
kampong in Taman Sari. In this research I was assisted Denny Riezki Pratama 
and Anindya Praharsacitta, anthropology students from Padja djaran Univer-
sity, who were recommended to me by Dr Selly Riawanti, a lecturer from that 
same university and (at that time) the head of the research department of the 
NGO Akatiga. In total some 20 older residents were interviewed. Finally, I 
continued collecting newspaper clippings and interviewed about 10 officials, 
politicians, NGO-workers and other key informants.
Towards the end of my fieldwork I fell ill of dengue fever, for which I 
was hospitalized for a week. Fortunately my assistants were able to finish 
most of the work in my absence. When I returned to the Netherlands two of 
my assistants continued to collect data, Ivan Rahadian by interviewing res-
idents in City Quarter Ciroyom on a land clearance case and Mohammad 
Ira Fitrian by collecting regional legislation and policy documents.
The last years were used to analyze my fieldwork data and to write this 
book. I paid short visits to Bandung in July 2007 and July/August 2008, 
which allowed me to interview 30 other people, mostly NGO-workers and 
academics. In terms of data collection, this fieldwork has thus resulted in 
thousands of newspaper clippings, hundreds of laws and policy docu-
ments, survey data based on 420 respondents, and 140 interview tran-
scripts. About 10 people assisted me during the fieldwork.
31 As a token of gratitude for taking the time to participate in the survey, participants 
received a t-shirt.
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1.8 Limitations of research
Doing socio-legal fieldwork in Indonesia has become easier since the end of 
the New Order, but it is still challenging. As noted before, it requires a 
research permit from the Indonesian government. This permit allows one 
to obtain another research permit from the Municipality, which in turn 
allows one to obtain permits from the Sub-District (Camat) or City-Quarter 
Head (Lurah), and these permits are often required to obtain permission 
from the Neighbourhood Head and/or the Head of the Neighbourhood 
Block, for instance to organise a survey. The procedure for obtaining these 
permits is time-consuming and often frustrating.
Even after I had obtained all required permits, not all people were will-
ing to assist me. Particularly lower officials and members of the Municipal 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) proved reluctant to 
speak openly about some of the issues that are central to this study. Land 
has been a sensitive topic since the 1960s, when the Indonesian govern-
ment initiated an ambitious land reform programme that partly formed the 
root of the civil conflicts, violence, and atrocities of 1965-1966. Concentrat-
ing then on urban poverty and ‘slums’, which particularly in the eyes of 
municipal officials are embarrassing issues, this research was even more 
sensitive. Along the way, it turned out that these topics were related to var-
ious dubious if not unlawful practices, which may explain why it was 
sometimes hard for people to talk to me or provide reliable information.
It proved particularly difficult to do research on tenure security as 
related to internal disputes in kampongs, such as disputes over ownership, 
inheritance, and land borders. On the basis of our survey we obtained an 
insight into the existence of some of these disputes. We followed up the 
survey by interviewing kampong dwellers who had indicated during the 
survey that they were involved in an internal dispute, but these people 
remained quite unresponsive. I thus decided not to use the material on 
internal disputes in this book. Despite these challenges, the fieldwork 
proved rewarding.
The current study focusses on the effects of land registration on hous-
ing consolidation. It does not look at specific economic effects, such as ena-
bled land markets and on access to credit. I did collect data from kampong 
dwellers regarding their willingness to sell their land and dwellings and 
the type of party they would sell to. I also collected data from kampong 
dwellers regarding access to credit, the use of such credit, and if not, the 
reasons not to use it. However, the data were only partial; in order to fully 
understand the effects of land registration on enabled land markets and on 
access to credit, data from recent buyers of land and dwellings and from 
banks would be needed too. Recent buyers of land and dwellings could not 
be found. Banks proved reluctant to provide information. I therefore decid-
ed not to address these topics in this study.
I realise that, in order to be able to generalise, it would have been worth 
to conduct additional fieldwork in cities other than Bandung. However, 
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considering the time constraints and the sensitivity of the research, I had to 
choose between collecting rather superficial data from several locations or 
studying the topic in depth at one research location. I chose to do the latter, 
because I believe doing in-dept research is the only way to fully under-
stand the complexity of the topic that is central to this study. In addition, it 
should be noted that the research on legal tenure security consists predom-
inantly of an analysis of national legislation, which is applicable in any city 
in Indonesia. Finally, I have collected clippings about land cases in other 
cities, giving some room to generalise.
1.9 Outline
The outline of this book follows the previously discussed research ques-
tions. The next two chapters sketch the context of the topic of this book, 
both from a bottom-up and top-down perspective, focusing first on society 
and then on law. Chapter 2 focuses on the settlements that this study is all 
about – kampongs in Bandung. The first part forms an historical overview 
of the formation of kampongs and the local, national, and international fac-
tors underlying this process. It describes the main policies towards kam-
pongs adopted by the Indonesian government, civil society groups and 
international organisations, and assesses their impact. In closing, it analy-
ses the contemporary social-economic, physical, and legal characteristics 
and dynamics of kampongs, allowing us to assess to which extent kam-
pongs actually qualify as ‘slums’.
Chapter 3 gives a general overview of land law in the context of Indone-
sia’s changing rule of law environment. It starts with the period of Guided 
Democracy (1957-1965), when the foundation of Indonesian national land 
law was laid, and then deals with the New Order (1965-1998). The last part 
discusses Post-New Order political and legal reforms. This analysis forms 
the basis for detailed legal and empirical analyses in the following chapters.
Having thus established the context, Chapter 4 turns to the core subject 
of this book, i.e. tenure security for Indonesia’s urban poor, by taking a 
close look at land registration and legal tenure security. It first discusses the 
background, aim, and set-up of land registration. The chapter then assesses 
how in practice, kampong dwellers in Bandung are actually try to register 
their land on an individual basis (‘sporadic registration’). In this way the 
chapter evaluates the need for ‘systematic registration’ through large-scale 
land registration programmes. This is followed by a discussion of such pro-
grammes in general, and particularly the Land Administration Project 
(LAP), a land registration programme initiated by the World Bank and the 
Indonesian government in 1994. It discusses the activities that have been 
carried out under the programme and studies to what extent it has reached 
the urban poor. Finally, and most importantly, the chapter assesses to what 
extent the urban poor enjoy legal tenure security, and to what extent land 
registration contributes to this.
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Chapter 5 turns to the issue of spatial planning and legal tenure securi-
ty. It first discusses spatial planning law and practice in the late New Order. 
The chapter then pays attention to Post-New Order reforms related to spa-
tial planning law. Thereafter, it takes a closer look at spatial planning prac-
tices in Post-New Order Bandung, by analyzing the preparation process of 
the General Spatial Plan in 2004 and its premature revision in 2006. In clos-
ing, it discusses to what extent the 2007 spatial management law might 
overcome some of the noted problems in Bandung.
Chapters 6 and 7 finally deal with the important issue of land clear-
ance. Chapter 6 pays attention to land clearance by the state. It discusses 
legal instruments which the state can use to acquire land. This is followed 
by a general description of land clearance practices and entailing resistance 
in the late New Order. This chapter also discusses the abovementioned 
land clearance case in Bandung, the Pasupati case. Furthermore, it evalu-
ates the case in the light of past reforms and draws general conclusions on 
land clearance by the state in Post-New Order Indonesia. The final section 
discusses the potential effect of recent legal reforms.
Chapter 7 pays attention to land clearance by commercial developers. It 
gives a broad overview of the various pieces of legislation that formed the 
legal basis for commercial land clearance during the New Order. A central 
concept in this chapter is the site permit (izin lokasi), which developers need 
before they can start acquiring land. The chapter then takes a close look at 
the practice of land clearance. This is followed by a short overview of the 
Post-New Order reform of commercial land clearance related legislation. 
The chapter also discusses the contemporary practice of commercial land 
clearance in Bandung, by taking a closer look at a particular land clearance 
case, the Paskal Hyper Square-case. In closing, it evaluates this case and 
draws general conclusions on commercial land clearance in Post-New 
Order Indonesia.
Chapter 8 focuses on perceived tenure security and its economic bene-
fits. It first assesses the perceived tenure security of landholders with dif-
ferent tenure arrangements, both in relation to the risk of involuntary 
removal and, if this occurs, the chance to receive proper compensation. 
This is followed by an analysis of the changed perceptions of tenure secu-
rity since the end of the New Order. In closing, the chapter looks at the cor-
relations between tenure status, perceived tenure security, and housing 
consolidation.
The Conclusion (Chapter 9) summarises the main findings of the previ-
ous chapters and analyses them from a broader rule of law perspective. 
This allows us to look beyond the effects of the reforms on tenure security 
for the urban poor. It tells us something about the current state of the Indo-
nesian ‘Rechtsstaat’ (Negara Hukum), the country’s equivalent of ‘rule of 
law’. In addition, it allows us to come up with policy suggestions and con-
tributions to theory formation to further the current international develop-
ment debate on tenure security. In closing, suggestions for further research 
are made. 
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Map 1. Bandung Municipality with survey locations indicated
Bandung, Bandung, Bandung nelah Kota Kembang
Bandung, Bandung, sasakaal Sangkuriang
di lingkung gunung, heurin ku tangtung, puseur kota nu mulya Parahiangan
Bandung, Bandung, pada muru di jarugjugan1
2.1 Introduction
“In the colonial period, Taman Sari was so different. You would not recog-
nise the place!” Ibu Darsum gives me a meaningful look. She is not happy 
about the current condition of her kampong, Gang Bongkaran, located in 
City Quarter (Kelurahan) Taman Sari in the north of Bandung. Like so many 
older people, she speaks about the past with full appreciation and nostal-
gia, as if everything has deteriorated ever since she was born.
We sit in front of her house over a cup of tea. Her house is neither 
impressive in size, nor in quality, but by far the best in the neighbourhood. 
It even has a small flower garden in front. People in the kampong insisted 
that I should talk to her. She could take the edge off my curiosity about the 
history of Gang Bongkaran and adjacent kampongs in Taman Sari. At 84, 
she is one of the oldest residents in the neighbourhood. More importantly, 
no one has been residing in Gang Bongkaran as long as she: Ibu Darsum 
was born, raised and grew old here.
Indeed, kampongs in Taman Sari must have looked very different 
before the war. At present, housing thousands of low-income families, the 
settlements make a dilapidated impression. Most people live in one of the 
many small houses built alongside the Cikapundung River. They can be 
reached by alleys, some of which are so narrow that they are called gang 
senggol, bump alleys.
As discussed in Chapter 1, kampongs are Indonesia’s typical low-
income settlements that in the international development debate are quali-
fied as ‘slums’. There is however much more to say about these settlements 
and about the challenges that come with them. And more should be said in 
order to understand the possible role of development strategies that centre 
1 Lyrics of a Sundanese song by Mang Koko Koswara, which in English could be trans-
lated as: Bandung, Bandung, Bandung is called a city of development; Bandung, Ban-
dung, the legend of Sangkuriang; surrounded by mountains, densely inhabited, the 
capital of beautiful Parahyangan; Bandung, Bandung, has become the destination of 
everyone (own translation).
2 Migrants flows, regulatory failure
A short history of the kampongs of Bandung
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on the issue of tenure security. This chapter therefore gives an historical 
overview of the local, national and international factors underlying the for-
mation of kampongs in Bandung. It assesses the impact of the main devel-
opment policies towards kampongs adopted by subsequent colonial and 
Indonesian governments, international organisations, and civil society 
groups. The last part of the chapter analyses the contemporary social-eco-
nomic, physical, and legal characteristics and dynamics of kampongs, and 
thus assesses to what extent they qualify as slums. By way of illustration, 
special reference will be made to kampongs in Taman Sari.
The structure of this chapter is mainly chronological and subdivided 
into the five periods discussed, which also form major eras of Indonesia’s 
political history: late colonial times, the Japanese occupation and Revolu-
tion, the Old Order, the New Order, and the Post-New Order. It ends with 
some concluding remarks.
2.2 Autonomous villages in an expanding colonial town
From the late 19th century to the end of colonial rule, Bandung developed 
from a small settlement of about 10,000 inhabitants into a modern Europe-
an colonial city with a population of 200,000. Just as in other cities in the 
Dutch Indies, Bandung’s development was in large part the result of a new 
era in colonial policy, the liberal period, which led to legal reforms and in 
turn a radical increase of commercial activity (Voskuil 1996:31). From 1854 
private planters could lease land from the colonial government, and from 
1870 this became commercially attractive.2 The physical environmental 
conditions in the Priangan region around Bandung proved suitable for the 
cultivation of tea, coffee and quinine. Tea planters in particular were com-
mercially successful, and spent their money in Bandung – or, as it was also 
called because of its fashionable reputation, ‘Parijs van Java‘ (Paris of Java). 
The city also functioned as a transhipment point for their plantation prod-
ucts.
Soon Bandung started to attract people from outside the region, partic-
ularly from 1884, when the city was opened up by railway connections 
(Kunto 1984:161-2). From 1916 onwards the colonial government even 
developed plans to make Bandung the capital of the Dutch Indies. Due to 
financial and other reasons the plans never eventuated, but a number of 
government agencies were moved to the city (Van Roosmalen 2008:49-51). 
The plans also contributed to the city government’s success in attracting 
new European residents. Another important reason why Dutchmen (in the 
2 From 1870 holders could take out a mortgage, because the state no longer granted them 
a lease right (‘pacht’) with a maximum of 20 years, but a long lease right (‘erfpacht’) 
with a maximum of 75 years. This attracted many foreign private investors.
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1920s and 1930s, mainly pensioners) chose to settle in Bandung was its 
pleasant climate (Voskuil 1996:34-5).
Rural-urban migration of the indigenous population also contributed 
to Bandung’s expansion. Land in the Priangan region around Bandung was 
rapidly changing from an attribute of the community bound by genealogi-
cal or territorial ties into a private commodity. At the turn of the 20th centu-
ry, the region was already known for its large-scale landownership. Over 
time the size of the land holdings further increased and more land was 
alienated to (absentee) landowners, such as members of the menak (noble) 
families, well-to-do villagers, merchants and hadji. This resulted in a con-
centration of land ownership on the one hand, and a group of landless peo-
ple on the other hand (Van Dijk 1981:363-373). Combined with a growing 
population pressure on land and a decline of employment opportunities in 
rural areas, especially from the 1920s, this led to many peasants moving to 
the city (Jellinek 1991:4). With an expansion of economic activities and 
growing labour demand, Bandung proved an attractive destination.
The expanding city engulfed many desa (indigenous rural villages), 
which soon lost their rural character and developed into urban kampongs 
with an almost entirely residential nature (Flieringa 1930:36). As part of 
colonial legal dualism, these kampongs were allowed a high degree of 
autonomy (‘desa-autonomie’ or village autonomy), which means that the 
population could apply its own customary or adat law, administration, and 
administration of justice, also in relation to land. Village autonomy was 
said to respond to the divergent economic and social needs of the colony’s 
different population groups.3 In the early 20th century, 17 such autonomous 
villages existed within Bandung’s borders. By 1942, after the extension of 
the boundaries of Bandung Municipality, the number of villages had 
increased to 43.4
One of the villages, then called Soekadjadi, was Taman Sari. On first 
sight this area appeared strictly European. Located in the valley of Ban-
dung’s major Cikapundung river and enclosed between the Lembangweg 
and Van Houten Parkweg (currently Cihampelas Street and Taman Sari 
Street), it was covered with the private back gardens, orchards with cacao 
trees, and fishponds of the predominantly European, middle class popula-
tion residing in these main streets. At the eastern side of the river (now RW 
20 or Neighbourhood 20), alongside the Van Houten Parkweg, there was a 
European graveyard. This area as well as the area alongside the Cikapun-
dung River was municipal land.
3 Art. 71 of the 1854 Constitution acknowledged the autonomy of indigenous villages, 
and general standards were laid down in the 1906 Indigenous Village Ordinance 
(‘Inlandse Gemeente Ordonnantie’). The subsequent 1925 Constitution (‘Indische Staats-
regeling’) acknowledged this autonomy on the basis of Art. 128(3).
4 See Appendix I (p. 243) for an overview of these villages.
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Behind a façade of European property and infrastructure, the village 
was hidden. The area around Gang Bongkaran (now RW 15, a small alley 
or actually a fire lane) off the Lembangweg, formed one of the village’s set-
tlements. An informant remembers that in the early 1930s around this alley 
there was a handful of houses, owned by Dutch residents and by some 
indigenous who had bought the land from its former Dutch owners. A bit 
further north there was another settlement, called Garunggang Timur (later 
called Liang Maung, now RW 07 or Cimaung), consisting of another hand-
ful of houses.
Taman Sari initially retained a rural character. The plots were generally 
big. In Garunggang Timur a single resident held most of the land, but every 
household at least presided over a sawah or orchard, often with cacao trees. 
There were fishponds too. This land was so-called tanah garapan: land that 
on the basis of adat law had come into the residents’ possession through 
cultivation. The houses were constructed in a traditional manner, with 
raised floors, walls made of wood and bamboo mats (bilik kayu), and a bam-
boo roof. Paths consisted of sand or pebbles. Parts of the area were swampy 
and muddy. The Cikapundung River was so clean that it was used for 
drinking water. Contemporary names of kampongs in Taman Sari still 
reveal the rural character of the area. For instance the word Maung, which 
forms part of the name of the settlement Liang Maung or Cimaung, means 
‘wildcat’ in Sundanese, the regional language. This animal was just one of 
the wild species that were said to live in the area. According to several 
informants the area retained its rural character until the late 1930s. In the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the draft Town Planning Ordinance, which 
will be discussed below, Cikapundung Valley was referred to as “one of the 
few examples of natural scenery having been converted into scenes of nat-
ural beauty” (Toelichting 1938; Wertheim 1958:33).5
It should be noted that Taman Sari is located in the northern part of 
Bandung. The city was ethnically and to some extent also socio-economi-
cally divided, the railway track forming a clear borderline. The northern, 
cooler part was mostly reserved for well-to-do European citizens, who 
lived in ‘old Indies’ brick houses with large yards. Although the Europeans 
formed only 12 per cent of the population, they occupied more than half of 
the urban land (Wertheim 1956:180). The northern part was thus relatively 
spacious. Similarly, the indigenous residents of Taman Sari were relatively 
well off and the area had a small population. They were mostly cultivators 
and market gardeners, but some had made a fortune in trade.
Conditions were very different in the many kampongs in the southern 
part of Bandung. As a result of strong population growth and the alloca-
tion of land for the development of urban infrastructure and European 
districts, the majority of the indigenous population was packed into these 
5 This extended version of the Explanatory Memorandum was not enacted as the official 
elucidation of the Ordinance (Niessen 1999:229).
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settlements (Voskuil 1996:39-40).6 The indigenous formed 77 per cent of 
Bandung’s population, but occupied only 40 per cent of the land (Wertheim 
1956:180). Many were pushed out of the city centre to the city’s outskirts. 
Just as in Taman Sari, however, kampongs in the south retained a rural 
character, both in terms of construction of buildings and infrastructure, and 
from a social-economic perspective (Wertheim 1956:175-6). In combination 
with the densely populated environment, the very basic nature of the infra-
structure constituted a risk for public health.
Bandung’s urban government increasingly felt the need to improve 
conditions in the kampongs. Within the framework of the 1903 Decentrali-
sation Act, in 1906 Bandung had become a Town (‘Gemeente’) with rela-
tively strong powers.7 Yet, village autonomy severely restricted the town 
government’s scope to interfere in the kampongs. Besides, for a long time 
there remained uncertainty about the extent of the town government’s 
authority over the kampongs. The colonial government had already 
informed the town governments in 1907 that regulations concerning mat-
ters with a citywide scope were applicable to these settlements, but there 
seems to have been misunderstanding about this matter until the end of the 
1930s (Stadsgemeente Bandoeng 1938:19-20).
In order to enable the town government to exert influence within the 
kampongs, the Town Council (‘Gemeenteraad’) in 1917 expressed its wish 
to annul village autonomy.8 Legally this only became possible after a con-
stitutional amendment in 1918, which allowed for the abolishment of vil-
lages or limitation of their authorities within the borders of a town by ordi-
nance.9 The central government supported the unification of government 
6 It should be noted that these settlements did not consist of indigenous residents only. 
Surveys in kampongs in Bandung and other major cities in Java reveal that the kam-
pong population also consisted of Chinese, Eurasian, and European people (Colombijn 
2010:117-23). Colombijn goes as far as to argue that the defining social characteristic of 
kampongs was class and not ethnicity (Colombijn 2008:161).
7 The Decentralisation Act (‘Decentralisatiewet’) was a response to the increasingly com-
plicated tasks of the expanding administration, but also to the demands of the urban 
elite for self-government (Wertheim 1958:viii). It was implemented by other legislation. 
On the basis of the 1904 Decentralisation Decision (‘Decentralisatiebesluit’), the Gover-
nor-General promulgated separate Creation Ordinances (‘Instellingsordonnanties’) to 
create Towns, including Bandung in 1906. After the 1903 Decentralisation Act had been 
replaced by the 1922 Government Reform Act, the 1926 Municipality Ordinance 
(‘Stadsgemeente-Ordonnantie’) turned Towns already existing on the basis of the Crea-
tion Ordinances into Municipalities (‘Stadgemeenten’), leading to refinement of the 
structure of urban government (Niessen 1999:51).
8 This development occurred in the era of Ethical Policy, when the colonial government 
set increasing store by the fate of the indigenous population. Still, village autonomy 
was one of the few ‘native’ issues that received the council’s attention. See Otto, who on 
the basis of an analysis of the council's minutes describes the lively discussions in Ban-
dung's Municipal Council about this issue (Otto 1991).
9 A fourth section was added to Art. 71 of the 1854 Constitution of the Dutch Indies. This 
later became Art. 128(6) of the 1925 Constitution (‘Indische Staatsregeling’).
30 Chapter 2
in the cities, but did not want to cover all the financial costs leading to 
annulment of village autonomy, which in view of the improvement activi-
ties that had to be undertaken in kampongs would be considerable. The 
financial hurdle remained a matter of discussion between the Municipality 
and the central government until the end of colonial rule, the latter never 
offering to pay more than half the costs involved in this measure (Stadsge-
meente Ban doeng 1938:1-28).10 As long as the kampongs remained autono-
mous the central government did not allow municipal governments to 
interfere in these settlements.
Despite this attitude of the central government, Bandung’s town gov-
ernment did take several measures to improve conditions in kampongs. In 
1919 it started a housing programme, for which it established a Town Hous-
ing Authority (‘Gemeentelijk Woningbedrijf’). Each year hundreds of hous-
es were built for low-income residents, who could either rent the house or 
acquire it on the basis of a hire purchase system. However, the town govern-
ment could not provide houses for the entire population (Gemeente Ban-
doeng 1929:42-8). In practice only the lower middle-class groups benefited 
from the programme, since the dwellings built under the programme 
remained too expensive for the masses residing in kampongs. In any event, 
the programme was only of limited scale (Toelichting 1938:34-5; Wertheim 
1958:21-2). Private real estate firms never showed any interest to participate 
in such housing programmes, unless they were forced to (Toelichting 
1938:74; Wertheim 1958:61).11 For most low-income people, particularly 
indigenous, kampongs thus remained the only settlement option.
In 1926, in the same year Bandung became a Municipality, the govern-
ment reserved the southern part of the city for the indigenous population 
(Gemeente Bandoeng 1929:37-9). It would thus be protected against the 
allocation of more land for urban infrastructure and European districts. 
This measure, however, sharpened ethnic divisions (Voskuil 1996:39-40).
Meanwhile the central government remained opposed to urban gov-
ernment interference in the kampongs, without prior abolishment of the 
kampongs’ autonomy. Nevertheless, Bandung’s municipal government 
did not await a change of policy to take measures. In 1927 it officially start-
ed kampong improvement (‘kampongverbetering’), improving roads, con-
structing drainage and sewerage facilities, providing lighting equipment, 
and building hydrants and public baths (Gemeente Bandoeng 1929:36).
10 Village autonomy was annulled in some other cities, mostly after the Decentralisation 
Act of 1903 was replaced by the 1922 Government Reform Act (‘Wet op de Bestuursher-
vorming’) (Niessen 1999:47); for example in Malang and Surabaya in 1930. However, 
this measure only applied to villages whose residents felt that village ties no longer 
existed (Stadsgemeente Bandoeng 1938:17-9).
11 From the mid-1920s onwards, a Public Housing Company (‘N.V. Volkshuisvesting’), 
which was a joint venture between the central government and a Municipality for the 
development of public housing, was established in many cities, but not in Bandung. 
However, within ten years the concept of housing companies came under attack, as 
most operated at a loss (Cobban 1993:892-5).
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In 1929 the central government officially departed from the idea that 
the villages could only be improved if their autonomy was abolished (Van 
de Wetering 1939:3).12 Consequently, the central government started pro-
viding funding to the Municipality for improvement activities (Stadsge-
meente Bandoeng 1938:1-28).13 The municipal governments could now 
officially interfere in all interests and issues related to these villages, such 
as housing and hygiene; especially in villages located in or near the crowd-
ed city-centre. It should be noted that this change in policy was driven not 
only by concerns over hygiene and welfare, but also by underlying political 
motives. It was feared that poor living conditions would draw the urban 
poor into the arms of the nationalists, who wanted to overthrow the colo-
nial government (Van Roosmalen 2004:194).14
Kampong dwellers appeared to accept and sometimes responded posi-
tively to the colonial administration’s interventions in their settlements 
(Colombijn 2008). The effects of kampong improvement were however lim-
ited. Only a few of the problems could be tackled, specifically drainage and 
path construction. The activities were limited in scope and progress was 
slow (Toelichting 1938:32-3; Wertheim 1958:20). In some cases, kampong 
improvement only led to social upgrading in the sense that lower class resi-
dents were forced out by the more well-to-do (Wertheim 1956:179). Ban-
dung’s municipal government also tried to limit the construction of new 
primitive dwellings, but as a result the shortage of kampong housing 
increased, with several families being forced to share one house. Living 
conditions, in turn, further deteriorated (Toelichting 1938:33; Wertheim 
1958:21). By the end of the colonial period, it was acknowledged that the 
government had failed to manage the kampong issue (Toelichting 1938:33; 
Wertheim 1958:20).
This is not entirely surprising. Village autonomy remained, resulting in 
both the central and municipal governments being unable to exert their 
powers in all matters within their territories. And, as acknowledged by one 
government adviser on decentralisation, it remained hard to determine the 
extent of the municipal government’s authority to interfere in the kam-
12 The Municipalities were invited to start improvement activities by Art. 70 of the 1926 
Municipality Ordinance (‘Stadsgemeente Ordonnantie’). This ordinance – contrary to 
the earlier-mentioned Art. 128(3) of the 1925 Constitution on village autonomy – stated 
that the Municipal Council had the competence to regulate and administer the Munici-
pality’s household.
13 The activities were formalised in 1934 by the Kampong Improvement Ordinance 
(‘Kampong Verbeeteringsordonnantie’). Notably, Van de Wetering criticised the Munic-
ipality of Bandung for not fulfilling its moral obligation to spend as much on kampong 
improvement as it received from the Central Government for that purpose (Van de 
Wetering 1939:7).
14 See also the reference to the political consequences of kampong conditions in the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the draft Town Planning Ordinance’s (Toelichting 
1938:32; Wertheim 1958:19). For a further discussion of the colonial administration’s 
kampong improvement policy, see Van Roosmalen 2008:97-108.
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pongs.15 Bandung’s municipal government had great difficulties in enforc-
ing regulations that were applicable, such as the 1929/1931 enacted build-
ing code, because existing settlements developed continuously (Gemeente 
Bandoeng 1929:41). In addition, enforcement often remained limited for 
financial reasons (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:42).
By the end of the colonial period, the failure to manage the kampong 
issue led to an acknowledgement of the need to formulate central direc-
tives for town planning. The objective was to develop an integrated town 
planning approach, within which the government would acknowledge the 
singular status of kampongs as native neighbourhoods, and would there-
fore make an exception for kampongs with respect to the type of state regu-
lation, but not with respect to the actual level of state regulation. As formu-
lated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Town Planning Ordinance, 
the kampong would form “a unity with the rest of the Municipality, how-
ever, just like other neighbourhoods, with its own identity that requires 
individual treatment” (own translation) (Toelichting 1938:95).
2.3 Refuge settlements in an occupied city
The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 marked a new period of kam-
pong development in Bandung. During the occupation, the living condi-
tions in the West-Javanese countryside quickly deteriorated. Jobs on plan-
tations disappeared, farmers were forced to deliver large quantities of rice 
to the occupying forces, rural people were ‘recruited’ for forced labour 
(becoming romusha), and there was significant inflation (Smail 1964:12). 
These difficult conditions resulted in an influx of refugees to the cities: in 
just three years Bandung’s indigenous population almost doubled, from 
about 200,000 to some 400,000 (Van Bruinessen 1989:3). The Japanese 
administration tried to force people back to the countryside, but this was 
only partly successful (Wertheim 1956:185). Detailed data are absent, but 
it is clear that a large proportion of the refugees settled in existing kam-
pongs or created new settlements. The Japanse administration allowed and 
even encouraged people to squat on private land (Colombijn 2010:207).
After the Japanese surrender and the struggle for independence, war-
fare in West-Java between the Dutch and the Republican Army would 
result in new flows of refugees, but this time in the opposite direction. As 
soon as Allied troops arrived in Bandung in 1946, the city was effectively 
divided into two parts, separated by the railway track, with the north being 
guarded by British troops and the south by the Indonesian Republican 
Army. In March 1946, after four months of turmoil and following an ulti-
15 Such was acknowledged in 1938 by Levelt, the government adviser on decentralisation, 
in response to questions from a member of the Dutch Indies People’s Council (‘Volk-
sraad’) during a session on the abolishment of the autonomy of a number of villages in 
Malang (Handelingen 1937-1938:207-11).
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matum by the British, who wanted to put an end to the division, the Repub-
lican Army evacuated the Indonesian population to the countryside south 
of Bandung and destroyed large parts of the city by arson.16 By the end of 
the month, an estimated half a million people had moved out of the city. 
For a year and a half the southern part of Bandung remained a dead city, 
with people visiting the area only occasionally. Only the northern part of 
Bandung remained populated, generally by Europeans and Chinese (Smail 
1964:148-152).
Developments similar to those described above also occurred in Taman 
Sari. During the Japanese occupation the population grew considerably; 
although, as we will see, not as significantly as in later years. New houses 
were constructed, as well as a mosque. After the Japanese surrender, most 
of the Indonesian residents of Taman Sari fled to the countryside, to nearby 
places such as Tasikmalaya and Sumedang. Their houses were occupied by 
Dutch military. The Dutch, Indo-European, and Chinese populations gen-
erally stayed. Indonesian residents only returned in 1949-1950, after the 
Dutch had granted independence to the Indonesian Republic.
In the turbulent years of Japanese occupation and the struggle for inde-
pendence, state interference in kampongs remained limited. The Japanse 
did introduce the tonarigumi system in 1943, consisting of neighbourhood 
associations aimed at controlling the Indonesian population. These associa-
tions formed the predecessors of the neighbourhood associations that exist 
in Indonesia to the present day, under the names Rukun Warga (RW) and 
Rukun Tetangga (RT). After the Japanese surrender, as part of an urban 
housing policy, the central colonial government took several emergency 
measures to tackle the housing crisis, including rent control, allocation of 
extant housing, and reconstruction of damaged urban quarters (Colombijn 
2010:311). During the period of conflict migration, the unlawful occupation 
of government land had become common. In response, the central colonial 
government promulgated an ordinance in 1948, making such occupation a 
criminal offence.17 In the same year the government laid the foundation for 
future interference in kampongs, by finally enacting the first Town Plan-
ning Ordinance for Municipalities on Java. The Municipalities had to 
design a town plan, detail plans, and a municipal building code (Niessen 
1999:223-6).18 However, the Ordinance was not applicable to Bandung.19
16 This event is known as Bandung Lautan Api: Bandung a Sea of Fire.
17 ‘Ordonnantie onrechtmatige occupatie van gronden’.
18 ‘Stadsverordeningsordonnantie Stadsgemeenten Java’. An implementing regulation, 
the Town Planning Regulation (Stadsvormingsverordening), followed in 1949. For a dis-
cussion of the rationale, drafting process, enactment, and content of the Ordinance and 
the Explanatory Memorandum, see Van Roosmalen 2008:145-52; 179.
19 See Decision 3 of the Lieutenant Governor-General of Indonesia dated 3 October 1948, 
concerning the Assignment of cities which fulfil the requirements of Art. 51(1) of the 
Town Planning Ordinance (‘Aanwijzing van steden, welke voldoen aan het bepaalde in 
het eerste lid van artikel 51 van de Stadsvormingsordonnantie’) (Niessen 1999:225).
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2.4 Migrant settlements in a decolonising city
The transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic in 1949 marked the 
beginning of a period of decolonisation. The decolonisation effort, however, 
was far from easy. The first years of independence were as tumultuous as 
the years before. It was a period of struggle, uncertainty and quick transfor-
mation, particularly for the population of West-Java. During these years, 
Bandung experienced the most significant population growth in its history. 
With the population increasing from about 200,000 to over 1,000,000 inhabit-
ants, it was the fastest growing of all major Indonesian cities (Hugo 1981:81).
The first group of migrants after independence were civil evacuees and 
soldiers who had left Bandung in 1946 (Hugo 1981:84). Informants gave 
testimony of the difficulties they confronted when returning to their homes 
in Taman Sari. Some learnt that other Indonesians had occupied their hous-
es and land. Others found their houses partly demolished by the residents 
who had not left Taman Sari. The cacao trees in the orchards had been cut 
down and the fishponds were empty.
Soon, conflict migrants followed suit. They came to Bandung to escape 
the rebellion in the West-Java countryside by the Darul Islam, a movement 
that wished to establish an Islamic state. The uprising was particularly vio-
lent in East Priangan, near Tasikmalaya and Garut. Each year hundreds of 
civilians were killed and thousands of houses burnt down. In 1951, more 
than one hundred thousand people were evacuated from the area. Between 
1955 and 1962, a yearly average of 250,000 people fled their homes (Van 
Dijk 1981:104-6). Since the cities were relatively safe, most evacuees sought 
refuge there, not least in Bandung. The atrocities only ended in 1962, when 
the last prominent leaders of the Darul Islam movement were arrested.
In the same period Bandung also started to experience labour migra-
tion. The city became the seat of the provincial government and it resumed 
its role as a centre for education. The industrial sector focused on process-
ing agricultural products and textiles. The Asia-Africa conference in 1955 
created new job opportunities, including for lower-skilled people. Howev-
er, these demands for labour fell short of the number of people moving to 
Bandung (Hugo 1981:84-5).
By the late 1950s, net migration into Bandung had become negligible, 
and in the early 1960s it even became slightly negative (Van Bruinessen 
1989:4). The number of migrants moving to Bandung dropped considera-
bly and many people moved back to their home villages as the West-Java-
nese countryside became safer again. However a great number of people 
stayed on in Bandung, including some who may have originally consid-
ered returning to their village of origin; not least because job prospects in 
the countryside were even worse than those in the city.
The above developments coincided with the exodus of the Dutch pop-
ulation. The nationalisation of Dutch enterprises in 1957/8 forced these 
residents to leave the country. The first Europeans to leave managed to sell 
their property, although at below market value; while those who initially 
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remained, would later also be forced to leave. Their houses were occupied 
by government and military officials, and were often on-sold to well-to-do 
Chinese. Large plots of land, especially in the north, became vacant.
Some of the migrants from the West-Java countryside moved to one of 
the many existing kampongs, while others created new kampongs by 
squatting on land that had become vacant as a result of the departure of the 
European population. Other migrants occupied municipal land alongside 
railway tracks and riversides, and also in graveyards. The vast flow of 
evacuees was disorganised, as many poor villagers attempted to escape the 
violence between the Darul Islam and the Republican Army. Many could 
not find a job, or were employed in the informal sector.20 They could not, 
therefore, afford formal access to land and housing; of which there was an 
increasing shortage anyway. In 1959 the ratio of people to houses in Ban-
dung was 12:1 (Hugo 1981:85). Refugees thus had no other choice but to 
build their own houses, often without permission from the Municipality.
According to several informants, the Indonesian Communist Party 
(Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), which was increasingly influential as an 
opposition party, supported unlawful occupation of vacant land. This strat-
egy fitted into the party’s political objective to organise a strong power base 
among lower-income groups.21 The party forged alliances with particular 
worker groups, which could become strategically important in times of 
revolution. For instance, the party established strong links with workers in 
the state railway company, through the Railway Workers Union (Serikat 
Buruh Kereta Api or SBKA); particularly in Bandung, where the company’s 
head office was located.22 The Railway Workers Union’s actions included 
the occupation of railway company land, and once unionists began to occu-
py their employer’s land, other workers followed.23
20 Hugo refers to a report of the national labour agency which presents the results of a 
survey, finding that only 62.7 per cent of males of twelve years and older were formally 
employed (Hugo 1981:85).
21 In terms of political support, the strategy proved successful. By the end of 1950 the 
Party had built up a strong and organised base among urban workers and other non-
peasant groups. In later years the party tried to gain support from the peasant popula-
tion, including by organising a campaign for land reforms in the countryside, as well as 
drafting and backing bills on that matter, and subsequently by initiating the unilateral 
action movement (aksi sepihak) that was responsible for the unlawful occupation of agri-
cultural land (Mortimer 1972).
22 There were two unions at the time. The other Union was the Railway Workers Associa-
tion (Persatuan Buruh Kereta Api or PBKA), which was backed by the Indonesian Social-
ist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia or PSI) and Nasution’s Alliance of Supporters for Free-
dom of Indonesia (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia or IPKI).
23 I have found no accounts of the occupation of land with support of the PKI in any of the 
literature on the history of Bandung, except a general reference in a book by Siregar, 
who states: “In the city, the illegal occupation of land continued and, to a limited extent, 
it was even encouraged by left-wing political factions” (Siregar 1990:113). Despite this 
paucity of written accounts, several informants confirmed that the practice occurred.
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In spite of the large numbers of squatters, the process of land occupation 
was incremental, which is typical for countries in Asia and Africa, and is 
unlike the large-scale invasion practices common in South-American coun-
tries. The land was developed without authorisation, usually via a similar 
series of steps. Typically, the process would begin with a small number of 
squatters occupying the land, to check for a response by the owner or care-
taker of the land (which could be a government agency or a private party). If 
no eviction occurred, other people would join the squatters. Often, people 
required approval from a community leader before they could move onto 
the land. It is likely that this form of social screening also contributed to the 
slow rate of growth of these settlements, which may have been a prerequi-
site for survival of the community, as an inundation of people would likely 
have led to resource scarcity and ensuing disputes (Wibowo 1983:4-5).
In 1964 an estimated minimum of 11,000 houses were rumah liar (Hugo 
1981:85).24 This is probably a serious underestimation. By that year, hun-
dreds of thousands of people had already migrated to Bandung, and the 
city had reached a population of over a million.
What were the developments in Taman Sari in the first years after the 
transfer of sovereignty? Taman Sari also proved an attractive destination 
for migrants. According to several informants, many of the families of cur-
rent residents settled in this period, coming from places like Cipendeuy, 
Malangbong, Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Subang. Initially they were rather 
separate communities according to their place of origin. Liang Maung, for 
instance, consisted of three separate areas: Kidul, Sisi Gawir, and Mesjid, 
with migrants from three different places. Many of these migrants stayed, 
even after the Priangan countryside had become safe again. With the inflow 
of new migrants in later years, the three communities gradually mixed and 
unified.
Taman Sari drew many migrants because there was so much land avail-
able. Here too, the Dutch residents were leaving. Generally, their houses 
became occupied by Indonesian military personnel during the late 1950s. 
A single Indo-European family also chose to remain in their residence. 
However, few of the original residents retained control over their land, 
which allowed newcomers to occupy the land easily. Many newcomers 
would first rent a house or room and then occupy land, subdivide it, and 
build their own house. It seems that some bought the land from the Dutch, 
while others had the land donated to them; for instance because they had 
been employees of the owners. Most former orchards or sawahs that had 
become empty or uncultivated, or were on absentee land, were simply 
occupied without obtaining permission from the European or Indonesian 
title holder. 
24 Unfortunately Hugo gives no reference for this statement. Considering the cautious-
ness of this estimation, it would not be surprising if it were derived from documents 
from the municipal government.
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An informant recalls that one of the European residents strictly guarded his 
land and threatened newcomers with the gun if they attempted to occupy 
it. Others had greater consideration for the refugees, who were generally in 
poor condition. Some newcomers occupied land alongside the Cikapun-
dung River.25 The Municipality, which managed the riverside land, was not 
as strict as some private owners. Newcomers therefore settled here first. If 
someone (later) claimed a right to the land, migrants sometimes agreed to 
buy or lease it. These claimants were not always rightful owners, however.
Informants gave no account of any involvement of the PKI in the occu-
pation of land in Taman Sari. Such involvement seems unlikely, given that 
a small number of newcomers took control over larger plots of land – a 
practice that the party strongly opposed. Some informants explained that 
certain people occupying the land had close connections with the munici-
pal government or the army. Early occupants enclosed plots, subdivided 
them, and leased them out to newcomers. Some of these newcomers 
bought the land. In Liang Maung a kampong head, who was the leader of 
the area, played a central role in the allocation of former European land to 
newcomers.26
Taman Sari also proved attractive because it was located close to labour 
opportunities. Most migrants found employment in the informal sector, for 
instance as petty-traders. Migrants from each region developed their own 
specialisations. Their modest incomes and dependence on customers urged 
many of them to settle near markets.
With the first flow of migrants, Taman Sari finally started to develop 
from a rural into an urban residential area. Sawahs and orchards steadily 
transformed into a residential area. Initially the houses were temporary or 
semi-permanent constructions made of wood and bamboo, and many 
empty plots remained available around them. Yet the basic structure of the 
area was already taking form: a labyrinth of small alleys giving access to 
more or less permanent constructions.
From Taman Sari we return to the national level to discuss further rele-
vant developments. Despite the 1948 enactment of legislation against 
unlawful occupation and town planning legislation, which remained in 
force after independence, the new Indonesian government also failed to 
effectively regulate kampongs. In the first busy years after independence, 
the government was occupied with other matters; and at this point it also 
had no financial resources to interfere.
25 In later years, when the settlement became denser, newcomers reclaimed land by nar-
rowing the Cikapundung River. The European graveyard that had been cleared in the 
1950s was used only as orchard land and a playfield; until around 1980, when the 
Islamic University of Bandung (Unisba) was founded. It is likely that newcomers were 
reluctant to reside on a place of burial (Van Bruinessen 1988:40).
26 One of the informants remembers that he was called Pak Apung, an acronym of kepala 
kampung (head of the kampong). His real name was Pak Karta and he headed the area 
until 1960.
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This changed in later years. In the early 1950s, the Department of 
Labour initiated a housing programme in Bandung. Similarly to other 
municipalities, Bandung's municipal government established a Co-opera-
tive Housing Association (Jajasan Kas Pembangunan) in 1953, which 
financed housing through central government funding and the savings of 
individual members. The municipal administration also spent part of its 
own budget on housing. However, the effects of these activities on the 
city’s housing market were marginal, and in any event they mostly benefit-
ed civil servants, rather than the masses in the kampongs. At the same time, 
kampong improvement activities remained limited. Under these circum-
stances, Indonesia’s central government began to place an emphasis on 
self-help housing policy, which also gained prominence within internation-
al development circles. However, this policy was not properly implement-
ed in Indonesia – except of course by kampong dwellers themselves 
(Colombijn 2010:336-52).27 In an effort to curb rural-urban migration; 
which, as discussed above, was the major cause of the expansion of kam-
pongs and the deterioration in living conditions, on 1 March 1954 the 
municipal government declared Bandung a ‘closed city’. Each newcomer 
required a so-called settlement certificate (‘vestigingsbewijs or VB’).28 The 
regulation remained in force until 1964, but the main effect was that 
migrants were discouraged from registering as permanent residents (Hugo 
1981:85). Land reforms in the countryside, meant to provide access to land 
to poor tenants and landless labourers, were just as unsuccessful at halting 
the migration. Alarmed by the growing practice of squatting, in 1954 the 
Mayors of the twelve provincial cities in Indonesia, including Bandung, 
initiated a joint effort to tackle this problem, demolishing squatters’ houses 
with the help of the police and the army. During four months in the first 
half of 1955, as many as 657 houses were demolished in Bandung. These 
actions however soon met with strong resistance, forcing the municipal 
administration to reconsider its stance on squatting (Colombijn 2010:215-
24).
Meanwhile, the autonomous legal status of the kampongs was main-
tained. Only after the European population had departed and the rural-
urban migration of low-income Indonesians to Bandung was reaching a 
peak, with its associated occupation of abandoned and municipal land, did 
the central government attempt to end this colonial-era legal dualism. In 
the 1950s there were increasingly strong calls to abolish village autonomy. 
Opposition was directed towards the 1906 Indigenous Village Ordinance 
27 The central government funding came from the People’s Housing Department (Djawat-
an Peroemahan Rakjat, later spelt as Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat), which was established 
in 1951.
28 The municipal government also had a political rationale for this policy; it could check 
whether any Darul Islam members were among the newcomers (personal communica-
tion of a retired senior municipal official, 20 July 2006).
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and the 1907 Regulation on the Election of Village Heads.29 On the basis of 
the latter ordinance, only the original residents of the villages were allowed 
to vote for the election of village heads. Since the villages had become very 
heterogeneous, this was considered unfair. In the early 1960s, the National 
Council (which had replaced the National Parliament in 1957) finally 
issued a statement that the dualist administrative structure had been abol-
ished, and stopped providing funds for the election of the village heads. 
Formally the ordinances were never abolished.30
As noted in Chapter 1, in 1960 the Indonesian government enacted the 
Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), which was meant to unify land law.31 Most adat 
rights were intended to be integrated into a unified system of land law. 
This required the surveying of the land, after which the land was to be reg-
istered and certified by the administration. However, as will be discussed 
in further detail in Chapter 4, for various reasons few kampong dwellers 
registered their land.
By this time many people, both within and outside the larger Indone-
sian cities, continued to occupy state land or land that was privately owned 
by third parties. In response to this situation, in 1961 the government enact-
ed another law, which stipulated that every person residing on land with-
out permission from the title holder would be considered an unlawful 
occupant and could be evicted at the discretion of the regional head (i.e. the 
Mayor).32 Unlike the 1948 ordinance, the law not only involved a prohibi-
tion to occupy state land, but also private land. Private right holders could 
already base an eviction claim on private law, but this new law made evic-
tion easier, because enforcement authorities could be called in without a 
prior court order. Moreover, the law might prevent the practice of unlawful 
occupation, because such an action now formed a criminal offence. The 
General Elucidation to the Law explains that the government understands 
the reasons behind unlawful occupation, given the shortage of land for the 
people, but considers that in the interest of the state’s development, the use 
of land should be regulated in an organised manner.33
The abolishment of village autonomy was an important symbolic step, 
but because this measure was not accompanied by a consistent set of 
applied policies to improve living conditions in kampongs, it had little con-
sequences in practice. A similar situation occurred with the enactment of 
29 ‘Inlandse Gemeenteordonnantie’; ‘Reglement op de verkiezing, de schorsing en het 
ontslag van hoofden van inlandsche gemeenten op Java en Madoera’.
30 Personal communication of a retired senior official, 20 July 2006. See also: Otto 1991:214.
31 The full name of the law is: Law No. 5/1960 on the Basic Provisions of Agrarian Princi-
ples (UU No. 5/1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria).
32 Law No. 51/1960 on the Prohibition to Use Land Without Permission from the Right 
Holder or his Deputy (UU No. 51/1960 tentang Larangan Pemakaian Tanah Tanpa Izin yang 
Berhak atau Kuasanya). The Military Command had enacted similar regulations in as 
early as 1957. The law will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.
33 General Elucidation, under 1 Law No. 51/1960.
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land legislation. While this legislation changed the legal position of kam-
pong dwellers and turned many kampongs into informal settlements, 
housing residents with weak or no legal claims to the land, again the regu-
latory changes were not enforced. Residents therefore continued to have no 
reason to fear immediate interference by the municipal government. To 
illustrate this point, only one informant in Taman Sari could give an 
account of an eviction case in that period for reason of unlawful occupation 
and this seemed to have been a rare and ad-hoc affair. Other informants 
revealed that some newcomers in Taman Sari not only asked and obtained 
permission to settle in the area from the informal kampong leader, but also 
personally from local officials. This may even have been common practice, 
a practice that continued in later years, as we will see in Chapter 4. Obvi-
ously, this does not mean that it was lawful to settle in Taman Sari.
Political-economic conditions prompted the government’s laissez-faire 
attitude. As an official of the City Quarter Office explained, the vast flow of 
migrants to Bandung forced the municipal government to allow them to 
settle in the area, even though it was not their land and in most part was 
not reserved for residential purposes. Besides, the political influence, at the 
municipal level, of the PKI and other parties supporting the urban poor 
should not be underestimated. Through the late 1950s and in the early 
1960s, two out of six of Bandung’s Aldermen were members of the PKI. The 
party also received support from at least one member of the judiciary. As a 
consequence, if formal landholders whose land had been occupied went to 
court, they often lost the case. The few efforts of the administration to evict 
people led to protests.34
2.5 Migrant settlements in a metropolitan city
After Soeharto had established his New Order regime in 1966, Indonesia 
experienced extraordinary economic growth. The focus of the regime’s eco-
nomic policy on industrialisation resulted in increasing employment 
opportunities in the cities.35 Being the target of domestic and foreign invest-
ments, Bandung was one of them. These developments effectively reduced 
poverty, but also resulted in new flows of rural migrants coming to the city 
in search of jobs. Generally, urban incomes were higher than rural incomes; 
for instance in 1980 they were up to 1.5 times higher (Keban 1993:88). Other 
catalysts for migration included the development of modern transporta-
tion and better communication networks.
34 Personal communication of a retired senior municipal official, Bandung, 20 July 2006.
35 The regime also focussed on agricultural development, by initiating intensification pro-
grammes, but these programmes led to a labour surplus rather than an increasing 
labour demand in rural areas. Economic disparities between urban and rural areas 
increased.
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Most migrants came from the West-Java countryside. Just like in other 
cities in Indonesia, with the exception of Jakarta and some other coastal cit-
ies, intra-provincial migration remained the most common mode of popu-
lation movement to Bandung.36 This was mainly due to significant ethno-
linguistic and socio-cultural differences between Indonesian Provinces 
(Wibowo 1983:25-6).
Some migrants found employment in the formal sector. From the 1970s, 
the garment industry attracted many poor agricultural labourers to Ban-
dung. Mainly women worked in this industry (Keban 1993:93). The sizable 
military and civilian bureaucracy, as well as institutions of higher educa-
tion, created employment opportunities for low-skilled workers (Van Brui-
nessen 1988:40).
One should not overestimate the importance of the formal sector in 
terms of job opportunities for migrants, who were generally low-educated 
and ill-skilled. Moreover, throughout the years, labour-intensive work-
shops were replaced by modern capital-intensive factories, which only 
employed a fraction of the former labour force. Other employment in the 
formal sector was hard to find without a proper network of koneksi (Van 
Bruinessen 1988:46). This explains why 66 per cent of the migrants sur-
veyed in Bandung in 1986 were employed in the informal sector (Keban 
1993:99).37 Even in this period of economic growth, many other migrants 
were unemployed, which was not reflected in official figures. Labour 
demand in the formal sector was not increasing as fast as the number of 
migrants moving to Bandung, and the absorption capacity of the informal 
sector proved also insufficient to provide the jobs needed.38
In this period too, most migrants settled in kampongs. Most important-
ly, because of their socio-economic position, they had no access to formal 
land and housing. In addition, being employed predominantly in the infor-
mal sector, migrants preferred to settle in centrally-located kampongs, for 
that is where they could find employment. In any case, living at the out-
skirts of the city was usually not an option, since travel expenses would be 
too high in relation to their modest incomes. Rural migrants were also likely 
36 This picture also emerges from the research by Van Bruinessen in a kampong called 
Sukapakir, which he conducted in 1983-4. He observed that in the 1950s many of the 
residents of this settlement came from Tasikmalaya, Garut and the southern parts of 
Bandung District, while in the 1960s and the early 1970s many came from the north 
coast, further away from Bandung, such as Indramayu, Cirebon, Brebes and Tegal. At 
the mid-1970s people from Majalengka dominated the migration flows (Van Bruinessen 
1988:42).
37 See also: Hugo, who estimated that between half and two thirds of the West Javanese 
resident urban workforce worked in the informal sector (Hugo 1981:41).
38 Van Bruinessen claims that 10 per cent of the residents in kampong Sukapakir were 
long-time unemployed. 80 per cent worked in the informal sector, in which there was 
no regular employment. Lifetime mobility between different kinds of employment and 
intergenerational mobility was also limited (Van Bruinessen 1989:27-32).
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attracted by the settlements’ way of life; which retained rural features as 
villages turned into urban settlements and the inflow of new migrants from 
the countryside continued.39
Migrants tended to cluster on the basis of origin, near relatives or some-
one from their village who could assist them in getting a house and a job. 
A survey organised in 1973 revealed that three quarters of migrants were 
initially housed with family or friends (Hugo 1981:204-5). This concentra-
tion of ethnic, regional and kinship groups was part of the chain migration 
process occurring in Bandung and many other cities in Indonesia (Hugo 
1981:88). This is not to say that kampongs were homogeneous. Several 
groups would cluster in the same settlement (Van Bruinessen 1988:38). 
Group members often assisted migrants in housing construction, which 
was generally an incremental process. Benjamin et al., who conducted 
research in nine kampongs in Bandung in the mid-1980s, estimated that 
such assistance from members of the group resulted in the initial capital 
requirements being reduced by as much as 50 per cent of total construction 
costs. Kampong dwellers could live in housing well beyond their actual 
budget (Benjamin & Ali Arifin 1985:94). Since group members often also 
supported migrants in finding a job, regional specialisations emerged.40 So 
migrants from each different place of origin developed their own distinct 
profession.
Several surveys in the 1970s and 1980s, including some conducted in 
Bandung, as well as our own informants suggest that the buildings 
changed in that period; towards dwellings of a more permanent character, 
especially in older kampongs (Benjamin & Ali Arifin 1985:100-1). By the 
mid-1980s, all but the poorest kampongs in Bandung consisted mostly of 
permanent housing. In the older kampongs, as many as 75 per cent of the 
dwellings were permanent (Benjamin & Ali Arifin 1985:106).
Notably, housing consolidation occurred despite the informality of the 
kampongs in terms of land tenure and land use. By 1971, the number of 
illegal houses in Bandung was conservatively estimated at 60,000 (Hugo 
1981:86).
39 The rural character of kampongs can for instance be illustrated by the fact that in these 
settlements social control and security were still relatively strong. Yet, the traditional 
culture of gotong royong (mutual help), whereby residents provide services to the com-
munity without any financial reward (for instance helping each other with the con-
struction of a house), was already disappearing at that time.
40 Van Bruinessen notes that residents of Sukapakir who originated from Tegal-Brebes 
Districts on the north coast and Purwokerto further south, mostly worked as itinerant 
vendors of mie baso (noodles with meatballs). Other residents originating from 
Majalengka worked as vendors of baso tahu (fish balls with bean curd in spicy sauce). A 
third group, originating from one village in Indramayu, made an income as beggars. 
The fourth group that could be distinguished on the basis of their origin and occupa-
tion, were people from Kebumen, who worked in a big modern factory (Van Bruinessen 
1989:19-20).
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Bandung’s migration rate remained high, but in general slowed down 
from the 1970s. An increasing proportion of migrants were circular 
migrants, who returned to their village of origin after a relatively short 
time. In addition, the number of migrants settling in the Districts around 
Bandung Municipality grew, especially from the 1980s. Lastly, more people 
were now commuting daily between their village of origin and the city. 
Growing transportation opportunities in West-Java enhanced these devel-
opments (Keban 1993:102-3). From the 1970s onwards, physical accessibili-
ty greatly improved as a result of road extensions and increases in the num-
bers of vehicles, including vehicles for public transportation. This enabled 
people living in isolated rural areas to travel to the city easily and at rela-
tively low cost (Keban 1993:91). Overpopulation in Bandung was another 
reason for the slower pace of population growth during the 1970s. It had 
become difficult to find an affordable place to live in the increasingly dense 
city. Partly for that reason, many non-circular migrants returned to their 
villages to retire. Declining living conditions in the urban kampongs also 
made the countryside more attractive (Van Bruinessen 1989:22-3). A survey 
on migration intentions in Bandung conducted in 1986 revealed that 58 per 
cent of the migrants intended to leave the city, while 26 per cent was unde-
cided (Keban 1993:99).
Despite these developments, Bandung’s kampong population contin-
ued to grow. This was not only the result of migration; the numerous poor 
families were also generally large. As soon as the older generation had 
passed away, the land and house would be subdivided. This is how the 
plots of some landlords became increasingly small. Depending on their 
financial position, some heirs rented the new space to fellow-residents, 
while others sold the land.
Taman Sari was one of the areas that attracted migrants from this new 
wave. Residents commonly returned to their village of origin for the Feast 
of Ramadan, and afterwards took relatives or other villagers with them 
home. Migrants who moved to Taman Sari unaccompanied often had rela-
tives or friends living there. The origins of migrants who settled in Taman 
Sari changed over the years. Initially, most were from West-Java. In contrast 
to other kampong areas, in later years many migrants came from Middle 
and East-Java, and later again even from Sumatra and other outlying 
islands. In Cimaung (currently RW 07) many residents originate from vil-
lages around Cipendeuy, Malangbong and Garut, where they had already 
been members of the same community. They followed as relatives or 
former neighbours of the refugees who had settled in the 1950s. Later 
migrants from other parts of West-Java, like Kuningan, and Middle and 
East-Java moved to Cimaung. Part of that neighbourhood is called kampung 
Jawa (Javanese kampong), because its residents are mostly of Javanese ori-
gin. The first migrants from this second wave arrived in the 1970s, and rela-
tives soon followed.
Throughout the years the location of Taman Sari became of great eco-
nomic value, not only because of the proximity of the city-centre and good 
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transportation facilities, but also because its surroundings transformed. In 
the 1970s a number of new universities and schools were built around 
Ta man Sari, like the Islamic University of Bandung (Universitas Islam Ban-
dung or UNISBA), built on the land of the former European graveyard; 
Pasundan University (Universitas Pasundan or UNPAS); and Bandung Law 
School (Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Bandung or STHB). From the end of the 1980s, 
Cihampelas Street developed into the famous ‘jeans street’, with shops 
offering cheap clothing.
Many newcomers found employment in and around these new educa-
tional and commercial centres. Some ran their own stand (warung) at the 
market or just on the sidewalk, others worked as itinerant vendors, pedicab 
(becak) drivers, craftsmen, or offered small services. Here too, regional spe-
cialisations emerged. So almost all of the male Javanese residents of 
Cimaung worked as meatball soup traders (tukang bakso) and the females 
went door to door with traditional medicines (tukang jamu gendong). Espe-
cially from the 1970s, as a result of upward social mobility, some residents 
of Taman Sari worked as state officials or employees in the (formal) private 
sector. Because of the proximity of schools and universities, many students 
settled in Taman Sari. For many residents, renting out rooms to students 
became one of the major sources of income. This changed the physical 
structure of the kampong, for they built one or two extra floors on top of 
their houses.
As the 1973 survey earlier referred to revealed, the first migrants of the 
new wave usually stayed in a relative’s or friend’s house until they had 
found employment and a place to live, both often nearby. Later residents 
occupied the last plots of non-residential land in Taman Sari. In the mean-
time, prices of land and buildings continued to rise, so many of the later 
migrants would initially rent a house.
As a result of the continuing influx of low-income migrants, Taman Sari 
became dense and dilapidated.41 In 1975, the area had 404 residents and 79 
houses per hectare. The settlement’s infrastructure was in bad shape or non-
existent (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum dan Tenaga Listrik 1975:130-1). 
There were social problems too. The population had become increasingly 
heterogeneous, and as a result of circular migration the percentage of tem-
poral residents increased. Crime was rife within the kampongs. The com-
munity feeling that had been very strong until the end of the 1960s was lost 
to a large extent.
41 Compared to other kampong areas, it appears that the area was still in relatively good 
shape though. In a 1975 report by the Department of Public Works, the problems in 
Taman Sari were put into perspective by comparing the situation in this City Quarter 
with that in two other City Quarters, Pajajaran and Jamika. Unemployment rates were 
relatively low in Taman Sari and because dwellers had relatively good jobs, they were 
well aware of environmental issues. The physical circumstances were also better than in 
the other City Quarters (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum dan Tenaga Listrik 1975:129-
130).
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In the first years after the Soeharto regime became established, the 
regime did little to address the above problems. For instance, state expend-
iture on housing was modest; not only because of the government’s limited 
resources, but also because the informal housing sector, as mentioned 
before, proved to have great absorptive qualities (Goldblum 1987:150). 
However, following the beginning of the oil boom, a policy shift occurred. 
In 1974, the Indonesian government implemented a national housing poli-
cy, leading to the establishment the National Housing Cooperation (Perusa-
haan Umum Pembangunan Perumahan Nasional or Perum Perumnas), which 
was to build houses at low cost; and a state bank (Bank Tabungan Negara or 
BTN), which provided credit for public and private housing (Goldblum 
1987:154). As well, the government introduced the 1-3-6 rule, requiring 
(private) developers to build 6 units of ‘simple’ housing and 3 units of mid-
standard housing for every unit of ‘luxury’ housing. In the following years, 
the National Housing Cooperation built 400,000 and the private sector 
another 800,000 housing units.
On first consideration, the housing programme seemed impressive; but 
it was of too small a scale, and in any case mostly benefited mid-income 
groups. The 1-3-6 rule was formulated vaguely and was easy to circum-
vent. In addition, its implementation was rarely monitored (Hoek-Smit 
2002:30). Bandung Municipality’s 1992 General Town Plan acknowledged 
that there was general shortage of housing, particularly for lower income 
groups (Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Bandung 1991:2-9). This 
indicated that new forms of housing only partially substituted for self-help 
housing in kampongs (Goldblum 1987:159-160).
In view of these circumstances, the Indonesian government decided to 
take a pragmatic approach. Just as the colonial Municipality had done 40 
years before, it attempted to improve the living conditions of kampongs 
dwellers in the country’s major cities, this time through the so-called Kam-
pong Improvement Programme (KIP). This programme initially focussed 
on the improvement of infrastructure and housing conditions. The first 
project was set up by the Jakarta Municipality in 1969, and later copied to 
other cities. From 1974, when the government implemented its second five-
year development plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun or REPELITA II), 
the programmes became part of a national development policy. The Indo-
nesian government made the KIP part of integrated urban projects, in 
which the KIP’s emphasis on micro-level facilities was complemented by 
citywide services and systems (Suselo & Taylor 1995:13). The government 
also broadened the KIP’s scope, implementing it in two hundred cities and 
expanding the range of interventions, such as in the field of nutrition, 
health and education (Goldblum 1987:154-6). The KIP covered over 85,000 
hectares of “slum areas”, assisting more than 36 million people at nearly 
2,000 locations in a wide variety of towns and cities (UN-Desa 2002).
Kampong dwellers in Bandung were among the first to benefit from 
the KIP. From 1972, kampongs had already been the target of the Bandung 
Water Supply (BAWS) programme, which focussed on water supply, sani-
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tation, and waste management. In 1975, the Department of Public Works 
selected five kampongs as priority areas for the KIP, Taman Sari being one 
of them.42 The settlement was chosen because “a large share of unauthor-
ized housing located on government property alongside the riverbanks 
could be found here. Its central location, unauthorized status, and the fre-
quent flooding of some areas all indicate[d] that a portion of the residents 
[had to] be resettled and those areas which remained for residential use […] 
be upgraded” (Department of Public Works and Electric Power 1975:9).43 
In 1976 the Bandung Urban Development and Sanitation (BUDS) Project 
was initiated, of which the KIP would form part. In the same year, the Indo-
nesian government started a pilot project in two kampongs in Bandung 
(and one in Surabaya) with assistance from the United Nations Environ-
mental Programme and the United Nations Childrens' Fund. This project 
took an integrated approach, not only focusing on physical improvement, 
but also on the amelioration of social and economic conditions. In 1979 
Bandung signed another loan for a KIP with the ADB which was meant to 
upgrade a total area of 385 hectares of kampongs in the city (Suyono 
1983:174). These activities now became part of the Bandung Urban Devel-
opment Project (BUDP), which was followed by the Bandung Urban Devel-
opment Project II in 1985 and the Metropolitan Bandung Urban Develop-
ment Project (MBUDP) in 1996.
Not all kampongs could benefit from the KIP. As the project formed an 
integrated part of town planning policy, it primarily targeted kampongs 
located in residential zones and whose population consisted of low-income 
groups. Subsequently, kampongs were selected not only on the basis of cri-
teria such as age, state of dilapidation, density, population growth rate, 
income of population, and physical condition of the settlement, but also 
concordance of the location with the General Town Plan. Because of the 
final criterion, most squatter settlements should have been excluded from 
the KIP (Goldblum 1987:161-2 and 170-1). However, on the basis of our own 
observations we can safely conclude that these criteria were not strictly 
applied in Ban dung.44
Generally, the KIP had at least two unwanted side effects. First, the val-
ue of the houses and the land increased considerably – by an estimated 243 
percent in ten years. The KIP was partly focused on the improvement of 
access and drainage of land, and these factors are among the two most 
important determinants of the market price of land. Second, the social dif-
42 Other selected City Quarters were Babakan Surabaya, Cikutra, Maleber and Warung 
Muncang.
43 All selected kampongs had high population densities, but otherwise they differed 
greatly. The programme would therefore focus on different aspects in each kampong 
(Department of Public Works and Electric Power 1975:9-11).
44 Bandung’s 1991 General Town Plan partly explains this practice, by noting that previ-
ous Plans had not indicated in detail which regions could benefit from the KIP (General 
Town Plan, chapter 2, p. 8).
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ferentiation increased as well, both within rehabilitated kampongs and 
between rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated kampongs (Goldblum 
1987:159).
Despite the above unforeseen side effects of the KIP, Bandung’s munic-
ipal government intensified the programme in the 1990s on the basis of the 
so-called Tribina concept, which pursue an integrated approach and gave a 
greater role to its beneficiaries in its implementation. Taman Sari was again 
one of the City Quarters that benefited from the programme. The munici-
pal government chose a bottom-up approach, supporting community 
demands both technically and financially. Improvement activities became 
part of a larger community-based development programme, and focused 
on housing and environment, which were expected in turn to have a bene-
ficial effect on public health, employment, and productivity (Peme rintah 
Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Bandung 1993:4-26).
Bandung’s municipal government also experimented with new 
approaches, such as land consolidation and urban renewal, by replacing 
kampong housing with low-income tenement buildings (Pemerintah Kota-
madya Daerah Tingkat II Bandung 1991:5-21).45 The experiment, facilitated 
by the Department of Public Works and implemented in a kampong in City 
Quarter Arjuna, was however put on hold as a result of the 1998 financial 
crisis; and never finished.
In later years the Indonesian government paid increasing attention to 
the socio-economic conditions in kampongs. It did not take measures to 
target poverty directly, but provided ‘social services’ in the fields of educa-
tion and health. In the early 1970s, the government had started promoting 
the expansion of public health centres (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat or 
Puskesmas) and sub-centres (Pos Pelayanan Terpadu or Posyandu). In 1994, 
the government adopted the Health Cards (Kartu Sehat) programme, which 
aimed to enable the poorest families in the community to receive free medi-
cal treatment at community health centres and public hospitals.
From the late 1980s, the Indonesian government began to support the 
activities of microfinance institutions, and initiated various microfinance 
programmes. Many of these activities were implemented on behalf of the 
government by banks and other financial institutions. The commercial 
Indonesian People’s Bank (Bank Rakyat Indonesia or BRI) implemented some 
of the most significant programmes, such as the Village Credit Programme 
(Kredit Umum Pedesaan or KUPEDES) and the Urban Savings Programme 
(Simpanan Masyarakat Kota or SIMASKOT). Secondary micro-banks, known 
as the People’s Credit Banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat or BPR), were estab-
lished in later years and implemented similar programmes. In 1990 the 
45 Such buildings were also constructed in Jakarta and Palembang (Kuswartojo 2005:34). 
This new approach was in line with Presidential Instruction No. 5/1990 on the Upgrad-
ing of Slum Housing that is Located on State Land (Instruksi Presiden No. 5/1990 tentang 
Peremajaan Pemukiman Kumuh yang Berada di Atas Tanah Negara).
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Indonesian government established a state-owned pawnshop company, 
Perum Pegadaian, which formed an important source of liquidity for low-
income households with savings in movable assets. During the 1990s the 
government also implemented various other microfinance programmes, 
such as the Family Welfare Income Generation Effort (Usaha Peningkatan 
Pendapatan Keluarga Sejahtera or UPPKS) in 1996. This programme was 
managed by the National Family Planning Coordination Board, and pro-
vided women belonging to low-income households with guidance, entre-
preneurship and credit (Holloh 2001:15-38).46
With all these efforts aimed at the physical and social-economic devel-
opment of kampongs, what then happened to their legal status? The initia-
tors of the KIP expected that once the kampong’s infrastructure had been 
improved, residents themselves would take the initiative to improve their 
tenure status; but there has never been any evidence to support this 
hypothesis.47 The government thus initiated various land registration pro-
grammes. In 1981 the government instituted the National Land Registra-
tion Project (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria or PRONA), a project that was 
to accelerate land registration by providing land titles to the urban poor at 
low cost. Ban dung’s municipal government also initiated and financed a 
Regional Land Registration Project (Proyek Operasi Daerah Agraria or PRO-
DA). Moreover, the World Bank initiated the Land Administration Project 
(LAP) in 1994, registering land of the urban poor at low cost in Java and in 
urban areas. These programmes will be discussed in further detail in Chap-
ter 4.
2.6 Bandung’s kampongs today: a ‘challenge of slums’?
Indonesia’s 1997 economic crisis had severe consequences for Bandung’s 
kampong dwellers and for the government programmes supporting them. 
The number of urban poor increased substantially as real wages fell and 
unemployment increased. At the same time, government (supported) pro-
46 Not all microfinance activities were government-related. Some banks also initiated their 
own microfinance activities. Other institutions, such as cooperatives and NGOs, fol-
lowed suit, albeit on a relatively limited scale. The most important cooperatives are 
some of the previously mentioned People’s Credit Banks and savings and credit coop-
eratives. Examples of such NGOs are the national Yayasan Bina Swadaya and West-Java 
Yayasan Dharma Bhakti Parasahabat (YDBP). Finally, international development organisa-
tions initiated microfinance programmes aimed at developing sustainable microfinance 
systems in cooperation with banks, NGOs and self-help groups, such as the Project 
Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups Project of Bank Indonesia and the German Society 
for Technical Cooperation ('Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit' or 
GTZ), and the Micro Credit Project of the ADB, which were launched in 1989 and 1996 
respectively.
47 See for instance Taylor 1987, who in his evaluation of the Jakarta KIP could not draw 
any conclusions on that matter.
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grammes on housing and human settlements came to a standstill. The 
National Housing Cooperation nearly went bankrupt, but was bailed out 
by the government. The private housing sector had to recover from their 
over-investment and loan failures (UN-Desa 2002).
Under these circumstances, poverty became the government’s primary 
concern. So in mid-1998 the government initiated several programmes as 
part of a larger emergency programme for poverty reduction, the Social 
Safety Net (Jaringan Pengaman Sosial or JPS, henceforth SSN). The pro-
grammes covered various needs, including food security, employment, 
crucial social services – particularly health and education –, and communi-
ty empowerment (Hatmadji & Mursitama 2003:269).
From 2001 the Indonesian government took an unprecedented series of 
further poverty reduction measures, which also benefited kampongs and 
their dwellers. These measures addressed the socio-economic, physical and 
legal conditions of kampongs.
The measures addressing the socio-economic conditions followed the 
five-year poverty reduction strategy that the government had formulated 
in 2000 and were based on three pillars: focusing on promoting social secu-
rity for the poor, supporting their empowerment, and facilitating their eco-
nomic opportunities. These and other measures also addressed the physi-
cal and legal conditions in kampongs.
As part of the effort to promote social security, some of the programmes 
of the SSN became regular development programmes. So the SSN pro-
gramme in the field of food security was succeeded by the Rice for Poor 
Families (Beras untuk Keluarga Miskin or Raskin) Programme. When in 2005 
the Indonesian government again reduced fuel subsidies, it reallocated 
most of the released funds to four programmes in the fields of education, 
health, direct unconditional cash transfers and, less relevant here, village 
infrastructure. Finally, in 2007 the Indonesian government initiated the 
Hopeful Families Programme (Program Keluarga Harapan or PKH), which is 
a conditional cash transfer system meant to ease the burden of poor house-
holds and to break the vicious circle of poverty between generations.
Empowerment activities and activities facilitating economic opportuni-
ties included the Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme/Urban Poverty 
Project (Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan di Perkotaan or P2KP, hence-
forth the UPP), which the Indonesian government had already initiated in 
1999. It is based on the so-called Tridaya approach, pursuing community-
based development in the social, economic, and physical fields, with the 
aim of empowering urban communities to overcome poverty. Self-help has 
thus become part of government policy. The programme provides funding 
for sustainable economic activities demanded by the people themselves. It 
also supports individual urban poor with credit, which they have to pay off 
within two years with interest at commercial rates. Last, it funds develop-
ment of community-selected basic infrastructure and related employment-
generating activities. In order to guarantee that communities participate in 
the UPP, the Indonesian government established Community Self-Reliance 
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Bodies (Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat or BKM) in each targeted City Quar-
ter. Bandung was among the cities where the programme was first imple-
mented. In 2006, the UPP integrated into the National Community Empow-
erment Programme (Program Nasional Pemperdayaan Masyarakat or PNPM), 
which is designed to accelerate the handling of poverty in urban and rural 
areas by empowering the people’s economy, and which again consists of 
several components. In 2007, the programme was renamed PNPM Man-
diri.
At least 16 structural poverty reduction programmes, part of which are 
(also) implemented in cities, have a microfinance component (ProFI 2005:4). 
Meanwhile, existing microfinance activities outside the banking sector, such 
as by NGOs, continue to expand. For instance, since 2002 Yayasan Bina Swa-
daya has followed the Nobel Prize winning Bangladeshi ASA microfinance 
model, targeting low-income factory workers and micro-entrepreneurs in 
urban settings. In 2008, several credit programmes conducted by ministries 
and other government institutions were unified into the People’s Business 
Credit (Kredit Usaha Rakyat) programme. The objective is to accelerate the 
development of primary sectors and employment of small businesses, to 
improve accessibility to credit and financial institutions, and to reduce pov-
erty. Six banks implement this programme.
Activities focusing on the physical conditions of kampongs are mostly 
integrated into the above UPP. As well, there have been some housing con-
struction activities outside this programme. In 2002, the newly established 
Department of Settlements and Rural Infrastructure (Departemen Pemukim-
an dan Prasarana Wilayah or Kimpraswil) introduced a new National Hous-
ing and Settlement Policy and Strategy (Kebijakan dan Strategi Nasional Peru-
mahan dan Permukiman or KSNPP). A year later the President initiated the 
human settlement development activities in the form of the One Million 
Houses (Satu Juta Rumah) Development Programme (UN-Desa 2002). 
However, so far construction activities have focussed mostly on relieving 
internally displaced persons and disaster victims and rehabilitating facili-
ties in conflict areas.
Activities addressing the legal conditions in kampongs consist of the 
Land Management and Policy Development Project (LMPDP), which was 
initiated in 2004 to succeed the LAP, and PRONA.
All of the above programmes are initiated by the central government. 
However, as a result of regional autonomy, municipal governments have 
an increased responsibility in poverty reduction. Bandung’s municipal 
government has actively assumed this responsibility, although the scope of 
activities is limited. In 2006, it initiated the ‘Bring me…’ programmes 
(Bawaku…), such as ‘Bring me Prosperity, Health, Brightness’ (Bawaku Mak-
mur, Bawaku Sehat, Bawaku Cerdas), aimed at improving the socio-economic 
position of low-income households. In 2007 it initiated the Housing Opera-
tion (Bedah Rumah) programme, which is to renovate houses in slum areas. 
Each City Quarter receives Rp. 45 million for the renovation of about nine 
houses.
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Aside from these government activities, kampong communities are still 
to some extent self-reliant – although the feeling of ‘community’ is not par-
ticularly strong. In Taman Sari residents have initiated social-economic 
activities, for instance in the field of family planning, microfinance, social 
security, and religion. They also clean the river, improve roads and other 
infrastructure, and organise waste management. Most of these initiatives 
are cash-based. Each month, the neighbourhood heads collect money from 
the people.48 Some kampongs in Taman Sari also receive contributions for 
these activities from Bio Farma, a nearby pharmaceutical company.
Having given an historical overview of the local, national and interna-
tional factors underlying the formation of kampongs in Bandung, and hav-
ing assessed the impact of the main development policies towards kam-
pongs adopted by the Indonesian government, international organisations, 
and civil society groups, the question rises what are the contemporary 
socio-economic, physical and legal characteristics of kampongs in Ban-
dung. Our survey provides some data on the socio-economic and physical 
features of these settlements. Appendix II (see p. 244) presents data on the 
socio-economic characteristics of the kampongs, more specifically on edu-
cation levels of dwellers, the sectors they work in, and their income. The 
survey reveals that generally, contemporary kampongs in Bandung are 
low-income settlements. A large proportion of the kampong population is 
low-educated, the majority works in the informal sector and, according to 
international standards in particular, poverty is rife in all kampongs. On 
average, 40 per cent of male household heads have only received primary 
school education (not always completed). As many as 63 per cent work in 
the informal sector. 65 per cent live under the poverty line of $1 US per day, 
as set in the UN Millennium Development Goals. In Taman Sari, the per-
centage of low-educated male household heads is slightly higher than 
average, namely 43 per cent. However, at the same time a relatively high 
percentage of this category of respondents (19 per cent) have enjoyed high-
er education. This does not mean that a proportional quantity of people in 
Taman Sari works in the formal sector. Just as in most other City Quarters, a 
majority of male family heads is employed informally, namely 63 per cent. 
A high percentage of this category of respondents works as petty traders, 
as is the case in Ciroyom; probably because big market places are near at 
hand in both these City Quarters. On the basis of several income calcula-
tions, we can see that households and their individual members in Taman 
Sari are poor, but still relatively well off when compared to households in 
kampongs in the other City Quarters.
Appendix III (see p. 245) presents data on the physical characteristics of 
the kampongs. Dwellings are generally small, particularly if measured as 
48 Interviews with neighbourhood heads (about 25) in the kampongs where survey 
research was conducted reveal that almost every kampong community organises these 
kinds of activities and finances them in a similar way.
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average house size per person, but they are also reasonably consolidated. 
There is relatively good infrastructure and access to public utilities. So on 
average, 39 per cent of the dwellings are less than 36 m2. 86 per cent of the 
dwellings have roof consisting of tiles, 92 per cent of the dwellings have 
brick walls, and 75 per cent of the dwellings have a roof consisting of tiles. 
17 per cent of the households have piped water and 98 per cent have elec-
tricity. Compared to other kampong City Quarters, the percentage of very 
small (less than 18 m2) and large dwellings (more than 70 m2) is considera-
ble in Taman Sari. Here, the average house size per person is the biggest of 
all City Quarters. Furthermore, the houses are even more consolidated. 
(Only) 79 per cent of the dwellings have roofs consisting of tiles, but 95 per 
cent of the dwellings have brick walls. Access to public utilities is relatively 
good in Taman Sari. About 35 per cent of households have piped water, 
which is a high percentage compared to other City Quarters, such as Kebon 
Lega, where as little as 7 per cent of households have this facility.
Kampongs in Bandung still have a predominantly informal status in 
terms of land tenure and land use, but as will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter 4, there are various degrees of legality among and within these 
settlements. Many kampongs are not consistent with spatial planning laws, 
whether with respect to zoning, sub-division, or building regulations. 
Almost none of the households hold the required permits to reside on the 
land. Many dwellers are informal landholders, most of whom reside on 
state land. However, at the same time a considerable share of the popula-
tion has a land certificate or owns land on the basis of a customary land 
right. Many others lease land from the Municipality.
In view of the physical and legal characteristics of kampongs in Taman 
Sari and other City Quarters in Bandung, it would be inaccurate to qualify 
these settlements as slums on the basis of international standards. None-
theless, the Indonesian government does so – on the basis of its own stand-
ards. On the basis of a survey conducted in 1999, the Department of Public 
Works concluded that 121 out of the 139 City Quarters in Bandung consist 
of ‘slum settlements’. 44 of these City Quarters consist of slum settlements 
that are non-legal, because they are not consistent with spatial planning 
law or because dwellers reside on state land. Taman Sari is qualified as a 
City Quarter consisting of ‘slum, non-legal settlements’ (Departemen 
Pekerjaan Umum 1999:I-32-50).49
While the conclusions of the Department of Public Works can be debat-
ed, it is clear that conditions in kampongs in Bandung remain adverse. 
There is also little chance that this will change in the near future. Currently, 
49 Interestingly, Bandung‘s municipal government had earlier conducted similar research 
and identified only 54 City Quarters that consisted of ‘slum settlements’, Taman Sari 
again being one of them. In its latest Spatial Plan the municipal government identifies 
62 slum-like areas, apparently mistakenly referring to the same report of the Depart-
ment of Public Works, which only states that these 62 areas were initially selected for 
closer research.
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Bandung is a metropolitan city of 2.3 million inhabitants.50 With 13,346 
people per km2, it is one of the densest cities in Indonesia (BPS Kota Ban-
dung 2005:35). Kampongs are not attracting as many newcomers as in ear-
lier years, partly because of increasing circular migration and a growing 
number of people commuting between their village and Bandung. Still, 
low-income migrants keep flowing into kampongs, which also remain 
populous with newborns. Bandung’s annual population growth rate is cur-
rently about 2.5 per cent, meaning that each year the population increases 
by more than 50,000 people (Pemerintah Kota Bandung 2004a:12).
The reduction of (urban) poverty continues to be a policy priority of the 
Indonesian government. As noted in Chapter 1, in 2005 it adopted a five-
year National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (Strategi Nasional Penanggu-
langan Kemiskinan or SNPK) which, in line with the UN Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, takes an integrated, rights-based approach.51 It thus 
formulates ten basic rights that should be fulfilled, including the right to 
adequate housing and (notably, mentioned separately) the right to secure 
land tenure (BAPPENAS 2005:137-8; 140-1). The Strategy has been includ-
ed in the 2004-2009 National Mid-Term Development Plan (Rencana Pem-
bangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional or RPJMN 2004-2009).
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has described the history of Bandung’s kampongs, govern-
ment measures aimed at improving the conditions in these settlements, 
and contemporary characteristics of kampongs in view of international 
standards on slums. It thus aims to clarify the local settings of development 
strategies that centre on the issue of tenure security.
Notably, since the late 19th century Bandung transformed from a small 
town into a metropolis of 2.3 million inhabitants. Kampongs developed in 
parallel. During the heyday of the colonial period the expanding city 
engulfed rural villages, which turned into urban settlements with a resi-
dential nature, thus becoming the city’s first kampongs. During the Japa-
nese occupation kampongs served as refuge settlements for those fleeing 
the hardships of West-Java’s countryside. A few years later, these and other 
dwellers again had to leave Bandung, because of warfare between the 
Indonesian Republican Army and the Allied, later Dutch troops. They 
returned after independence, accompanied by vast flows of new refugees, 
50 This number represents the population size of the City of Bandung alone. The popula-
tion size of Bandung Metropolitan, including Bandung District, which encloses the city, 
is estimated at up to five million inhabitants.
51 Notably, the Indonesian government does not follow the distinction of rights or use the 
related concepts that can be found in international human rights law: instead of explic-
itly referring to tenure security as part of the right to adequate housing, the National 
Strategy for Poverty Reduction refers to legal certainty regarding rights to land.
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who fled the violent clash between the Darul Islam and the Republican 
Army. Coinciding with the exodus of the European population, they settled 
in existing kampongs or created new ones by occupying vacant land. In 
later years, and particularly during the early years of the New Order peri-
od, kampongs continued to grow as a result of labour migration. Under 
these circumstances, living conditions in kampongs quickly deteriorated.
Subsequent governments have tried to improve the living conditions in 
kampongs through a variety of measures, first addressing their physical, 
then their socio-economic, and later also their legal characteristics. So Ban-
dung’s colonial government introduced a housing programme, allocated 
the southern part of the city for the Indonesian population, and later initi-
ated kampong improvement activities. These measures were limited in 
scope, not least because of ‘village autonomy’, which gave kampongs a 
legally autonomous status and which, despite calls for its annulment, was 
maintained; thereby severely restricting the government’s opportunity to 
exert influence in the kampongs. During the struggle for Independence the 
Dutch Indies colonial government promulgated an ordinance that made 
the unlawful occupation of government land a criminal offence. It also 
enacted the first Town Planning Ordinance for Municipalities on Java, 
which laid the foundation for future town planning, also in relation to kam-
pongs. In the early 1950s, the Department of Labour of the Indonesian 
Republic initiated a housing programme, the municipal government 
declared Bandung a close city and initiated a joint effort to tackle the prob-
lem of squatting. A few years later, ‘village autonomy’ was abolished. In 
1960 the Indonesian government enacted the BAL, which was meant to 
unify land law. Customary land owners had to register their land, other-
wise their rights would no longer be recognised. The government also 
enacted a law in 1961 enabling the state and private landholders to easily 
evict unlawful occupants. In practice, however, eviction only occurred on a 
limited scale in Bandung. To the contrary, practices of unlawful occupation 
were tolerated and even approved by the administration and judiciary, per-
haps under the influence of the PKI and other parties supporting the urban 
poor. From the 1970s, the New Order regime formulated and implemented 
a social housing policy. It also started the KIP, which was initially focused 
on physical improvements only, but later also on socio-economic issues. 
From the 1980s the regime initiated land registration programmes like 
PRONA, PRODA, and the LAP. Following the 1997 economic crisis, the 
Indonesian government took an unprecedented series of new measures, 
first as part of an emergency programme and later as part of a structural 
poverty reduction strategy, in which several of the previous strategies are 
integrated.
Despite the above measures, our survey data reveal that contemporary 
kampongs in Bandung are low-income settlements, in the sense that they 
house dwellers who are generally low-educated, work in the informal sec-
tor, and have low incomes. Although on first sight they give the impres-
sion of a slum, most settlements do have reasonably consolidated housing, 
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access to public utilities, and relatively good infrastructure. Besides, while 
they still have a predominantly informal status in terms of land tenure 
and land use, there are various degrees of legality among and within these 
settlements. On the basis of international standards it would therefore be 
inaccurate to qualify these settlements as slums – as the Indonesian gov-
ernment does. Still, conditions in kampongs remain adverse. The Indone-
sian government is continuing its efforts in addressing (urban) poverty, in 
which the provision of tenure security can be identified as one of the gov-
ernment’s priorities.
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are questions whether strategies cen-
tred on tenure security in which land registration plays a dominant role can 
indeed contribute to poverty alleviation in settlements like in Taman Sari. 
Alternative approaches that combine the provision of basic services and 
credit facilities – for which in Indonesia, programmes have already been 
initiated decades ago – with protective administrative or legal measures 
against evictions may be just as or even more successful. In any event, the 
success of these approaches depends on the enforceability of property and/
or human rights. This requires a rule of law environment, in which the 
urban poor are protected against arbitrary behaviour by the state or private 
parties. In order to be able to answer the main questions addressed in this 
book, the next chapter therefore first provides a general overview of Indo-




As discussed in Chapter 2, as part of colonial legal dualism, from the early 
years of colonial rule until 1960, the Indonesian population residing in the 
autonomous villages that had been engulfed by the expanding city could 
apply their own customary or adat law, administration, and administration 
of justice. This adat law was supposedly of a traditional, customary, unwrit-
ten, and often communal character.1 It could also be applied in relation to 
land, which in the autonomous villages qualified as ‘indigenous land’. 
Land outside the autonomous villages was qualified as ‘European land’, 
which was subject to the provisions of the Civil Code of the Dutch East 
Indies (‘Burgerlijk Wetboek voor Nederlandsch-Indië’).
The Indonesian government believed that the dualist system, meant to 
serve colonial interests, had failed in creating legal tenure security. Immedi-
ately after the transfer of sovereignty, it therefore started to draft a bill on 
land, water, and airspace. Article 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution formed the 
point of departure of this effort. It states that land, water, and the natural 
resources contained therein shall be under the authority of the state and be 
used to the greatest benefit of the people.2 Article 33(5) stipulates that the 
provisions of this article (including Sub-clause 3) must be implemented by 
act of parliament (undang-undang).
In 1960, after twelve years of preparations (Tan 1977:1), the Indonesian 
government finally enacted the law implementing Article 33(3) of the 1945 
Constitution: the Basic Agrarian Law. The word ‘basic’ (dasar) indicates that 
the BAL lays the foundation for a system of agrarian law; its general princi-
ples should be implemented by other laws and regulations.3 The word 
‘agraria’ does not imply that the law is about agriculture or agricultural 
land, but it is a term from colonial times that refers to land, water, and air-
1 Adat is Arabic for custom. For Indonesia, adat law was defined during the colonial era as 
all customs with legal consequences, without implying that the latter and other adat can 
be strictly (and easily) divided (Snouck Hurgronje 1893:16). Although Snouck Hurgron-
je introduced the term (Slaats 2000:49), adat law became well known by the contribu-
tions of Van Vollenhoven.
2 In Indonesian this section reads: Bumi dan air dan kekayaan alam yang terkandung di dalam-
nya dikuasai oleh negara dan dipergunakan untuk sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat. The Elu-
cidation to Art. 33 explained that land, water and the natural resources must be under 
the power of the state because they form the basis for the people’s welfare.
3 Compare Explanatory Memorandum, General Elucidation, pt. I BAL.
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space.4 To this day, the BAL provides the general framework of Indonesian 
land law.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the success of approaches to the enhance-
ment of tenure security depends on enforceability of property and/or 
human rights. This requires a rule of law environment, in which urban 
poor are protected against arbitrary behaviour by the state or private par-
ties. In order to be able to answer the main questions addressed this book, 
this chapter therefore gives a general overview of Indonesian land law in 
the context of Indonesia’s changing rule of law environment. It thus forms 
the point of departure for a more detailed legal and empirical review in 
later chapters.
Following the three political periods it addresses, this chapter compris-
es five sections. The next section focuses on the implementation of land law 
during Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1957-1965), Section 3.3 on 
the implementation of land law during the New Order (Orde Baru, 1965-
1998), and Section 3.4 on the implementation of land law during the Post-
New Order (since 1998), after which the chapter concludes.
3.2 Guided Democracy: land law in a state of revolution
A general overview of Indonesian land law requires first a few words on 
the 1945 Constitution, on which the BAL is based, and Guided Democracy, 
the prevailing political ideology during the period in which the BAL was 
enacted and was first implemented.
Promulgated on 18 August 1945, the day after the proclamation of 
independence, the 1945 Constitution was Indonesia’s first constitution. It 
was a vague and ambivalent document. The Constitution consisted of no 
more than 37 articles – which made it the world’s shortest constitution. In 
addition, it was based on two contradictory notions of state ordering, 
namely that of a ‘Rechtsstaat’ (in Indonesian: negara hukum) and of a so-
called ‘integralist state’.5 The exact meaning of the ‘integralist state’ concept 
is unclear, but at least it represents a strong state, in which there can be no 
dualism between the state and the people, as they form an organic unity 
(Mulya Lubis 1999:173). Formally, the latter notion was dropped. So the 
General Elucidation to the 1945 Constitution indicated that Indonesia 
4 Compare Art. 5 BAL.
5 This ambivalence was the result of a controversy between several members of the Con-
stitutional Committee: Yamin and Hatta, who were supporters of a ‘Rechtsstaat’ notion, 
and Soepomo and Soekarno, who had a preference for the notion of an ‘integralist 
state’. For a discussion of the historical background of this controversy, please refer to 
Bourchier 1999. There were also supporters in the committee for an Islamic state, an 
issue that does however not deserve much attention in the context of this book.
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formed a ‘Rechtsstaat’, not a ‘Machts staat’.6 However, the 1945 Constitu-
tion gave no definition of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ concept.7 Worse, various provi-
sions were more in line with the notion of the ‘integralist state’, for instance 
those on the position of the executive branch, which was clearly dominant.8 
Reference to human rights was limited.9
When in 1949 the Dutch government finally granted independence to 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution was 
replaced by the Federal Constitution (Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat). 
In 1950, the Federal Constitution was again replaced by the Provisional 
Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara), in which the influence of 
European ideas on democracy was apparent (Lindsey 1999b:15). The enact-
ment of the Constitution indeed marked the beginning of a period of con-
stitutional democracy. In 1955 the first parliamentary elections were organ-
ised. As Lev concluded, there was a balance between state and society and 
there were limits on public authority in these years (Lev 2007:239).
The period of constitutional democracy was short-lived though. In 
1957, growing political unrest in the regions (such as the Darul Islam rebel-
lion in West-Java, discussed in Chapter 2), among political parties as well 
as between the political parties/civilian government and the army formed 
a reason – or an excuse – for President Soekarno to declare martial law. This 
step marked the beginning of ‘Guided Democracy’, which was followed by 
three major political decisions. First, the imposition of a mutual coopera-
tion (gotong royong) cabinet of the major parties that was advised by a coun-
cil of functional groups (youth, workers, peasants, religions, regions, etc.), 
strengthening the position of the President, limiting the influence of politi-
cal parties, and allowing for military participation. Second, the introduc-
tion of the ‘Middle Way of the Army’ (later called the dwifungsi or dual-
function of the armed forces), on the basis of which the army would not 
only have a role in national defence, but also a socio-political role. Two 
years later, in 1959, the transition to Guided Democracy was completed, 
when President Soekarno reintroduced the 1945 Constitution by decree 
(Lev 2007:239-40).
According to President Soekarno, the new form of government was 
meant to revive the spirit of the revolution, support social justice, and 
retool the state apparatus in the name of the ongoing revolution (Ricklefs 
2001:323). These aims formed an excuse to sweep away legalism. Soekarno 
6 In Indonesian, the General Elucidation reads “Indonesia ialah negara yang berdasar atas 
hukum (rechtsstaat), tidak berdasarkan atas kekuasaan belaka (machtsstaat).”
7 The 1945 Constitution did refer to separate elements of the Indonesian ‘Rechtsstaat’, 
such as regarding the independence of the judiciary. So according to the Elucidation to 
Art. 24-25, “Judicial authority is an independent authority, in the sense that it is beyond 
the influence of government.” It is not clear what is meant by independent authority, 
which allowed for various interpretations of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ notion.
8 See for instance Art. 5, 12, and 22 of the 1945 Constitution.
9 See Art. 27, 28, 29, 31, 34 of the 1945 Constitution.
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had a disregard for lawyers, which he considered to be instrumental in 
maintaining vested interests. What the country needed, was revolutionary 
law (hukum revolusi), he believed.
Under these circumstances, the legal system gradually collapsed. 
Although the colonial criminal code created enough room to silence oppo-
sition, Soekarno issued directives on political activity in 1963, stipulating 
that almost any political activity required the permission of the authorities, 
and on anti-subversion, which set a maximum gaol term of seven years for 
a wide range of activities that might be considered subversive, while deny-
ing suspects normal procedural protections.10 With the enactment of laws in 
1964 and 1965 that empowered the President to interfere in judicial matters, 
even the separation of powers fell victim of Soekarno’s revolutionary ide-
as.11 Besides, corruption started to affect the courts required impartiality 
and limited their access. It was the beginning of a phenomenon that, as will 
be discussed in Section 3.3 below, would become widespread in later years, 
also outside the judiciary (Lev 2007:240-1).
Under Guided Democracy the Indonesian government undertook a 
few major substantive law reforms. These reforms aimed at ending the 
colonial and feudal system and instead imposing a national and socialist 
economic order. The natural resources sector, including land, was an 
important target of the reforms. In 1960, the reforms resulted in the enact-
ment of the BAL.
Enacted in the period of Guided Democracy, the BAL is a product of its 
time. It is based on anti-colonial, nationalist, and socialist principles.12 The 
BAL is as full of aspirations and symbolic meaning as a number of its key 
provisions are vague and ambivalent. The BAL stresses that land has a 
social function (fungsi sosial) and that particularly vulnerable groups 
should be protected.13 It therefore grants the state a strong authority in land 
matters. This authority finds its basis in the state’s right of control (hak meng-
uasai dari negara), which extends to all land, water, and airspace, including 
the natural resources contained therein.14 This right allows the state to ‘hold 
the land in custody’ as the representative of the Indonesian people (Gauta-
10 Presidential Directive No. 5/1963 on Political Activities (Penetapan Presiden No. 5/1963 
tentang Kegiatan Politik); Presidential Directive No. 11/1963 on the Eradication of Anti-
Subversive Activities (Penetapan Presiden No. 11/1963 tentang Pemberantasan Kegiatan 
Subversi).
11 Law No. 19/1964 on the Basic Principles of Judicial Power (UU No. 19/1964 tentang Ke -
tentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kukuasaan Kehakim) and Law No. 13/1965 on Justice in the 
Sphere of the General Courts and the Supreme Court (UU No. 13/1965 tentang Pengadil-
an dalam Lingkungan Peradilan Umum dan Mahkamah Agung).
12 Art. 5 BAL. For a general overview of the principles of the BAL please refer to: Harsono 
2005:162-75.
13 Art. 6 and 11 BAL.
14 Art. 2 BAL.
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ma & Harsono 1972). As long as the state has not granted any rights on 
state land, it holds a direct right of control over the land.15
Land matters are in principle under the authority of the central govern-
ment. Within the framework of co-governance (‘medebewind’), it can 
transfer the authority to exercise the state’s right of control over land to the 
Provinces and the Districts/Municipalities. For these regional govern-
ments land can become a source of income.16 Besides, the central govern-
ment can grant a (state) management right (hak pengelolaan) to authority 
bodies, state companies, and regional companies.17 This right is not explic-
itly acknowledged by the BAL, but is referred to in the General Elucida-
tion.18 It is further elaborated by Ministerial Regulations.19
The state’s right of control allows the state to grant individual land 
rights (hak-hak perorangan), to limit these rights, or to revoke them. If the 
state grants individual land rights, it still holds an indirect right of control 
over the land. Rights the state can grant, comprise four primary rights: an 
ownership right (hak milik), long-lease right (hak guna usaha), construction 
right (hak guna bangunan), and usage right (hak pakai). Someone holding an 
ownership right can grant a lease right (hak sewa), which forms a secondary 
right.20 These rights resemble the rights that could be held on European 
land during the colonial period, but are not the same.21 For instance, the 
BAL makes no distinction between real rights (rights in rem) and relative 
rights (rights in personam), which are indeed unknown in the adat law on 
which the BAL is claimed to be based (Tan 1977:36-7).
15 In this context a distinction is often made between a broad conception and a narrow 
conception of the state right of control. For a narrow definition see for instance Art. 1(3) 
of GR No. 24/1997 on Land Registration (PP No. 24/1997 tentang Pendaftaran Tanah) 
(Harsono 2005:476-7).
16 Art. 2 BAL and Elucidation in conjunction with Art. 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution. It 
should be noted, however, that the state cannot lease out land, since it is not the owner 
of the land (Elucidation Art. 44 and 45 BAL).
17 The institution holding a management right can in turn grant individual land rights to 
third parties. Third parties can obtain an ownership right, construction right, or usage 
right to the land. State land should not be confused with land to which government 
institutions hold a usage right. Instead of a direct right to avail, it then holds a private 
land right. Such land forms an asset of the state, which falls under the responsibility of 
the Minister of Finance (Harsono 2005:271-80).
18 Section II, under 2 BAL.
19 See Minister of Home Affairs No. 5/1974 on Provisions on the Disposal and Provision 
of Rights for the Needs of Companies (Permen Dalam Negeri No. 5/1974 tentang Ketentu-
an-Ketentuan mengenai Penyediaan dan Pemberian Hak untuk Keperluan Perusahaan); Regu-
lation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 1/1977 on the Procedure for the Request and 
Settlement of Granting Rights on Land Plots with Management Rights and their Regis-
tration (Permen Dalam Negeri No. 1/1977 tentang Tatacara Permohonan dan Penyelesaian 
Pemberian Hak atas Bagian-Bagian Tanah Hak Pengelolaan serta Pendaftarannya).
20 Other secondary rights that can be granted are the right to reclaim land (hak membuka 
tanah) and the right to collect forest products (hak memungut-hasil-hutan) (Art. 16 BAL).
21 See also Elucidation Art. 16 BAL.
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In order to secure individual interests, private rights are part of a ‘truly 
Indonesian’ unified system of land rights, of which, as will be further dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, the primary rights must be registered in a legal regis-
try.22 The BAL thus tries to bring an end to colonial dualism in land law.
While it is the objective of the BAL to create a unified system of land 
rights, it maintains one adat law figure: the community’s right of avail (hak 
ulayat and its equivalents).23 The legislator’s wish to come to a unified sys-
tem is obvious though: the community’s right of avail is only acknowl-
edged if apparently still existing and not contrary to the national interest 
and interests of the state, on the basis of the unity of the people, and if not 
contrary to higher state legislation (Haverfield 1999:51-4).24
The state can limit the exercise of land rights (and claims) on the basis 
of spatial planning, as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5. The 
central government is responsible for national planning, on the basis of 
which the regional governments can undertake regional planning, which is 
formalised by the enactment of bylaws. According to the BAL, such bylaws 
only become valid after the approval, with regard to Provinces, by the Pres-
ident, with regard to Districts/Municipalities, by the Governors (Guber-
nur), and with regard to Sub-Districts, by the District-Heads/Mayors 
(Bupati/Walikota).25
The state can revoke land rights if individuals (and families) hold too 
much land (land reform), or, as will be discussed in further detail in Chap-
ter 6, if such revocation is in the public interest (kepentingan umum). In addi-
tion, land rights become forfeited if land qualifies as neglected land (tanah 
terlantar). In all cases, right holders are entitled to compensation.26 As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 and will also be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
6, the state can also clear land if it is occupied without permission from the 
title holder.
In the first years after the enactment of the BAL, only few provisions of 
the law were implemented by other laws and lower regulations. Imple-
menting legislation that was enacted included a government regulation in 
lieu of law on land reform, a government regulation on land registration, 
which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, a law on the use of 
land without permission from the title holder and a law on the revocation 
of land rights, which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.
22 See Art. 23, 32, and 38, in conjunction with Art. 19 BAL.
23 For a discussion of the conception of adat law as a universal principle and specific adat 
rights acknowledged by the BAL, see Harsono 2005:176-218.
24 Art. 3 BAL. See also General Elucidation II (3), which notably explains that an ulayat 
community cannot simply refuse that the state develops its land to realise large projects 
for the purpose of increasing food production or transmigration. Indeed, on the basis of 
Art. 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution, the state has the right and the duty to exploit land to 
the greatest benefit of the people.
25 Art. 14 and Elucidation and General Elucidation, Sub II, under 8 BAL.
26 Art. 10; Art. 17 in conjunction with Art. 7; Art. 18 BAL.
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Guided democracy did not lead to stability. In fact, the tensions 
between the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or 
PKI), the military, and religious organisations only grew stronger. The 
unlawful occupation of land with the support of the PKI, discussed in 
Chapter 2, contributed to these tensions. State initiated land reforms, in 
later years, were equally controversial. When in 1965 lower ranked military 
allegedly affiliated to the PKI staged a coup against the army’s supreme 
command, General Soeharto, the highest in rank to survive the coup, seized 
the opportunity to stage a counter-coup, eliminating the PKI and eventual-
ly removing Soekarno from office. The accompanying massacre of an esti-
mated 500,000-1,500,000 alleged communists have in part been connected 
to the land reforms in previous years (Cribb 1990).
3.3 The New Order: land law in a ‘developmentalist‘ state
When in 1966 General Soeharto became the new President of the Indone-
sian Republic, there were strong hopes that the Indonesian ‘Rechtsstaat’ 
would be restored. Rhetorically, the Soeharto regime was indeed strongly 
committed to the rule of law.
The proclaimed goal of Soeharto and his so-called New Order regime 
was to build a modern, prosperous nation. He therefore adopted a ‘devel-
opmentalist’ approach to stimulate economic growth, focusing on state-led 
industrialisation, intensification of agriculture, and large scale exploitation 
of natural resources. So in 1967 and 1968, two laws were enacted on foreign 
and domestic investment respectively.27 Economic objectives at the broadest 
level were enunciated by the Broad Outlines of Government Policy (Garis-
Garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN) and the Five-Years Development Plans 
(Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun or REPELITA). The National Develop-
ment Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional or BAP-
PENAS) and the Regional Development Planning Agencies (Badan Perenca-
naan Pembangunan Daerah or BAPPEDA) at the provincial and district/
municipal level would play a pivotal role in planning.28
27 Law No. 1/1967 concerning Foreign Investment (UU No. 1/1967 Penanaman Modal 
Asing) and Law No. 6/1968 on Domestic Investment (UU No. 6/1968 tentang Penanaman 
Modal Dalam Negeri). These laws were slightly revised by Law No. 11/1970 on the Revi-
sion and Extension of Law No. 1/1967 on Foreign Investment (UU No. 11/1970 tentang 
Perubahan dan Tambahan UU No. 1/1967 tentang Penanaman Modal Asing) and Law No. 
12/1970 on the Revision and Extension of Law No. 12/1967 on Domestic Investment 
(UU No. 12/1970 tentang Perubahan dan Tambahan UU No. 6/1968 tentang Penanaman 
Modal Dalam Negeri) respectively.
28 For a (critical) assessment of the New Order ‘developmentalist’ approach, see Robison 
1986:174-5; Hill 2000; Rosser 2002.
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Economic growth required political stability. After having purged the 
country of alleged communists, Soeharto thus built a centralist regime of 
authoritarian rule with strong military backing. Centralism was confirmed 
by the enactment of the 1974 Decentralisation Law, which left the regions 
very limited authority.29 The judiciary remained far from independent, also 
after the enactment of a revised law on judicial power in 1970, which in fact 
created new room for executive interference.30 Political activity was further 
curtailed, culminating in the enactment of five laws on political organisa-
tion in 1985, prescribing all non-governmental organisations to be formally 
based on the Pancasila, thus creating a so-called ‘Pancasila-democracy’, 
referring to the five principles forming Indonesia’s state ideology.31 As a 
result, the New Order was in fact just “a continuation of the model of guid-
ed democracy (by the executive) but without Soekarno’s ‘left-wing rheto-
ric’” (Lindsey 1999a:8). The 1945 Constitution proved a proper basis for this 
‘integralist’ type of rule (Lindsey 1999b:17-8).32
29 Law No. 5/1974 on the Principles of Government in the Regions (UU No. 5/1974 tentang 
Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan di Daerah). For a discussion of this law and previously decen-
tralisation laws, see Niessen 1999:41-88.
30 Law No. 14/1970 on the Basic Provisions for Judicial Power (UU No. 14/1970 tentang 
Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman). Law No. 2/1986 and 6/1986, which 
replaced Law 14/1970, were of the same kind (Mulya Lubis 1999:174-5). It should be 
acknowledged that the law created the authority of the Supreme Court to review legis-
lation below the rank of acts of parliament against higher legislation, however only if in 
relation to an appeal case (Art. 26 Law No. 14/1970). This authority was later confirmed 
by Art. 11(4) People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. III/MPR/1978 on the Posi-
tion and Working Relation of the Highest State Bodies with/or between High State 
Bodies (TAP MPR No. III/MPR/1987 tentang Kedudukan dan Hubungan Tata-Kerja Lembaga 
Tertinggi Negara dengan/atau antar Lembaga-Lembaga Tinggi Negara). See also Art. 31 Law 
No. 14/1985 on the Supreme Court (UU No. 14/1985 tentang Mahkamah Agung). From 
1993, a request for review no longer had to be related to an appeal case, but could be 
initiated separately following a complaint or a request. See Regulation of the Supreme 
Court No. 1/1993 on the Right to Substantive Review (Peraturan Mahkamah Agung No. 
1/1993 tentang Hak Uji Materiil) in conjunction with Art. 79 Law No. 14/1985.
31 Law No. 1/1985 on the Revision of Law No. 15/1969 on the Election of Members of the 
Consultative Assembly/Representative Councils as Earlier Revised by Law No. 5/1975 
and Law No. 2/1980 (UU No. 1/1985 tentang Perubahan atas UU No. 15/1969 tentang 
Pemilihan Anggota-Anggota Badan Permusyawaaratan/Perwakilan Rakyat Sebagaimana Telah 
Diubah Dengan UU No. 5/1975 dan UU No. 2/1980); Law No. 2/1985 on the Revision of 
Law No. 16/1969 on the Organisation and Mode of Operation of the People’s Consulta-
tive Assembly, the People’s Representative Council, and the Regional People’s Repre-
sentative Councils as Earlier Revised by Law No. 5/1975 (UU No. 2/1985 tentang Perubah-
an atas UU No. 16/1969 tentang Susunan dan Kedudukan MPR, DPR, dan DPRD 
Sebagaimana Telah Diubah dengan UU No. 5/1975); Law No. 3/1985 on the Revision of 
Law No. 3/1975 on Political Parties and the Functional Groups (UU No. 3/1985 tentang 
Perubahan atas UU No. 3/1975 tentang Partai Politik dan Golongan Karya); Law No. 5/1985 
on Referendum (UU No. 5/1985 tentang Referendum); Law No. 8/1985 on Civil Organisa-
tions (UU No. 8/1985 tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan).
32 For a further discussion on the collapse of the Indonesian ‘Rechtsstaat’ under the New 
Order, see Lev 2000a.
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Meanwhile, the problem of ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’ 
(korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme or KKN) became epidemic in all branches and 
at all levels of government. From 1967 various half-hearted efforts were 
made to fight corruption through the establishment of anti-corruption 
institutions, but as a result of, inter alia, opposition from other state institu-
tions and a lack of supporting legislation, they were little successful (Asse-
gaf 2002:134-6). According to Lev, the opportunity of self-enrichment made 
available to supporters was actually the glue that kept the New Order 
structure together (Lev 2007:244).
While constitutional law provided the stability required for economic 
development, the New Order regime created a new framework of substan-
tive laws and regulations that were to facilitate such development. Existing 
legislation was not always annulled, but often marginalised and reinter-
preted.
Land law was also reformed to facilitate economic development, lead-
ing to significant legal inconsistencies. The socialist oriented BAL was 
maintained. As the law grants the state a broad authority in land matters, it 
was basically a suitable instrument to implement New Order ‘develop-
mentalist’ policies. However, the BAL’s reference to Indonesian socialism 
was reformulated as the strive for “a just and prosperous society in accord-
ance with the Pancasila” (Harsono 2005:166-7). Furthermore, the BAL’s 
scope was strongly limited by the enactment of various sectoral laws, such 
as the 1967 laws on forestry and mining and, as will be further discussed in 
Chapter 5, the 1992 law on spatial management, which also regulates spa-
tial planning (including land use planning, which is an integrated part of 
spatial planning, which again forms an integrated part of spatial man-
agement).33
Various prominent legal scholars argue that, despite the enactment of 
the above laws, the BAL, being an ‘umbrella law’, remains the highest law 
in hierarchy in the field of agraria.34 This point of view is however untena-
ble: the Indonesian legal system has never formally acknowledged the dis-
tinction between ‘umbrella laws’ and ‘ordinary laws’.35 In addition, with the 
enactment of various sectoral laws, the BAL can be considered itself a sec-
toral law, no longer applicable to tenure and use of natural resources, but 
only to tenure of non-forest land, which covers only 30 per cent of Indone-
sia’s total land area (Wallace 2008:195).
33 Law No. 5/1967 on the Principles of Forestry (UU No. 5/1967 tentang Pokok-Pokok Kehu-
tanan) and No. 11/1967 on the Principles of Mining (UU No. 11/1967 tentang Pokok-Pokok 
Pertambangan); Law No. 24/1992 on Spatial Management (UU No. 24/1992 tentang Pena-
taan Ruang).
34 See for instance to Gautama 1993 [1960]; Parlindungan 1998:21-38; Harsono 2005:174-5; 
Sumardjono 2005.
35 Compare Explanatory Memorandum, General Elucidation, pt. I BAL, in which it is con-
firmed that formally there is no difference between the BAL and other acts of parlia-
ment.
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As far as the BAL still played a role, much of its required implementing 
legislation was never enacted during the New Order. In 1994, Parlindun-
gan estimated that the enactment of more than 40 laws and regulations 
were still awaited.36 At the same time the body of detailed, subordinate leg-
islation and ‘soft law’ grew, consisting of thousands of regulations, admin-
istrative standards, and announcements (Wallace 2008:201). Most of this 
material was produced by the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan 
Nasional or BPN, hereafter NLA), currently a non-departmental body resid-
ing under and directly responsible to the President, which holds authority 
over land matters. This legislation and ‘soft law’ reflected the New Order 
regime’s extreme ‘integralist’ interpretation of key concepts of the BAL, 
such as the social function of land, the state’s right of control, and public 
interest.37 Examples of such legislation, which will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively, are the Regulation of the Minister of 
Home Affairs and the Presidential Decision on land clearance for develop-
ment in the public interest and the Regulations of the Minister of Home 
Affairs and later the NLA on site permits (izin lokasi), permits that allow 
developers to initiate commercial land clearance.
As will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, the combination 
of i) a ‘developmentalist’, centralist-authoritarian, and corrupt New Order 
state, ii) a (marginalised) BAL granting a strong role to that state, and iii) a 
lack of implementing legislation that, as far as it was in place, reflected an 
extreme ‘integralist’ interpretation of key-concepts of the BAL resulted in 
the central government retaining strong discretionary powers in the land 
sector that could easily be and indeed were commonly abused in the name 
of ‘development’ (pembangunan), affecting the tenure security of ordinary 
landholders. In short, it proved hard for particularly the urban poor to reg-
ister their land, the New Order government showed little concern for the 
interests of these people in spatial planning, security forces evicted land-
holders from their land against little or no compensation, and they assisted 
commercial developers to equally do so. As Fitzpatrick noted, develop-
ment became a legal norm, which the bureaucracy and the courts used to 
subjugate formal procedures that were actually meant to protect landhold-
ers (Fitzpatrick 1997:199).
The above practices, and repressive politics and corruption in general, 
increasingly affected the regime’s legitimacy. Combined with the rise of an 
educated middle class, Soeharto faced increasing criticism from students, 
opposition parties, NGOs, and even the military. As a response, he 
endorsed a policy of 'openness' (keterbukaan) in 1989. While never imple-
36 ‘Prof Dr AP Parlindungan: Lebih dari 40 Produk Hukum Perintah UUPA Belum 
Dibuat’, Kompas, 12 August 1994.
37 See also Sumardjono in ‘Penyempurnaan UUPA dan Sinkronisasi Kebijakan’, Kompas, 
24 September 2003.
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mented to the full, for several years after 1989 the regime allowed for more 
dissent and somewhat loosened press restrictions.
The period of political openness was accompanied by two major legal 
reform measures. In 1991 the regime established Administrative District 
Courts (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara or PTUN) in District capitals / Munic-
ipalities and Administrative Courts of Appeal (Pengadilan Tinggi Tata Usaha 
Negara or PTTUN) in provincial capitals. The jurisdiction, powers of 
review, and remedial powers of the Administrative Courts were limited. 
They could only review government institutions’ written decisions with 
legal effect that were individual, concrete, and final.38 Furthermore there 
were only three grounds for review i) contravention of laws and regula-
tions; ii) misuse of power, and; iii) arbitrariness.39 A litigated decision in 
principle maintained its validity, but plaintiffs could demand its suspen-
sion.40 The courts did not have the remedial power to revoke a decision, but 
they could order revocation of the decision.41 Finally, they could award dam-
ages, but such damages were limited to Rp. 5 million.42
Two year later, in 1993, the Jakarta-based National Human Rights Com-
mission (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia or Komnas HAM) was found-
ed. It is to monitor compliance with human rights, to investigate violations, 
as well as to give (non-binding) opinions, judgements and advice to gov-
ernment bodies on the implementation of human rights.43
Developments looked promising, but the period of political openness 
was short-lived. As soon as President Soeharto managed to reconsolidate 
his power, repression was re-imposed. Such was marked by the revocation 
of the press licences of the magazines Tempo, Editor, and Dëtik in 1994 
(Aspinall 2005:47-8). Nonetheless, both the Administrative Courts and par-
ticularly the National Human Rights Commission continued in putting the 
executive branch under considerable scrutiny, not least in land cases (Lev 
2007:244-6).
38 Art. 47 in conjuction with Art. 1(4) in conjunction with Art. 1(3) Law No. 5/1986 on 
Administrative Justice (UU No. 5/1986 tentang Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara).
39 Art. 53(2) Law No. 5/1986. The law did not allow the courts to review decisions for 
contravening general principles of proper administration. The minutes of parliamenta-
ry debates on the law show that the initial idea was to grant the courts the authority to 
review decisions on the basis of these principles, but that for political reasons, the gov-
ernment did not want to refer to them explicitly in the law. In practice, the courts have 
invoked this ground for review from the start. The Supreme Court has accepted this 
practice (Bedner 2009:215-6).
40 Art. 67 Law No. 5/1986.
41 Art. 116 Law No. 5/1986.
42 Art. 97(10) Law No. 5/1986 in conjunction with Art. 3 GR No. 43/1991 on Compensa-
tion and its Implementation in the Context of Administrative Justice (PP No. 43/1991 
tentang Ganti Rugi dan Tata Cara Pelaksanaan pada Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara). For addi-
tional compensation, the plaintiff had to start a separate procedure at a General Court.
43 Art. 4, under c Presidential Decision No. 50/1993 on the National Human Rights Com-
mission (Keppres No. 50/1993 tentang Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia).
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3.4 Post-New Order: land law in a decentralised ‘Rechtsstaat’?
The 1997 monetary and economic crises created the right circumstances for 
students and other opposition groups to finally bring down Soeharto in 
May 1998.44 Soeharto’s resignation cleared the way for reformasi (reform). 
The IMF, which the Indonesian government had addressed for assistance 
in October 1997, and other donors added to the pressure. The People’s Con-
sultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR), People’s Rep-
resentative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) as well as Soeharto’s 
successor, President Habibie, responded by initiating an ambitious reform 
programme, also in relation to land. What follows is an overview of these 
reforms, starting with the general reforms, then regional autonomy, and 
finally land law reform. The reforms are only discussed as far as they may, 
in one way or the other, change practices in the land sector.
3.4.1 General reforms 45
The general reforms addressed the three main characteristics of New Order 
rule: ‘developmentalism’, authoritarian rule, and corruption. Indonesia’s 
reorientation of its development policy was ambivalent though. The first 
priority of the new government was to overcome the economic crisis. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank offered financial assist-
ance and imposed reforms, many of which were informed by neo-liberal 
economic policy. Between 1997 and 2000, the Indonesian government 
signed 16 Letters of Intent to the IMF, which formed the basis for a series of 
structural adjustment measures (Hadiz & Robison 2005:225-6). Pressured by 
emerging people’s power, the People’s Consultative Assembly however at 
the same time enacted various directives for reforms toward a ‘people’s 
economy’ (ekonomi kerakyatan).46 A broad base of small and medium-scale 
enterprises was to form the main pillar of national economic development.47
44 For an analysis of the role of the various oppositional forces in this historic event, see 
Aspinall 2005.
45 For a further discussion of these reforms, see Lindsey 2001; Lindsey 2002; Lindsey 2004; 
Stockmann 2004; Lev 2007; Lindsey & Santosa 2008.
46 See People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. X/MPR/98 on the Reform Princi-
plies for Development in the Framework of the Recovery and Normalisation of Nation-
al Life (TAP MPR No X/MPR/1998 tentang Pokok-pokok Reformasi Pembangunan dalam 
Rangka Penyelamatan dan Normalisasi Kehidupan Nasional) and People’s Consultative 
Assembly Directive No. XVI/MPR/98 on Political Economy within Economic Democ-
racy (TAP MPR No. XVI/MPR/1998 tentang Politik Ekonomi dalam Rangka Demokrasi Eko-
nomi). Directive No. X/MPR/98 eventually led to the enactment of a new law on devel-
opment planning, Law No. 25/2004 on the National Development Planning System 
(UU No. 25/2004 tentang Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional).
47 See Preamble, under: Consideration (b) and Art. 7 People’s Consultative Assembly 
Directive No. XVI/MPR/98.
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Indonesia’s reorientation of its development policy was translated into 
the National Policy Guidelines and entailing development plans. The 2000-
2004 National Development Programme (Program Pembangunan Nasional or 
PROPENAS), which succeeded REPELITA VI), gave priority to the devel-
opment of a people’s economy. According to the document, such an econo-
my should combine economic growth with social values, including equity, 
quality of life, and environmental protection. Poverty alleviation and the 
provision of basic needs as well as the development of micro, small, and 
middle-size companies and cooperatives formed other policy objectives. A 
final objective relevant to mention here formed the development of infra-
structure to further economic growth. From New Order experience, we 
know that these objectives can heavily collide in Indonesia. However, the 
Plan did not give notice of such risk, let alone mention any preventive 
measures.
General reforms also focussed on the dismantling of the authoritarian 
state. To that aim, the People’s Consultative Assembly enacted several 
directives.48 More importantly, as noted in Chapter 1, between 1999 and 
2002 it amended the 1945 Constitution four times.49 The document is now 
three times longer than it used to be. Although still containing some imper-
fections, it now clearly reflects rule of law ideology, creating a separation of 
powers, establishing democracy, and acknowledging human rights. The 
People’s Representative Council and the central government supported the 
constitutional amendments by implementing legislation and programmes. 
What follows is an overview of the most important constitutional reforms.
First, the (discretionary) power of the executive branch was limited. 
The position of the armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or 
ABRI) weakened. It was split up into the Indonesian National Army (Ten-
tara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) and the Police of the Indonesian Republic 
48 See for instance People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. III/MPR/1998 on Gen-
eral Elections (TAP MPR No. III/MPR/1998 tentang Pemilihan Umum, later revised and 
extended by Directive No. XIV/MPR/1998); People’s Consultative Assembly Directive 
No. XV/MPR/1998 on the Organisation of Regional Autonomy, Regulation, Division 
and Use of National Natural Resources in a Just Manner, and the Financial Relation 
between the Centre and Regions within the Framework of the Unitary Republic State of 
Indonesia (TAP MPR No. XV/MPR/1998 tentang Penyelenggaraan Otonomi Daerah, Peng-
aturan, Pembagian, dan Pemanfaatan Sumber Daya Nasional yang Berkeadilan, serta Perim-
bangan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah dalam Kerangka Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia); 
People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights (TAP 
MPR No. XVII/MPR/1998 tentang Hak Asasi Manusia); People’s Consultative Assembly 
Directive No. VIII/MPR/1998 on the Revocation of People’s Consultative Assembly 
Directive Np. IV/MPR/1983 on Referenda (TAP MPR No. VIII/MPR/1998 tentang Pen-
cabutan TAP MPR No. IV/MPR/1983 tentang Referendum).
49 The 1945 Constitution was amended on the following dates: First Amendment, 19 Octo-
ber 1999; Second Amendment, 18 August 2000; Third Amendment, 9 November 2001; 
Fourth Amendment, 10 August 2002.
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(Polisi Republik Indonesia or POLRI).50 Moreover, the security apparatus’ 
dwifungsi came to an end, which means the army and police no longer hold 
seats in the People’s Consultative Assembly, People’s Representative Coun-
cil, Provincial Assemblies, or District/Municipal Councils (on both region-
al levels called the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD).
Second, a mechanism for the review of the constitutionality of legisla-
tion was established, potentially enhancing the legal framework’s consist-
ency. A Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) was founded, which 
reviews the constitutionality of acts of parliament against the Amended 
1945 Constitution.51 However, this review mechanism only applies to legis-
lation passed after the First Constitutional Amendment, i.e. after 19 Octo-
ber 1999. The Supreme Court’s (Mahkamah Agung) authority to review leg-
islation below the rank of acts of parliament was reinforced in the 
Constitution. However, legislation below the rank of acts of parliament can 
no longer be reviewed against higher legislation, but only against acts of 
parliament.52
Third, democracy was strengthened. Not only members of the People’s 
Representative Council and of the newly established Representative Coun-
cil of the Regions (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD), which now together 
form the People’s Consultative Assembly, and of the Provincial Assemblies 
and District/Municipal Councils are now directly elected, but also the 
President, provincial Governors, and District-Heads/Mayors.53 Four of the 
five New Order laws on political organisation were revised, as a result of 
which there is no longer a limit on the number of political parties and on 
political activities.54 Soekarno’s heavily criticized anti-subversion law was 
50 See Presidential Instruction No. 2/1999 on Policy Steps in the Framework of the Separa-
tion of the Police from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Inpres No 2/1999 
tentang Langkah-Langkah Kebijakan dalam Rangka Pemisahan Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia dari Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia); Art. 30 Amended 1945 Constitution.
51 Art. 24C Amended 1945 Constitution; Law No. 24/2003 on the Constitutional Court 
(UU No. 24/2003 tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi).
52 Art. 24A Amended 1945 Constitution; Art. 11(2), under b Law No. 4/2004 on Judicial 
Power (UU No. 4/2005 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman); Art. I Law No. 5/2004 on the Revi-
sion of Law No. 14/1985 on the Supreme Court (UU No. 5/2004 tentang Perubahan atas 
UU No. 14/1985 tentang Mahkamah Agung) (revising Art. 31 Law No. 14/1985). The 
aforementioned Regulation of the Supreme Court No. 1/1993 on the Right to Substan-
tive Review was replaced by Regulation No. 1/1999, which was again replaced by Reg-
ulation No. 1/2004.
53 See Art. 2(1), 6A, 18(3-4), 19(1), 22C(1), and 22E Amended 1945 Constitution.
54 See Art. 85 Law No. 3/1999 on General Elections (UU No. 3/1999 tentang Pemilihan 
Umum), revised by Law No. 12/2003 (UU No. 12/2003 tentang Pemilihan Umum Anggota 
DPR, DPD, dan DPRD), which was again revised by Law No. 10/2008; Art. 47 Law No. 
4/1999 on the Legislature (UU No. 4/ 1999 tentang Susunan dan Kedudukan MPR, DPR dan 
DPRD), revised by Law No. 22/2003; Art. 21 Law No. 2/1999 on Political Parties (UU 
No. 2/1999 tentang Partai Politik), revised by Law No. 31/2002, which was again revised 
by Law No. 2/2008; Law No. 6/1999 on Referenda (UU No. 6/1999 tentang Pencabutan 
UU No. 5/1985 tentang Referendum), and, the law which has not yet been revised, Law No. 
8/1985 on Societal Organisations (UU No. 8/1985 tentang Organisasi Kemasya rakatan).
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repealed.55 There is more room for public participation, for instance in law-
making.56 Democracy was also strengthened by the enactment of the 1999 
and 2004 Regional Autonomy Laws, discussed in Section 3.4.2 below.
Fourth, controlling mechanisms were improved. Existing courts became 
more independent from the executive. A new appointment procedure was 
introduced for members of the Supreme Court, in which the Judicial Com-
mission (Komisi Yudisial) plays a central role.57 The Supreme Court now 
not only has substantive but also administrative-financial control over the 
courts.58 Judges of the General and Administrative Courts are appointed by 
the President at the proposal of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.59 The 
jurisdiction of the judiciary broadened. Specialised courts were established, 
such as a Corruption Court, discussed below, and a Human Rights Court, 
which has jurisdiction in cases of gross human rights violations.60 Review 
powers and remedial powers of the judiciary, particularly of the Adminis-
trative Courts, broadened too. Several general principles of proper adminis-
tration now explicitly form criteria for review by these courts and the mech-
anism ensuring the implementation of their judgements was strengthened.61
55 Law No. 26/1999 on the Annulment of the Law on the Eradication of Anti-subversive 
Activities (UU No. 26/1999 tentang Pencabutan UU No. 11/PNPS/Tahun 1963 tentang Pem-
berantasan Kegiatan Subversi).
56 Art. 53 Law 10/2004 on Lawmaking (UU No. 10/2004 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan 
Perundang-Undangan).
57 See Art. 24A(2-4) and 24B(1) Amended 1945 Constitution; Law No. 22/2004 on the Judi-
cial Commission (UU No. 22/2004 tentang Komisi Yudisial). Notably, in August 2006 the 
Constitutional Court stripped the Judicial Commission of its oversight role by ruling 
that the law establishing the body did not clearly state what it would monitor.
58 Art. I Law No. 35/1999 on the Revision of Law No. 14/1970 on the Basic Provisions for 
Judicial Power (UU No. 35/1999 tentang Perubahan atas UU No. 14/1970 tentang Ketentu-
an-Ketentuan Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman) (revising Art. 11 Law No. 14/1970); Art. 13 
Law No. 4/2004.
59 Art. I Law No. 8/2004 on the Revision of Law No. 2/1986 on General Jurisdiction (UU 
No. 8/2004 tentang Perubahan atas UU No. 2/1986 tentang Peradilan Umum) (revising Art. 
16 Law No. 2/1986); Art. I Law No. 9/2004 on the Revision of Law No. 5/1986 on 
Administrative Justice (UU 9/2004 tentang Perubahan atas UU No. 5/1986 tentang Peradi-
lan Tata Usaha Negara) (revising Art. 16 Law No. 5/1986).
60 Art. 4 Law No. 26/2000 on the Human Rights Court (UU No. 26/2000 tentang Pengadilan 
Hak Asasi Manusia).
61 Art. I Law No. 9/2004 (revising Art. 53(2) under b and 116(4-5) Law No. 5/1986). 
Regarding the general principles of proper administration, the Elucidation to Art. 53(2) 
under b Law No. 5/1986 refers to principles mentioned in Law No. 28/1999 on the 
Organisation of a State Clean and Free of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (UU No. 
28/1999 tentang Penyelenggaraan Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas dari Korupsi, Kolusi dan 
Nepotisme). These principles are: the principles of legal certainty, proportionality, disci-
plined state management, transparency, professionalism, and accountability. Bedner 
has noted that the latter four principles were unknown in the Administrative Courts’ 
practice and seem hard to apply in the context of the Administrative Courts. In addi-
tion, Law No. 28/1999 does not refer to the previous grounds of review of misuse of 
power and arbitrariness. However, a quick review of recent rulings of Administrative 
Courts indicates that the grounds are still applied (Bedner 2009:216-7).
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The Indonesian judiciary itself appeared aware that there was a 
need for major reforms. In October 2003 the Indonesian Supreme Court 
announced a comprehensive reform plan for the structure and the man-
agement of the judiciary. The reform plan is set down in five reports that 
are collectively referred to as the Supreme Court Blueprints, which have 
been designed by partnership between state institutions and civil society. 
The Blueprints focus on the following themes: i) the Supreme Court, ii) 
the Judicial Commission, iii) court personnel management, iv) court finan-
cial management, v) permanent education of judges, vi) the Commercial 
Court, vii) the Anti-Corruption Court, viii) the Human Rights Court, and, 
ix) the needs assessment. In 2004, the Supreme Court established a Judicial 
Reform Committee, consisting of the leadership of the Supreme Court as 
well as civil society representatives, which has the task to implement the 
Blueprints.
Alternative institutions of dispute settlement were founded, such as 
the National Ombudsman Commission (Komisi Ombudsman Nasional or 
KON).62 Upon complaints by citizens, the Commission has the authority to 
ask for clarification on, to monitor, or to investigate acts of government 
institutions, including judicial institutions.63 The position and mandate of 
the National Human Rights Commission was strengthened. It now has 
equal status to other state institutions. Besides, the Commission receives 
funding from the National Budget instead of the Budget of the Cabinet Sec-
retariat, making it accountable to the People's Representative Council 
instead of the Cabinet and thus less susceptible to political interference by 
the latter. Aside from existing functions, the law expands the Commission’s 
functions in relation to protecting and promoting human rights (Herbert 
2008:460-1).64 It also has the authority to investigate gross human rights vio-
lations.65
Fifth, as noted in Chapter 1, Indonesia has now formally committed 
itself to first as well as second generation human rights, including the right 
to adequate housing. Various international treaties were ratified, including 
the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights 
(ICSECR), the most important treaty to recognise the right to adequate 
housing. Furthermore, the Amended 1945 Constitution includes a bill of 
rights, which is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.66 It 
also contains a provision on the right to an adequate standard of living and 
the (derived) right to adequate housing.67 The provision states inter alia that 
62 Presidential Decision No. 44/2000 on the National Ombudsman Commission (Keppres 
No. 44/2000 tentang Komisi Ombudsman Nasional).
63 Art. 2 Presidential Decision No. 44/2000.
64 Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights (UU No. 39/1999 tentang Hak Asasi Manusia), in par-
ticular Art. 75-99.
65 Art. 18 Law No. 26/2000.
66 Art. 28A-J Amended 1945 Constitution.
67 Art. 28H(1) Amended 1945 Constitution.
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every person has a right to live in physical and spiritual prosperity, to have 
a home and to enjoy a good and healthy environment.68 Finally, imple-
menting legislation supporting human rights has been enacted.69 The 
establishment of the above specialised Human Right Court and the 
strengthening of the position of the National Human Rights Commission 
potentially contribute to the realisation of these rights.
The general reforms also dealt with the problem of KKN. In 1998 the 
People’s Consultative Assembly enacted anti-corruption Directive No. XI/
MPR/1998.70 This was followed by the enactment of two anti-KKN laws in 
1999.71 It led to, inter alia, the creation of an Audit Commission on Wealth of 
State Officials (Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara or KPKPN). 
The Commission has the task and authority to carry out audits of the 
wealth of state officials, receive reports from the public on corruption and 
gather evidence.72 Furthermore, an anti-money laundering law was enact-
ed, which led to the establishment of an Anti-Money Laundering Agency 
(Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan or PPATK).73 It assists the 
Office of the Chief Prosecutor, the National Police and the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (to be discussed below) in corruption matters by 
obtaining financial transaction reports. In 2002 another anti-KKN law was 
enacted, which established in addition to the existing prosecution service 
and court structure a Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pembe-
rantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi or KPK) and a specialised Corruption Court 
(Pengadilan Khusus Tindak Pidana Korupsi or Tipikor).74 The Corruption Erad-
ication Commission supervises and coordinates the handling of corruption 
cases, including their investigation and prosecution. The Corruption Court 
68 In Indonesian the section reads: Setiap orang berhak hidup sejahtera lahir dan batin, bertem-
pat tinggal, dan mendapatkan lingkungan hidup yang baik dan sehat serta berhak memperoleh 
pelayanan kesehatan.
69 See for instance Law No. 40/1999 on the Press (UU N0. 40/1999 tentang Pers), which 
supports the freedom of press.
70 People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. XI/MPR/1998 on the Organisation of a 
State Clean and Free of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (TAP MPR No. XI/
MPR/1998 tentang Penyelenggaraan Negara Yang Bersih dan Bebas Korupsi, Kolusi, dan 
Ne potisme).
71 Law No. 28/1999; Law No. 31/1999 on the Eradication of Corruption Offences (UU No. 
31/1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi). Law No. 31/1999 was revised by 
Law No. 20/2001 on the Revision of Law No. 31/1999 on the Eradication of Corruption 
Offences (UU No. 20/2001 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi). See also Assegaf 
2002.
72 Art. 10-9 Law No. 28/1999 in conjunction with Presidential Decision No. 81/1999 on 
the Establishment of an Assets Auditing Commission (Keppres No. 81/1999 tentang Pem-
bentukan Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara). See also Sherlock 2002.
73 Law No. 15/2002 on Money Laundering Offences (UU No. 15/2002 tentang Tindak 
Pidana Pencucian Uang). The Law was amended by Law No. 23/2003.
74 Law No. 30/2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission (UU No. 30/2002 tentang 
Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi). The Law in part forms an implementation 
of Art. 43 Law No. 31/1999. See also Assegaf 2002.
74 Chapter 3
has exclusive competence in corruption cases.75 Notably, in the first years 
after their establishment, the above institutions were located in Jakarta 
only.76
3.4.2 Regional autonomy 77
The 1999 Regional Autonomy Laws
One of the most significant reform initiatives of the Post-New Order peri-
od, deserving separate attention, was the enactment of two 1999 regional 
autonomy laws (hereafter the 1999 RALs), which came into effect on 1 Jan-
uary 2001.78 Contrary to the previous 1974 Decentralisation Law, the 1999 
RALs led to substantial administrative and political (or democratic) decen-
tralisation from the central government to the Provinces and particularly 
the Districts/Municipalities as well as new fiscal relations between these 
government levels.
Administrative decentralisation involved the devolution of govern-
ment authorities. To the Districts/Municipalities, Law No. 22/1999 
devolved (obligatory) authorities in eleven important sectors, including 
land.79 To the Provinces, on the contrary, few authorities were devolved and 
deconcentrated, namely: (1) authorities for issues that cross border between 
two or more districts/municipalities; (2) authorities not yet, or not able to 
be handled by the districts/municipalities; (3) authorities transferred from 
the central government by means of deconcentration.80 Besides, the central 
government could assign certain tasks to regions (and villages) as part of 
75 Notably, in August 2006 the Constitutional Court ruled that the Corruption Court was 
unconstitutional. In order to prevent the Corruption Court would lose its competence 
in favour of the General Courts, the People's Representative Council had to enact a new 
law by 19 December 2009. The law, Law No. 46/2009 on the Corruption Court (UU No. 
46/2009 tentang Peng adilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi), was enacted on 29 October 2009. It 
replaces Art. 53-62 of Law No. 30/2002.
76 On 17 December 2010, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court established Corruption 
Courts in Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya (see Decree of the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court No. 191/KMA/SK/XII/2010). On 7 February 2011, he established 14 
other Corruption Courts in Medan, Padang, Pekanbaru, Palembang, Tanjung Karang, 
Serang, Yogyakarta, Banjarmasin, Pontianak, Samarinda, Makassar, Mataram, Kupang 
and Jayapura (see Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court No. 022/KMA/SK/
II/2011).
77 For a further discussion of the regional autonomy laws, see Bell 2001; Rifai 2002; Fane 
2003; Ryaas Rasyid 2003; Schmitt 2008.
78 The 1999 RALs consist of Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance (UU No. 22/1999 
tentang Pemerintahan Daerah) and Law No. 25/1999 on the Financial Balance between 
the Central Government and the Regions (UU No. 25/1999 tentang Perimbangan Keuang-
an antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah). The laws found their constitutional basis in Art. 
18, 18A, and 18B of the 1945 Amended Constitution.
79 Art. 11 Law No. 22/1999.
80 Art. 9 Law No. 22/1999.
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co-governance.81 Notably, the Provinces and Districts/Municipalities 
became independent and no longer had a hierarchal relationship to each 
other.82
Although involving a far-reaching form of decentralisation, the 1999 
RALs did do not render the central government powerless. It retained 
authority over foreign policy, defence and security, the administration of 
justice, monetary and fiscal affairs, religion and ‘other sectors’. In ‘other 
sectors’ the authority to develop policy for planning and control was 
included.83 Otherwise, its role concentrated on supporting and supervising 
the regions. The central government provided guidelines, guidance, train-
ing, direction, and supervision.84 It could thus intervene if the regions failed 
to meet certain standards, for instance if a regional government did not 
enforce prevailing legislation or if it enacted a bylaw that contravened the 
public interest or higher legislation.85 However, bylaws no longer had to be 
approved by the Governor or the Minister of Home Affairs prior to their 
enactment; they could be annulled afterwards.86
The transfer of authority to the regions not only involved administra-
tive decentralisation, but also empowered the Provincial Assemblies and 
District/Municipal Councils, thus leading to political or democratic decen-
tralisation. Their legislative and budgetary powers were reinforced, and 
their control over the executive branch strengthened. The representative 
bodies got the authority to elect the regional heads (Governors and Dis-
tricts-Heads/Mayors).87
Decentralisation had to be accompanied with the transfer of means and 
the authority to the regions to gain their own revenues.88 Law No. 25/1999 
therefore set out new fiscal relations between the central government and 
the regional governments. In relation to devolved authorities the regional 
governments have at their disposal several regional revenue sources, 
namely the Balance Fund (Dana Perimbangan), Regionally Generated Reve-
nues (Pendapatan Asli Daerah or PAD), Regional Loans (Pinjaman Daerah), 
and Other Legal Revenues (Lain-lain Penerimaan yang Sah).89 These sources 
81 Art. 13 Law No. 22/1999.
82 Art. 4(2) Law No. 22/1999. For this reason, the regions were no longer called Province 
Region Level I and District/Municipality Region Level II, but simply Province and Dis-
trict/Municipality (Art. 121 Law No. 22/1999).
83 Art. 7(2) Law No. 22/1999.
84 Art. 112 and Elucidation Law No. 22/1999.
85 Art. 7 GR No. 25/2000; Art. 114 Law No. 22/1999.
86 Law No. 22/1999 required that the provisions on support and supervision were imple-
mented by government regulation. This requirement was met by the enactment of GR 
No. 20/2001 on Support and Supervision of the Implementation of Regional Gover-
nance (PP No. 20/2001 tentang Pembinaan dan Pengawasan atas Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah-
an Daerah).
87 Art. 18-9 Law No. 22/1999.
88 Art. 8; General Elucidation, under 8 Law No. 22/1999.
89 Art. 3 Law No. 25/1999.
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are all part of the Regional Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah 
or APBD).90
Several of the regional revenues are land related. The Balance Fund is 
particularly important, as it defines land as a source of revenues. It includes 
the Revenues Sharing Fund (Dana Bagi Hasil).91 This fund comprises reve-
nues from Land and Building Tax (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan or PBB) as well 
as Land and Building Right Retribution (Bea Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan 
Bangunan or BPHTB), of which the Districts/Municipalities receive a major 
share.92 In many Districts/Municipalities, Regionally Generated Revenues 
include revenues from licensing, such as land use permits (izin peruntukan 
penggunaan tanah or IPPT), building permits (izin mendirikan bangunan or 
IMB), and permits for the use of municipal land and/or buildings (izin 
pemakaian tanah dan/atau bangunan or IPTB). Moreover, since the Districts/
Municipalities now also have the authority to grant site permits for com-
mercial land clearance, as will be discussed below, the revenue base of the 
licensing system has broadened.
Various scholars have noted that Law No. 25/1999 did not lead to fiscal 
decentralisation. The central government continued to control all major tax 
bases and thus the majority of revenues of the regional governments. 
Besides, it still held the authority over development spending (Fane 
2003:161). Silver et al. suggest that the regional government’s financial reli-
ance on the central government even increased (Silver, et al. 2001:347). At 
the same time, however, the regional governments got more fiscal discre-
tion, since most revenues were no longer earmarked. Besides, there was 
more room to create regional taxes, although the central government could 
annul bylaws on this matter.
It should be noted that the 1999 RALs were enacted under exceptional 
circumstances. There were rising demands in various Provinces, particu-
larly in those possessing much of Indonesia’s natural resources, for region-
90 Art. 2(1) Law No. 25/1999.
91 Art. 7-8 Law No. 25/1999.
92 Provinces receive 16.2 per cent of Land and Building Tax revenues, districts/munici-
palities 64.8 per cent, while 9 per cent is reserved to cover the cost of collection. Another 
10 per cent goes to the central government, of which 65 per cent is equally distributed 
among all districts/municipalities, while 35 per cent is distributed as incentives to dis-
tricts/municipalities of which realized contributions in the previous year exceeded esti-
mated revenues from certain sectors. Provinces receive 16 per cent of the Land and 
Building Right Retribution revenues, districts/municipalities 64 per cent, while 20 per 
cent goes to the central government. See Art. 2, 4, 5 GR No. 104/2000 on the Balancing 
Fund (PP No. 104/2000 tentang Dana Perimbangan), as revised by GR No. 84/2001 on the 
Revision of GR No. 104/2000 (PP No. 84/2001 tentang Perubahan PP No. 104/2000) in 
conjunction with Art. 6(2-4) Law No. 25/1999). See also GR No. 16/2000 on the Distri-
bution of Land and Building Tax Revenues between the Central Government and the 
Regions (PP No. 16/2000 tentang Pembagian Hasil Penerimaan Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan 
antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah); Law No. 20/2000 on the Revision of Law No. 
21/1997 on Land and Building Right Retribution (UU No. 20/2000 tentang Perubahan atas 
UU No. 21/1997 tentang Bea Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan).
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al autonomy. Such demands coincided with severe pressure from interna-
tional donors to implement decentralisation. This gave the ruling party 
Golkar reason to support the initiative, for it could draw regional elector-
ates. The team within the Department of Home Affairs responsible for the 
initiative (the so-called Team of Seven – Tim Tujuh), consisting of key 
Golkar figures, included US-trained political scientists who could mediate 
international decentralisation policy with local agendas (McCarthy 
2005:157).
Considering the exceptional circumstances under which the 1999 RALs 
were enacted and the widespread confusion it created within the state 
apparatus as to who should do what, it is no surprise that shortly after they 
had been enacted, they met with growing calls for revision. There was 
however no agreement as to whether this revision should lead to further 
decentralisation or to recentralisation. In 2000 and 2002, the People’s Con-
sultative Assembly passed directives calling for a prompt revision of the 
laws toward further decentralisation.93 This was also required by the Sec-
ond Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of August 2000 regarding the 
direct elections of the regional heads. At the same time national depart-
ments and agencies, which under the laws had lost so many of their author-
ities to the regions, lobbied for recentralisation. Voices for recentralisation 
gained influence when in 2001 Megawati Sukarnoputri was elected Presi-
dent. She had strong reservations about regional autonomy, believing it 
endangered the Indonesian unitary state her father had created (Barr, et al. 
2006:51).
The resistance against regional autonomy was nowhere as strong and 
nowhere as successful as in the land sector.94 Initially it seemed that in this 
sector, in accordance with Law No. 22/1999, the Districts/Municipalities 
would obtain exclusive authority, particularly at the expense of the 
NLA.95As early as in December 1999, the newly elected President Abdur-
rahman Wahid promulgated Presidential Decision No. 154/1999 on the 
basis of which the role of the NLA was marginalised by putting it under the 
93 People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. IV/MPR/2000 on Recommendations on 
the Policy and Implementation of Regional Autonomy (TAP MPR No. IV/MPR/2000 ten-
tang Rekomendasi Kebijakan dan Penyelenggaraan Otonomi Daerah); People’s Consultative 
Assembly Directive No. VI/MPR/2002 on Recommendations on the Reporting of the 
Implementation of People’s Consultative Assembly Directives by the President, 
Supreme Advisory Council, People’s Representative Council, Supreme Audit Board, 
and Supreme Court to the People’s Consultative Assembly’s Annual Session of the Year 
2002 (TAP MPR No. VI/MPR/2002 tentang Rekomendasi atas Laporan Pelaksanaan Putusan 
MPR Republik Indonesia oleh Presiden, DPA, DPR, BPK, MA pada Sidang Tahunan MPR 
Republik Indonesia Tahun 2002).
94 See also Thorburn 2004.
95 Art. 11(2) Law No. 22/1999.
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leadership of the Minister of Home Affairs. The Minister was instructed to 
bring the tasks and functions of the NLA in accordance with the RALs.96
The new balance of power in the land sector was affirmed by Govern-
ment Regulation No. 25/2000, which divided the authorities between the 
central government and the Provinces.97 In relation to the land sector, it 
referred to a number of matters over which the central government would 
keep authority, matters that basically remained limited to the formulation 
of standards and guidelines.98 The central government also retained some 
authority in relation to spatial planning. It determined national spatial 
planning on the basis of spatial planning of the Provinces and Districts/
Municipalities.99 The provinces only retained (limited) authority in the field 
of spatial management. They determined spatial management in agree-
ment with the Districts/Municipalities. The provinces also supervised the 
implementation of spatial management.100
The Districts/Municipalities held all remaining authorities over land 
matters, but it would take years before these authorities were specified.101 
The reason for the delay was pure political. Fearing to lose its powers, the 
NLA started to lobby for a revision of the above legislation – in part suc-
cessfully.102 This resulted in a legal limbo, particularly because of the enact-
ment and promulgation of contradictory legislation, as we shall see below.
One month after the 1999 RALs came into effect, President Wahid prom-
ulgated Presidential Decision No. 10/2001, which stated that pre-exist-
ing legislation pertaining to land matters would remain in force until all 
implementing legislation of Government Regulation No. 25/2000 had been 
promulgated. Meanwhile the districts/municipalities had been invited, on 
96 Art. I-II Presidential Decision No. 154/1999 on the Revision of Presidential Decision 
No. 26/1988 on the National Land Agency (Keppres No. 154/1999 tentang Perubahan atas 
Keppres No. 26/1988 tentang Badan Pertanahan Nasional).
97 GR No. 25/2000 on Authorities of the Government and the Authorities of the Provinces 
as Autonomous Regions (PP No. 25/2000 tentang Kewenangan Pemerintah dan Kewenang-
an Propinsi sebagai Daerah Otonom).
98 The central government retained the authority to determine: i) the requirements for the 
issuance of land rights; ii) the requirements for land reform; iii) the standards for land 
administration; iv) the guidelines regarding the costs for land related services; v) the 
Basic Framework for a National Cadastre and the surveying policy for Order I and II of 
this Framework (Art. 2(3), under 14 GR No. 25/2000). See also Art. 3 of the implement-
ing Presidential Decision No. 95/2000 on the National Land Agency (Keppres No. 
95/2000 tentang Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which granted the NLA no more than a 
(coordinating) role in the development of land law and policy.
99 Art. 2(3), under 13 GR No. 25/2000.
100 Art. 3(12) GR No. 25/2000.
101 GR No. 25/2000 prescribed these authorities to be specified within six months after the 
enactment of the RALs, a period during which the regional governments could not 
employ their authorities, nor enact bylaws regarding the implementation of these 
authorities (Art. 9 and Elucidation GR No. 25/2000).
102 For instance, several critical articles regarding decentralisation in the sector of land 
were published on the NLA’s website. See for example Anshari 2004.
79State rights and individual obligations
the basis of Presidential Decision No. 5/2001, to formulate their authorities 
in a ‘positive’ list, to be acknowledged by the central government.103 Both 
decisions contradicted the 1999 RALs, which devolved full authority over 
land matters to the Districts/Municipalities and certainly did not require 
the acknowledgement of this authority (World Bank 2003b:12; 2003c:11).
The Association of Local Governments (APEKSI) called upon the Min-
ister of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy to withdraw Presidential 
Decision No. 10/2001, but to no avail (Rieger, et al. 2001:21). In fact, Presi-
dent Wahid promulgated Presidential Decision No. 62/2001, which 
assured the authority of the NLA in the regions until all legislation pertain-
ing to land had been enacted. The enactment of this legislation should take 
no more than two years.104 This step was motivated by the argument that the 
Districts/Municipalities were not yet ready to hold these authorities. It is 
clear, however, that this presidential decision again conflicted with the 1999 
RALs (World Bank 2003c10-1).105
In August 2003 the Districts/Municipalities’ authorities over land mat-
ters were finally specified. On the basis of Presidential Decision No. 
34/2003, which also implemented People’s Consultative Assembly Direc-
tive No. IX/MPR/2001 to be discussed below, the number of functions was 
limited to nine in total, which were mostly related to spatial planning and 
land clearance.106 The Presidential Decision again contradicted the 1999 
103 See Presidential Decision No. 5/2001 on the Acknowledgement of the Authorities of 
Districts/Municipalities (Keppres No. 5/2001 tentang Pelaksanaan Pengakuaan Kewenangan 
Kabupaten/Kota). It is said that most districts/municipalities complied, but some includ-
ed authorities that belonged to the central government, while others left out some of the 
obligatory authorities of Art. 11 Law No. 22/1999.
104 Art. I, under 6 Presidential Decision No. 62/2001 on the Revision of Presidential Deci-
sion No. 166/2000 on the Position, Tasks, Functions, Authorities, Organisation, and 
Mode of Operation of Non-Departmental State Bodies as Revised Several Times, Lastly 
by Presidential Decision No. 42/2001 (Keppres No. 62/2001 tentang Perubahan atas Keppres 
No. 166/2000 tentang Kedudukan, Tugas, Fungsi, Kewenangan, Susunan Organisasi, dan Tata 
Kerja Lembaga Pemerintah Non Departemen sebagaimana Telah Beberapa Kali Diubah Terakhir 
dengan Keppres No. 42/2001).
105 The Decision was part of a series of Presidential Decisions regarding the tasks and struc-
ture of Non-Departmental Institutions (Lembaga Pemerintah Non Departemen or LPND). 
See Presidential Decision No. 166/2000; 173/2000; 178/2000; 17/2001; 42/2001; 60/2001; 
62/2001; 103/2001. See also Presidential Decision No. 110/2001 on the Unit Organi-
sation and Tasks of Echolon I Non Departmental Institutions (Keppres No. 110/2001 
tentang Unit Organisasi dan Tugas Eselon I Lembaga Pemerintah Non Departemen), which 
was revised by Presidential Decisions Nos. 3/2002; 4/2002; 12/2005, and; 52/2005.
106 See Art. 2 Presidential Decision No. 34/2003 on the National Policy in the Sector of 
Land (Keppres No. 34/2003 tentang Kebijakan Nasional di Bidang Pertanahan). The imple-
mentation of these authorities are further explained by Decision of the Head of NLA 
No. 2/2003 on the Norms and Standards concerning the Mechanism for the Organisa-
tion of the Authorities of the Government in the Sector of Land that are Implemented 
by the Districts/Municipalities (Keputusan Kepala BPN No. 2/2003 tentang Norma dan 
Standar Mekanisme Ketatalaksanaan Kewenangan Pemerintah di Bidang Pertanahan yang 
Dilaksanakan oleh Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota).
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RALs. Moreover, Districts/Municipalities already held most of the authori-
ties mentioned in the presidential decision on the basis of sectoral legisla-
tion. Despite the contradictory status of the decision, it appears that most 
Districts/Municipalities accepted the revision.
The 2004 Regional Autonomy Laws
In 2004 the 1999 RALs were replaced altogether by Law No. 32/2004 and 
33/2004 (henceforth 2004 RALs), which came into effect on 15 October 
2004.107 Considering the contradictory forces behind the idea of regional 
autonomy, it is no surprise that the 2004 RALs are rather ambivalent, lead-
ing to both administrative recentralisation and political decentralisation.
From an administrative perspective, the 2004 RALs involve two main 
revisions. First, in nearly all government matters the Districts/Municipali-
ties have to share their authorities with the Provinces, including the – what 
is now called – mandatory authority over land matters.108 Second, the 2004 
RALs factually recreate a hierarchal order between the different regional 
administrative levels. It is stated that the relationship between the central 
government, the Provinces, and the Districts/Municipalities as well as 
between the different regional administrative levels are interrelated, inter-
dependent, and synergic (or mutually supporting).109 The hierarchal rela-
tionship is thus not re-imposed explicitly. However, since the provincial 
Governors may at the same time hold the deconcentrated central govern-
ment authority to inter alia coordinate and to monitor and supervise the 
districts/municipalities, this is certainly the case in practice (Isra 2007).110 So 
prior to their enactment, provincial and district/municipal bylaws regard-
ing the regional budget, taxes and revenues, as well as spatial planning 
should be evaluated by the relevant Ministers and the Governor respective-
ly.111
From a political perspective, the 2004 RALs involve two other impor-
tant revisions. The regional heads are elected directly by citizens, who thus 
now have influence on the governance process.112 Besides, the central gov-
ernment can unilaterally suspend Governors or District-Heads/Mayors if 
107 Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance (UU No. 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Da-
erah); Law No. 33/2004 on the Financial Balance between the Central Government and 
Regional Governance (UU No. 33/2004 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah 
Pusat dan Pemerintahan Daerah). Since its enactment, Law No. 32/2004 has been amend-
ed by Law No. 8/2005 and Law No. 12/2008 respectively. The amendments are not rel-
evant to be discussed in the context of this book.
108 Art. 13-14 Law No. 32/2004.
109 Art. 11(2) Law No. 32/2004. See also General Elucidation, which speaks of a harmoni-
ous relationship between the different administrative levels.
110 Art. 217, under c in conjunction with Art. 10(5), under b Law No. 32/2004.
111 Art. 189 in conjunction with Art. 185-6 Law No. 32/2004.
112 Art. 56-67 Law No. 32/2004.
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they have been sentenced to more than five years imprisonment, or for cor-
ruption, terrorist acts, subversion, and/or threatening state security.113 The 
Provincial Assemblies and District/Municipal Councils are thus stripped 
of two of the basic authorities that they previously held.
From a fiscal perspective, the 2004 RALs involve few revisions. Basi-
cally Law No. 33/2004 confirms the fiscal relations between the central 
government and the regions that were created by Law No. 25/1999. At the 
same time it diminishes the risk of a ‘fiscal gap’ between the authorities 
assigned to the regions and the revenues available to implement these 
authorities (Schmitt 2008:185). The regions receive practically the same 
share of land related revenues as before.
The 2004 RALs led to the enactment of a new series of legislation 
regarding the divisions of authority in the land sector, but this was a slow 
process. It took another two years before the tasks and structure of the NLA 
were finally specified. In 2006, the successor of Megawati Soekarnoputri, 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono promulgated Presidential Decision 
No. 10/2006, on the basis of which the NLA no longer falls under the lead-
ership of the Minister of Home Affairs but has a separate Head again.114 
More importantly, the decision leads to recentralisation in the land sector. 
The NLA holds tasks in the land sector on the national, regional, and secto-
ral level. Furthermore it holds a non-limitative number of 21 functions, 
mostly related to land administration, but also the implementation of spa-
tial planning, the implementation of land law reform, and the handling of 
land disputes.115 Not surprisingly, the presidential decision has been strong-
ly criticised by representative organisations of regional governments and 
regional assemblies/councils for limiting their authorities in the field of 
land and for contradicting the 2004 RALs, arguments that indeed hold 
true.116 This time it was the Association of Provincial Governments (APPSI) 
that called upon the Minister of Home Affairs to withdraw the presidential 
decision, but again to no avail.
Only in 2007, Government Regulation No. 25/2000 discussed above 
was replaced by Government Regulation No. 38/2007.117 According to Kom-
pas daily, one of the reasons for the delay was a disagreement between the 
113 Art. 30-1 Law No. 32/2004.
114 Presidential Decision No. 10/2006 on the National Land Agency (Perpres No. 10/2006 
tentang Badan Pertanahan Nasional). The Decision annuls the Decisions mentioned in 
footnote 105 on the tasks and structure of Non-Departmental Institutions as far as relat-
ed to the NLA (Art. 55).
115 Art. 2-3 Presidential Decision No. 10/2006.
116 See ‘Badan Pertanahan Nasional Tak Mampu Benahi Birokrasi’, Kompas, 17 May 2006; 
‘Pertanahan, Kewenangan yang Masih Diperebutkan’, Kompas, 16 June 2006; ‘Pemerin-
tah Daerah Minta Hak Mengatur Investasi’, Hukum Online, 29 June 2006.
117 GR No. 38/2007 on the Division of Government Affairs between the Government, Pro-
vincial Governments, and District / Municipal Governments (PP No. 38/2007 tentang 
Pembagian Urusan Pemerintahan antara Pemerintah, Pemerintahan Daerah Propinsi, dan 
Pemerintahan Daerah Kabupaten/Kota).
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NLA and the Ministry of Home Affairs about the transfer of authority over 
land matters. The NLA wanted to base the division of authorities in the 
land sector on the BAL, while the Ministry of Home Affairs referred to the 
2004 RALs.118 The Ministry of Home Affairs appears to have won the argu-
ment: Government Regulation No. 38/2007 confirms what is stipulated in 
the 2004 RALs, namely that the regions hold the mandatory authority over 
land matters.119 However, the attachment to the Government Regulation 
limits the regions’ functions in the land sector to the same nine functions 
referred to in Presidential Decision No. 34/2003, which as discussed above 
are mostly related to spatial planning and land clearance. Meanwhile, Pres-
idential Decision No. 10/2006 on the National Land Agency has not been 
revoked.
In sum, while the 1999 RALs promised to be a groundbreaking initia-
tive of administrative, political, and perhaps even some type of fiscal 
decentralisation, they also resulted in much confusion, particularly in the 
land sector. Implementing legislation involving the division of authorities 
strongly limited administrative decentralisation, not least in relation to 
land matters. The 2004 RALs led to administrative recentralisation, also in 
the land sector. Contradictory implementing legislation has resulted in a 
somewhat inconsistent framework regarding the division of authorities 
over land between the central government, the Provinces, and the Dis-
tricts/Municipalities. That being said, the 1999 RALs have indeed led to 
political decentralisation, to which the 2004 RALs further contributed, and 
both the 1999 and 2004 RALs have created new fiscal relations between 
Jakarta and the regions.
3.4.3 Land law reform
Indonesia’s constitutional reforms, such as those related to human rights, 
suggested that much of its land law should be revised. This was confirmed 
by Law No. 22/1999, which stated that all existing sectoral laws, including 
the BAL, should be adjusted to the RALs.120 Obviously this would not be 
easy. As discussed above, the BAL is in principle centralist in nature. How-
ever, in view of the intensive lobbying for land law reform, in the first years 
of the Post-New Order, by NGOs such as the Consortium for Agrarian 
Reform (Konsortium Pembaruan Agraria or KPA) and influential academics, 
such reform initially only seemed a matter of time.
A prelude to structural land law reform was supposed to be People’s 
Consultative Assembly Directive No. IX/MPR/2001, which was promul-
118 See ‘Pertanahan, Kewenangan yang Masih Diperebutkan’, Kompas, 16 June 2006.
119 Art. 7 GR No. 38/2007.
120 Art. 133 Law No. 22/1999.
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gated in November 2001.121 It recognized that management of land and 
natural resources had caused environmental deterioration, an imbalance in 
the structure of control, ownership, use and exploitation of those resources, 
and given rise to conflict. The directive also acknowledged that existing 
legislation was overlapping and contradictory.122 This situation required 
legal reforms, based on twelve principles, including supremacy of the law, 
decentralisation, democracy and participation, prosperity and justice for 
the people, as well as the recognition of human rights.123 Legal reforms 
should focus on the revision of laws and regulations, land reform regard-
ing both agricultural and urban land, collection of data regarding land 
through inventory and registration, dispute settlement, institutional 
strengthening and strengthening of authority, and the creation of funds for 
such reforms. 124 Notably, the directive does not refer to the BAL in any way 
whatsoever.
It should be noted that the legal status of People’s Consultative Assem-
bly Directive No. IX/MPR/2001 was weak. On the basis of the Third 
Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, which was passed on the same day 
as the Directive, the People’s Consultative Assembly no longer has the 
right to enact directives that are binding to other state organs. Furthermore, 
in 2004 the legal status of People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. 
IX/MPR/2001 became uncertain, since on the basis of Law No. 10/2004, 
People’s Consultative Assembly Directives no longer make part of the hier-
archy of legislation.125 According to the People’s Consultative Assembly, the 
Directive however remains valid until the legislation it calls for has been 
enacted (Bedner & Van Huis 2008:187).126
After two years, the NLA was assigned the task, on the basis of Presi-
dential Decision No. 34/2003 discussed above, to draft several bills in the 
land sector, including a bill revising the BAL.127 It should have completed 
121 People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. IX/MPR/2001 on the Renewal of Agrar-
ia and Natural Resources Management (Ketetapan MPR RI No. IX/MPR/2001 tentang 
Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam). For a description of the pro cess 
that led to the promulgation of the directive as well as criticism on the directive, see 
Lucas & Warren 2003.
122 Preamble, under c-d People’s Consultative Assembly’s Directive No. IX/MPR/2001.
123 Art. 5 People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. IX/MPR/2001.
124 Art. 6(1) People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. IX/MPR/2001.
125 Art. 7 Law No. 10/2004 on Lawmaking (UU No. 10/2004 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan 
Perundang-Undangan).
126 Art. 4(11) People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. I/MPR/2003 on the Review of 
the Material and Legal Status of Directives of the Temporal People’s Consultative 
Assembly and the People’s Consultative Assembly of the Indonesian Republic of the 
Year 1960 to the Year 2002 (Ketetapan MPR RI No. I/MPR/2003 tentang Peninjauan Terha-
dap Materi dan Status Hukum Ketetapan Majelis Permusayawaratan Rakyat Sementara dan 
Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tahun 1960 sampai dengan 
Tahun 2002).
127 Art. 1, under a Presidential Decision No. 34/2003.
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this task before 1 August 2004.128 Although the content of the Presidential 
Decision was not fully to the liking of the NGOs that had lobbied for the 
People’s Consultative Assembly Directive, the legal status of the Presiden-
tial Decision is indisputably stronger than that of People’s Consultative 
Assembly Directive No. IX/MPR/2001.129
By the end of 2004, the NLA presented a bill, drafted by Vice-Head of 
the NLA and Gadjah Mada University Professor Maria Soemardjono, 
which would replace the BAL altogether. The bill met with strong criticism 
from academics such as Trisakti University Professor Boedi Harsono, who 
in the 1950s was involved in the drafting of the BAL, and agrarian and 
environmental NGOs such as KPA. Referring to the fact that the drafting of 
the BAL had taken twelve years, Boedi Harsono found the bill a product of 
hasty work.130 He agreed that the BAL contained some weaknesses, but this 
did not mean it should be replaced altogether. NGOs found the bill too 
much state and investor oriented. It did not recognise the community right 
of avail, confirmed sectoralism in the field of agraria, created room for the 
monopolisation of control over land and natural resources, and the envis-
aged simplification of the system of land rights would only add to existing 
confusion.131 Trisakti University and NGOs both presented alternative bills 
revising certain parts of the BAL, but basically keeping it intact.132
The disagreement between the NLA, academics, and NGOs over the 
direction of the BAL’s revision resulted in a deadlock. NGOs tried to con-
vince the People’s Representative Council to reject the bill of the NLA.133 
They were successful in this effort. The bill of the NLA did not receive a 
majority vote. Next, the NLA proposed an alternative bill, which consisted 
of an amendment to the BAL. This bill met the same fate as its predecessor.
Meanwhile little other land law has been reformed. As will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, a bill revising the 1992 Spatial Management Law was 
enacted in 2007. Otherwise, land law reform remained limited to the prom-
ulgation of lower legislation related to participation and transparency in 
128 Art. 4 Presidential Decision No. 34/2003.
129 NGOs that had lobbied for the promulgation of People’s Consultative Assembly Direc-
tive No. IX/MPR/2001 were concerned that the Presidential Decision did not imple-
ment the People’s Consultative Assembly Directive as intended. The development of a 
land information and management system was believed to lead to an extension of the 
survey and registration of land through the World Bank supported Land Administra-
tion Project (LAP), discussed in further detail in Chapter 4 (Lucas & Warren 2003:1233).
130 ‘Meski Masuk Prolegnas, RUU SDA Belum Tentu Selesai Tahun Ini’, Hukum Online, 23 
March 2005.
131 ‘KPA: RUU Sumber Daya Agraria Dinilai Memiliki Empat Kelemahan’, Hukum Online, 
24 March 2005.
132 ‘Tiga Lembaga Ajukan Draf Revisi UU Pokok Agraria’, Hukum Online, 13 October 2004; 
‘Jalan (Tak) Panjang Membahas RUU Sumberdaya Agraria’, Hukum Online, 18 Novem-
ber 2004.
133 ‘Meski Masuk Prolegnas, RUU SDA Belum Tentu Selesai Tahun Ini’, Hukum Online, 23 
March 2005; Soal Agraria, Seharusnya Fokus pada Amanat MPR, Kompas, 30 May 2005.
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spatial management, land clearance for development in the public interest, 
site permits for commercial land clearance, which, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 5-7, does not reflect the ambitious land law reform programme 
formulated in People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. IX/
MPR/2001 or even comply with the Amended 1945 Constitution and the 
ratified ICESCR.
3.4.4 Access to justice and legal empowerment
The national reforms discussed above were closely related to various pro-
grammes supported by international donor organisations. GTZ for instance 
played a supporting role in the implementation of regional autonomy by 
the Department of Home Affairs. Since 1998, strengthening the rule of law 
has been a major point of interest for various international donor organisa-
tions, such as the Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID), the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Coopora-
tion (DGIS), USAID, the World Bank, and the UNDP. While the former 
three have intensively collaborated with the judiciary, the latter two have 
set up access to justice initiatives that include legal empowerment compo-
nents. 
 The World Bank launched in collaboration with BAPPENAS the Justice 
for the Poor (J4P) programme in 2002. Aside from research activities and 
building partnerships, a great variety of operational activities are under-
taken under World Bank’s J4P programme. First, it includes the Mediation 
and Community Legal Empowerment (MCLE) programme, which has the 
objective to empower communities to handle a variety of disputes and 
legal problems. The programme is implemented in Aceh and the Moluc-
cas.134 Second, under J4P, the Revitalisation of Legal Aid (RLA) pilot pro-
gramme is being implemented. It has the objectives to establish a legal aid 
network for the poor in Indonesia, increase the capacity of community 
organisations to provide mediation, legal aid and education via village 
paralegals and mediators, and strengthen national and local government 
policies regarding legal aid for communities in Indonesia. The RLA pro-
gramme has been operating since 2005 in Lampung, West Java and West 
Nusa Tenggara. The third programme operating under J4P is the Women’s 
Legal Empowerment (WLE) programme. It has the objectives to increase 
women’s knowledge and awareness of the law, particularly in relation to 
women’s rights, increase the capacity of legal institutions to deliver train-
ing and provide effective services, increase the role and capacity of parale-
gals who work directly with the community, and increase policy advocacy 
134 The MCLE programme is a component of the Support for Poor & Disadvantaged Areas 
(SPADA) programme, which facilitates local governments to accelerate development 
through increasing local social and economic capacity and strengthening governance 
and planning processes.
86 Chapter 3
to realise women’s rights. A WLE pilot programme was carried out from 
April 2005 to December 2008 in Brebes, Cianjur and West Nusa Tenggara. 
Since then, the programme expanded to East Nusa Tenggara, West Kali-
mantan, North Maluku, Jakarta, and Aceh. The Strengthening Access to 
Non-State Justice programme is another programme that is part of J4P. Its 
objective is to strengthen best practice informal dispute resolution in West 
Sumatra and West Nusa Tenggara. The fifth programme under J4P to men-
tion is the Local Government Regulation programme. Its goal is to increase 
the quality of local government regulations and strengthen drafting proc-
esses and harmonization, specifically focused on public service delivery 
regulations. Strengthening Access to Justice in Aceh is the sixth programme 
under J4P. The objective of the programme is to support poor Acehnese 
communities to obtain fair and effective dispute resolution, through a time-
efficient, unbiased and humane procedure.135
As noted in Chapter 1, in collaboration with BAPPENAS, UNPD initi-
ated the Legal Empowerment and Assistance for the Disadvantaged 
(LEAD) programme in 2007. The programme include five steps: i) estab-
lishing a grant-making facility focused on civil society empowerment, ii) 
the provision of civil society support and capacity development, iii) ensur-
ing legal and human rights empowerment at the grassroots level; iv) foster-
ing a human rights-based approach with regard to grantee activity devel-
opment and implementation; and v) constructively engaging state 
authorities. Grant activities seek to strengthen public awareness and legal 
empowerment, with an emphasis on, inter alia, land and natural resources 
and local governance issues, and assist the legal services community to 
provide free legal assistance to the most vulnerable and marginalised. Fur-
ther, the programme facilitates community participation, and oversight of 
local government policies and service provision. The programme was initi-
ated as a pilot project in North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, and Southeast 
Sulawesi.136
Both the World Bank and the UNDP have been involved in the devel-
opment of a comprehensive National Strategy on Access to Justice (Strategi 
Nasional Akses terhadap Keadilan or SNATK) for inclusion in the 2010-2014 
National Medium Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka 
Menengah Nasional or RPJMN 2010-2014). In this framework, BAPPENAS 
initiated in collaboration with the UNDP, the World Bank, and the Van Vol-
lenhoven Institute the joint programme Building Demand for Legal and 
Judicial Reform 2007- 2010: Strengthening Access to Justice in 2008. As part 
of the programme, case studies have been conducted in various regions in 
Indonesia focusing on various themes, including land. These findings have 
135 This description was derived from the J4P page at www.worldbank.org.
136 This description was derived from the LEAD page at www.undp.org.
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been translated into policy advice through policy-dialogues that bring 
together the most important stakeholders.137
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter gave a general overview of Indonesian land law in the context 
of Indonesia’s changing rule of law environment. It forms a first effort to 
assess to what extent kampong dwellers in Bandung are protected against 
arbitrary behaviour by the state or private parties, which is a prerequisite 
for tenure security.
The general framework of Indonesian land law is formed on the basis 
of article 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution by the 1960 BAL, which was enact-
ed during Guided Democracy, when the Indonesian ‘Rechtsstaat’ was 
under severe pressure and Soekarno was promoting Indonesian socialism, 
including ‘revolutionary law’. As any law, the BAL is a product of its time. 
In order to protect vulnerable groups, it stresses that land has a ‘social func-
tion’. To realise this function, the law grants the state a strong authority in 
land matters in the form of a state’s right of control. It allows the state to 
grant individual land rights to landholders, to limit these rights, or to 
revoke them. The BAL required the enactment of implementing legislation, 
which only partly occurred though.
Guided Democracy was followed by the New Order period in 1965, 
marked by stability and economic growth. The Soeharto regime adopted a 
‘developmentalist’ approach of state-led industrialisation, intensification 
of agriculture, and large-scale exploitation of natural resources. To imple-
ment this policy, it built a centralist regime of authoritarian rule with strong 
military backing. Throughout the years, the New Order was increasingly 
marked by KKN. While authoritarian interpretations of constitutional law 
provided the stability required for economic development, the New Order 
regime created a new framework of substantive laws and regulations that 
were to facilitate such development. Existing legislation was not always 
annulled, but often marginalised and reinterpreted. Land law was also 
reformed to facilitate economic development, leading to significant legal 
inconsistencies. The socialist oriented BAL was maintained. As the law 
grants the state a broad authority in land matters, it was basically a suitable 
instrument to implement New Order ‘developmentalist’ policies. The 
BAL’s importance was however strongly reduced by the enactment of oth-
er legislation. Furthermore, little legislation implementing the BAL was 
enacted. What little implementing legislation was enacted reflected the 
New Order regime’s ‘integralist’ interpretation of key concepts of the BAL. 
The combination of these conditions resulted in the central government 
137 This description was derived from the Van Vollenhoven Institute’s Access to Justice 
page at www.law.leiden.edu.
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retaining strong discretionary powers in the land sector, which could easily 
be and indeed were abused in the name of ‘development’, affecting the ten-
ure security of ordinary landholders.
The fall of Soeharto in 1998 marked the beginning of an ambitious 
political and legal reform programme, leading to a reformulation of Indo-
nesia’s development policy, a dismantling of the authoritarian state, and 
various measures against KKN. The 1945 Constitution was amended four 
times and implementing legislation was revised or enacted, thus strength-
ening the Indonesian ‘Rechtsstaat’, including more democracy, a clearer 
separation of powers, and better human rights protection. The right to ade-
quate housing is now explicitly acknowledged in the Amended 1945 Con-
stitution and through the ratification of major international human rights 
treaties. One of the most important initiatives following these constitution-
al reforms was the enactment of the 1999 RALs, revised by the 2004 RALs, 
which resulted in the devolution of tasks, authorities, political power, and 
resources from the central government to the districts/municipalities. 
Implementing legislation has however led to much confusion and has 
severely limited the scope of regional autonomy in the land sector. Land 
law has only been revised to a limited extent, despite calls for fundamental 
reform. It thus still contains clear trails of Guided Democracy and New 
Order ideology.
It follows from the above that compared to the New Order period, 
kampong dwellers in Bandung now seem more protected against arbitrary 
behaviour by the state or private parties. At least on paper, the rule of law 
environment in which land law is embedded, has improved significantly. 
The effect of this improvement may however be limited by the fact that 
land law itself has not yet been reformed. In order to assess this affect, the 
following chapters therefore take a closer look at the law and practice of 
four specific areas that are relevant in relation to the issue of tenure securi-
ty: land registration (Chapter 4), spatial planning (Chapter 5), land clear-
ance by the state (Chapter 6) and land clearance by commercial developers 
(Chapter 7).
4.1 Introduction1
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, three categories of land tenure are generally 
found in urban kampongs: formal tenure, semi-formal tenure, and infor-
mal tenure. Following the aim of the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) to unify the 
system of land law, the latter two tenure categories are to be formalized 
through the registration of land, which is intended to enhance legal tenure 
security. In order to promote this, the Indonesian government has initiated 
large-scale land registration programmes. The first programme dates back 
to 1981, and several have followed. With the support of the World Bank 
and AusAID, the Indonesian government started the Land Administration 
Project (LAP) in 1994. The project takes a de Soto-like approach of provid-
ing land titles to low-income landholders at low cost, as well as institu-
tional reforms. The LAP and other programmes have resulted in the regis-
tration of millions of land parcels, particularly in cities.
While impressive in scale, little is known about the contribution of land 
registration (through titling programmes) to enhancing legal tenure secu-
rity for the urban poor. To fill this knowledge gap, this chapter presents an 
analysis of the law and practice of land registration in kampongs in Ban-
dung.
The chapter is divided into eight sections. The next section gives a short 
overview of the legal system of land registration in Indonesia. This is fol-
lowed by Section 4.3, which assesses whether the urban poor are actually 
able to do sporadic registration, by which this chapter assesses ex-ante the 
feasibility of land registration programmes. Section 4.4 discusses these pro-
grammes in general, and the LAP in Bandung in particular, describing the 
activities carried out. The following section studies the extent to which the 
urban poor actually have had a chance to participate in the LAP. Most 
importantly, Section 4.6 assesses the extent to which registration of land 
through programmes such as the LAP contributes to legal tenure security 
of participants – by providing them with legally valid titles that allow them 
to reside on the land and which can stand the test of time. In closing, this 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was published as Reerink, G.O. (2009), ‘Land Regis-
tration Programs for Indonesia’s Low-Income Slum Dwellers, Need, Reach, and Effect 
in the Kampongs of Bandung’, In: J.M. Ubink, W.A. Assies & A. Hoekema (ed.), Legalis-
ing Land Rights, Local Practices, State Responses and Tenure Security in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, Leiden: Leiden University Press, p. 527-48.
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Chapter discusses some recent legal and institutional reforms in relation to 
land registration, after which it concludes.
4.2 The system of land registration in Indonesia
The BAL’s provisions on land registration are implemented by Govern-
ment Regulation No. 24/1997 and various lower regulations.2 On the basis 
of this legal framework, both semi-formal and informal tenure can be inte-
grated into the unified system of land rights, thus becoming formal tenure, 
be it in different ways. Semi-formal tenure can be formalised by the legal 
conversion of colonial land rights, while informal tenure can be formalized 
by the state granting rights to individuals and legal bodies over land to 
which it has a right of control (state land).3 Indonesian land law does not 
acknowledge the concept of adverse possession (also known as ‘squatters’ 
rights’), which means that obtaining a right to another person’s land by 
continuous tenure for a certain period of time is impossible (Harsono 
2005:156-8).
Upon registration, landholders receive a land certificate. According to 
Harsono, only then is the legal conversion of colonial land rights into one 
of the statutory rights mentioned in the BAL actually validated (Harsono 
2005:324). Implementing legislation can determine criminal sanctions for 
right holders on failure to register, but these have never been formulated.4 
There is a time limit for the registration of former European rights; all of 
those should have been registered before 1980. If not, the land reverts back 
to the domain of the state.5 No such time limit applies to the registration of 
colonial adat ownership rights.
As discussed in Section 3, authorities in the field of land administra-
tion, including land registration, were never devolved to the regions. These 
authorities are therefore still assigned to the National Land Agency (Badan 
2 GR No. 24/1997 on land registration (PP No. 24/1997 tentang Pendaftaran Tanah). The 
government regulation replaced GR No. 10/1961 on Land Registration (PP No. 10/1961 
tentang Pendaftaran Tanah). See also Art. 65 GR No. 24/1997.
3 Art. 22(2), 31, 37, 41 Law No. 5/1960 in conjunction with Regulation of Department of 
Home Affairs No. 6/1972, GR No. 24/1997 and, Regulation of the Department of Home 
Affairs No. 5/1973.
4 Art. 52(2) in conjunction with Art. 19 Law No. 5/1960.
5 Art. 1 Presidential Decision No. 32/1979 on the General Policy in the Framework of 
Granting New Rights on Land that was Previously Subject to Converted Western Rights 
(Keppres No.32/1979 tentang Pokok Kebijaksanaan dalam Rangka Pemberian Hak Baru atas 
Tanah Asal Konversi Hak-Hak Barat) in conjunction with Art. 55(1) Law No. 5/1960. See 
also Art. 3(1) Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 3/1979 on Provisions regard-
ing the Request and Granting of New Rights on Land that was Previously Subject to a 
Converted European Right (Kepmendagri No. 3/1979 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan menge-
nai Permohonan dan Pemberian Hak Baru atas Tanah Asal Konversi Hak-Hak Barat).
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Pertanahan National or BPN, hereafter the NLA).6 The NLA is a non-depart-
mental state body under the direct responsibility of the President. It has 
branch offices at the provincial and district/municipal level – the so-called 
Land Offices (Kantor Pertanahan) (Harsono 2005:122-4). Land Deed Officials 
(Pejabat Pembuat Akte Tanah or PPAT), who can be Sub-District Heads 
(Camat) or public notaries (notaris), assist the NLA with the registration of 
land by drawing up land deeds.7 These deeds form the major source of 
information for maintaining the land register.8
The initial registration of land rights, also called adjudication (adjudika-
si), is a major task of the NLA. Such registration can be organized ’sporadi-
cally’ or ’systematically’. Sporadic registration is the individual or joint reg-
istration of one or several land plots at the initiative of (a) right holder(s).9 
Systematic registration means that several plots in the same area (a Village 
or City Quarter) are registered at the same time, at the initiative of the gov-
ernment. This form of registration is organized by a special Adjudication 
Committee (Panitia Ajudikasi).10 The Indonesian government gives priority 
to systematic registration in the cities.11
For the initial registration of semi-formal rights (registration of ‘old’ 
rights), several land documents, such as colonial land tax documentation, 
can form (supportive) evidence.12 In principle, these documents should 
relate to the person claiming the land right, not previous landholders. Oth-
erwise, that person should have other documents proving the historical 
chain of ownership. In case the evidence is incomplete, witnesses or the 
person claiming the right can give testimony.13 If someone wishes to regis-
ter a semi-formal right but cannot present proper evidence, the 1997 Gov-
ernment Regulation allows him to register the right if the land has been in 
his possession (or the possession of possible predecessors) for 20 years or 
more, in good faith and in openness, as confirmed by a reliable witness; 
and if no one objects after the announcement that the right is to be regis-
tered (Harsono 2005:495-8).14
6 Art. 19 Law No. 5/1960 in conjunction with Presidential Decision No. 26/1988 on the NLA 
(Keppres No. 26/1988 tentang BPN). On land registration, see Art. 6(1) GR No. 24/1997.
7 Art. 6(2) GR No. 24/1997 in conjunction with GR No. 37/1998.
8 General Elucidation GR No. 24/1997.
9 Art. 1(10) and (11); General Elucidation GR No. 24/1997.
10 Art. 8 GR No. 24/1997 in conjunction with Art. 48-54 Ministerial Regulation No. 
3/1997.
11 General Elucidation GR No. 24/1997; General Elucidation, Pt. IV Law No. 5/1960.
12 Examples of other documents that can form (supportive) evidence are: a counterpart 
original of a notary deed concerning a European ownership right; a private contract 
concerning the transfer of land that is witnessed by an adat leader / a village head / a 
neighbourhood head, which is created before the 1997 Government Regulation has 
been enacted; a deed drawn up by a Land Deed Official, which has not yet been regis-
tered; a letter from the Land and Building Tax Department clarifying the history of the 
land, and; other written evidence regarding the land.
13 Art. 24(1) (including Elucidation) GR No. 24/1997.
14 Art. 24(2) GR No. 24/1997. Evidence means documents mentioned in Art. 24(1).
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The initial registration of rights that have been granted by the state on 
state land (registration of ‘new’ rights) is much easier. It only requires the 
right holder to prove his right with a decision of an NLA official who is 
competent to grant a land right (Harsono 2005:325).15
Registration of new rights may be easy, but obtaining such rights is 
generally not. As discussed in Chapter 2, over the years much state land 
has been squatted and kampongs have developed. Part of this land is 
former European land, of which the rights have not been registered before 
1980. Kampong dwellers occupying such state land in principle have a pri-
ority right over third parties to request a new land right.16 For kampong 
dwellers occupying land that is not state land, obtaining a new land right is 
more complicated. The existing land right should become forfeited first, 
after which the land reverts back to the domain of the state and the state 
can grant a new land right. As discussed in Chapter 3, land rights become 
forfeited if land qualifies as neglected land. Such is the case if the land is 
deliberately not used in accordance with its physical condition or with the 
form and goal of the right to which it is subject or not well taken care of. 
Rights that can become forfeited include state management rights, private 
rights as well as legal claims to hold the land that have not yet become 
rights. It is the Head of the NLA who, for instance after a reporting by citi-
zens, decides whether land qualifies as neglected land.17
Whether concerning old or new rights, in both cases initial registration 
involves costs. These consist of variable costs for the surveying of the land, 
and Rp. 25,000 for the registration itself.18 Poor people are exempted from 
registration costs.19 People qualify as poor if their income is below Regional 
Minimum Wage (Upah Minimum Regional or UMR) as defined by the dis-
15 Art. 23 GR No. 24/1997 in conjunction with Regulation of the Department of Home 
Affairs No. 6/1972 and Regulation of the Department of Home Affairs No. 5/1973.
16 Art. 5 Presidential Decision No. 32/1979 in conjunction with Regulation of the Minister 
of Home Affairs No. 3/1979 on the Provisions for the Request and Granting of New 
Rights on Land that was Previously Subject to Converted Western Rights (Permendagri 
No. 3/1979 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan mengenai Permohonan dan Pemberian Hak Baru 
atas Tanah Asal Konversi Hak-Hak Barat).
17 Art. 3, 8, 9, 14 GR No. 36/1998 on the Regulation and Exploitation of Neglected Land 
(PP No. 36/1998 tentang Penertiban dan Pendayagunaan Tanah Terlantar) in conjunction 
with Art. 27(a, under 3), 34(e), and 40(e) BAL. GR No. 36/1998 is implemented by Deci-
sion of the Head of the NLA No. 24/2002 on the Implementing Provisions of GR 
36/1998 (Keputusan Kepala BPN No. 24/2002 tentang Ketentuan Pelaksanaan PP No. 
36/1998).
18 See Art. 4 and Art. 5 in conjunction with Annex GR No. 46/2002 on the Tariffs on Non-
Tax State Revenues Applicable to the NLA (PP No. 46/2002 tentang Tarif atas Jenis Pene-
rimaan Negara Bukan Pajak yang Berlaku pada BPN).
19 Art. 21(1) GR No. 46/2002. Compare Art. 19(4) Law No. 5/1960 and Art. 61(2) of GR 
No. 24/1997. Contrary to the provision in the BAL, the one in GR No. 24/1997 states 
that people who cannot afford registration can be exempted from part of or all the costs 
for registration.
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trict/municipal government as evidenced by a written statement from the 
RW (RT) Heads that is approved by the City-Quarter Head.20
A landholder who obtains a new right on state land not only has to pay 
registration fees, but also Entry Money (Uang Pemasukan) and tax in the 
form of a Fee for Acquisition of Rights to Land and Buildings (Bea Perolehan 
Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan or BPHTB). The amount of Entry Money 
depends on the agricultural or non-agricultural status of the land, the 
land's Sale Value as a Tax Object (Nilai Jual Obyek Pajak or NJOP) on the 
basis of which the Land and Building Tax (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan or PBB) 
is calculated, and the type of right that is granted. To obtain an ownership 
right on residential land, a new formal landholder pays 2 per cent of the 
estimated value minus an exemption base.21 People who are in a weak eco-
nomic position get a 50 per cent reduction.22 People qualify as being in a 
weak economic position if their income is below Regional Minimum Wage 
as defined by the municipal government as evidenced by a written state-
ment from the RW (RT) Heads that is approved by the City-Quarter Head.23 
The tax rate is at 5 per cent over the market value of the property, or if this 
value is unknown or lower than the estimated value determined for Land 
and Building Tax, 5 per cent of that estimated value, minus a tax exemption 
base.24 A new formal landholder is exempted from this tax if the value of 
the property is less than Rp. 60,000,000 or if the district/municipal govern-
ment has determined a lower tax exemption base, less than that amount.25
In order to keep the system of land registration reliable, a formal land-
holder should report any change in the legal status of registered land to the 
NLA.26 This is called derivative registration. Most transfers of land rights 
can in principle only be registered if proved by a land deed drawn up by a 
Land Deed Official (Harsono 2005:508-9).27 The registration procedure of 
20 See Art. 1(3) Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 1/2003 on the Technical Implementa-
tion of Art. 21 GR No. 46/2002 (Keputusan Kepala BPN No. 2/2003 tentang Teknis Pelak-
sanaan Pasal 21 PP 46/2002).
21 The exemption base is defined by the Department of Finance for each region (Art. 1(13) 
GR No. 46/2002).
22 Art. 15-21 GR No. 46/2002.
23 Art. 4(3) Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 1/2003.
24 Art. 5 and 8 Law No. 21/1997 on the Costs for Obtaining a Right to Land and Buildings 
(UU No. 21/1997 tentang Bea Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan); Art. 2(2), under b, 
and Art. 6 Law No. 20/2000 on the Revision of Law No. 21/1997 (UU No. 20/2000 ten-
tang Perubahan UU No. 21/1997). The exemption base is defined by the Department of 
Finance for each region (Art. 1(13) GR No. 46/2002).
25 GR No. 113/2000 on the Definition of the Value of an Acquired Tax Object Not Subject 
to Costs for Obtaining a Right to Land and Buildings (PP No. 113/2000 tentang Penentuan 
Besarnya Nilai Perolehan Objek Pajak Tidak Kena Pajak Bea Perolehen Hak atas Tanah dan 
Bangunan) in conjunction with Art. 7 Law No. 20/2000.
26 Art. 36 GR No. 24/1997 in conjunction with Art. 94 Ministerial Regulation No. 3/1997.
27 Art. 37 GR No. 24/1997. Failure to draw up a land deed in case of any legal change in 
the status of the land thus does not necessarily mean that this change is void, but the 
new right holder will meet difficulties to register it (Harsono 2005:515-6).
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land rights transferred by inheritance is somewhat different. In cases where 
registered land is inherited, the heir is required to provide the NLA with the 
land certificate, a death certificate of the former formal landholder, and writ-
ten evidence that he or she is the heir of that formal landholder.28 Signifi-
cantly, the Law sets no time limit for the provision of this documentation.
As with initial registration, derivative registration involves costs; con-
sisting of registration costs and tax. Again as with initial registration, these 
costs are Rp. 25,000; but in this case low-income people are not exempted.29 
However, if an heir registers as the new right holder within six months of 
the former right holder passing away, they are exempted from registration 
costs.30 Just as in case of the initial registration of new rights, a person who 
obtains land and/or buildings is also required to pay 5 per cent tax over the 
market value of the property, or if this value is unknown or lower than the 
estimated value determined for Land and Building Tax, 5 per cent of that 
estimated value, minus a tax exemption base.31 Someone obtaining proper-
ty through inheritance or bestowal from a first degree relative pays only half 
the amount of tax of someone who has obtained such property by other 
means.32 The tax exemption base is determined by the district/municipal 
government and may not be higher than Rp. 60,000,000 or, in cases where 
the land is inherited or bestowed to a first degree relative, Rp. 300,000,000.33 
Until the person obtaining the property has paid this tax, notaries and the 
NLA are not allowed to cooperate in the transfer of the land right.34
In case of sale, an alienator is required to pay 5 per cent income tax on 
the revenues from the transfer of the rights on land/buildings, or again, if 
this amount is smaller than the estimated value determined for Land and 
Building Tax, 5 per cent of that estimated value. An alienator of property 
that cost less than Rp. 60,000,000 is exempted from this tax, unless his or her 
income exceeds the tax exemption base.35 Until the alienator has paid this 
tax, the NLA is not allowed to cooperate in the transfer of the land right.36
28 Art. 42(1) GR No. 24/1997. Art. 111 Ministerial Regulation No. 3/1997 defines which 
documents can prove that he or she is the heir of the right holder.
29 Art. 5 in accordance with Annex GR No. 46/2002.
30 Art. 61(3) GR No. 24/1997.
31 Art. 5 and 8 Law No. 21/1997; Art. 2(2), under a, and Art. 6 Law No. 20/2000.
32 Art. 2 GR No. 111/2000 on the Cost Assessment for Obtaining a Right to Land and 
Buildings by Inheritance or Bestowal (PP No. 111/2000 tentang Pengenaan Bea Perolehan 
Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan Karena Waris dan Hibah Wasiat) in conjunction with Art. 3 
Law No. 20/2000.
33 GR No. 113/2000 in conjunction with Art. 7 Law No. 20/2000.
34 Art. 24 Law No. 20/2000; Art. 5 GR No. 111/2000.
35 Art. 5 GR No. 48/1994; Art. 8(3) GR No. 27/1996.
36 Art. 7 GR No. 48/1994; Art. 39 GR No. 24/1997.
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4.3 Sporadic registration and its limits
On paper, the integration of semi-formal and informal tenure into a unified 
system of land rights seems simple. In practice, however, it proves hard for 
semi-formal and informal landholders to (obtain a right and) register their 
land, as will be discussed below.
Government Regulation No. 24/1997 replaced Government Regulation 
No. 10/1961 to make the land registration process more efficient (World 
Bank 1994:6).37 For instance, evidence requirements for registration were 
made less stringent.38 Nevertheless, semi-formal landholders still have dif-
ficulty meeting these requirements. This is especially the case in cities such 
as Bandung. In urban areas, land is often purchased instead of inherited, 
and evidence of such transactions usually consists of private contracts 
(surat zegel, perjanjian jual-beli) or sales receipts (kwitansi jual-beli). These 
documents do not meet the evidence requirements for registration (Smeru 
2002:17). Documents that meet evidence requirements – such as notary 
deeds of sale (akte jual beli) – are generally far more expensive, so it is diffi-
cult or practically impossible for low-income dwellers to obtain them. Fre-
quent purchase of land also makes it hard for landholders to prove that the 
land they live on has been inhabited for at least twenty years (by them-
selves and possible previous landholders), which otherwise would allow 
them to register land on the basis of testimonial evidence.
In an interview with Republika daily, the Head of Bandung's Municipal 
Land Office argued that land mostly remains unregistered because people 
have no legal basis for occupying the land, and thus cannot meet the evi-
dence requirements to obtain a certificate.39 This statement suggests that 
although the state could choose to grant or transfer rights to these people, 
there is no political will to do so. In contrast, usage rights or management 
rights are often granted to public entities, which leads to the state no longer 
holding a direct right of control over the land.40 The municipal government 
claims to have the authority to excercise a direct right over 51 per cent of 
the city’s land. It could transfer the right to this land to dwellers upon 
request, for a price decided by a Municipal Committee and agreed to by the 
Mayor and the Municipal Council.41 However, in practice this only occurs 
on a limited scale. One reason for the reluctance to transfer rights may be 
the fact that by not doing so, the Municipality is able to continue issuing 
37 The 1961 Government Regulation was replaced by the 1997 Government Regulation fol-
lowing the systematic review and drafting of land laws and regulations under the LAP.
38 For an overview of all revisions, see the General Elucidation of GR No. 24/1997.
39 ‘BPN: 30 Persen Lahan di Kota Bandung Belum Bersertifikat’, Republika, 28 November 
2005.
40 Informal landholders hold priority rights to obtain new rights on much of this land, but 
they appear to be unaware of this and the state simply ignores that such landholders 
have these rights.
41 Art. 3-7 Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 24/2001.
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permits to reside on the land (izin pemakaian tanah) to an increasing number 
of residents (thus often legalising informal tenure), which generates signifi-
cant revenues while at the same time keeping the land ‘available’ for future 
development projects. Depending on the Municipality’s General Spatial 
Plan, permits are granted for one, five, or ten years.42 Still, an estimated 15 
per cent of the municipal land is used without a permit.43 Qualification of 
land as neglected land and redistribution of such land also seldom occur in 
Bandung, although a lot of squatted land would qualify.44 Even if this were 
to occur, few kampong dwellers would probably be capable of registering 
their land, due to the costs involved.
High costs and unwieldiness of the registration process (in terms of 
complexity and tardiness) form other obstacles to sporadic registration. 
Costs are high despite the availability of special financial arrangements 
exempting low-income groups from registration costs and reducing the 
amount of Entry Money and tax due. Despite their low incomes, most land-
holders are not eligible for these arrangements. As discussed above, land-
holders are only eligible if their income is below Regional Minimum Wage. 
In Bandung, the 2005 monthly Regional Minimum Wage was Rp. 642,590, 
which is considerably less than the average monthly income of semi-formal 
landholders or even informal landholders in kampongs in Bandung.45 
Even if landholders are eligible for the special financial arrangements, the 
remaining costs are still too high for them to register their land.
High costs and also unwieldiness of the registration process are how-
ever mostly the result of a weak performance (and even maladministra-
tion) of the state institutions involved. The NLA in particular has a bad 
reputation in this respect; it is generally considered one of Indonesia’s 
worst performing public bodies. As the World Bank notes, the NLA “has 
been characterised as over-centralised, secretive and unresponsive to land-
holders and the land registration process itself “is complex, paper-intensive 
42 There are questions as to whether the municipal government is entitled to do this. The 
BAL proscribes the state from leasing out land, since it is not the owner of the land 
(Explanatory Memorandum Art. 44 and 45 BAL). There is no reason to suggest that the 
situation would be different for Bandung's municipal government. Perhaps for this rea-
son, the municipal government does not grant a lease right (hak sewa), but a so-called 
Land Use Permit (Ijin Pemakaian Tanah), which is not to be confused with the Land Use 
Permit discussed below.
43 Data derived from internal document of the Housing Service of Bandung Municipality; 
document on file with the author.
44 A good example of such land in Bandung is land on which the Indonesian Railway 
Company (PT Kereta Api Indonesia or PT KAI) has a management right. It manages a 
total of 269,900 ha in the whole of Java. Only 1,140.75 ha or 0.42 per cent is leased out to 
people (personal communication of senior manager of the Indonesian Railway Com-
pany, Bandung, 19 January 2005). Most of the land that has not been leased out is sim-
ply neglected, which explains why so many people can squat. See also the case study 
discussed in Chapter 7.
45 Decision of the Governor of West Jawa No. 561/Kep.1132-Bangsos/2004.
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and manual” (World Bank 2003b:45). Corruption forms another serious 
problem. The NLA “has been used by prevailing political and bureaucratic 
establishment for personal and political gains” (World Bank 2003b:45). It is 
common for landholders who wish to register their land to have to pay 
bribes. These revenues are a welcome addition to the modest salaries of 
NLA officials. Not surprisingly, the World Bank claims that “registration 
fees are excessive, among the highest in the world” (World Bank 2003b:45). 
Maladministration of the NLA also affects the accuracy of the land register, 
a matter that we will discuss below.
Landholders also appear to have negative perceptions about the NLA. 
A 2007 survey of the Corruption Eradication Commission among 3,611 
respondents from Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi revealed 
that among 30 national public bodies, the NLA was considered one of the 
two bodies with the least integrity (the other being the Department of Jus-
tice). In particular the services related to land registration, namely survey-
ing and certification, were qualified as very poor.46 
The results of our survey among kampong dwellers in Bandung affirm 
the conclusions of the World Bank and the Corruption Eradication Com-
mission. In our survey, formal landholders who had obtained a land certifi-
cate in the past 10 years through sporadic registration were asked about the 
costs and duration of the procedure. On average the respondents paid 
almost Rp. 1,600,000, which for most kampong dwellers in Bandung is 
more than a monthly income.47 The duration of the procedure varied 
between one and twelve months. However on average it was relatively 
short; at a little more than three months.48
Our survey also showed that semi-formal landholders held negative 
perceptions regarding the costs, complexity, and duration of registration, 
and would often not even try to obtain a certificate (Table 4.1). When asked 
why they had not yet registered their land, the foremost reason provided 
was prohibitive costs: 63.2 per cent of respondents were of the opinion that 
land registration is too expensive. A further 23.1 per cent of respondents 
believed the procedure demanded a lot of time and trouble, arguing that 
they did not know how to obtain a certificate, that the procedure was com-
plex and would take too long, or that they did not have the energy to get it 
done. Only 3.2 per cent of respondents believed that a land certificate was 
46 ‘Survey KPK: BPN dan Dephukham, Instansi Pemerintah dengan Pelayanan Terburuk’, 
Hukum Online, 30 March 2008.
47 n = 15. The actual estimated costs were on average Rp. 1,597,333.
48 n = 38. The actual estimated duration was on average 3.18 months. Notably, the results 
of our survey are rather positive compared to those of a comparative research under-
taken as part of an evaluation of the LAP and conducted by the Indonesian research 
institute Smeru (to be discussed in further detail below). In this research, respondents 
who had performed sporadic registration in Bandung stated that certificates cost 
between Rp. 2 and 3 million and took years to obtain (Smeru 2002:25).
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useless. One of these respondents explained that he had not obtained a 
land certificate because he believed that the land evidence he held, in his 
case a colonial tax document, was more reliable.
Table 4.1 Semi-formal landholders: why do you not have a land certificate?
Reason %
Land registration is too expensive 63.2 % 
Land registration is unwieldy 23.1 % 
Trying to obtain a land certificate 4.2 % 
Impossible to obtain a land certificate 3.2 % 
A land certificate is useless 3.2 % 
Other reasons 3.2 % 
Note: n = 95
We asked those respondents who believed that land registration was too 
costly to make an estimation of costs, and to say whether they thought 
these costs formed an official charge or involved bribes. On average they 
estimated that the costs of land registration would be almost 2,000,000.49 
Notably, almost one-third of the respondents believed that these costs 
would involve bribes.50 Compared with the actual amount spent by formal 
landholders who had obtained a land certificate in the past 10 years, it 
seems that semi-formal landholders were generally well-informed about 
the costs of land registration, which allowed them to make a rational deci-
sion as to whether to register their land.
Together, the many barriers to sporadic registration faced by kampong 
dwellers include: the stringent evidence requirements for the registration 
of semi-formal rights (which do not reflect the complex land relations, par-
ticularly in urban kampongs); a lack of political will to grant ‘new’ or trans-
fer existing rights of public entities; prohibitively high costs; and an 
unwieldy registration process, related to poor administrative performance. 
Given these barriers, and the associated negative perceptions held by land-
holders about registration, it is clear that kampong dwellers are generally 
reluctant to undertake sporadic registration, which explains the low output 
of sporadic registration in Bandung Municipality (Table 4.2).51 
49 n = 63. The actual estimated costs were on average Rp. 1,943,333.
50 n = 64. The precise percentage of respondents believing that the estimated costs of land 
registration involved bribes was 31.3 per cent.
51 Arguably, the output of sporadic registration may have decreased as a result of system-
atic registration under the LAP.
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Table 4.2 Output sporadic registration in Bandung Municipality
Year Registration of ‘old’ 
rights in number  
of parcels
Registration of ‘new’ 
rights on state land 
in number of parcels
Total number of 
parcels
1998 2,071 517 2,588
1999 182 557 739
2000 84 478 562
2001 32 301 333
2002 62 346 408
Total 2,431 2,199 4,630
Source: Internal document of the Land Office in Bandung Municipality (Titled: ‘Laporan 
Bidang Pengukuran dan Pendaftaran Tanah’)
Indeed, we can see that it is actually the legal system itself that generates 
‘extra-legal’ tenure. Systematic registration through land registration pro-
grammes could be of assistance, if it could remove the barriers currently 
obstructing sporadic registration. The following sections will take a closer 
look at the structure of such programmes, their reach, and their effect.
4.4 Systematic registration: set-up of land registration 
programmes
As a response to the slow process of land registration, at a relatively early 
stage Indonesia initiated large-scale titling programmes. In 1981 the Indo-
nesian government initiated the National Land Registration Project (Proyek 
Operasi Nasional Agraria or PRONA), which aimed to increase legal tenure 
security for economically weak landholders through mass-registration and 
the resolution of land disputes.52 In some regions, Regional Land Registra-
tion Projects (Proyek Operasi Daerah Agraria or PRODA) were launched; 
similar programmes that are financed by the regional governments. 
Around 1988, the land registration efforts were intensified. The number of 
registered parcels grew to about 1 million per year. However, since the total 
number of parcels continued to grow even faster, the Indonesian govern-
ment was never able to catch up (World Bank 1994:3-4). Therefore, the need 
was felt for a more ambitious approach.
As discussed in Chapter 1, international donors’ renewed enthusiasm 
for the land registration approach, in which De Soto played a catalytic role, 
also struck Indonesia. In 1994, the Indonesian government and the World 
52 PRONA finds its legal basis in the Third Five-Year Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun or Repelita III), as elaborated by Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 
189/1981. Beside PRONA and PRODA, the Indonesian government also initiated a vil-
lage-by-village titling programme, which was based on GR No. 10/1961, the PP10 pro-
gramme.
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Bank started the LAP, which as part of a broader policy approach was to 
accelerate land registration through systematic as well as sporadic registra-
tion (World Bank 1994:10-2). In total, 1.2 million land parcels in Districts 
and Municipalities across Java would be registered systematically, benefit-
ing about 4 million people, including about 100,000 families estimated to be 
below the low-income line (World Bank 1994:i-ii).53 Another goal of the 
project was to improve the institutional framework for land administra-
tion, which included a systematic review and drafting of land laws and 
regulations, and the training of NLA staff. Finally, the project was to sup-
port the Indonesian government to develop long-term land management 
policies, through the organisation of seminars and workshops (World Bank 
1994:12-3). The total costs of the project were budgeted at US$ 140.1 million 
(World Bank 1994:15).54
The LAP particularly focussed on West-Java. This Province had the 
lowest coverage of land registration in Java at the time the project was initi-
ated, namely 13 per cent of all parcels. In Bandung, 60.18 per cent of all par-
cels had been registered (World Bank 1994:36-7). 68 per cent of the planned 
1.2 million certificates would therefore be issued in two Municipalities and 
four Districts in West-Java, including 101,500 ownership right (hak milik) 
certificates in Bandung (World Bank 1994:10/44). Although all eligible 
parcels were expected to be registered under the project, to date this has 
not been the case in Bandung (World Bank 1994:14). Still, an impressive 
number of parcels has been registered – even more than planned; namely 
132,863 parcels, as Table 4.3 shows.
Table 4.3 Output LAP in Bandung Municipality
Year Number of Sub-
Districts
Number of City 
Quarters
Number of parcels
1996/1997 7 29 30,792
1997/1998 6 29 39,042
1998/1999 10 35 37,098
1999/2000 12 30 22,839
2000/2001 2 2 3,092
Total 37 125 132,863
Source: Internal document of the Land Office in Bandung Municipality (Titled: ‘Daftar: 
Rekapit ulasi Pelaksanaan Proyek Administrasi Pertanahan di Kota Bandung Tahun 1996/1997 S/D 
Tahun 2000/2001’)
53 Aside from this, the project supported sporadic registration in eight areas in Java and 
Sumatra (World Bank 1994:10).
54 To compare, in 2003 the Indonesian government allocated Rp. 300 million or about US$ 
30,000 for the issuance of 2,600 land titles through PRONA. See ‘Pemerintah Terbitkan 
Sertifikat Prona’, Pikiran Rakyat, 6 February 2003.
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The NLA estimated that in 2005 about 600,000 land parcels in Bandung 
Municipality had been registered. Still 30 per cent or 5,019 hectares of all 
land remain unregistered, despite the fact that many landholders meet the 
registration requirements.55
The successor of the LAP, the Land Management and Policy Develop-
ment Project (LMPDP), which is also an initiative of the Indonesian govern-
ment and the World Bank, is now well under way. It is even more ambi-
tious than the LAP, with a stronger focus on land registration and 
institutional development (World Bank 2004:8). Its goal is to issue 2.5 mil-
lion certificates in areas of high poverty and high economic potential, by 
systematic registration throughout Indonesia (World Bank 2004:3). In the 
LMPDP project appraisal, the World Bank re-recognises the need of a land 
policy “as an integral element of a broader policy dialogue rather than as a 
string of narrowly oriented technical interventions” (World Bank 2004:13). 
To that aim, it wishes not only to perform systematic land registration, 
increase coherence and consistency of land administration and manage-
ment related laws and regulations and promote institutional development, 
but also develop a Land Information System (LIS) and provide training 
and capacity building to all local governments (World Bank 2004:3).
Aside from impressive results in numbers of registered (and to be regis-
tered) parcels, relatively low costs, and short duration of the registration pro-
cedures, the question remains whether the LAP and other land registration 
programmes have reached low-income groups and contributed to their legal 
tenure security. So far, the LAP has been the subject of three key studies, 
which will be referred to throughout the remainder of this chapter. The first 
study was a World Bank-ordered evaluation undertaken by Hardjono (1999), 
in collaboration with a number of local NGOs, which had a qualitative char-
acter, using methods like Focus Group Discussions and in-depth interviews 
with members of communities, and was conducted in nine urban, peri-
urban, and rural City Quarters and Villages, including a City Quarter in Ban-
dung. The second study was also a World Bank-assigned evaluation, this 
time conducted by the Indonesian research institute Smeru (2002). This 
study was also quantitative in nature, involving a comparative survey 
among LAP and non-LAP participants in various Villages and City Quarters 
in 14 Districts and Municipalities, including a total of 110 respondents from 
two City Quarters in Bandung. The third study was a PhD research project 
undertaken by Soehendera (2005), who conducted qualitative research in a 
kampong in Central Jakarta’s City-Quarter Rawa. From the studies, one key 
point was that Smeru evaluated the LAP positively in relation to the registra-
tion process itself, the economic and social impacts of the project, and the 
wider socio-economic effects. The current research does not fully support 
these conclusions, as will be discussed in the following sections.
55 ’BPN: 30 Persen Lahan di Kota Bandung Belum Bersertifikat’, Republika, 28 November 
2005.
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4.5 Reach of land registration programmes
Hardjono concluded that “there was […] at least a very conscious effort to 
ensure that the poor were not overlooked”, and Smeru stated with regard 
to the LAP that “there has been a clear bias towards locations in which 
most households are not well off” (Hardjono 1999:4; Smeru 2002:13). In the 
current research, however, the assessment of whether the LAP and similar 
programmes have reached low-income groups leads to a mixed picture: 
some of the earlier discussed general obstacles hindering sporadic registra-
tion have been overcome, but not all.
Further analysis of the Smeru study reveals that many kampongs could 
not participate in the LAP because of the location selection criteria. Loca-
tions were selected where lower-income households formed the majority of 
households, no more than 30 per cent of land parcels were registered 
through sporadic registration or other land registration programmes, and 
rapid urbanisation was occurring. At the same time, locations where land 
registration was expected to be difficult were avoided. So locations were 
selected where many land transactions took place through Land Deed Offi-
cials (officials of the Sub-District Office or public notaries), where parcels 
without certificates were concentrated instead of widely dispersed and 
where basic village maps were available. In some areas other requirements 
applied as well, such as the absence of major land disputes. Areas involv-
ing conflicts over state land, especially, were avoided (Smeru 2002:13). 
However, these conditions often characterise the poorest kampongs, which 
means that these titling programmes often did not target settlements where 
most members of the programmes’ target group reside.
Even when the programme has extended to kampongs, stringent evi-
dence requirements regarding the registration of semi-formal rights, as 
well as the lack of political will to grant new rights, have remained an 
obstacle for landholders (particularly for the poorest, for reasons discussed 
above) when it came to registering their land through a programme like the 
LAP. Hardjono concludes that landholders who could not benefit from the 
LAP included those with inadequate proof of claims, and occupants of 
state land (Hardjono 1999:7-9).56 The current study reaches an additional 
conclusion: that a landholder’s lack of evidence is often connected to a lack 
of financial means to obtain the correct documents. Documents that meet 
evidence requirements are expensive, and particularly for semi-formal 
landholders with low-incomes this may be a reason why they have never 
obtained them. Similarly, informal landholders – to whom new rights could 
be granted – often squat land precisely because they lack financial means.
56 Hadjono does however refer to one case in Semarang, where squatters of state land that 
was managed by PT KAI were granted new rights. She suspected that political motives 
influenced this decision, which was taken shortly before the 1997 General Elections 
(Hardjono 1999:17).
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Obstacles produced by the costs and unwieldiness of the registration 
process (in terms of complexity and tardiness) were in large part overcome 
by land registration programmes. As part of the survey, formal landholders 
who had obtained a land certificate in the past 10 years through systematic 
registration (through LAP or another land registration programme) were 
asked about the costs of land registration and the duration of the proce-
dure. On average they spent Rp. 78,000, which is only 5 per cent of the costs 
spent by formal landholders who obtained their land certificate through 
sporadic registration.57 Moreover, the average duration of the systematic 
registration procedure was shorter than sporadic registration, namely 2.2 
months.58
Although these costs seem reasonable, they exceeded the official charge 
and still prevented many low-income dwellers from registering their land 
through a programme like the LAP.59 According to Hardjono, costs were 
greatly dependent upon what participants needed from local officials in 
terms of documentation and legalisation (Hardjono 1999:14). To remind the 
reader, it is likely that semi-formal landholders with the lowest incomes in 
particular would be required to obtain new documents in order to meet 
evidence requirements; and that this is the group for which such a request 
would form the biggest financial burden. Soehendera argues that costs 
resulting from officials asking for bribes for their services, as well as mid-
dlemen (calo) having to be paid, prevented dwellers in kampong Rawa 
from participating in the programme. As a result of past experiences, resi-
dents also had negative cost-related perceptions regarding the registration 
process, particularly in relation to the NLA. Those who did participate 
were depending on informal networks and patron-client relationships to 
get their land registered through the programme (Soehendera 2005). In the 
location described by Hardjono where landholders occupying state land 
could participate in the LAP, they decided not to do so, because of the tax 
that has to be paid upon registration of new rights (Hardjono 1999:9, 40). 
57 n = 33. The costs mentioned in the current research are significantly higher than the 
average costs calculated by Smeru, which calculated on the basis of 85 formal landhold-
ers in the cities Bandung, Depok, South-Jakarta, Semarang, Palembang and Medan that 
these costs were Rp. 40,978 (Smeru 2002:18-21). These results suggest that either regis-
tration through the LAP is cheaper in other cities than in Bandung, or that registration 
through other programmes is more expensive than through the LAP.
58 n = 44. Smeru calculated a similar average duration of the LAP registration process 
(Smeru 2002:21).
59 Smeru draws the same conclusion, and notes particularly that the costs of documenta-
tion needed to meet evidence requirements were considerable (Smeru 2002:18-21). 
Under the LAP, the costs in urban areas were Rp. 11,500 – and since 1999/2000, registra-
tion has actually been free of charge. Landholders who receive a new right are also 
exempted from the requirement to pay Entry Money (Art. 20 Law No. 20/2000 in con-
junction with Art. 1(a), under 1 and 3, and 2(a) and (c) Decision of the Minister of 
Finance No. 561/KMK.03/2004). They may have to pay the Fee for Acquisition of 
Rights to Land and Buildings. However, those with a low income can then request a tax 
reduction of as much as 76 per cent.
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Still, according to Smeru, 94.7 per cent of those who did participate in the 
LAP said that the costs in terms of money, time, and effort were small in 
comparison to the benefits of a land certificate (Smeru 2002:25). Hardjono 
even argued that middle and upper income groups would be willing to pay 
“somewhat more” to get their land registered through the LAP (Hardjono 
1999:40-1).
Obstacles similar to those discussed above suggest that in Bandung 
also, land registration programmes like the LAP do potentially not reach 
most kampong dwellers with the lowest incomes. The average monthly 
income of formal landholders who have obtained certificates through a 
systematic titling programme is lower than those who have obtained cer-
tificates through sporadic registration, namely around Rp. 1,600,000 com-
pared with Rp. 1,800,000.60 Yet their income is still much higher than that of 
semi-formal or informal landholders residing in the same kampongs, 
which is around Rp. 1,400,000 and Rp. 1,260,000 respectively.61 It is unlikely 
that this difference in income can be explained merely by the economic 
effects that registration is said to have; rather, this difference casts doubt as 
to whether land registration programmes, in their current form, do reach 
the landholders they are meant to target.
4.6 Land registration, tenure security, and the rule of law
The last question this chapter addresses is whether land registration in gen-
eral, and land registration programmes in particular, have actually contrib-
uted to legal tenure security for kampong dwellers. Our research shows 
that this contribution remains limited.
To be able to assess the effects of land registration programmes on the 
legal tenure security of semi-formal and informal landholders, we first 
need to consider their position before they register their land. Our research 
shows that even before such registration, their tenure security is surpris-
ingly strong, in the sense that they enjoy a high degree of administrative 
recognition. First, most landholders, even most informal landholders, have 
been living on the land for decades, which means that the state has for a 
long time condoned non-formal land tenure. Secondly, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the state has improved the infrastructure in kampongs and pro-
vided kampong dwellers with basic services, such as water, electricity, and 
identity cards, which again demonstrates administrative recognition. 
Third, and this is the most important point in this context, most semi-for-
mal and even informal landholders hold state issued, land-related docu-
mentation. Semi-formal landholders hold colonial tax assessment notices 
and other documentation issued – often recently – by the state, which they 
60 n = 38; n = 44.
61 n = 95; n = 145.
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could use for registration. But also informal landholders have such docu-
mentation, often consisting of multiple-purpose letters (surat serba guna), 
clarification letters (surat keterangan), or declaration letters (surat pernyat-
aan) stating that they reside on the land, usually issued by officials of the 
City Quarter office. In fact, these officials do not have the legal authority to 
provide such documentation.62 However, an interviewed City Quarter 
Head explained that according to administrative practice they do have this 
authority. It is common for people to come to the offices and ask for such 
documentation.63 Officials are reluctant to deny such a request, probably 
also because they can earn some pocket money with it. Almost all land-
holders, including semi-formal and informal landholders, have Land and 
Building Tax documentation. Contrary to the colonial period, any individ-
ual or legal body holding a land right, benefiting from the land, and/or 
owning, controlling or profiting from the building(s) on it, is now subject to 
Land and Building Tax.64 So Land and Building Tax is levied on informal 
landholders. Notably, to avoid any misunderstanding, it is indicated on the 
tax assessment (Surat Pemberitahuan Pajak Terhutang or SPPT) that it does 
not form evidence for any land right. Still, Land and Building Tax docu-
mentation, which is based on data from the fiscal registry, provides rela-
tively accurate information on the size of plots and the dwellings on it and 
the person(s) having an interest in the property.65
To what extent, then, do formal landholders still enjoy more legal ten-
ure security than semi-formal or informal landholders? The difference is 
limited, particularly in the long run, for at least three reasons. The first rea-
son for the limited effect of current land registration programmes on legal 
tenure security is related to the public law requirements regarding residen-
tial land.66 Specifically, residence is not legalised through land registration 
alone. Various permits are also required in order to reside legally on land, 
62 The authorities of the City Quarter Offices are formulated in Bylaw of Bandung Munic-
ipality No. 8/2001; Decision of Mayor of Bandung No. 329/2001; Decision of Mayor of 
Bandung No. 335/2001.
63 Personal communication of City Quarter Head, Bandung, 3 January 2005.
64 Art. 4(1) Law No 12/1985 on Land and Building Tax (UU No. 12/1985 tentang Pajak Bumi 
dan Bangunan). The decision to organise tax assessment not on the basis of the legal sta-
tus of the land (and buildings) but their actual use rested on financial considerations 
(Suharno 2003:25). Despite the limited share of Land and Building Tax within the total 
of the state’s tax proceeds (Suharno 2003:12), organising tax assessment on the basis of 
the legal status of the land (and buildings) would have had serious consequences for 
the state’s budget, since only an estimated 20,000,000 parcels are registered, while 
84,700,000 parcels are object of Land and Building Tax. At least, these considerations 
prevent the state from reorganising the tax assessment. According to a senior official of 
the NLA in Jakarta, only if all land is registered, the system could be changed (personal 
communication, 20 August 2004).
65 The tax department uses state of the art equipment (i.e. satellite photos) to acquire data 
for the fiscal registry, as a result of which the assessment has improved both from a 
qualitative and quantitative perspective (Suharno 2003:vii).
66 This is a common issue, also outside Indonesia. See Otto 2009:188.
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namely a land use permit (izin peruntukan penggunaan tanah or IPPT), a 
building permit (izin mendirikan bangunan or IMB), and a building use per-
mit (izin penggunaan bangunan).67
It is a difficult process to obtain the required permits, in terms of dura-
tion, costs, and the administrative burden; with several Municipal Services 
involved. The regulations are unclear about the duration to obtain a per-
mit, with the exception of the Building Permit, which in case of a house 
with no more than two stories should take no longer than nineteen days to 
receive if all procedural requirements are fulfilled.68 The costs of obtaining 
the permits generally depend on the function, location and size of the plot 
and building, plus costs of surveying and mapping.69 However, respond-
ents informed us that the process often also requires payment of substantial 
bribes, due to, inter alia, the involvement of middlemen and disreputable 
persons (oknum), as well as deviations from prescribed procedures.70 It is 
for this reason that not only the NLA but also Municipal Services are com-
monly referred to as the ‘wet sector’ (sektor basah). In addition, it is not 
uncommon for the institutions to set additional non-financial requirements 
(Niessen 1999:260-1). The negative reputation of the institutions involved 
67 The Land Use Permit consists of a Planning Permit and/or a Planning Recommenda-
tion, which are both granted by the Municipal Town Planning Service (Dinas Tata Kota) 
(Art. 2 Bandung Municipality Bylaw No. 4/2002). The permit forms an administrative 
requirement for the granting of a Building Permit (Art 3). The Permit also forms a 
requirement for the granting of a Permit for the Use of Land and/or Buildings (Izin 
Pemakaian Tanah dan atau Bangunan or IPTB) (Art. 4(1)). The request for the Permit and 
Recommendation should come with additional documentation, including land docu-
mentation (Art. 6). Permits will only be granted if the land use is in accordance with 
zoning provisions of the Municipal General Spatial Plan and the land is not subject to 
conflict (Art. 7). The Land Use Permit is valid for one year and can be extended for 
another year. Within that term a request for a Building Permit should be submitted to 
the Municipal Building Service (Dinas Bangunan) (Art. 4(2)). A Building Permit is 
required for any building activity from the Municipal Building Service (Art. 4 Bylaw of 
the Bandung Municipality No. 14/1998). A permit request should again come with 
additional documentation, including proof of land ownership and, as noted before, a 
Land Use Permit. It is not indicated whether proof of land ownership means a land title 
or can also include alternative documentation. The Building Permit will only be grant-
ed if the building plan meets zoning, sub-division, and building provisions as set out in 
the municipal building regulation itself and spatial planning regulations (the Municipal 
General Spatial Plan, Detailed Spatial Plan and the Technical Plan). The Mayor may 
temporarily allow kampong dwellers to use land for residence until zoning provisions 
regarding that area have been enacted. A Building Use Permit should be obtained from 
the Municipal Building Service before a new building can be used (Art. 28(2)). A request 
for such a permit will only be granted if the building requirements as determined in the 
Building Permit are filfilled (Art. 28(1), 39 and 40).
68 Art. 18 Bandung Municipality Bylaw No. 14/1998.
69 See Art. 9-20 Bandung Municipality Bylaw No. 4/2002; Bandung Municipality Bylaw 
No. 24/1998.
70 This is also confirmed by a joint research of the Municipal Research and Development 
Office and a consultancy firm (Pemerintah Kota Bandung 2004).
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in licensing seems to be due both to the complexity of the procedures, and 
to the repressive powers of the institutions. Based on fieldwork in Bandung 
in the mid-1990s, Niessen concluded that “the pro cess is notorious for its 
tardiness, expense, and unpredictability” (Niessen 1999:267-8). These fac-
tors still form an obstacle for people to apply for a permit, particularly for 
low-income (and low-educated) kampong dwellers, all the more because 
they have strong negative perceptions regarding these procedures.71
Zoning, sub-division, and building requirements, as set out in the spa-
tial planning and building regulations, form another obstacle for kampong 
dwellers to obtain the required permits. For instance, many kampongs are 
located alongside a river or railway track. These locations are designated as 
protected areas, where no building is allowed.72 Zoning provisions have 
been enacted, and, legally speaking, the Mayor cannot temporarily allow 
residence in these areas. Furthermore, in most kampongs 80-90 per cent of 
the land is covered by buildings, and this percentage exceeds the allowable 
limit.73 Finally, an average kampong house does not meet building stand-
ards, including standards regarding facilities.74 Therefore many dwellers in 
these kampongs, including those who have obtained a land certificate 
through a land registration programme, will never be able to fully legalise 
their tenure.
Municipal building and spatial planning regulations set severe sanc-
tions for not meeting permit requirements. The Mayor of Bandung Munici-
pality can command closure, clearance or demolition of a building or pro-
hibit its use.75 Despite the threat of such severe sanctions, it may not come as 
a surprise that very few kampong dwellers have such permits.76 We asked 
71 See also the research report mentioned in the previous footnote.
72 According to the Building Regulation, building is forbidden at less than 4 metres from a 
road and 5 metres, or in a densely built area, 4 metres from a canal (Art. 351 in conjunc-
tion with Art. 346 and 348 of Bandung Municipality Bylaw No. 14/1998). From a river, 
residential buildings should be positioned at more than 10-30 metres, depending on its 
depth (Art. 358 in conjunction with Art. 355). According to Municipal Spatial Plan the 
distance should be at least 3 metres (Art. 70 in conjunction with Art. 36(3) Bandung 
Municipality Bylaw No. 3/2004). However, the Plan refers to municipal bylaws such as 
the Building Regulation. No building is allowed at less than 10 metres from a railway 
track (Art. 36(3)).
73 The building rate should be no more than 80 per cent (Art. 46 Bandung Municipality 
Bylaw No. 14/1998 in conjunction with Table 5, Annex 1 Bandung Municipality Bylaw 
No. 2/2004).
74 For that matter, the Public Order Regulation determines fines of up to Rp 1,000,000 
and/or administrative sanctions against those who do not maintain their buildings 
(Art. 49 Bandung Municipality Bylaw No. 3/2005) or do not have such facilities as sew-
erage (Art. 49(1 sub i and l)). The regulation does not form a direct threat in terms of 
tenure security, in the sense that dwellers cannot be evicted for that reason.
75 Art. 31, 36, 256, 352 Bandung Municipality Bylaw No. 14/1998; 116 Bandung Munici-
pality Bylaw No. 2/2004.
76 See also, Niessen 1999:269-70.
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respondents from all tenure categories whether they have a Building Per-
mit (see Table 4.4). The overall majority of respondents answered that they 
did not. The more formal the land tenure status, the higher was the per-
centage of landholders with a building permit. However, although, a high-
er proportion of formal than informal landholders had building permits, 
the percentage of formal landholders without a building permit was still 
very high (82.8 per cent). This percentage was slightly higher for landhold-
ers who had obtained their certificate through systematic registration, 
namely 84.1 per cent. Thus, despite land registration, the overall majority 
of formal landholders still did not meet the legal requirements to reside on 
the land.










Building permit 16.2 % 13.6 % 14.1 % 2.2 % 1.9 % 
Equivalent of  
building permit
5.4 % 2.3 % 3.0 % 1.1 % 0.6 % 
No building permit 78.4 % 84.1 % 82.8 % 96.8 % 97.5 %
Note: a n = 37 b n = 44, c n = 99, d n = 94, e n = 161
We asked respondents without building permits, from all tenure catego-
ries, why they had not obtained a permit (see Table 4.5). Most believed that 
there was no need for one. A considerable share of these people was not 
even aware that they were under the obligation to obtain a permit. Others 
argued that no one in the neighbourhood had a permit, that their buildings 
were modest or located in an alley, that their buildings had been construct-
ed years ago, or that they held other documentation allowing them to build 
the land. The second most important reason for not having a permit was 
that they considered the permit procedure to demand a lot of time and 
trouble. Respondents argued that they did not know how to obtain a per-
mit, that the procedure was complex, or that they did not have the energy 
to get it done. Relatively few respondents argued that they did not have a 
permit because of the high costs of the procedure. Depending on tenure 
status, a proportion of respondents (relatively more for informal than for 
formal status) argued that they did not have a building permit because 
they could not meet permit requirements.
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No need of permit 50 % 61.5 % 59 % 60.4 % 48.4 %
Permit procedure  
is unwieldy
25 % 25.6 % 26.5 % 24.2 % 19.7 % 
Permit procedure  
is too expensive
25 % 10.3 % 13.3 % 8.8 % 3.2 % 
Do not meet  
requirements 
- 2,6 % 1.9 % 6.6 % 28.7 % 
Note: a n = 28, b n = 39, c n = 83, d n = 91, e n = 157
The Municipality seems to be aware of the dimension and causes of the 
problem. An interviewed senior official of the Municipal Building Service 
estimated that about 35 or 40 per cent of all buildings in Bandung are con-
structed without a permit. Bandung’s municipal government now tries to 
make people aware of their obligations. It implements an Integrated Legal 
Information (Penyuluhan Hukum Terpadu or Lukumdu) programme at the 
city quarter level, where applicable laws are being ‘socialised’.77 However, 
to date the programme has had limited effect.78 Although the number of 
building permits issued annually by the Municipal Building Service is 
slowly increasing, in recent years the number of permits issued has 
remained about 3,000 building permits per year, as Table 4.6 shows; far 
fewer than the number required for a city of 2.3 million people.
Table 4.6 Number of building permits issued by Bandung's Municipal Building Service







Source: Internal document from Bandung’s Municipal Building Service
77 Personal communication of a senior official of Bandung’s Municipal Building Depart-
ment, January 2005.
78 It may be for this reason that Head of Bandung' Municipal Building Service Ubad Bach-
tiar, in an interview with the daily Pikiran Rakyat, speculated about a more repressive 
approach to increase the percentage of building owners meeting permit requirements. 
He suggested that a building permit should become a requirement for the provision of 
electricity (See ‘Jadikan IMB Syarat Pasang Listrik’, Pikiran Rakyat, 4 January 2005). The 
idea was never taken up though.
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The effect of land registration on legal tenure security is also limited due to 
the fact that a significant proportion of Bandung’s kampong dwellers who 
have a land certificate may not perform derivate registration of their land. 
We asked formal landholders whether they would undertake such registra-
tion, in case of future land transfers. As shown in Table 4.7 below, only 73.7 
per cent of formal landholders who obtained their land certificate through 
sporadic registration claimed they would perform derivative registration. 
Of the formal landholders who obtained their land certificate through sys-
tematic registration, even fewer said they would do so; just 52.4 per cent. If 
we take these two groups together and include formal landholders whose 
land has already been registered by earlier formal landholders, the percent-
age of future derivative registration is 60.8 per cent. A significant propor-
tion of landholders (7.9 per cent, 26.2 per cent, and 16.5 per cent respec-
tively; Table 4.7) would let a buyer of the land decide whether to do 
derivative registration or not.79
Table 4.7 Estimation on derivative registration in case of future land transfers
Formal 
landholders  









Derivative registration 73.7 % 52.4 % 60.8 % 
Derivative registration  
if buyer wants to
7.9 % 26.2 % 16.5 % 
No derivative registration 18.4 % 21.4 % 22.7 % 
Note: a n = 38, b n = 44, c n = 97
Hardjono, who also conducted research on this issue, argued that the pro-
portion of formal landholders who perform derivative registration is low 
for several reasons, including because they do not understand its impor-
tance; Sub-District and City Quarter Offices are willing to provide alterna-
tive land related documentation; derivative registration involves substan-
tial administrative costs and tax levies; and the procedure demands time 
and trouble (Hardjono 1999:38-40). The expenses for derivate registration 
(which likely also consist of bribes) form an obstacle in particular for for-
mal landholders who have obtained their land certificate through system-
atic registration, because on average these formal landholders have lower 
incomes than formal landholders who have obtained their land certificates 
through sporadic registration.
79 It should be noted that some respondents may have given a politically correct answer to 
the question whether or not to perform derivate registration. In addition, in practice 
derivative registration may prove more difficult than expected. The percentage of kam-
pong dwellers who will actually perform derivate registration may thus be lower.
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The low percentage of formal landholders who choose to perform 
derivative registration “just in case” of future land transfers may not come 
as a surprise, but it is no less concerning. The lack of such registration will 
mean that, despite initial land registration, in the future many formal land-
holders will again lack proper documentation to prove that they have a 
right on the land; which will affect their legal tenure security. Worse, the 
low percentage of derivative registration also means that the register loses 
its accuracy. This affects not only formal landholders who do not perform 
derivative registration, but any formal landholder; as general trust in the 
land register depends on its actual and perceived accuracy.
The third reason for the limited effect of current land registration pro-
grammes on legal tenure security is related to the fact that the land admin-
istration system offers only partial protection. Again this is a result of a 
combination of weaknesses in the legal framework, and maladministra-
tion. The BAL creates a negative registration system combined with ele-
ments of a positive system, which means that a land certificate is not con-
clusive, but only forms (strong) evidence regarding a land right. A third 
party can dispute the right of a formal landholder during the five years 
after the certificate has been issued.80 In order to protect right holders 
against such claims, Indonesian land law recognises the concept of forfei-
ture of rights, which serves as an alternative for the concept of adverse pos-
session (Harsono 2005:478-82).
The legal framework thus has some weaknesses, but the main prob-
lems derive from maladministration. According to many observers, the 
NLA has a notorious reputation as a result of incompetence – both from a 
technical and from an organisational perspective – and corruption.81 It is 
said to be common for NLA officials to issue more than one certificate for 
the same plot of land. Indonesians even have specific names for such cer-
tificates, such as sertifikat ganda (double certificate) or sertifikat aspal (origi-
nal, but false certificate).82 In 2003, a former Head of the Land Office in 
Bandung Municipality was arrested for issuing a certificate to a third party 
for another person’s land plot.83 Aside from the failure of formal landhold-
ers to carry out derivative registration of their land, the issuing of double 
certificates further affects the reliability of the land register.
As part of the evaluation of the LAP, the World Bank concluded that the 
institutional development component of the project “was less than success-
ful” (World Bank 2004:14). It is therefore reasonable to expect that problems 
of incompetence and corruption are not just problems of the past. Ironical-
ly, land registration programmes may even enlarge these problems, 
80 Art. 32 GR No. 24/1997 (and Elucidation) in conjunction with Art. 19(2c), 23(2), 32(2) 
and 38(2) BAL.
81 See also Zevenbergen 2002:143-4/150-1.
82 See also Bedner 2001:167.
83 See: ‘Mantan Kepala BPN Kota Bandung Ditahan Polisi’, Kompas, 15 January 2003. It is 
not clear whether the official has been convicted.
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because the administration is not accustomed to mass registration of land, 
which may hence impose an excessive burden (Payne 2001:425).
It is not the land administration system alone that offers only partial 
protection, but land law in general. As discussed in Chapter 3, all land, 
regardless of whether it is state or private land, always retains a ‘social 
function’.84 This concept is said to be derived from adat law, and means that 
individual rights must be balanced against the interests of the community 
(General Elucidation, Chapter II, under 4) (Fitzpatrick 1999:76). The state’s 
right of control is a useful tool to maintain the social function of land. The 
BAL contains several mechanisms so land can be re-used for the benefit of 
the community, such as forfeiture of rights on neglected land, land reform, 
and revocation of rights in the public interest.85 As discussed above, land 
qualifies as neglected land if it is deliberately not used in accordance with 
its physical condition or with the form and goal of the right to which it is 
subject or if it is not well taken care of. This includes the use of land that is 
not in accordance with spatial planning regulations, particularly if land is 
subdivided without permission, and the failure as such to obtain a statuto-
ry land right.86 This again shows how important it is for kampong dwellers 
to hold all required permits. However, formal landholders may be saved by 
the provision holding that land will not be classified as neglected land if 
they are economically incapable to use the land the way it should be used 
or if the land is object of a dispute.87 Land reform includes annulment of 
land rights if a right holder has too much land, or if land qualifies as absen-
tee land. Such land can also be redistributed to vulnerable groups. Land 
reform, however, only applies to agricultural land.88 In all cases, the law 
contains certain safeguards that should protect landholders. It falls outside 
the scope of this chapter to discuss this issue in more detail, but in view of 
past experiences it is questionable whether the Indonesian government 
takes adequate consideration of these safeguards.
4.7 Recent reforms related to land registration
In order to overcome some of the legal and administrative shortcomings 
discussed above, recently, legislation related to land registration has been 
revised significantly. There is new legislation on topics as various as 
neglected land, minimum services standards, and registration costs. In 
84 Art. 6 BAL.
85 On land clearance for development in the public interest, see: Art. 18 BAL.
86 Art. 3 and 4 GR No. 36/1998 in conjunction with Art. 27(a, under 3), 34(e), and 40(e) 
BAL.
87 Art. 11 GR No. 36/1998 in conjunction with Art. 27(a, under 3), 34(e), and 40(e) BAL. 
Notably, this provision does not apply to semi-formal and informal landholders, who 
are thus not protected.
88 Art. 7, 10, 17 BAL.
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addition, the Indonesian government has introduced the Service to the 
People for Land Registration (Layanan Rakyat untuk Sertifikasi Tanah or 
LARASITA) programme, which has the aim to make the registration sys-
tem more accessible to low-income groups.
In January 2007, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono held a speech 
in which he announced agrarian reform would again become a govern-
ment priority. In this framework, the Indonesian government initiated the 
National Agrarian Renewal Programme (Program Pembaruan Agraria 
Nasional or PPAN).89 The PPAN is a state land redistribution project, which 
focuses on agricultural land. However, the renewed attention for agrarian 
reform may also benefit urban landholders. In order to facilitate land redis-
tribution, Government Regulation No. 36/1998 was replaced by Govern-
ment Regulation No. 11/2010.90 On the basis of the new government regu-
lation land rights still become forfeited if land qualifies as neglected land. 
Land qualifies as neglected land if it is deliberately not used in accordance 
with its physical condition or with the form and goal of the right to which it 
is subject. Such is the case if, inter alia, no land right is applied for or if the 
land is not used in accordance with the requirements set in a site permit 
(izin lokasi), decision to grant a land right or any other permit, decision or 
letter issued by a competent official.91 That land is not well taken care of, is 
no longer a separate criterion to qualify land as neglected land. Land does 
not qualify as neglected land if the landholder is economically incapable to 
use the land the way it should be used.92 The government regulation 
explicitly stipulates that land which, as a result of a decision of the NLA 
that it qualifies as neglected land, reverts to the domain of the state, should 
be made productive again in the interest of the people and the state in the 
framework of land reform, strategic state programmes, and other state 
plans.93
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government initiated the People’s Service 
for Land Registration programme.94 In the framework of this programme, 
mobile land administration services are provided to landholders who wish 
89 Notably, a legal basis for the initiative is still awaited. The NLA has completed work on 
a draft government regulation on agrarian reform, but it has not been enacted.
90 GR No. 11/2010 on the Regulation and Exploitation of Neglected Land (PP No. 11/2010 
tentang Penertiban dan Pendayagunaan Tanah Terlantar). The government regulation is 
implemented by Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 4/2010 on the Procedure for 
the Regulatation of Neglected Land (Peraturan Kepala BPN No. 4/2010 tentang Tata Cara 
Penertiban Tanah Terlantar).
91 Art. 2 and Elucidation GR No. 11/2010.
92 Art. 3 and Elucidation GR No. 11/2010. Notably, this stipulation only applies to land on 
which formal ownership or construction rights have been established. Hence, semi-
formal and informal landholders are not protected in this regulation. 
93 Art. 15 GR No. 11/2010.
94 The programme is based on Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 18/2009 on the 
NLA People’s Service for Land Registration programme (Peraturan Kepala BPN No. 
18/2009 tentang LARASITA Badan Pertanahan Nasional Republic Indonesia).
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to register their land. Landholders are thus no longer required to go to a 
‘normal’ Land Office. In the first period of its implementation, 3,274 land 
certificates have been issued in Bandung under the programme. It is 
expected that in the coming period, each year, about 1,500 land certificates 
will be issued.95
Indonesia has also witnessed the enactment of legislation on minimum 
services standards. In February 2005, the Head of the NLA promulgated 
Decision No. 1/2005, which formulated standard operational procedures 
for, inter alia, land registration.96 The decision was soon replaced by Regula-
tion of the Head of the NLA No. 6/2008.97 On the basis of the regulation, 
the procedure to perform derivative registration should take no longer 
than five days.98 Notably, the Regulation formulated no time limit for ini-
tial land registration.
In July 2009, Law No. 25/2009 on Public Services was enacted.99 On the 
basis of this Law, administrative services providers have the obligation to 
formulate services standards and to provide services in accordance with 
these standards.100 The services standards should relate to, inter alia, time 
limits and costs.101 Provisions on costs should be enacted with the agree-
ment of the People’s Representative Council, the Provincial Assembly, or 
the District/Municipal Council.102
The public has the right to file complaints about public services to the 
administrative services provider, the Ombudsman, People’s Representa-
tive Council, the Provincial Assembly, and/or the District/Municipal 
Council.103 Notably, in order to realise this right, the Ombudsman is 
required to establish representative offices at the regional level within three 
95 'Pemkot Bandung Bisa Bantu Sertifikasi Lahan Masyarakat', Pikiran Rakyat, 9 July 2010.
96 Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 1/2005 on the Standard Operation Procedures for 
Regulation and Service in the Context of the National Land Agency (Keputusan Kepala 
BPN No. 1/2005 tentang Standar Prosedur Operasi Pengaturan dan Pelayanan Di Lingkungan 
Badan Pertanahan Nasional).
97 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 6/2008 on the Simplification and Acceleration 
of the Standard Operation Procedures for the Regulation and Service of Land for Spe-
cific Land Services (Peraturan Kepala BPN No. 6/2008 tentang Penyederhanaan dan Percepat-
an Standar Prosedur Operasi Pengaturan dan Pelayanan Pertanahan untuk Jenis Pelayanan 
Pertanahan Tertentu).
98 Attachment II-VI Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 6/2008.
99 Law No. 25/2009 on Public Services (UU No. 25/2009 tentang Pelayanan Publik).
100 Art. 15 Law No. 25/2009.
101 Art. 21 Law No. 25/2009.
102 Art. 31(4) Law No. 25/2009.
103 Art. 40 Law No. 25/2009.
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years after the enactment of the Law.104 Following complaints, superiors 
can impose sanctions.105 In case a complaint is filed with the service pro-
vider, it should be decided upon within sixty days and the party who has 
filed the complaint should be informed about this decision within two 
weeks. A decision can involve the awarding of damages.106 In addition, 
citizens can lodge an appeal to the Administrative District Court in case a 
services provider infringes the obligations set in the law and if the services 
have caused damage.107 Infringement of these obligations can also lead to 
the leadership of service providers receiving written warnings, being dis-
charged from office, being imposed a salary cut or being dismissed with 
dishonour, criminal sanctions and/or fines, depending on the obligations 
the service providers have failed to meet.108
All regulations regarding public services should be brought in accord-
ance with the law within two years after its enactment.109 Implementing 
government regulations, including a government regulation regarding 
guidelines for the formulation of services standards, should have been 
enacted within six months. Following the enactment of the government 
regulation regarding the formulation of services standards, service provid-
ers should have formulated services standards within six months.110
The enactment of the government regulation regarding the formulation 
of services standards is still awaited. Nonetheless, various government 
institutions have formulated services standards. This includes the NLA, 
which enacted Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 1/2010, 2/2010 and 
3/2010.111 Regulation No. 3/2010 requires that each land office has a serv-
ice counter.112 On the basis of Regulation No. 1/2010, initial registration of 
old rights should take no longer than ninety eight days, granting new own-
ership rights to non-agricultural land of less than 2,000 m2 no longer than 
104 Art. 46 Law No. 25/2009. This Article amends Art. 5(2) and 43(1) Law No. 37/2008 on 
the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (UU No. 37/2008 tentang Ombudsman 
Republik Indonesia), which gives the Ombudsman (no longer called the National 
Ombudsman Commission) the authority to establish representative offices at the pro-
vincial and district/municipal levels. Law No. 37/2008 also provides for the possibility 
that additional, independent Regional Ombudsman (Ombudsman Daerah) offices are 
established. See General Elucidation Law No. 37/2008.
105 Art. 41 Law No. 25/2009.
106 Art. 50 Law No. 25/2009.
107 Art. 51-2 Law No. 25/2009.
108 Art. 54-8 Law No. 25/2009.
109 Art. 59 Law No. 25/2009.
110 Art. 50 Law No. 25/2009.
111 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 1/2010 on Standards for Land Services and 
Regulation (Peraturan Kepala BPN No. 1/2010 tentang Standar Pelayanan dan Pengaturan 
Pertanahan); Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/2010 on the Handling of People’s 
Complaints (Peraturan Kepala BPN No. 1/2010 tentang Penanganan Pengaduan Masyar-
akat); Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2010 on Land Services Counters (Perat-
uran Kepala BPN No. 1/2010 tentang Loket Pelayanan Pertanahan).
112 Art. 2 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2010.
116 Chapter 4
thirty eight days, and derivative registration no longer than five days. Reg-
ulation No. 2/2010 creates a complaint mechanism. Complaints should 
also be handled within five days.113 District/municipal governments have 
also formulated services standards. In Bandung, Bylaw No. 22/2009 was 
enacted.114 The bylaw confirms that service providers at the municipal lev-
el are required to formulate services standards for licensing, relating to, 
inter alia, time limits and costs. In addition, they are required to handle 
complaints in accordance with existing standards and mechanisms.115 It is 
unclear whether these standards and mechanism have already been formu-
lated.
In January 2010, Government Regulation No. 13/2010 on Non-Tax 
State Revenues was enacted.116 The objective of this government regulation 
is to increase non-fiscal state revenues for the NLA.117 The fees for the sur-
veying of land are now fixed and amount to Rp. 450,000.118 The fees for 
registration itself have increased by 100 per cent to Rp. 50,000.119 Poor peo-
ple are however still exempted from registration fees.120 In addition, land-
holders obtaining new rights on state land no longer have to pay Entry 
Money.
A final initiative that is worth to mention here is the National Strategy 
on Access to Justice (Strategi Nasional Akses terhadap Keadilan or SNATK), 
which was launched by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in October 
2009. As noted in Chapter 3, it aims to create a framework of policies and 
regulations that are inclusive of poor and marginalised people and afford 
them access to justice so that they can utilise their resources to overcome 
poverty. The National Strategy outlines eight themes, including legal and 
judicial reform, legal aid, local governance, land and natural resources, and 
poor and disadvantaged groups. Under each theme challenges are identi-
fied along with a strategy and action plan identifying the role that relevant 
governments, civil society organisations, and donor institutions can play. 
Key policy recommendations include implementing coordinated and com-
prehensive agrarian reform; developing an integrated and comprehensive 
legal and policy framework based on social and environmental justice, and 
widening space for participation of poor and adat customary users of land 
and other natural resources in law-making; recognising and protecting 
rights, and harmonising spatial planning and licensing, to ensure that poor 
113 Attachment Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 1/2010.
114 Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 22/2009
115 Art. 38 Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 22/2009.
116 GR No. 13/2010 on the Tariffs on Non-Tax State Revenues Applicable to the NLA (PP 
No. 13/2010 tentang Jenis dan Tarif Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak yang Berlaku pada Badan 
Pertanahan Nasional).
117 General Elucidation, GR No. 13/2010.
118 Art. 3 in conjunction with Attachment, under I(A(1)) GR No. 13/2010.
119 Art. 17 in conjunction with Attachment, under II(A(1-2)) GR No. 13/2010.
120 Art. 23(2, under a) GR No. 13/2010.
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and adat communities can safeguard their rights to land and natural 
resources; increasing efficiency and professionalism within the bureaucra-
cy; improve the quality of public services and complaint mechanisms, and; 
encouraging educational institutions to become more active in community 
education.121 Further reforms can thus be expected. This is evidenced by 
the 2010-2014 National Legislative Programme (Program Legislasi Nasional 
or PROLEGNAS 2010-2014), which for instance announces the introduc-
tion of bills on land and on land rights.
All in all, the above reforms make it potentially easier for low-income 
kampong dwellers to register their land. Although the National Agrarian 
Renewal Programme focuses on agricultural land, at least there appears to 
be a general political will to grant new rights to informal landholders. Gov-
ernment Regulation No. 11/2010 on the Regulation and Exploitation of 
Neglected Land also makes it easier for the Indonesian government to do 
so. As a result of the enactment of Government Regulation No. 13/2010 on 
Non-Tax State Revenues, obtaining a registered land right generally has 
become considerably less expensive for informal landholders (but slightly 
more expensive for semi-formal landholders with an income above the 
monthly Regional Minimum Wage). The enactment of the legislation on 
minimum services standards leads to the registration and licensing pro-
cesses possibly becoming less unwieldy. Although the People’s Service for 
Land Registration programme probably benefits landholders in remote 
areas in the first place, it may also remove time and distance barriers as 
well as perceptional barriers to land registration of urban landholders. 
However, the reforms do not address the other main problem discussed in 
this chapter, namely that land registration, through land registration pro-
grammes or otherwise, contributes little to legal tenure security for kam-
pong dwellers.
4.8 Conclusion
The chapter has discussed the law and practice of land registration in kam-
pongs in Bandung. The starting point for land registration is the 1960 BAL, 
which aims to bring an end to the colonial dualist system by integrating 
colonial land rights (‘old’ rights) into a unified system of land rights, and 
also allows for the granting of ‘new’ rights on state land; for instance to 
informal landholders (squatters). In order to increase legal tenure security, 
the BAL requires primary rights to be registered in a legal register. To facili-
tate land registration, the Indonesian government financially and/or tech-
nically assists low-income landholders.
121 This description was derived from the LEAD page at www.undp.org.
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Despite the above facilitation, in practice it is difficult for kampong 
dwellers in Bandung to register their land. Stringent evidence require-
ments, a lack of political will to grant new rights to informal landholders, 
high costs and unwieldiness (in terms of complexity and tardiness) of the 
registration process as a result of poor administrative performance or even 
maladministration, along with related negative perceptions of kampong 
dwellers regarding the registration process, all combine to ensure that spo-
radic land registration only occurs on a limited scale.
Since 1981 the Indonesian government has initiated several land regis-
tration programmes. Over a hundred thousand people have made use of 
such programmes in Bandung only. Nonetheless, on the basis of income 
data it appears that in Bandung land registration programmes such as the 
LAP do often not reach the kampong dwellers with the lowest incomes. 
This limited reach can be explained by the fact that the LAP is only imple-
mented in locations where registration is relatively easy, which means that 
locations where many low-income dwellers reside are ignored. As well, 
some of the same obstacles occurring in case of sporadic land registration 
remain in place; namely the stringent evidence requirements for initial reg-
istration and a lack of political will to grant new rights to informal land-
holders.
Land registration programmes in Bandung not only have a limited 
reach, but also contribute little to actual legal tenure security for kampong 
dwellers. Assessing the tenure security of semi-formal and informal land-
holders, we can conclude that their security is surprisingly strong, in the 
sense that they enjoy a high degree of administrative recognition. At the 
same time, the legal tenure security of formal landholders is limited for at 
least three reasons. First, few formal landholders have the permits they 
need to legally reside on their land. Besides a land certificate, people need 
spatial planning related permits; consisting of a land use permit, building 
permit, and building use permit. Again, the processes to obtain these per-
mits are costly, complex, and slow. Also, many kampong dwellers are not 
eligible for such permits, because they do not meet zoning, sub-division, 
and/or building requirements. However, most people fail to obtain these 
permits because they are not aware of their need. Second, a number of for-
mal landholders reported that they will not perform derivate registration 
after a change in the legal status of the land; probably because doing so 
would incur significant administrative costs and (depending on the value/
condition of the property) tax levies. This not only means that future formal 
landholders will enjoy less legal tenure security, but also that the register 
loses its accuracy, which affects any formal landholder in Indonesia. Final-
ly, the land administration system and even land law in general are dispos-
sessory in nature, which is again the result of weaknesses in the legal 
framework and maladministration.
Recently, there have been significant reforms in relation to land regis-
tration, consisting of the enactment of new legislation on topics as various 
as neglected land, minimum services standards, registration costs and 
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neglected land, and the introduction of the People’s Service for Land Regis-
tration programme. These reforms are hoped to make it easier for low-
income kampong dwellers to register their land. However, the reforms do 
not address the problem that land registration contributes little to the legal 
tenure security for kampong dwellers.
Legal tenure security of the urban poor not only depends on these 
dwellers holding legally valid titles that offer them legal protection against 
involuntary removal, but also on the content of spatial plans. The participa-
tion of the urban poor in the making of these plans is of utmost importance. 
The next chapter will therefore take a closer look at the role of the public 
and particularly the urban poor in lawmaking processes, leading to the 
enactment of Bandung’s Municipal General Spatial Plan.

5.1 Introduction1
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Indonesian state can limit the exercise of 
land rights (and claims) as part of spatial planning. Land use is determined 
by town plans and spatial plans. These plans form the frame of reference 
for a licensing system. A landholder is only allowed to build a house if he 
holds a building permit. Developers are only allowed to initiate land clear-
ance for commercial development if they hold a site permit. A government 
institution is only allowed to clear land for development in the public inter-
est if the District-Head/Mayor has given permission, which should be in 
accordance with spatial plans. Spatial planning thus has a potentially sig-
nificant impact on the legal tenure security of landholders. For that reason 
it is of utmost importance that landholders can participate in spatial plan-
ning, that the government informs them about this process, and that their 
interests are taken into account.
In view of the above, this chapter discusses the law and practice of spa-
tial planning during the New Order and, after having paid attention to 
Post-New Order reforms, takes a close look at the practice of spatial plan-
ning in Post-New Order Bandung. It assesses to what extent the general 
public and particularly kampong dwellers now have the opportunity to be 
actively involved in spatial planning. In doing so, the chapter also looks 
into the role of the Municipal Council, higher levels of government, and 
‘civil society’ in supporting kampong dwellers’ interests. Furthermore, it 
assesses to what extent spatial planning has become more transparent. In 
closing, it reviews to what extent the interests of kampong dwellers are 
taken into consideration in spatial plans.
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The next section discusses 
the law and practice of spatial planning in the late New Order. This is fol-
lowed by a description of Post-New Order spatial planning related reforms. 
Section 5.4 focuses on spatial planning practices in Post-New Order Ban-
dung, by analyzing the lawmaking process of the General Spatial Plan in 
2004 and its premature revision in 2006. Next, spatial planning is analysed 
further from a rule of law perspective. Section 5.6 discusses some recent 
spatial planning related reforms, after which the chapter concludes.
1 A summary of this chapter was published as Reerink, G.O. (2009), ‘When Money Rules 
over Voice, Regional Autonomy and Spatial Planning in Bandung Benefits the Elite’, 
Inside Indonesia (98).
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5.2 Spatial planning under the late New Order
Spatial planning is a relatively new phenomenon in Indonesia. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, the first centrally-formulated Town Planning Ordi-
nance, of which spatial planning was initially a part, was enacted by the 
colonial government in 1948.2 After independence, the colonial legislation 
was maintained.3 In addition, two competing departments, the Depart-
ment of Home Affairs and the Department of Public Works, enacted vari-
ous regulations on town planning. It falls outside the scope of this chapter 
to discuss these regulations in detail, other than to notice that because of a 
lack of coordination among the two departments, they were largely contra-
dicting each other.4 In addition, this legislation overlapped with a system 
of land use planning established according to Article 14 of the BAL (Otto & 
Syafrudin 1990).
The last pieces of town planning legislation that were enacted during 
the New Order were the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 
2/1987, and the implementing Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs 
No. 59/1988.5 On the basis of this legislation, urbanised Districts and 
Municipalities were required to design and enact a General Town Plan 
(Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Kota), Detailed Town Plans (Rencana Detail Tata 
Ruang Kota), and Technical Town Plans (Rencana Teknik Ruang Kota).6 The 
General Town Plan covered the whole territory of a Municipality.7 It con-
tained general directions on how space should be used, as well as maps. 
The Detailed Town Plans covered the whole or part of the territory of a 
Municipality and included zoning provisions.8 These provisions were sup-
ported by maps of a smaller scale than those accompanying the General 
2 The Town Planning Ordinance was implemented by the 1949 Town Planning Regula-
tion.
3 In 1973 the Minister of Home Affairs declared the Town Planning Ordinance applicable 
to all urban settlements (Circular Letter Pemda 18/2/6, dated 15 May 1973). This was 
confirmed by Presidential Instruction No. 1/1976 on the Coordination of Tasks in the 
Field of Agaria with those in the Fields of Forestry, Mining, Transmigration and Public 
Works (Inpres No. 1/1976 tentang Koordinasi Tugas Bidang Keagrariaan dengan Bidang Kehu-
tanan, Pertambangan, Transmigrasi dan Pekerjaan Umum). The Ordinance was finally 
annulled by the 1992 SML (Art. 31 1992 SML).
4 See on this point and for an overview of the history of town planning in Indonesia, 
Niessen 1999:220-36.
5 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987 on Guidelines for the Formula-
tion of Town Plans (Permendagri No. 2/1987 tentang Pedoman Penyusunan Rencana Kota); 
Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 59/1988 on the Directives for the Imple-
mentation of Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987 (Keputusan Menteri 
Dalam Negeri No. 59/1988 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Permendagri No. 2/1987).
6 Art 1 and Art. 5 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987.
7 The following description also applied to urbanised Districts.
8 Art. 6, under c and 7 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987.
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Town Plan.9 The Technical Town Plans dealt with infrastructure and build-
ings.10
The municipal governments had authority in town planning, including 
both the design of town plans and their implementation, but they needed 
to coordinate, integrate, and synchronise with ‘related bodies’, consisting 
of deconcentrated Central Government Bodies and Municipal Services.11 
Specifically, town planning was carried out by the Regional Development 
Planning Agencies (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah or BAPPEDA) 
at the municipal level.12 These agencies were entitled to contract consultants 
to assist in the design of plans.13
According to the legislation, town planning was not intended to be just 
a bureaucratic process. The municipal governments were required to take 
into account the aspirations of the people. To meet that aim, they were 
meant to organise discussion meetings and seminars, where representa-
tives of the people could provide input.14 The Municipal Councils also had a 
role in communicating such views to the municipal governments, which 
were meant to use this input to improve drafts.15 Once designs were ready, 
they were sent to the Municipal Councils to be enacted by bylaw.16
The final steps in the decision-making process in town planning were 
the recommendation and legalisation of town plans by higher administra-
tive levels. In the case of General Town Plans and Detailed Town Plans, the 
Governor first needed to give a recommendation, at which occasion it was 
checked whether the development programmes of the municipal govern-
ments were integrated with those of neighbouring regions in accordance 
with the provincial governments’ development policies.17 Thereafter, the 
Director-General of Regional Development verified whether the procedure 
for the design of plans had been followed.18 Finally, the plans had to be 
legalised. As for the General Town Plans and Detailed Town Plans, this was 
the authority of the Governor or, if the plans concerned a provincial capital 
9 The scale of the maps of the Detailed Town Plan was 1:5,000, while that of the General 
Town Plan was 1:10,000 for a Municipality with less than 1,000,000 inhabitants, and 
1:20,000 for a Municipality with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants (Art. 11 and 7 Regula-
tion of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987).
10 Art. 10, under b Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987.
11 Art. 12-14 and 25 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987.
12 Art. 16 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987.
13 Art. 18, 54, 62, and 82 Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 59/1988.
14 Art. 14 and 25 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987.
15 Art. 34, 44, 52, under a, and 60 Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 59/1988.
16 Art. 26 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987. If the design of plans 
had been contracted out to consultants, they could inform councillors about the techni-
cal aspects of the drafts (Art. 76(3) Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 
59/1988).
17 Art. 28 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987; Art. 78(3) Decision of the 
Minister of Home Affairs No. 59/1988.
18 Art. 79 Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 59/1988.
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or a city with a strong population growth and a strategic position in national 
and regional development, the Minister of Home Affairs. Technical Town 
Plans were always to be legalised by the Governor.19
On the basis of the 1974 Decentralisation Law, the plans could be imple-
mented as soon as they had been legalised, or three months after they had 
been sent to the relevant officials and no decision had been taken. This term 
could be extended for another three months if the relevant officials 
informed the municipal governments about the matter within this term.20
Once the bylaw enacting a town plan had been legalised, the public 
could apply at the Supreme Court for judicial review of the bylaw against 
higher legislation, although only in relation to a concrete case.21 If the 
Supreme Court ruled that the bylaw contradicted higher legislation, it 
would be void and no longer applicable.22
The above shows that the legislation on town planning contained some 
safeguards that could protect the interests of landholders, but that they 
were rather weak. The provisions on participation and transparency for 
instance required municipal governments to “take notice of the aspirations 
of the people“ in town planning, but it did not clarify what consequences 
this should have. Furthermore, the legislation did not make provision for 
all interested parties to have input, but only for “representatives of the peo-
ple“, without clarifying who these could be. Finally, the legislation con-
tained no provisions requiring the plans to be available for inspection by 
the public once enacted.
In 1992 the first umbrella spatial management law was enacted, Law 
No. 24/1992 (hereafter the 1992 SML).23 The aim of the 1992 SML was to 
manage natural resources in a more coordinated and integrated way. It 
therefore incorporated town planning into the broader context of spatial 
management, which involved planning (perencanaan tata ruang), utilisation 
(pemanfaatan ruang), and control of use (pengendalian pemanfaatan ruang) of 
land, water, and airspace at all government levels. The SML required the 
enactment of several implementing regulations. Until these regulations 
were enacted, older legislation was to remain in force.24
The 1992 SML created a whole new planning framework, including 
new terminology. At the municipal level, General Spatial Plans (Rencana 
Umum Tata Ruang) were to be enacted (replacing the General Town Plans), 
19 Art. 28-9 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987.
20 Art. 69(1-2) Law No. 5/1974.
21 Art. 26 Law No. 14/1970 on the Basic Provisions for Judicial Power; Art. 11(4) People’s 
Consultative Assembly Directive No. III/MPR/1978 on the Position and Working Rela-
tion of the Highest State Bodies with/or between High State Bodies (TAP MPR No. III/
MPR/1987 tentang Kedudukan dan Hubungan Tata-Kerja Lembaga Tertinggi Negara dengan/
atau antar Lembaga-Lembaga Tinggi Negara); Art. 31 Law No. 14/1985 on the Supreme 
Court (UU No. 14/1985 tentang Mahkamah Agung).
22 Art. 31 and Elucidation Law No. 14/1985.
23 Law No. 24/1992 on Spatial Management (UU No. 24/1992 tentang Penataan Ruang).
24 Art. 30 Law No. 24/1992.
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which were valid for 10 years. The plans followed the plans of higher 
administrative levels as guidelines. The General Spatial Plans formed the 
basis for Elaborated Spatial Plans (Rencana Rinci Tata Ruang), consisting of 
Detailed Spatial Plans and Technical Spatial Plans (replacing the Detailed 
Town Plans and Technical Town Plans respectively).25 The 1992 SML 
required the enactment of a government regulation regarding the form and 
content of the plans, but such a regulation was never enacted.26 Regulation 
of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987 thus remained the guiding doc-
ument in relation to this matter.
The Governor had authority in spatial management within the Prov-
ince, and the Mayor within the Municipality.27 In order to improve coordi-
nation between and among the different administrative levels, a National 
Coordinating Board for Spatial Planning (Badan Koordinasi Tata Ruang 
Nasional) was established, which was chaired by the Head of the National 
Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional 
or BAPPENAS).28
The 1992 SML explicitly granted the public the right to participate in 
planning, and even required the central government to enact a separate 
government regulation on this matter.29 This regulation was enacted four 
years later: Government Regulation No. 69/1996.30 In the drafting process 
of the General Spatial Plan at the municipal level, the public (consisting of 
individuals, communities, or legal bodies) could give input regarding the 
direction of regional development; identify potential issues and problems 
regarding development; give input on the formulation of spatial planning; 
provide information, proposals, judgments and opinions on the strategic 
organisation of spatial use within the Municipality; object to the draft Gen-
eral Spatial Plan; collaborate in research and development; and/or give 
specialized support.31 The public also had a similar right to participate in 
the drafting process of detailed plans.32 Any form of public participation in 
the drafting process of spatial plans at the municipal level had to be direct-
ed towards the Mayor in written or oral form. Detailed provisions regard-
ing this matter were to be formulated by the Minister of Home Affairs.33 
25 Art 20(3-4), 21(3-4), 22(3 and 5) Law No. 24/1992.
26 Art. 23(1) and (3) Law No. 24/1992.
27 Art. 27(1) and 28(1) and Elucidation Law No. 24/1992.
28 Presidential Decision No. 75/1993 Presidential Decision No. 75/1993 on Co-ordination 
of the Organisation of National Spatial Planning (Keppres No. 75/1993 tentang Koordinasi 
Pengelolaan Tata Ruang Nasional) in conjunction with Art. 29 Law No. 24/1992.
29 Art. 4 and Art. 12 Law No. 24/1992.
30 GR No. 69/1996 on the Implementation of the Rights and Obligations as well as the Pro-
cedure and Form of Public Participation in Spatial Management (PP No. 69/1996 tentang 
Pelaksanaan Hak dan Kewijaban serta Bentuk dan Tata Cara Peran Serta Masyarakat dalam 
Penataan Ruang). The regulation will be discussed in further detail in the next section.
31 Art. 1(10) and 15 GR No. 69/1996.
32 Art. 18 GR No. 69/1996.
33 Art. 27 GR No. 69/1996.
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As will be discussed below, the Minister enacted a regulation regarding 
this matter only in 1998, six months after Soeharto’s fall.
The Municipal Council enacted General Spatial Plans by bylaw. The 
1992 SML contained no provisions regarding the enactment of Detailed 
Spatial Plans, Technical Spatial Plans, or legalisation of plans. Regulation of 
the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1987 thus again remained the guiding 
document in relation to this matter, which means that these plans were also 
enacted by bylaw. General Spatial Plans and Detailed Spatial Plans were 
legalised by the Governor or the Minister of Home Affairs and Technical 
Plans by the Governor.
Just as in case of a town plan, once the bylaw enacting a spatial plan 
had been legalised, the public could apply at the Supreme Court for judi-
cial review of the bylaw against higher legislation. This became easier from 
1993, when the review no longer had to be related to a concrete case, but 
could be initiated separately following a complaint or request.34
The 1992 SML granted the public the right to be informed about region-
al spatial plans, and again required the central government to enact a regu-
lation on this matter.35 This was realised by the same government regulation 
as discussed before, Government Regulation No. 69/1996. It added to the 
right of the public to be informed about regional spatial plans, as enshrined 
in the 1992 SML, the concept of transparency (mengetahui secara terbuka), 
which made the law potentially more significant.36 Likewise, it stated that 
the government had the duty to make enacted spatial plans publically 
available in government offices and public places.37
The right to be informed about regional plans formed part of a broader 
effort to increase the role of the public in spatial management. It was 
intended that members of the public should be able to obtain information 
easily and quickly, through the media and public forums, and could take 
initiatives to support the implementation of their rights. The government 
was supposed to support such initiatives by increasing public awareness, 
for instance through providing legal aid and education, as well as promot-
ing transparency in spatial management.38
Spatial plans were also to be evaluated and revised. The criteria and 
procedures for the evaluation and revision of plans were to be elaborated 
by government regulation; but this regulation too was never enacted. In 
any event citizens had a right to participate in planning and to be informed 
about plans.39
34 See Regulation of the Supreme Court No. 1/1993 on the Right to Substantive Review 
(Peraturan Mahkamah Agung No. 1/1993 tentang Hak Uji Materiil) in conjunction with Art. 
79 Law No. 14/1985.
35 Art. 4 and 6 Law No. 24/1992.
36 Art. 2, under b Law No. 24/1992.
37 Art. 3(2) GR No. 69/1996.
38 Art. 30 GR No. 69/1996.
39 Art. 13(2-3) and Elucidation Law No. 24/1992.
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The above shows that the 1992 SML and Government Regulation No. 
69/1996 contained some new safeguards that could protect the interests of 
landholders, but that these safeguards remained weak – particularly for the 
urban poor. Government Regulation No. 69/1996 has been criticized, for 
several reasons. For instance, its provisions suggested that participation 
was an open process, to be initiated by the people themselves, upon which 
the government should create a forum or another framework in which peo-
ple could express themselves. Yet, as Darminto has argued: “low income 
people tend to be hesitant to be involved in [spatial management], unless it 
will directly enhance the quality of their lives and their involvement will 
return tangible outcomes in which they have interests.” He thus concludes 
that low income people should be more directly and carefully encouraged 
to participate, and even be assisted in such efforts (Darminto 2003:10-1).40
Another point of criticism regards the fact that the government was in 
no way required to make use of the public input. The government could 
also not be ‘sanctioned’ if it failed to let the people participate in spatial 
planning or inform them about plans. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Administrative Courts established in 1991 only had jurisdiction to review 
government institutions’ written decisions with legal effect when the deci-
sions were concrete, individual, and final. The Administrative Courts could 
thus not review a bylaw formalising a spatial plan; as the enactment of 
such bylaw is not considered to be a decision of a concrete or individual 
nature (Oetomo 1997:8).
Although the law created a mechanism that allowed the public to par-
ticipate in spatial planning, there was no such participation in practice. As 
Salim noted, the public was not actively involved in planning processes 
from the beginning, and often played no role at all. Problems were thus not 
identified by the public, but by municipal governments, which were guid-
ed by the policies of the central and provincial governments. If the public 
was consulted before the enactment of plans, this typically took place after 
the plans had already been designed, which left little room for discussion. 
As a result, the enacted plans did not usually reflect the needs of the public 
(Salim 2003:21).
The indirect influence of the public, through elected forums, was also 
limited. The only contribution of the Municipal Councils was in giving 
decisive consent to the plans (Niessen 1999:232-3). In effect the only ‘out-
siders’ who could influence the outcome of plans were the consultants who 
were commonly contracted to advise on the design of plans. In some cities 
the Detailed and Technical Plans were actually enacted by decision of the 
Mayor, which means that contrary to prevailing legislation, the Municipal 
Councils played no role whatsoever in the determination of such plans 
(Niessen 1999:256).
40 See also Salim, who stressed the need to empower the people (Salim 2003:23).
128 Chapter 5
The central government appeared to have little interest in spatial plan-
ning at the municipal level. Niessen notes that several years after plans had 
been enacted, they had often still not been legalised (Niessen 1999:254). As 
discussed before, according to the 1974 Decentralisation Law, plans could 
then be implemented; however in practice regional governments were 
reluctant to do so (Niessen 1999:209).
Transparency remained limited, even after plans had been enacted and 
legalised. According to Niessen, plans were not available for inspection. 
Officials often used the argument that they wanted to prevent land specu-
lation. Aside from the fact that this argument may have been misleading, it 
was against the law to withhold from the public the information contained 
in the plans (Niessen 1999:254-5).
The enactment of the 1992 SML and Government Regulation No. 
69/1996 did not significantly improve the situation. Since the legal frame-
work regarding public participation remained unfinished, it was unclear 
how and in what form such participation should take place (Sumardjono 
2005:73-4). Perhaps not surprisingly, plans typically facilitated develop-
ment that benefited politico-economic elites. These groups could use plans 
to justify the appropriation of resources to further private interests, which 
often ran counter to those of the urban poor, who were simply ignored 
(Schulte Nord holt 1995:193-201).
There was little resistance against the above practices. Even the most 
critical elements showed little interest in spatial planning. As will be dis-
cussed in Chapters 6 and 7, from the early 1970s many rights-oriented 
NGOs, and from the late 1980s student movements, lent their support to 
(urban) low-income groups, but only as far as the latter’s interests were 
directly threatened – such as in case of land clearance for development in 
the public interest. From the late 1980s, environmental NGOs emerged 
(Cribb 2003:45-6), some of which took a critical stance in spatial planning, 
but only as far as this related to environmental issues.
5.3 Legal reforms related to spatial planning
As discussed in Chapter 3, the fall of Soeharto in May 1998 marked the 
beginning of an ambitious reform programme. These reforms also extend-
ed to spatial management law. The Minister of Home Affairs enacted Regu-
lation No. 8/1998, which contained new provisions regarding spatial man-
agement in the regions, and Regulation No. 9/1998, which constituted the 
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implementing regulation of Government Regulation No. 69/1996 dis-
cussed above.41
The new legislation formulates further standards for public participa-
tion in spatial management.42 The Mayor is required to inform the public 
that a plan is being designed.43 This information is to be disseminated for 
seven days through various media and public forums, which for General 
Spatial Plans should be organised at the Sub-District level; for Detailed 
Spatial Plans at the City-Quarter or Village level; and for Technical Spatial 
Plans at the Neighbourhood or Block level.44 During the design process, dis-
cussions and seminars should be organised, to which government bodies, 
specialists, informal leaders, professional and civil organisations, and 
investors should be invited.45 Mayors are under the obligation to take sug-
gestions and opinions from the public and to use this input in the decision-
making process.46 As soon as the final draft of the design is completed, the 
Mayors have to announce this to the public.47
The role of Municipal Councils in spatial planning diminished. General 
Spatial Plans and revisions of such plans are to be enacted by bylaw; 
Detailed Spatial Plans by decision of the Mayor with agreement of the lead-
ership of the Municipal Council; and Technical Spatial Plans by decision of 
the Mayor.48
The new legislation did not require municipal governments to obtain a 
recommendation from the Governor, nor require them to send General 
Spatial Plans to the Governor or the Minister of Home Affairs for legalisa-
tion. At the same time, it did not explicitly revoke Regulation of the Minis-
ter of Home Affairs No. 2/1987, which suggests that municipal govern-
ments were still required to take these steps. The 1999 RALs made clear 
that they only need to forward bylaws or decisions of the Mayor to the cen-
tral government within fifteen days of their enactment, and that on the 
basis of the central government’s review authority the legislation can be 
revoked if contrary to the public interest or higher legislation. If the bylaw 
is annulled, municipal governments can initiate proceedings against this 
decision at the Supreme Court.49
41 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998 on the Organisation of Spatial 
Management in the Region (Permendagri No. 8/1998 tentang Penyelenggaraan Penataan 
Ruang di Daerah); Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9/1998 on the Method 
of Public Participation in the Spatial Planning Process in the Region (Permendagri No. 
9/1998 tentang Tata Cara Peran Serta Masyarakat dalam Proses Perencanaan Tata Ruang di 
Daerah).
42 Art. 31, 35, and 38 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
43 Art. 7(1 and 4) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
44 Art. 13(4-5) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9/1998.
45 Art. 8(3) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
46 Art. 5, under b and c Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
47 Art 5, under a, 8(4) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
48 Art. 44(2) and 47(3) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
49 Art. 113-114 Law No. 22/1999.
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As discussed in Chapter 3, in 2004 the role of higher administrative lev-
els increased as a result of the revision of the RALs, also in spatial manage-
ment. The provincial governments now obtained a shared authority with 
the municipal governments in the fields in which the latter previously held 
exclusive authority.50 The Governor has the task of guiding and supervising 
the municipal governments, as well as coordinating government matters.51 
It is for this reason that, prior to the enactment of a draft bylaw related to 
municipal spatial planning, a Mayor must send a copy of the draft to the 
Governor for evaluation, within three days of having reached agreement 
with the Municipal Council over the draft. This evaluation should be com-
pleted within fifteen days. If the Governor considers the draft bylaw to be 
not in accordance with the public interest or higher legislation, the munici-
pal government is required to correct it within seven days. If the municipal 
government fails to do so, the Governor annuls the draft bylaw. If the 
bylaw is annulled, the municipal government can start proceedings against 
this decision at the Supreme Court. The Governor forwards the result of his 
evaluation to the Minister of Home Affairs. This process should be coordi-
nated with the minister dealing with spatial management, i.e. the Minister 
of Public Works.52
As soon as the bylaw has been enacted, the municipal government 
must forward a copy of the bylaw to the central government within seven 
days. On the basis of its review authority, the central government can annul 
the bylaw if it is deemed contrary to the public interest or to higher legisla-
tion by presidential regulation, within sixty days of having received a copy 
of the bylaw. If the bylaw is annulled, municipal governments can start 
proceedings against this regulation at the Supreme Court.53
Review by the central government is not the only way a bylaw can be 
annulled. After its enactment, people can also file a request to the Supreme 
50 Art 13 and 14 Law No. 32/2004.
51 Art. 38 Law No. 32/2004.
52 Art. 189 in conjunction with Art. 186 Law No. 32/2004. These provisions are imple-
mented by Art. 37-42 GR No. 79/2005 on Guidelines for Guidance and Supervision of 
the Excercise of Regional Government (PP No. 79/2005 tentang Pedoman Pembinaan dan 
Peng awasan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah). According to Art. 42 GR No. 79/2005, 
Art. 37-39 GR No. 79/2005 should be implemented by ministerial regulation, but this 
was only done in 2008 (see Section 5.6 below).
53 Art. 145 Law No. 32/2004. Notably, Law No. 32/2004 only requires a Mayor to forward 
a draft bylaw to the Governor for evaluation, and to the central government; GR No. 
79/2005 requires a Mayor also to forward a draft regulation of the Mayor to the Gover-
nor for evaluation; decisions of the Mayor are not required to be forwarded. As Detailed 
Plans and Technical Plans are enacted by decision of the Mayor, they are thus not evalu-
ated by the Governor. The General Elucidation however notes in general terms that in 
cases where a municipal government is negligent or commits violations, the central 
government can impose sanctions, including in the form of annulment of decisions of 
the Mayor. See General Elucidation, under 9.
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Court for judicial review of the bylaw against acts of parliament.54 Review 
of the bylaw against other types of higher legislation (government regula-
tions and presidential regulations) is no longer possible.55
As soon as a spatial plan has been formalised by bylaw, the Mayor is 
required to disseminate the plan through the media and to ‘socialise’ it.56 In 
addition, the public should be able to access the plan in a quick and easy 
manner, through the press, electronic media, or public forums.57
The above shows that spatial management legislation contains further 
safeguards that could protect the interests of landholders. Most important-
ly, it lists various obligations of municipal governments in relation to pub-
lic participation and transparency. However, most obligations are still not 
clear and enforceable. How many discussions and seminars should be 
organised during the plan’s design process? Government bodies, special-
ists, informal leaders, professionals and civil organisations are invited to 
these discussions and seminars on the basis of what selection criteria? How 
should suggestions and opinions from the public be used in the decision-
making process? What are the sanctions if municipal governments fail to 
meet these and other obligations in relation to public participation and 
transparency? In addition, the role of the Municipal Councils has dimin-
ished, in the sense that technical spatial plans are enacted by decision of the 
Mayor alone, which means that democratic control has actually weakened. 
Finally, the provincial and central government’s role with respect to guid-
ance and supervision also remains limited, although this role has increased 
since 2004. Despite these weaknesses, the regulations could still offer some 
protection to the urban poor in spatial planning, particularly in combina-
tion with the general reforms discussed in Chapter 3. The following section 
takes a close look whether, and if so how, spatial planning practices have 
changed in Post-New Order Bandung.
5.4 Practice of spatial planning in Post-New Order Bandung
Shortly after the fall of Soeharto, plans for democratic reform entered Ban-
dung’s political agenda. In 1999 the then Mayor of Bandung, Aa Tarmana, a 
member of Soeharto’s Golkar Party and of military background, formulat-
ed Reform Principles for Regional Development (Pokok-Pokok Reformasi 
Pembangunan Daerah), in which he announced that local politics would 
democratise and involve public participation.58 The council elections of 
54 Art. 11(2), under b Law No. 4/2004 on Judicial Power; Art. 31 Law No. 5/2004 on the 
Revision of Law No. 14/1985 on the Supreme Court.
55 Since the enactment of Law No. 10/2004 on lawmaking, municipal bylaws and provin-
cial bylaws have the same hierachical status.
56 Art. 10 and 5, under e Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
57 Art. 41(1) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8/1998.
58 Attachment, p. 10, Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 103/1999.
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May 1999 resulted in a landslide victory for the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrat Indonesia-Perjuangan or PDI-P). Though 
still the third largest party, Golkar lost its dominant position.59 In 2001 the 
1999 RALs came into force, which strengthened the position of the Munici-
pal Council vis-a-vis the municipal government. Finally, in the same year 
the Reform Principles for Regional Development were elaborated in a 
Regional Development Programme (Program Pembangunan Daerah or PRO-
PEDA), which explicitly underlined the need to develop a new paradigm 
in planning, with room for public participation, involvement of stakehold-
ers, and decision-making at the lowest possible level.60
Whether the idea of democratisation was indeed taking root, or wheth-
er it remained just political rhetoric, was soon tested. Bandung was due for 
a new General Spatial Plan before 2005, and in October 2001 the municipal 
government therefore began to design a draft. A technical team, consisting 
of officials from several Municipal Services, was responsible for this pro-
cess.61 However, the draft plan was actually designed by a private consul-
tancy firm, PT Surya Anggita Sarana Konsultan, which had been selected 
following a public tender (Sari 2003:63-4).
Various NGOs in Bandung advocated for participation in spatial plan-
ning. The Discussion Group for the Citizens of Bandung (Sarasehan Warga 
Bandung or Sawarung), a citizens’ forum established in July 1999 by 18 
community development NGOs, was the most vocal organisation.62 It con-
sisted of several working groups, including a group called the Spatial Plan-
ning Enclave (Enclave Tata Ruang), which consisted of ten representatives 
from various larger and smaller NGOs in Bandung. These representatives 
were well related to and sometimes actually members of the city’s kam-
pong communities.63
Enclave Tata Ruang noticed that the general public did not know how 
to voice its discontent with government policy. The organisation therefore 
launched various initiatives, including a study, a survey, focus group dis-
cussions, and workshops to identify problems and needs in spatial plan-
59 The 45 seats of the Municipal Council were divided as follows: PDI-P – 14; PAN – 8; 
Golkar – 6; Keadilan Bulan Bintang – 5; PPP – 4; Kebangkitan Bangsa – 2; Keadilan dan 
Persatuan – 1; TNI / POLRI – 5.
60 Attachment, p. 9, Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 9/2001 on the Regional Develop-
ment Programme of Bandung Municipality Year 2000-2004 (Perda Kota Bandung No. 
9/2001 tentang Program Pembangunan Daerah (Propeda) Kota Bandung Tahun 2000-2004).
61 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 650/Kep.243-Bag.Huk/2001.
62 Aside from developing a mechanism to participate in decision-making processes, the 
objective of Sawarung was to monitor the implementation of government programmes. 
These activities required local knowledge, for which the forum established a database 
network, known as Combine. This network relied on the collection and updating of 
data concerning local conditions, resources, development needs and problems by the 
communities themselves.
63 For example, one of the members was a resident of kampong Cimaung, one of the kam-
pongs in Taman Sari discussed in Chapter 2.
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ning (Enclave Tata Ruang 2004b:7-12). It also developed an alternative 
planning mechanism, called Mistar (short for Model Interaksi Stakeholder 
Tata Ruang), which aimed at creating interaction between various stake-
holders in spatial planning (Enclave Tata Ruang 2004a). For this purpose, 
the activists argued, a new body would need to be established within the 
municipal government.64
The municipal government offered little response to these initiatives; 
and the involvement of the public in spatial planning still remained limit-
ed. During the design process the municipal government only once organ-
ised a seminar to get input from stakeholders. This seminar, organised in 
January 2002, consisted of a dialogue and workshop about the General 
Spatial Plan, in which various NGO activists, academics, members of the 
Municipal Council, and representatives of the media participated. Notably, 
there were no clear criteria for the selection of these stakeholders (Sari 
2003:69-70).
Between October 2002 and February 2003, the first draft was ‘social-
ised’, to enable it to be further improved (Sari 2003:64). During this process 
the municipal government organised a small seminar; however aside from 
government representatives only journalists participated, so it was little 
more than a press conference (Sari 2003:70). The municipal government 
also organised a survey among the general public; but did not see the need 
to organise a public forum, as the General Spatial Plan was only a macro 
plan and, according to the municipal government, the public had been suf-
ficiently represented by stakeholders during the seminar in 2002 (Sari 
2003:72).
Despite the provision for participation, the input given by stakeholders 
was largely ignored. As a senior academic who participated in the 2002 
seminar argued: “In the first year the plan would be formulated with repre-
sentative participation, in the second year the public would be asked to 
participate. However, in fact this was just token participation.“65 Separately, 
two NGO members who participated in the seminar came to a similar con-
clusion: “public participation was only a formality really.”66
The drafting process of the General Spatial Plan was more transparent 
than before, but there were still some deficiencies. This was confirmed by 
research by Zulkaidi & Sari, who analyzed the transparency in the different 
stages of the drafting process as regulated by Regulation of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs No. 2/1987. Aside from organising the seminars and survey, 
and coordinating the meetings previously mentioned, the municipal gov-
ernment disseminated information through various media, namely local 
radio, local television, the internet, and local newspapers. The drafting 
process was sufficiently transparent in terms of the comprehensiveness of 
64 Personal communication of several NGO members, Bandung, 10 August 2004.
65 Personal communication of a senior academic, Bandung, 21 July 2008.
66 Personal communication of NGO members, Bandung, 22 July 2008.
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the information provided, thus accommodating the opinion of stakehold-
ers, as well as in terms of the procedures followed to organise and target 
information. However, the process did not meet other essential transpar-
ency standards, namely in relation to the way in which information was 
provided and the variation of the media used to provide the information 
(Zulkaidi & Sari 2004).67
The final draft of the General Spatial Plan was completed in February 
2003. It had taken little consideration of the interests of kampong dwellers. 
The draft proposed the restructuring of ‘slum areas’ (kawasan kumuh) by the 
construction of tenement buildings, so that the remaining land could be 
used for commercial purposes.68 Bandung’s municipal government thus 
broke with the policy of kampong improvement that, as noted in Chapter 
2, had been implemented since the 1970s. Instead, it adopted a policy of 
drastic urban renewal. The draft risked damaging the economic position of 
kampong dwellers, most of whom work in the informal sector. Traditional 
markets that were considered ‘disturbing’ or lacked infrastructure could be 
relocated, as could local markets that were no longer in accordance with 
the General Spatial Plan; the activities of sidewalk vendors would be regu-
lated and curbed and they were to be encouraged to trade without utilizing 
public space.69
A month later the municipal government sent the draft Plan to the 
Municipal Council, which formed a Special Committee for the General 
Spatial Plan (Panitia Khusus Rencana Tata Ruang dan Wilayah or Pansus) to 
deliberate over the draft. Public participation was again very limited. The 
Municipal Council was under time pressure, as elections were being held 
soon. As the previously quoted senior academic involved in the process 
noted: “Those who were consulted were technical specialists, not people 
who would be affected by the General Spatial Plan. Besides, they were only 
asked to participate in the evaluation of the draft plan after the Special 
Committee had already decided to support it. Public participation of this 
kind was only a way to legitimise the decision already taken.”70
The Municipal Council’s final deliberations hardly addressed the sub-
stantive issues any further. Councillors primarily focused their attention on 
the wording of Article 22, under c of the draft General Spatial Plan, which 
stated tourist and recreational activities that were not in accordance with 
67 Notably, the researchers qualify their findings, since they draw from sources within the 
Regional Development Planning Agency only – sources that could not be crosschecked. 
Further, it was hard to estimate the fulfilment of some of the standards. Finally, the 
study only assessed compliance with (minimum) transparency standards and did not 
look at the quality of such compliance.
68 Art. 14(2), under c of the draft plan.
69 Art 17, under a and j-m and Art 42(3), under d of the draft bylaw. On the implementa-
tion of these measures, see also Art. 79, under f-g and Art. 80, under c-e in conjunction 
with Art. 42 of the draft bylaw.
70 Personal communication of a senior academic involved in the drafting process, Band-
ung, 22 July 2008.
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the “local people’s religious and cultural standards“ were to be curbed, 
limited or prohibited. After objections from religious parties like the United 
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) and Justice 
Moon and Star Party (Partai Keadilan Bulan Bintang or PKBB), it was decid-
ed that the words ‘curb’ and ‘limit’ would be dropped.71 Otherwise, the 
Municipal Council proposed no major revisions. On 10 February 2004, just 
weeks before the Municipal Council elections, the General Spatial Plan was 
enacted by Bylaw No. 2/2004.72
Soon after the formalisation of the General Spatial Plan, it emerged that 
the councillors had overlooked a major issue – at least, they claimed to 
have overlooked it. This concerned Punclut, a 268 ha conservation and 
water catchment area situated in the scenic hills of North Bandung, which 
is part of the environmentally significant North Bandung Territory (Kawas-
an Bandung Utara or KBU). Protection of the area is considered of utmost 
importance to guarantee the city’s water supplies and to prevent flooding 
downhill.73 Notably, the area is also inhabited by a large kampong commu-
nity, which has built the land with low-density, semi-permanent housing.
Punclut had already been surrounded by controversy for decades. In 
the past the provincial government and later the NLA issued site permits to 
developers, allowing them to clear land for the development of real estate 
– in which the NLA even assisted a developer by annulling existing land 
rights.74 The issuance of these permits was in violation of Bandung’s 1992 
General Town Plan, which did not allow real estate development in Pun-
clut. However, until the enactment of the General Spatial Plan, no develop-
ment had taken place and existing site permits had expired.75
The councillors claimed to have overlooked that the General Spatial 
Plan contained a map designating part of Punclut in yellow, which signi-
fied that low-density real estate development would now be allowed.76 A 
plan for which in previous years land had been cleared could thus finally 
be realised. Notably, the bylaw that enacted the General Spatial Plan also 
contained a provision stating explicitly that in the North Bandung Area no 
new permits would be issued, no access road could be built, and no new 
infrastructure would be realised, unless it involved infrastructure that was 
71 ‘Perda RTRW Kota Bandung Disahkan, Dilarang, Hiburan yang Langgar Norma Aga-
ma’, Pikiran Rakyat, 11 February 2004.
72 Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 2/2004 on the General Spatial Plan of Bandung 
Municipality (Perda Kota Bandung No. 2/2004 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah 
(RTRW) Kota Bandung).
73 Punclut is an acronym for Puncak Ciumbuleuit, or Top of Ciumbuleuit, which is the 
City Quarter in which Punclut is located.
74 In 1961 the ownership rights had been granted to former military personnel. In 1997 the 
Head of the NLA annulled this decision, on the basis of which these rights had been 
granted, because the right holders were said to have failed to meet the requirement of 
building houses on the land (Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 19-VIII-1997).
75 See also Niessen 1999:274-89; Hardjono 2005.
76 ‘Ada Manipulasi Peta RTRW Kota Bandung’, Kompas, 22 June 2004.
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‘vital for the area’.77 It thus seemed that there was no risk that real estate 
development would expand in Punclut.
Once the ‘mistake’ had been discovered, councillors of the Special 
Committee for the General Spatial Plan claimed that Bandung’s Regional 
Development Planning Agency had failed to inform them about the revi-
sion. Since the councillors had never changed the map themselves, they 
had not taken the trouble to check it again. Deliberations instead concen-
trated on the provisions in the draft bylaw.78 There is anecdotal evidence 
that during the final deliberations over the enactment of the General Spa-
tial Plan, the map had been distributed in black-and-white. As a result, the 
councillors could not discern that part of the Punclut area was coloured 
yellow instead of green.
Notably for this case, less than a year before, Uce Salya, a councillor 
and an undisclosed source of Pikiran Rakyat daily, declared that in January 
2003 – two months before the draft General Spatial Plan had been sent to 
the Municipal Council -, several councillors responsible for spatial plan-
ning had received money from PT MS, one of the companies that held a site 
permit in Punclut. Uce Salya acknowledged that he had received Rp. 15 
million, but claimed he had returned the money three months later, not to 
the company – which refused to take it back – but to Ecih Sukaesih, the sec-
retary of the Municipal Council. The councillors as well as the leadership of 
PT MS rejected the allegations, and reported Uce Salya to the police for 
libel.79 A few days later the dispute took a very different turn. Uce accepted 
the reading of his fellow committee members that they had never received 
any money, and apologised for accusing them of any wrongdoing.80 The 
police never seriously investigated the allegations.
The Municipal Council demonstrated little commitment to rectifying 
the mistake in the General Spatial Plan. The Municipal Council’s Chairman 
decided to postpone the revision of the plan until after the council elec-
tions. This decision was fiercely rejected by a few councillors, as the 
changed maps would remain applicable for quite a long time, without 
maintaining the area’s status quo.81 The Municipal Council did set up 
meetings to generate input from the public (including members of NGOs 
and well-known artists) regarding the future of Punclut. At these occasions 
77 Art. 100(2) Bandung Municipality Bylaw No. 2/2004.
78 ‘Perubahan RTRW Bandung Utara Tidak Diketahui DPRD’, Kompas, 2 July 2004; ‘DPRD 
Kecolongan, Peta Punclut Telah Diubah, Bappenas Keberatan Pembangunan Punclut’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 2 July 2004.
79 ‘Pengembang Puncrut Diduga Main Suap’, Kompas, 23 April 2003; ‘Anggota Dewan 
Bereaksi Keras, Uce Diminta Membuktikan Soal Isu Sogokan Rp 15 Juta’, Pikiran Rakyat, 
24 April 2003; ‘Menyusul Pernyataan Uce Salya tentang Uang Suap’, Pikiran Rakyat, 26 
April 2003.
80 ‘Usulan Dewan Kehormatan Batal’, Pikiran Rakyat, 1 May 2003.
81 ‘BEM Mal tak Sesuai RTRW 2004’, Pikiran Rakyat, 29 July 2004; ‘Bappeda Salah Masuk-
kan Peta, DPRD Jabar Teliti Jalur Dago-Lembang’, Pikiran Rakyat, 14 July 2004.
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various objections were conveyed against the plan to develop real estate in 
the area, but to no avail.82
Similarly to the Municipal Council, the new Mayor of Bandung, Dada 
Rosada (Golkar), who had been elected by the Municipal Council in Sep-
tember 2003, and the Regional Secretary denied having prior knowledge of 
the issue.83 The Head of the Regional Development Planning Agency, Tjetje 
Soebrata, argued that in any event, the development of Punclut was con-
sistent with the General Spatial Plan that West-Java Province had enacted 
in January 2003. “So why these allegations that the municipal government 
has manipulated the General Spatial Plan’s map,” he questioned.84
However, the argument that the development of Punclut was consist-
ent with the West Java Province's General Spatial Plan is disputable. It des-
ignated the whole North Bandung Territory as a protected area (kawasan 
lindung), specifically a protected forest area (kawasan hutan yang berfungsi 
hutan), which must be preserved permanently. In addition, the plan gener-
ally designated water catchment areas (kawasan resapan air) as protected 
areas. These areas in particular were considered important to be preserved, 
in order to secure the availability of drinking water.85 It is hard to perceive 
how real estate development can be combined with the preservation of 
Punclut.
Despite this inherent inconsistency, there was little West-Java's provin-
cial government could do. Again, on the basis of the 1999 RALs the imple-
mentation of the General Spatial Plan no longer required a recommenda-
tion from the Governor. Early July 2004, Governor Danny Setiawan 
therefore stressed that Punclut formed a conservation area, but noted that if 
the General Spatial Plan were violated, it was not West-Java’s provincial 
government, but Bandung’s municipal government that should act first. 
“In accordance with Law No. 22/1999, the only role we play is to confirm 
the acts of the municipal government. After all, under this law, coordina-
tion between the central government, the provincial government, and the 
district/municipal governments has become weak. We’ll have to wait and 
see what the revision of this law leads to.”86
In fact, the Governor did take several measures to avoid real estate 
development in Punclut. In June 2004 he sent a circular letter to the Mayor 
of Bandung and other responsible regional heads, in which he requested 
82 ‘Soal Rencana Pembangunan Punclut, Bimbo Tegur DPRD‘, Kompas, 2 July 2004.
83 ‘Perubahan RTRW Bandung Utara Tidak Diketahui DPRD’, Kompas, 2 July 2004.
84 ‘DPRD Kota Bandung Tidak Setuju Punclut Dibangun’, Kompas, 26 June 2004.
85 Art. 31 and 33-34 Regulation of West-Java Province No. 2/2003 on the General Spatial 
Plan of West-Java Province (Perda Jawa Barat No. 2/2003 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang 
Wilayah Provinsi Jawa Barat).
86 ‘Bappenas: Punclut Tidak Direkomendasikan untuk Dibangun’, Kompas, 3 July 2004. 
See also ‘DPRD Kecolongan, Peta Punclut Telah Diubah, Bappenas Keberatan Pem-
bangunan Punclut’, Pikiran Rakyat, 2 July 2004.
138 Chapter 5
them to put a restraint on spatial use in North Bandung Territory.87 A month 
later, he succeeded in persuading the Mayors of Bandung and Cimahi, as 
well as the District-Heads of Bandung and Sumedang, to sign a Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU) in which they agreed to collaborate with 
the Province and with each other in spatial management and environmen-
tal protection.88 To that purpose a General Spatial Plan for the Metropoli-
tan Territory Bandung (Kawasan Metropolitan Bandung or KMB) was to be 
designed. The Governor also established the Coordinating Team for Spatial 
Management of West-Java Province (Tim Koordinasi Penataan Ruang Daerah 
Propinsi Jawa Barat or TKPRD).89 Finally, in August 2004 he sent a circular 
letter to the Mayor of Bandung and other responsible regional heads, in 
which he called upon them i) not to issue permits until a spatial manage-
ment policy for the Metropolitan Territory Bandung as well as operational 
directives for spatial use in North Bandung had been formulated, ii) to 
review the status of permits that had already been granted in accordance 
with prevailing legislation, iii) not to extend the permits of developers that 
undertook development activities not in accordance with formulated con-
ditions, and iv) to implement the circular letter he had sent in June.90
The Provincial Assembly supported Governor Danny Setiawan in his 
measures, which were the first Punclut-related measures a Governor had 
taken since 1994.91 However, given that the measures took the form of circu-
lar letters and an MoU, they had little binding force. Unfortunately, the 
Governor was also grappling with a credibility issue, since the provincial 
government was itself planning to construct a road in the North Bandung 
Territory.92
As was explained in Section 5.3, the Department of Home Affairs could 
have annulled Bandung Municipality’s General Spatial Plan on the basis of 
its review authority. However it did not do so, despite the fact that the 
Head of the Spatial Planning and Land Section of the National Develop-
ment Planning Agency, Sujana Royat, stated that he would not recommend 
the development of Punclut. He said that to this purpose, the Agency 
87 Circular Letter of the Governor of West-Java No. 650/1704/Bapeda, dated 14 June 2004.
88 Joint Decision of the Governor of West-Java, Head of District Bandung, Head of District 
Sumedang, Mayor of Bandung, and the Mayor of Cimahi No. 31/2004-23/2004-
21/2004-650/Kep.521-Bappeda/2004-23/2004. It took more than a year before the Pro-
vincial Assembly officially agreed with the MoU. See also ‘Disetujui, MoU Pengelolaan 
Bandung Metropolitan, RTRW Kota/Kab. di Cekungan Bandung Harus Mangacu ke 
Provinsi’, Pikiran Rakyat, 14 September 2005.
89 Decision of the Governor of West-Java No. 120.05/Kep.691-Org/2004. Art. 20 of Regu-
lation of West-Java Province No. 2/2003 required the establishment of this team.
90 Circular Letter of the Governor of West-Java No. 650/2530/PRLH, dated 18 August 
2004. See also ‘Gubernur Minta Izin di KBU Tidak Diperpanjang’, Kompas, 5 August 
2004.
91 ‘Soal KBU, Gubernur Harus Didukung’, Pikiran Rakyat, 1 August 2004; ‘Gubernur: Pem-
bangunan Punclut Harus Dihentikan’, Kompas, 13 January 2005.
92 For a short description of this case, see: Hardjono 2005:218-20.
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would take initiatives to improve the legislative framework. “However, for 
now it is most important that the people show stronger resistance against 
development activities in Punclut.” Notably, Royat did not specify what 
form such resistance should or could take.93
The objections of the provincial and central governments against real 
estate development in Punclut did not prevent Mayor Dada Rosada from 
issuing the required permits for that purpose. Soon after the enactment of 
the General Spatial Plan, the Mayor announced that some 130 Ha of the area 
would be developed by private companies, including PT DAM and PT MS.94 
In October 2004 he issued a Land Use Permit to PT DAM.95 A few months 
later, in January 2005, the Mayor issued two other permits, which allowed 
the company to clear the land for building and to construct a 2.2 kilome-
tres long access road in Punclut.96 More development activities could thus 
be undertaken than could be justified on the basis of the new Spatial Plan.
The issuing of these permits provoked strong reactions from the Munic-
ipal Council, NGOs and the media. Following these protests, Governor 
Danny Setiawan sent a letter to the Mayor, in which he requested that the 
activities of PT DAM be stopped, arguing they were not in accordance with 
Bandung Municipality’s General Spatial Plan and higher legislation. The 
Governor also suggested that to respond to the needs of the people, the 
Punclut area should be planned “in a wise and transparent way, in coordina-
tion with the provincial government, and involving all interested parties”.97
In February 2005 the Monitoring Body for the Upgrading of Sundanese 
Foresty and Environment (Dewan Pemerhati Kehutanan dan Lingkungan Tatar 
Sunda or DPKLTS), a local environmental NGO, initiated a procedure at 
Bandung's Administrative District Court, requesting the annulment of the 
land use permit that had been issued. The request was rejected by what 
may be considered an incorrect line of reasoning. Although acknowledging 
that Bandung Municipality’s Bylaw No. 2/2004 did not allow new permits 
to be granted, the Court concluded that this permit could be granted 
because the General Spatial Plan of West-Java contained a map signifying 
Punclut as a protected area outside the protected forest area, and protected 
areas could involve both natural resources and man-made resources.98 Even 
93 ‘DPRD Kecolongan, Peta Punclut Telah Diubah, Bappenas Keberatan Pembangunan 
Punclut’, Pikiran Rakyat, 2 July 2004. See also ‘Bappenas: Punclut Tidak Direkomen-
dasikan untuk Dibangun’, Kompas, 3 July 2004.
94 ‘Walkot Dinilai Kontroversi, DPKLTS Ancam PTUN-kan Jika Punclut Dibangun’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 20 June 2004.
95 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 503.640/2112/DTK/X/1004, dated 11 January 
2005.
96 Decision of the Head of the Road-Construction Service of Bandung Municipality No. 
593/01-DBM/2005); Decision of the Head of the Road-Construction Service of Ban-
dung Municipality No. 620/06-DBM/2005.
97 Letter of the Governor of West-Java No. 912/424/Bapeda, dated 10 February 2005.
98 Ruling of Bandung's Administrative District Court No. 14/G.TUN/2005/PTUN-BDG, 
dated 13 September 2005.
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if this were the case, the Court should accurately have taken into considera-
tion the National Spatial Plan’s stated objectives. These objectives include: 
i) that protected areas should be managed to prevent their nature functions 
from being damaged, and to conserve the protective functions that these 
areas may convey to nearby areas; and ii) that protected areas should be 
regulated (pengawasan) through the prohibition of human activities, except 
for activities that do not disturb the area’s nature functions or change the 
landscape/ecosystem.99
Although the outcome of the court procedure eventually proved 
favourable to the Mayor, the above responses forced him to act – but not in 
the way protesters had hoped for. In mid-2005 he announced the revision 
of the General Spatial Plan, so that the issued permits would be in accord-
ance with spatial planning legislation. According to the Mayor, this step 
was put through at the pressure of “investors and the people”.100
The drafting process of the revised General Spatial Plan was again a 
more or less bureaucratic affair – and as such contrary to existing legisla-
tion. Sabrina, who evaluated the drafting process, concluded that no stake-
holders other than government representatives were involved (Sabrina 
2008:79-83). Further, several academics concluded that the drafting process 
had not been transparent. “The mindset of the government apparatus is 
much like that of an investor”, one of them observed.101
The draft bylaw proposed the revision of seven articles, thereby creat-
ing more room for commercial development in Bandung. Not surprisingly, 
the plan legalised existing site permits. In addition, it even allowed for the 
issuance of new site permits, the construction of a road, and the develop-
ment of new infrastructure for local needs in the area.102 In relation to West-
Bandung, the development of housing, trade and services would no longer 
be limited, but restrained. “Green light for developers who will construct 
shopping malls, shop houses, and apartments”, a journalist commented.103 
Further, a new provision allowed traditional markets that were considered 
“not proper” to be regulated, developed, or relocated.104 Finally, the restruc-
turing of ‘slum areas’ was to be realised predominantly by the construction 
of condominiums.105 So on the basis of the draft, kampongs qualified as such 
could be restructured by relocation of residents, followed by the construc-
tion of shopping malls.
As participation and transparency remained limited, the draft-plan 
was forwarded to the Municipal Council by mid-August 2004, just a few 
99 Art. 10(1) in conjunction with Art. 41(1), under a; 43(1) GR No. 47/1997 on the National 
Spatial Plan (PP No. 47/1997 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Nasional).
100 ‘Wali Kota Bandung Ngotot Bangun Punclut’, Kompas, 5 September 2005.
101 ‘Revisi Perda RTRW Kota Bandung Tidak Transparan’, Kompas, 26 October 2005.
102 Art. 100(2) of the draft bylaw.
103 ‘Drama Paripurna’, Pikiran Rakyat, 6 January 2006.
104 Art. 42, under b-d of the draft bylaw.
105 Art. 14(2c), under c of the draft bylaw.
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months after the municipal government had announced the revision. There 
were several reasons to expect that it would not be easy for the municipal 
government to get the revised plan accepted. Council elections had taken 
place in April 2004, and by early August 2004 the new Municipal Council 
was installed, in which the division of seats had changed significantly; not 
least because the electorate had punished the PDI-P for its alleged involve-
ment in KKN.106 There were thus many new councillors, some of whom, 
from their public statements, appeared more critical – at least about devel-
opment activities in Punclut. They argued that the area should be restored 
to a conservation area.107 Interestingly, no objections were raised against the 
proposed revision on the basis of the potential harm it could cause to the 
interests of kampong dwellers.
At the same time, NGOs took to the streets to protest against the revi-
sion of the General Spatial Plan. As with the councillors, they were not con-
cerned about the consequences of the revision for low-income groups, but 
for the environment. Environmental NGOs in particular, organised in the 
‘Bandung Bermartabat’ People’s Coalition (Koalisi Masyarakat Bandung Ber-
martabat or KMBB, named after the Municipality’s development concept), 
voiced their concerns. They called upon the Municipal Council to create 
room for public consultation before taking any decision.108
The protests had some effect. The Municipal Council asked the Provin-
cial Regional Development Planning Agency to evaluate the draft bylaw. In 
its evaluation, the agency strongly criticised the revision, and advised that 
at least it should be postponed.109 The Municipal Council’s Special Commit-
tee for the Revision of the General Spatial Plan also invited twenty ‘stake-
holders’, consisting of academics, members of NGOs, and representatives 
of the Punclut community, to provide input.110 At this occasion, NGO mem-
bers and most academics fiercely rejected the draft plan, in particular 
because it allowed for development activities in Punclut. Some also criti-
106 The 45 seats of the Municipal Council were divided as follows: PKS – 11, PDI-P – 10, PD 
– 6, Golkar – 6, PAN – 6, and Persatuan Bintang – 6.
107 ‘Pembangunan di Punclut Dihentikan Secara Paksa, Pekerja PT DUS Tidak Melakukan 
Perlawanan’, Pikiran Rakyat, 31 December 2004; ‘Tak Mengindahkan Perintah Wali Kota 
Bandung, Pembuatan Jalan di Punclut Akan Terus Dilanjutkan’, Pikiran Rakyat, 7 Janu-
ary 2005; ‘Pembangunan di Daerah Punclut Menyalahi Aturan’, Kompas, 8 January 
2005; ‘Gubernur, “Pemkot Terkesan Tidak Konsisten Soal Punclut”, Dewan Akan Kirim 
Nota ke Wali Kota’, Pikiran Rakyat, 13 January 2005.
108 ‘Pemprov Akan Tegur Pemkot Jika Perda RTRW tak Sesuai, Gubernur, “Harus Selaras 
dengan Aturan Lebih Tinggi”’, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 September 2005.
109 Letter of the West-Java Province Regional Development Planning Agency No. 
650/1539/PRLH, dated 21 November 2005.
110 It again remains unclear which criteria the Municipal Council used to select these stake-
holders. They included some of the NGOs most critical of the development of real 
estate in Punclut, including KMBB and DPKLTS. These NGOs were probably selected 
because they had asked the Municipal Council to be involved.
142 Chapter 5
cised the drafting process. In their view, no attention was paid to the views 
of the general public (Sabrina 2008:85-95/Attachment C2).
Despite the above protests and objections, the Municipal Council 
agreed with the draft bylaw on the revised General Spatial Plan on 30 
December 2005. Surprisingly, even the members who had earlier presented 
themselves as strong critics of the development activities in Punclut, now 
supported the revision. The former Head of the Legislative Team for the 
Formulation of a Study on Punclut, Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Karim 
(National Mandate Party – Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN), is a noteworthy 
example. Acting as the Chairman of the Special Committee for the Revision 
of the General Spatial Plan, he argued that because of the revision, there 
would be no need to annul permits that had already been granted, mean-
ing that no compensation would need to be paid and no court cases fought, 
thus saving on the Regional Budget. “The only negative effect of the revi-
sion is the complaints from environmental observers,” he rather cynically 
argued. Only the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or 
PKS), a relatively young party with a particularly clean reputation, and a 
single member of the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat or PD) rejected the 
revision. During final deliberations, PKS representatives in the Municipal 
Council even staged a walk out as an act of protest.111
After the Municipal Council had agreed with the draft bylaw on the 
revised General Spatial Plan, it was sent to the Governor of West-Java on 3 
January 2006 for evaluation.112 Several members of the Provincial Assembly 
now began to voice their concerns. Earlier its Chairman, H.A.M. Ruslan, 
had sent a letter to Governor Danny Setiawan, urging him to annul bylaws 
related to the North Bandung Territory which contradicted higher legisla-
tion.113 Several councillors now called upon the Governor to act accordingly. 
“The revision of this recently enacted bylaw is biased towards the interests 
of developers, not the interests of the people”, a prominent member of the 
Provincial Assembly commented.114
In order to convince the provincial government to reject the revision, 
the ‘Bandung Bermartabat’ People’s Coalition and its separate NGOs con-
tinued their protests.115 The Indonesian Environmental Forum (Wahana Ling-
kungan Hidup Indonesia or WALHI), a well-known national environmental 
NGO, sent letters of protest to several high officials, including the Gover-
111 ‘Akhirnya DPRD Sahkan Perubahan Perda RTRW’, Pikiran Rakyat, 31 December 2005; 
‘Drama Paripurna’, Pikiran Rakyat, 6 January 2006.
112 Letter of the Mayor of Bandung No. 101/149-Huk, dated 3 January 2006.
113 Letter without reference, November 2005, on file with the author.
114 ‘Batalkan Revisi Perda RTRW, Gubernur Jabar Mempunyai Hak Represif’, Kompas, 4 
January 2006; ‘Revisi Perda RTRW Sebaiknya Ditolak’, Pikiran Rakyat, 4 January 2006; 
‘Revisi RTRW Harus Sesuai Kebijakan Propinsi’, Pikiran Rakyat, 17 January 2006.
115 ‘Perda RTRW Hanya untuk Ekonomi Jangka Pendek’, Kompas, 3 January 2006; ‘Segera 
Putuskan Evaluasi Revisi RTRW’, Pikiran Rakyat, 12 January 2006.
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nor and the Minister of Environment.116 Later several NGOs issued a Red 
Report on the Mayor of Bandung (Rapor Merah Wali Kota Bandung), criticis-
ing him for trading the General Spatial Plan in the interests of a particular 
developer in Punclut, thus setting aside democracy and good govern-
ance.117
The NGOs’ protests required courage in the face of groups of hood-
lums (preman), such as the Siliwangi Youth Force (Angkatan Muda Sili-
wangi or AMS), the Pancasila Youngsters (Pemuda Pancasila or PP) and 
the Grouping of Sons of Siliwangi Elite Troups (Gabungan Anak Siliwangi 
Barisan Utama or GASIBU), who responded by organising counter-protests 
and intimidation campaigns.118 At one of these occasions, they presented a 
Blue Report, expressing their support for Mayor Dada Rosada.119 NGO staff 
members also reported that members of these groups made phone calls to 
activists and visited NGOs’ offices, warning that staff would be harmed 
or even killed unless they ceased their resistance to development in Pun-
clut.120 Various sources argue that two members of the Municipal Coun-
cil who are also affiliated to the Siliwangi Youth Force, Bandung’s most 
powerful hoodlum group, played a central role in the mobilisation of these 
groups.121
Governor Danny Setiawan failed to issue a formal response within the 
required period of fifteen days after the submission of the draft bylaw on the 
revised General Spatial Plan.122 Following the procedure set out in the 2004 
RALs, he did coordinate with the Minister of Public Works, sending him a 
letter (of which a copy was forwarded to the Minister of Home Affairs), 
which referred to various weaknesses in the draft bylaw, including its incon-
sistency with higher legislation, and asking him to advise in the matter.123
116 ‘Perda RTRW Jamin Kepastian Hukum’, Pikiran Rakyat, 5 January 2006.
117 The NGOs involved in this action included KMBB, West-Java's branch of WALHI, 
DPKLTS, and several other environmental NGOs. See also ‘Buruk, Kinerja Bidang Ling-
kungan’, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 January 2006.
118 Preman is a term derived from the Dutch term ‘vrij man’, or free man.
119 ‘Giliran Ormas-OKP Berikan “Rapor Biru”’, Pikiran Rakyat, 2 February 2006; ‘Dada 
Tanya kan Obyektivitas “Rapor Merah”’, Kompas, 2 February 2006.
120 Personal communication of two NGO members, Bandung, 21 July 2008; personal com-
munication of a member of another NGO, Bandung, 21 July 2008; personal communica-
tion of a senior journalist, Bandung, 23 July 2008.
121 Personal communication of an NGO member, Bandung, 19 July 2008; personal commu-
nication of a senior journalist, Bandung, 23 July 2008; personal communication of a 
member of the Municipal Council, Bandung, 26 July 2008.
122 ‘Perda RTRW Masih Dikonsultasikan, Pikiran Rakyat, 25 January 2006.
123 The Governor consulted the Department of Public Works by Letter of the Governor of 
West-Java No. 188.342/220/Huk, dated 20 January 2006, of which a copy was sent to 
the Department of Home Affairs. The Department of Public Works responded by Letter 
of the Director-General for Spatial Management of the Department of Public Works No. 
PR.01.08-DR/14, dated 3 February 2006.
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On 3 February 2006, the Department of Public Works responded to the 
Governor’s letter.124 The department expressed strong reservations against 
the bylaw, and concluded that the North Bandung Territory functioned 
mainly as a protected area and that development should be restrained in 
order not to harm that function. In addition, the department called for the 
restoration of the protection function of those parts of the territory which 
had already had their use changed.
On 20 February 2006, the Department of Home Affairs also sent a 
response. It was more favourable to the draft bylaw, arguing that apart 
from one provision, it had no objections.125 The Department of Home Affairs 
wrote that “having studied the Provincial Spatial Plan, which states that 
Punclut is part of a cultivated area (kawasan budidaya), and given the techni-
cal difficulties which Bandung’s municipal government was facing in 
retaining Punclut as a protected area, and also insofar as there would be 
technical guarantees that an effort were made to control spatial use in Pun-
clut, the attempt to limit the size of the protected area [could] be justified.” 
It went even further, advising that the draft be enacted as quickly as possi-
ble.
As the fifteen days term for evaluation had long expired, Mayor Dada 
Rosada could enact the draft bylaw, which indeed was his intention.126 On 6 
March 2006, he sent a letter to the Municipal Council, of which a copy was 
sent to the Governor, announcing that “for the benefit of legal certainty and 
in order to fulfil the aspirations of the majority of the people”, he was plan-
ning to revise the draft bylaw in accordance with the input given by the 
Department of Home Affairs and enact it within two days.127
The Mayor’s announcement was followed by a quick response from 
Governor Danny Setiawan. On the same day, he finally sent his evaluation 
to the Mayor of Bandung.128 Despite new calls from various members of the 
Provincial Assembly to take a critical stance, he did not require the munici-
pal government to correct the draft bylaw. Instead, he reminded the munic-
ipal government that it contained several weaknesses, and formulated two 
124 Letter of the Director-General for Spatial Management of the Department of Public 
Works No. PR.01.08-DR/14, dated 3 February 2006. On the position of the Director-
General, see also ‘Pengesahan RTRW Tunggu Gubernur, Secara Substansi Dinilai Tidak 
Ada Masalah‘, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 February 2006; ‘Kawasan Punclut Tak Sesuai Kriteria‘, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 5 March 2006.
125 Letter of the Director-General for Regional Development of the Department of Home 
Affairs No. 188.342/172/IV/Bangda, dated 20 February 2006. The article of the draft 
bylaw that should be dropped was Art. 49(3), which is not relevant to discuss here. See 
also ‘Revisi RTRW Segera Disahkan‘, Pikiran Rakyat, 24 February 2006.
126 See also ‘Wali Kota Bandung Bisa Sahkan RTRW‘, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 February 2006.
127 Letter of the Mayor of Bandung Municipality No. 188.34/705-Huk, dated 6 March 2006.
128 Letter of the Governor of West-Java No. 188.342/710/Huk, dated 6 March 2006. See also 
‘Soal RTRW, Gubernur Beri Catatan‘, Pikiran Rakyat, 1 March 2006; ‘Evaluasi RTRW 
Gubernur Agar Dibahas‘, Pikiran Rakyat, 3 March 2006; ‘Gubernur Harus Tegas Sikapi 
Revisi RTRW‘, Pikiran Rakyat, 6 April 2006.
145When money rules over voice
rather modest conditions before the bylaw could be enacted. He advised 
that the municipal government should realise that the draft bylaw was still 
partial; and thus only solved local, short-term problems, while having sig-
nificant implications for various elements of the urban system. In addition, 
it contained a provision facilitating the granting of new site permits in Pun-
clut, when it should instead restrain development. The Governor therefore 
ordered the municipal government to quickly enact a Detailed Spatial Plan, 
containing detailed provisions regarding zoning and building, which could 
be used as an instrument for regulation and enforcement. Finally, he 
reminded the municipal government that if environmental degradation 
occurred as a result of building activities, sanctions should be imposed 
upon both the responsible permit granter and the developer.
In accordance with his earlier announcement, Mayor Dada Rosada 
enacted the draft bylaw, without having made any substantial revisions to 
it, on 8 March 2006.129 For this occasion, a special signing ceremony was 
organised in Punclut. “This forms part of our policy of transparency”, the 
Mayor explained to the press.130 The ceremony was attended by high offi-
cials and public figures; and guarded by the Siliwangi Youth Force.
Protests continued after the enactment of the bylaw. The ‘Bandung Ber-
martabat’ People’s Coalition attempted to get the bylaw annulled by organ-
ising new protests, including a street protest in front of the Department of 
Home Affairs in Jakarta.131 However the protests did not lead to any concrete 
results. The central government refused to use its review authority.
5.5 Spatial planning, tenure security, and the rule of law
Post-New Order spatial planning practices in Bandung show that despite 
major political and legal reforms, low-income kampong dwellers still rare-
ly participate in spatial planning and are hardly offered the opportunity by 
Bandung’s municipal government to do so. The municipal government 
now appears more inclined than during the New Order to follow the legal-
ly prescribed procedure to ensure participation and transparency in spatial 
planning. However, to date the procedure has not been followed to the full 
extent, and involves only token participation: such as seeking input from 
129 Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 3/2006 on the Revision of Bylaw No. 2/2004 of 
Bandung Municipality on the General Spatial Plan of Bandung Municipality (Perda Kota 
Bandung No. 3/2006 tentang Perubahan atas Perda Kota Bandung No. 2/2004 tentang Renca-
na Tata Ruang Wilayah (RTRW) Kota Bandung). The only significant difference compared 
to the original draft was the reformuled Art. 49(3), as the Department of Home Affairs 
had requested.
130 ‘Revisi Perda RTRW Ditandatangani di Punclut’, Pikiran Rakyat, 9 March 2006.
131 ‘Pengesahan Perda RTRW Dinilai Cacat Hukum’, Pikiran Rakyat, 9 March 2006; ‘Dada 
Bantah Penilaian Revisi RTRW Cacat Hukum‘, Pikiran Rakyat, 10 March 2006; ‘Besok, 
Demo di Depdagri menentang Perubahan Kawasan Punclut Bandung’, Kompas, 26 
March 2006; ‘Revisi RTRW Kota Bandung Diprotes’, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 March 2006.
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only a small selection of ‘stakeholders’, whose input may often then be 
ignored. Also, the municipal government still frequently acts in defiance of 
higher legislation, including both spatial planning and environmental laws 
and regulations. The interests of kampong dwellers, particularly as related 
to tenure security, are also not supported by the Municipal Council, higher 
levels of government or even civil society. Nor is spatial planning fully 
transparent, although it is becoming more so. This results in spatial plans 
that are adverse, particularly for kampong dwellers who reside in kam-
pongs the municipal government qualifies as ‘slums’.
Paradoxically, Post-New Order reforms and particularly regional auto-
nomy have contributed to this state of affairs. Administrative decentralisa-
tion has resulted in an increased need for funds to finance local govern-
ment.132 In order to generate revenues, Bandung’s municipal government 
introduced a new development policy in 2000 which was summarized by 
the concept ‘Bandung: City of Services’. The policy refers to several eco-
nomic activities that the municipal government wants to promote, includ-
ing trade, banking and education, as well as local services.133 As the city is 
not well endowed with natural resources and has an insignificant manufac-
turing industry, the services industry is the main sector that can generate 
these revenues.
The Mayor’s newly acquired authority to grant site permits and the 
new fiscal relationship between Jakarta and the regions prove useful in this 
respect. Granting permits generates Regionally Generated Revenues in the 
form of regional retributions. Commercial land development also increases 
the value of land, which in turn brings in Balance Revenues (Dana Perim-
bangan) derived from Land and Building Tax and from Fees for Acquisition 
of Rights to Land and Buildings. Finally, such development produces extra 
Regionally Generated Revenues, through hotel and restaurant, entertain-
ment, parking, and advertising taxes; particularly since the municipal gov-
ernment revised existing bylaws regarding such taxes and introduced new 
ones.134
132 Personal communication of a former senior municipal official, Bandung, 19 August 
2008.
133 Attachment, p. 10-1/37, Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 5/2000 (Perda Kota Ban-
dung No. 5/2000 tentang Pola Dasar Pembangunan Daerah Kota Bandung Tahun 2000-2004); 
Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 9/2001.
134 See Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 18/1998 on Hotel and Restaurant Tax, after 
annulment by the Department of Home Affairs revised by Bylaw No. 2/2003 on Hotel 
Tax (Perda Kota Bandung No. 2/2003 tentang Pajak Hotel) and bylaw of Bandung Munici-
pality 3/2003 on Restaurant Tax (Perda Kota Bandung No. 3/2003 tentang Pajak Restoran); 
Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 19/1998 on Entertainment Tax (Perda Kota Bandung 
No. 19/1998 tentang Pajak Hiburan), revised by Bylaw No. 11/2000; Bylaw of Bandung 
Municipality No. 13/2001 on Parking Taxes (Perda Kota Bandung No. 13/2001 tentang 
Pajak Parkir); Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 18/2001 on Advertising Taxes (Perda 
Kota Bandung No. 18/2001 tentang Pajak Reklame) revised in 2003 by Bylaw No. 8/2003).
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Table 5.1 Selected overview of revenues of Bandung’s municipal government (in millions of 
Rupiahs)






Rights to Land 
and Buildings
1997 – 1998 31,052 14,739 22,173 -
1998 – 1999 31,887 25,779 23,984 6,904









2001 66,450 40,447 32,000 28,160
2002 85,000 61,655 34,000 35,660
2003 110,00 58,529 39,000 35,660
2004 123,072 60,403 52,590 45,000
2005 132,250 63,844 53,400 57,600
2006 152,228 71,234 61,420 58,218
Note: Due to an official change in calculation methods, the 2000 budget was based on the 
results of the last nine months of that fiscal year. Revenues for the full year are estimated by 
adding 25 per cent (three months) to the nine-month revenues provided in the budget.
A review of Bandung’s Regional Budget demonstrates that the Municipali-
ty’s new development policy has been financially successful (Table 5.1). 
Between 1997 and 2006, revenues from regional retributions increased by 
500 per cent; regional taxes by 600 per cent; Land and Building Tax by 300 
per cent; and Fees for Acquisition of Rights to Land and Buildings by a 
massive 900 per cent.
Political decentralisation and other reforms that were meant to 
strengthen democracy at the local level also required new revenues for the 
municipal government to finance political support, for instance for the 
approval of spatial plans. Such support could be guaranteed by, for exam-
ple, allocating a generous budget to the Municipal Council, as Table 5.2 
shows. Between 1997 and 2006 the funding for the representative body 
increased by almost 700 per cent.135
135 See also Haryadi & Sumindar 2002; Honna 2006:81-2.
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Table 5.2 Overview of expenditure of Bandung’s Municipal Council and Secretariat (in millions 
of Rupiahs)
Year Expenditure
1997 – 1998 3,082
1998 – 1999 3,168








Political support may also be financed by extra-budgetary revenues; which 
again partly derive from the newly acquired authority to grant site permits. 
An illustration of this were the 2003 mayoral elections. Despite an increase 
in the Municipal Council’s total expenditure, it did not re-elect the incum-
bent Mayor Aa Tarmana, but Dada Rosada. A number of informed sources 
(including a member of council) independently acknowledged that Dada 
Rosada paid hundreds of millions of rupiahs to each councillor who voted 
for him. According to these sources, funding for the bribes was provided 
by developers, in return for ‘compensation’ in the form of site permits.136 
With the introduction of direct elections of regional heads in 2004, election 
costs grew considerably. According to Rinakit, during the 2005 elections, 
candidates at the district/municipal level spent between Rp 1.8 and Rp 16 
billion for their campaigns. Such expenditures are still midget sized com-
pared to those made at the provincial level; winning a governorship would 
require funds averaging Rp 100 billion (Rinakit 2005:2). In an important 
Municipality like Bandung and a key Province like West-Java, spending is 
probably much higher. With strong control mechanisms remaining absent, 
many donations, generally from the private sector, remain unreported. 
Once elected, the sponsors will have to be ‘repaid’ (Mietzner 2011).
Even after strongly supporting a new Mayor’s election campaign, 
developers may not be guaranteed the site permits they seek, since power 
has become more dispersed following Post-New Order reforms. Currently, 
spatial planning and permits also require the consent of other members of 
the Municipal Council, the Governor, the Department of Public Works and 
the Department of Home Affairs.
136 Personal communication of a senior journalist, Bandung, 23 July 2008; personal com-
munication of a member of the Municipal Council, Bandung, 26 July 2008; personal 
communication of a political broker close to both candidates, Bandung, 11 August 2008.
149When money rules over voice
A municipal government may achieve its ends by turning the vague, 
overlapping, and contradictory legal system to its advantage; such as by 
selectively invoking legislation that supports the government’s interests. In 
this case the municipal government found its justification in the Provincial 
Spatial Plan, which provided insufficient clarity about the prohibition of 
development activities in Punclut. This plan, combined with the weakness 
of the provincial government in providing guidance and supervision, and 
the leniency of the central government, enabled the municipal government 
to approve development.
The actions of councillors and administrators are difficult to explain 
without raising questions of KKN, given that many councillors voiced 
strong initial opposition to the development. This hypothesis is particular-
ly supported by the allegations of councillor Uce Salya that several mem-
bers of Bandung’s Municipal Council had accepted bribes from one of the 
developers in Punclut. KKN could also explain the Governor’s acceptance 
of the spatial plan. Notably, shortly after losing the elections, Governor 
Danny Setiawan was arrested for corruption.137 In May 2009 he was convict-
ed, given four years imprisonment, and required to pay a fine of Rp 200 
million and to refund Rp 2.8 billion.138 Although Setiawan’s arrest and con-
viction were unrelated to Punclut and the revision of Bandung’s General 
Spatial Plan, his conviction indicates the existence of corruption at the level 
of regional authorities involved in spatial planning.
The general public and civil society made little attempt to prevent the 
revision of the General Spatial Plan. People seemed disinterested in spatial 
planning, and appeared not to value its importance. Although NGOs were 
active in the process, their influence was limited. Some community devel-
opment NGOs with close relationships to the kampong communities par-
ticipated in the planning process, but their input was ignored. Environmen-
tal NGOs led the protests against the revision of the General Spatial Plan; 
their primary concern was with environmental interests rather than the 
interests of the local population of Punclut or kampong dwellers generally.
The NGOs focused on political strategies, which mainly involved 
organising street protests. They also built coalitions – but notably, only with 
other NGOs. They did not collaborate with political parties; even though, 
as noted earlier, several factions in the Municipal Council and Provincial 
Assembly initially shared their concerns over Punclut. This lack of collabo-
ration suggests that ten years after the fall of Soeharto, NGOs may still be 
in ‘opposition mode’ and may lack the pragmatism to collaborate with 
government groups; this would explain why their protests failed.
When asked why they did not focus more on legal strategies, such as 
filing a request with the Supreme Court for judicial review, one NGO staff 
member replied: “We have had bad experiences with this. It is very hard to 
137 ‘KPK Tahan Danny Setiawan’, Kompas, 10 November 2008.
138 ‘Divonis 4 tahun penjara, Danny Setiawan Terima’, Kompas, 30 June 2009.
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win the case, and if you do win, it will be hard to get the ruling executed.”139 
This concern was apparently validated when the single court proceedings 
that were initiated by an NGO in relation to Punclut were lost on the basis 
of an incorrect line of reasoning.
The NGOs’ protests were widely covered by the media, but the cover-
age was decidedly uncritical of the government’s plans. This may be 
explained at least partly by the positive incentives the municipal govern-
ment offered to journalists. Bandung’s Regional Budget always reserves 
funds to support journalists, despite there being no specification in the 
budget for this to occur.140 It is, for example, common for journalists to 
receive Rp. 500,000 at the Feast of Ramadan. Most local journalists appear 
to see no ethical problem in accepting such contributions. Nor do many 
local journalists, particularly freelance journalists, appear to see a problem 
in writing on demand, or being paid to write particular content.141
Fear is another potential reason for journalists – in particular journalists 
with permanent positions at regional ‘dailies’ – to limit their criticism of 
government. A journalist of Pikiran Rakyat feared that critical writing would 
be unwelcome with his editor, for whom it was important that the newspa-
per’s leadership maintained a close relationship with Mayor Dada Rosada. 
Journalists also feared the threats of being sued for libel or harassed by 
hoodlum groups. In the Punclut case, several critical journalists confirmed 
that they did indeed receive threatening phone calls. According to the jour-
nalist of Pikiran Rakyat, hoodlums advised his editor to replace critical col-
leagues.142
The involvement of hoodlum groups in local politics is not new in Ban-
dung, but their influence is unprecedented. Many of these groups, such as 
AMS, PP, and the Youth of Military Veterans (Pemuda Panca Marga or PPM) 
were already active during the New Order. They were linked to the munic-
ipal government, the military, and the ruling Golkar party. Since the fall of 
Soeharto, new groups have emerged, including GASIBU, and the militant 
Joint Initiative of the Sons of Siliwangi (Gabungan Inisiatif Barisan Anak Sili-
wangi or GIBAS), which formed a secession of the AMS and later split into 
two to create “a group of strictly Sundanese sons” (Gabungan Inisiatif 
Barisan Anak Sunda Siliwangi or GIBASS). Some of these groups are (still) 
139 Personal communication of an NGO member, Bandung, 21 July 2008.
140 An item in the 2005 draft Regional Budget of West-Java Province reserved similar 
funds, but it was dropped after criticism from members of the Provincial Assembly. See 
‘Pemprov Tidak Keberatan Batalkan Honor Kemitraan’, Kompas, 5 January 2005; ‘Ho nor 
Kemitraan dan THR untuk Wartawan Akan Dicoret’, Kompas, 6 January 2005; ‘DPRD 
Sepakat Hapus Dana Kemitraan dan THR untuk Wartawan’, Kompas, 11 January 2005.
141 These freelance journalists are also called Wartawan Tanpa Surat or WTS (journalist 
without papers), not coincidently also an acronym for prostitute.
142 Personal communication of a journalist, Bandung, 13 January 2004; personal communi-
cation of another journalist, Bandung, 13 January 2005; personal communication of a 
senior journalist, Bandung, 23 July 2008, personal communication of another senior jour-
nalist, 7 August 2008.
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loyal to the municipal government, the military and political parties, while 
others claim less attachment to specific interests.143 The groups have thou-
sands of members. The Bandung chapter of PP, for instance, claims a mem-
bership of 26,800 people.144
The loyalty of hoodlum groups can be explained by the funding they 
receive from the Regional Budget. Since the election of Dada Rosada as the 
city’s Mayor in 2003, the Regional Budget has contained an item called 
‘Financial Support to Civil Society Organisations’ (Bantuan Keuangan kepada 
Organisasi Kemasyarakatan), which supports local hoodlum groups in addi-
tion to other non-hoodlum, pro-government organisations. Funding is sig-
nificant, as table 5.3 shows.145
Table 5.3 Overview expenditure of Bandung’s municipal government on civil society 






In addition to the size of this budget, there has been much criticism of the 
way it is allocated. The process for selecting organisations that receive 
funding lacks clear standards; there is little transparency around which 
organisations receive funding and how much they receive; and there is lit-
tle accountability for how funding is used. Only once (in 2004) did the 
municipal government release a list identifying which organisations 
received funding and how much they received. The list included several of 
the afore-mentioned hoodlum groups. Interestingly the figures totalled to 
only about 10 per cent of the overall budget for this item. Mayor Dada 
Rosada has acknowledged publically that funding from the municipal gov-
ernment is allocated preferentially to organisations which support govern-
ment policies.146 Notably, criticism of this practice originates primarily from 
the Bandung Institute of Governance Studies (BIGS), a watchdog NGO, 
143 See also Honna 2006:86-8; on the Pemuda Pancasila, see Ryter 1998.
144 ‘Kami Mendukung Segala Kebijakan Pemerintah…’, Bujet, Is. 07, September 2006, p. 32.
145 According to one source, this is only part of the funding that hoodlum groups receive. 
Further funding derives from other vaguely-named items on the Regional Budget, 
including the Mayor’s ‘tactic fund’. Personal communication of a former senior munici-
pal official, Bandung, 19 August 2008.
146 See ‘Bantuan ke Ormas Harus Diaudit’, Pikiran Rakyat, 18 February 2005; ‘Dana Bantu-
an Ormas Naik’, Pikiran Rakyat, 22 October 2005; ‘Dari Kasus Bantuan Keuangan untuk 
Ormas: Kinerja Apa?’, Bujet, Is. 01, February 2004, p. 15; ‘Skandal Ormasgate: Ini Dia 
Daftar Penerima Dana APBD Kota Bandung’, Bujet, Is. 03, April 2004, p. 51-6; ‘Ada Apa 
dengan Bantuan Organisasi Kemasyarakatan?’, Bujet, Is. 7, September 2006, p. 5-13.
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and from the PKS faction in the Municipal Council. The practice does not 
meet with any other serious opposition.
Despite the Mayor’s statements, as well as public allegations of KKN 
from other sources and the intimidation experienced by those protesting 
against the revision of the General Spatial Plan for Punclut, neither Mayor 
Dada Rosada, members of the Municipal Council, nor members of the 
hoodlum groups have been formally accused of any wrongdoing. The Gen-
eral Elections Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU) never identified 
any irregularities with campaign donations. The Supreme Audit Board 
(Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK) concluded that Bandung’s General Spa-
tial Plan was not in accordance with the Provincial Spatial Plan and recom-
mended that the Mayor should be given a warning (BPK 2007:48-51). How-
ever, it never identified any misuse of the regional budget in relation to this 
matter. A report by BIGS led to the arrest of four leaders of the Municipal 
Council of the period 1999-2004, on the basis of corruption charges. Despite 
apparently strong evidence against them, Bandung's General District Court 
(Pengadilan Negeri) acquitted the four.147 Following the Punclut protests, 
NGO members also reported hoodlums who had intimidated them to the 
police, but to no avail.148
It is difficult to say whether the practices of spatial planning in Post-
New Order Bandung are representative of (urban) Indonesia, as little 
research has been conducted on this topic. However, it is clear that in poli-
cymaking processes at the local level generally, citizens and particularly the 
urban poor still play a limited role. There are some positive examples 
though. For instance, the Asia Foundation has undertaken three Indonesia 
Rapid Decentralisation Appraisals based on research conducted in eight 
Districts and four Municipalities, and its first two appraisals observed that 
citizens now had the opportunity to play a greater role in decision-making 
processes at the local level, through newly established organisations such 
as citizens’ forums (forum warga), mass organisations, and social move-
ments (The Asia Foundation 2002a:10,2002b:31). However in its third 
Appraisal, the Asia Foundation found that local communities still have 
very limited knowledge, awareness, and skills related to developing 
bylaws; and that public consultation in policy development (when it takes 
place at all) is often poorly used or conducted too early or too late, with 
local governments lacking knowledge about options for participation (The 
Asia Foundation 2003:16). Rosser, at al. argue that the poor and their NGO 
allies have been able to exercise greater influence over the policymaking 
process than before, “if only somewhat so” (Rosser, et al. 2005:54). While 
acknowledging the risk of elite-capture, Antlöv observes “an exciting wave 
147 See ‘Herry Mei, “Penggunaan Sesuai dengan Tujuan” Korupsi di DPRD Bandung?’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 15 June 2004; ‘Korupsi di DPRD Kota Bandung ke Penyidikan’, Kompas, 
21 September 2004; ‘Empat Mantan Pimpinan DPRD Divonis Bebas’, Pikiran Rakyat, 6 
June 2007.
148 Personal communication of two NGO members, Bandung, 21 July 2008.
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of grassroots mobilisation and initiatives” (Äntlov 2003:77). Some local 
governments increasingly recognise the importance of public participation, 
as evidenced by the enactment of supporting bylaws. In some areas, as case 
studies from Surakarta Municipality and Bandung Municipality’s neigh-
bouring Bandung District show, this has resulted in participatory planning 
practices (Pratikto 2005:64-6; Sofhani 2006:96-128).
5.6 More recent reforms related to spatial planning
Fairly recently, legislation related to spatial planning has been further 
reformed. In April 2007, Law No. 26/2007 (hereafter the 2007 SML) was 
enacted; followed in January 2008 by Regulation of the Minister of Home 
Affairs No. 1/2008, which finally replaces Regulation of the Minister of 
Home Affairs No. 2/1987, and Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs 
No. 28/2008.149 The system of spatial plans has to a large extent been main-
tained. Plans at the municipal level still consist of a General Spatial Plan 
and, if needed, Elaborated Spatial Plans, which consist of Detailed Spatial 
Plans and Spatial Plans for Strategic Areas (Rencana Tata Ruang Kawasan 
Stategis).150
The 2007 SML and implementing legislation contains some extra safe-
guards that could potentially protect the interests of vulnerable groups like 
the urban poor in spatial planning. The legislation creates the possibility to 
organise public participation through an urban people’s forum.151 Further-
more, all spatial plans at the municipal level are now enacted by bylaw, 
which means the role of the Municipal Councils has strengthened in spatial 
planning.152 Finally, there is a stronger role for central and provincial govern-
ments in spatial planning at the district/municipal level. Before any Spatial 
Plan, including Detailed and Strategic Plans, can be enacted by the Munici-
pal Council, district/municipal governments need to consult the Governor 
and the Ministers of Home Affairs and Public Works, who must give a rec-
ommendation for and agree to the draft plan respectively.153
149 Law No. 26/2007 on Spatial Management (UU No. 26/2007 tentang Penataan Ruang); 
Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 1/2008 on Guidelines for Planning of 
Urban Areas (Permendagri No. 1/2008 tentang Pedoman Perencanaan Kawasan Perkotaan); 
Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 28/2008 on the Procedure to Evaluate 
Draft Bylaws on Regional Spatial Plans (Permendagri No. 28/2008 tentang Tata Cara Eval-
uasi Rancangan Peraturan Daerah tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Daerah). Regulation of the 
Minister of Home Affairs No. 28/2008 also implements Art. 37-39 GR No. 79/2005, in 
accordance with Art. 42 GR No. 79/2005.
150 Art. 14 Law No. 26/2007.
151 Art. 33 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 1/2008.
152 Art. 28 in conjunction with Art. 26 Law No. 26/2007.
153 Art. 18 Law No. 26/2007; Art. 5, 10-13 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 
28/2008.
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In April 2008, Law No. 14/2008 on transparency of public information 
was enacted.154 Acknowledging the importance of transparency, it sets a gen-
eral framework for freedom of information. In principle, all government 
information is open and accessible to the general public. Such information 
should be provided in due time, against low costs and through a simple 
procedure. Information that is not open and accessible comprises secret 
information, opinions, and information that, in case it were open and acces-
sible, would harm overriding interests. 155 This includes information that can 
endanger the state, is related to the protection of companies from unhealthy 
competition, personal rights, the duty of professional confidentiality, or 
information that is not yet held or has not yet been documented.156 Public 
bodies should not only provide information upon request, but also periodi-
cally (meaning, every six months) publish information regarding, inter alia, 
financial reporting.157 In addition, government bodies should immediately 
announce information that forms a threat to the essentials of many people 
or the public order.158 Finally, they should make permanently available infor-
mation regarding, inter alia, policies and documentation underlying such 
policies.159 To this aim, public bodies should appoint an information officer 
and create an information services system.160
Notably, public companies, political parties, and even “non-govern-
mental organisations“ should make certain information publicly available.161
For political parties and NGOs, this includes information regarding the 
allocation and use of public funding. Notably, political parties are only 
required to provide information regarding the allocation and use of fund-
ing originating from the National/Regional Budgets, while NGOs are also 
required to provide information regarding the allocation and use of fund-
ing that originates from public donations and/or foreign donations.162
Law No. 14/2008 provides for the establishment of Information Com-
missions (Komisi Informasi) at the national and provincial levels, which 
have the task to implement the law and to resolve public information dis-
154 Law No. 14/2008 on Transparency of Public Information (UU No. 14/2008 tentang Keter-
bukaan Informasi Publik). The Law was implemented by GR No. 61/2010 on the Imple-
mentation of Law No. 14/2008 (PP No. 61/2010 tentang Pelaksanaan UU No. 14/2008).
155 Art. 2 Law No. 14/2008.
156 Art. 6(3) Law No. 14/2008. See also Art. 17-20 Law No. 14/2008.
157 Art. 9 Law No. 14/2008.
158 Art. 10 Law No. 14/2008.
159 Art. 11 Law No. 14/2008.
160 Art. 13 Law No. 14/2008.
161 Art. 14-16 Law No. 14/2008. “Non-governmental organisation“ here has a broader 
meaning than the usual concept. It not only includes NGOs (Lembaga Swadaya Masya-
rakat or LSM), but also legal entities or non-legal entities that “constitutes a gathering“ 
and non-governmental undertakings that receive funding from the National/Regional 
Budgets, donations from the public, and/or foreign donations (Elucidation Art. 16 Law 
No. 14/2008).
162 Art. 15, under d; Art. 16, under d Law No. 14/2008.
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putes through mediation and/or non-litigative adjudication.163 In case the 
provision of information is delayed or refused, the person who has request-
ed the information can file an appeal to, in case the defending party is a 
public body, the Administrative District Court, or, in case the defending 
party is not a public body, the General District Court.164 The Administrative 
District Court can award damages to a maximum of Rp. 5 million.165 The 
person who does not accept the ruling of the Administrative District Court 
or General District Court can file an appeal with the Supreme Court.166
A public body (or its representative) that deliberately fails to meet the 
requirements set in the law to make public information available, thus 
causing damages to a third party, is penalised with a maximum sentence of 
one year prison or a Rp. 5 million fine.167 Each person, including public body, 
that deliberately destroys, damages public information and/or makes such 
information disappear, is penalised with a maximum sentence of one year 
prison or a Rp. 10 million fine.168
In Chapter 3, reference was made to the launching, in October 2009, of 
the National Strategy on Access to Justice. This Strategy may also have an 
impact on spatial planning. Key policy recommendations not only include 
those discussed in Chapter 4, but also harmonising and improving the 
quality of local policies based on transparency, participation and accounta-
bility.169 Further reforms can thus be expected. This is evidenced by the 2010-
2014 National Legislative Programme, which for instance announces the 
introduction of bills on the revision of the 2007 SML, the revision of the 
2004 RAL, competentional relations between the central government and 
the regions, and regional taxes and retributions.
The reforms are a significant step forward. A strengthened role of 
Municipal Councils in decision-making processes, and the requirement for 
municipal governments to obtain a recommendation from the Governor 
and an agreement from the Ministers of Home Affairs and Public Works 
before spatial plans can be enacted, are laudable. The implication of Law 
No. 14/2008 should not be underestimated. Contrary to the legislation on 
public participation, it imposes clear and enforceable obligations. In addi-
tion, the scope of the law is broader. The obligations apply to state bodies, 
163 Art. 23 Law No. 14/2008. See also Art. 35-39 Law No. 14/2008. The Information Com-
mission at the national level should have been established within one year and the 
Information Commissions at the provincial level within two years after the enactment 
of the Law (Art. 59-60 Law No. 14/2008). The Information Commitee at the national 
level has already been established and became operational on 1 May 2010. The Informa-
tion Commission of West Java Province is in the process of being established.
164 Art. 4(4); Art. 47-50 Law No. 14/2008.
165 Art. 16 GR No. 61/2010 in conjunction with Art. 58 Law No. 14/2008.
166 Art. 50 Law No. 14/2008.
167 Art. 52 and Elucidation Law No. 14/2008.
168 Art. 53 and Elucidation Law No. 14/2008.
169 This information was derived from the LEAD page at www.undp.org.
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public companies, political parties, and even NGOs. It can not only play a 
role in spatial planning but also in other (land related) fields. This new 
piece of legislation may thus lead to a general strengthening of Indonesia’s 
rule of law. However, most obligations imposed to municipal governments 
to ensure public participation remain unclear and difficult to enforce.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the law and practice of municipal spatial plan-
ning in the New Order and the Post-New Order. It has been shown that 
New Order spatial planning law offered only partial protection to land-
holders, even if they had registered their land. The 1992 SML, which also 
regulates spatial planning, created a system to ensure that the interests of 
landholders were valued; but implementing legislation, particularly in 
relation to public participation and transparency, was only partly enacted. 
As far as such legislation had been enacted, it failed to assign clear and 
enforceable government duties to protect the rights of the public in spatial 
planning, and as far as these rights were protected, they had little sub-
stance. In practice, the Indonesian government showed little concern for 
the interests of vulnerable groups like the urban poor in spatial planning. 
municipal governments drafted plans with little room for the public to par-
ticipate. The Municipal Councils functioned as ‘rubber stamps’, enacting 
the plans without any form of external input. As plans required a recom-
mendation from the Governor, and had to be legalized by the central gov-
ernment, higher levels of government could control the planning process. 
After enactment, it was hard for the public to even get access to plans.
Post-1998 reforms included reforms to spatial management law. New 
legislation formulated further standards for public participation and trans-
parency. It contains safeguards that could protect the interests of landhold-
ers, but still imposes few obligations on municipal governments to ensure 
public participation and transparency. In addition, the role of the Munici-
pal Councils in spatial planning diminished. Finally, the provincial and 
central government’s role with respect to guidance and supervision initial-
ly also remained limited, but this role has increased since 2004. Despite 
these weaknesses, in combination with the general reforms discussed in 
Chapter 3, the legislation has the potential to offer protection to kampong 
dwellers in spatial planning.
Despite the reforms, the legal tenure security of low-income kampong 
dwellers remains limited, as post-New Order spatial planning practices in 
Bandung show. Participation of kampong dwellers in spatial planning is 
still rare; the municipal government hardly offers them the opportunity to 
be involved in this process. The Municipal Council, higher levels of gov-
ernment, or civil society equally fail to support the interests of kampong 
dwellers. Though we can witness some improvement, spatial planning is 
also still not fully transparent. This results in spatial plans that are adverse, 
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particularly for kampong dwellers who reside in kampongs the municipal 
government qualifies as ‘slums’.
The above practices are, at least in part, the result of Post-New Order 
reforms and particularly regional autonomy. Administrative decentralisa-
tion as well as the new fiscal relationship between Jakarta and the regions 
together have invited the municipal government to consider spatial plan-
ning merely as an instrument to stimulate economic development, without 
considering the interests of ordinary citizens. Political decentralisation 
required new revenues for the municipal government to finance political 
support, which can for instance be guaranteed by allocating a generous 
budget to the Municipal Council. KKN is also implicated, including such 
situations as developers financially supporting a particular Mayor (or may-
oral candidate) in return for permits; and, before 2004, the beneficiary using 
these revenues to get support from the Municipal Council for election. Yet, 
even after strongly supporting a new Mayor’s election campaign, develop-
ers may not be guaranteed the site permits they seek, since power has 
become more dispersed following Post-New Order reforms.
The municipal government succeeded in getting its spatial plan 
approved by using weaknesses in the legal system, selectively invoking leg-
islation which supported its interests. The weak role of the provincial gov-
ernment in guidance and supervision, and the lenient attitude of the central 
government, both contributed to the ability of the municipal government to 
reach decisions that violate the public interest and higher legislation. The 
advocacy or support for such decisions by local councillors and administra-
tors may again indicate the involvement of KKN in certain cases, particu-
larly given the initial public rejection of the process by some councillors.
The general public and civil society have done little to prevent these 
developments. People seemed disinterested in spatial planning and did not 
appear to value its importance. Although NGOs have been active in the 
process, applying political strategies, their influence was limited; and they 
focused on environmental issues rather than the interests of kampong 
dwellers. NGOs which protested against the process found that their mem-
bers were intimidated by hoodlum groups. The protests were widely cov-
ered by the media, but no journalists were critical of the process, perhaps 
also out of fear of being targeted by these same hoodlum groups. Despite 
the public allegations of KKN and the intimidation experienced by those 
who protested against the revision of the General Spatial Plan and Punclut, 
no one has been formally accused of any wrongdoing.
Recently, legislation related to spatial planning has been further 
reformed. The 2007 SML was enacted, followed by implementing legisla-
tion. A year later a Law on Transparency of Public Information was enact-
ed. The new legislation contains some extra safeguards that could protect 
the interests of vulnerable groups like the urban poor in spatial planning 
and sets a general framework for freedom of information. The reforms are a 
significant step forward. Especially the implication of the 2008 Law on 
Transparency of Public Information should not be underestimated.
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Now that the legal tenure security of kampong dwellers has been 
assessed in relation to land registration and spatial planning, the question 
arises as to the position of kampong dwellers when the state actually wish-
es to clear their land. The next chapter therefore deals with the topic of land 
clearance by the state.
6.1 Introduction1
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Indonesian state can clear land if it is needed 
for development in the public interest. Furthermore, it can clear land if it is 
occupied without permission from the title holder. Land clearance by the 
state can easily take form in involuntary removal, without due process of 
law and payment of proper compensation. Therefore, it is of utmost impor-
tance that this process is carried out in an appropriate manner.
This chapter discusses the law and practice of land clearance by the 
state during the New Order and takes a close look at the practice of such 
type of land clearance in Post-New Order Bandung. In doing so, it focuses 
on, inter alia, the justification for land clearance, the nature of the negotia-
tion process, and the level of compensation offered. It also emphasizes the 
nature of resistance – including the role of legal norms and institutions -, 
the response to such resistance, and its effect.
This chapter is divided into six sections. The next section establishes 
the legal framework pertaining to land clearance by the state, followed by a 
description of land clearance practices and resistance in the late New 
Order. Section 6.3 discusses the land clearance process preceding the con-
struction of the Pasupati flyover, a case that is further evaluated in the light 
of past reforms from a rule of law perspective in the succeeding section. 
The chapter then discusses recent law reform pertaining to land clearance 
by the state, after which it concludes.
6.2 Land clearance by the state under the late New Order
As discussed above, the Indonesian state can clear land if it is needed for 
development in the public interest. The law offers two options: compulsory 
and voluntary land clearance. Compulsory land clearance finds its legal 
basis in the 1960 BAL. Article 18 allows for such type of land clearance 
1 A summary of this chapter was published as Reerink, G.O. (2006), ‘The Price of Uncer-
tainty: Kampung Land Politics in Post-Suharto Bandung’, IIAS Newsletter 40, p. 14. An 
earlier version of this chapter was published as Reerink, G.O. (2010), ‘”Ganti Rugi? 
Ganti Untung!” Hukum dan Praktik Pengadaan Tanah di Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru’, 
In: M.A. Safitri & T.P. Moeliono (ed.), Hukum Agraria dan Masyarakat di Indonesia: Studi 
tentang Tanah, Kekayaan Alam, dan Ruang Masa Kolonial dan Desentralisasi, Jakarta: Huma; 
Van Vollenhoven Institute; KITLV-Jakarta, p. 311-38.
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through land expropriation (pencabutan hak atas tanah) if this is in the public 
interest (kepentingan umum), including the interests of the nation, the state, 
the people as a whole, provided that an appropriate compensation is paid 
and in accordance with a procedure laid down by act of parliament. 
According to the elucidation, this article is meant to protect the people with 
regard to their land rights.
In accordance with Article 18, Law No. 20/1961 sets out a procedure for 
compulsory land clearance.2 The procedure is to be followed when all 
efforts to obtain the land voluntarily on the basis of musyawarah, the tradi-
tional process of discussion and deliberation, have not led to a resolution.3 
Law No. 20/1961 also creates an alternative, accelerated procedure, but it 
can only be applied in case of emergency, for instance if an epidemic or a 
natural disaster occurs.4 In practice both procedures have seldom been 
used.5
The government institution requiring land for development in the pub-
lic interest has to file a motivated request for expropriation of the land to 
the President through the Minister of Agraria (the Head of the NLA), who 
before the President takes a decision must consult the head of the region 
where the land is located (the District-Head/Mayor), an Appraisal Com-
mittee (Panitia Penaksir), the Minister of Justice as well as the Minister com-
petent in the field the institution requesting the land to be expropriated is 
active.6 In case the alternative, accelerated procedure is applied, there is no 
need to consult the head of the region where the land is located and the 
Appraisal Committee.7 If landholders do not agree with the compensation 
offered, they can appeal to the Court of Appeal of the District/Municipality 
where the land is located.8
In addition to Law No. 20/1961 on compulsory land clearance, during 
the New Order several regulations on voluntary land clearance (through 
sale, exchange, or otherwise) were enacted. The first was Regulation of the 
2 Law No. 20/1961 on the Revocation of Rights on Land and the Buildings Erected on It 
(UU No. 20/1961 tentang Pencabutan Hak-Hak Tanah dan Benda-Benda yang Ada Diatasnya).
3 General Elucidation, under 2 Law No. 21/1961.
4 Art. 6 and General Elucidation, under 4, under c, under 5 Law No. 21/1961.
5 Referring to a 1991 World Bank report, Fitzpatrick states that the non-emergency proce-
dure has only been used once. In other cases, the procedure designed for emergency 
purposes was used, albeit not often (Fitzpatrick 1999:77).
6 Arts. 1-3 Law and General Elucidation, under 4, under c, under 4 No. 21/1961.
7 Art. 6(1) Law No. 21/1961.
8 Art. 8(1) Law No. 21/1961. In accordance with Art. 8(2) Law No. 21/1961, the procedu-
re for the Court of Appeal to determine the level of compensation is set out by GR No. 
39/1973 on the Procedure for the Determination of Compensation by the Court of 
Appeal in relation to the Revocation of Rights on Land and the Buildings Erected on It 
(PP No. 39/1973 tentang Acara Penetapan Ganti Kerugian oleh Pengadilan Tinggi Sehubun-
gan dengan Pencabutan Hak-hak atas Tanah dan Benda-benda yang Ada Diatasnya).
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Minister of Home Affairs No. 15/1975.9 A year later, the Minister promul-
gated Regulation No. 2/1976, which declared the procedure on voluntary 
land clearance for development in the public interest applicable to com-
mercial land clearance if this was determined to be in the interest of the 
government.10 Developers were thus enabled to call on the assistance of the 
authorities in commercial land clearance. The regulations resulted in an 
unclear distinction between public interest and commercial interest. Con-
taining few procedural safeguards, they met with severe and enduring 
criticism. After President Soeharto had started to endorse the policy of 
keter bukaan (openness), the regulations were therefore replaced by Presi-
dential Decision No. 55/1993, which was implemented by Regulation of 
the Head of the NLA No. 1/1994 (Fitzpatrick 1999:78).11
Presidential Decision No. 55/1993 is a major improvement in terms of 
protecting the interests of landholders, if only because it no longer allows 
developers to apply the procedure for land clearance for development in 
the public interest for commercial purposes.12 Nonetheless, this decision 
too contains important weaknesses. It non-exhaustively lists development 
activities for which land clearance for development in the public interest is 
allowed. These activities are to be undertaken by the government and be 
non-commercial; this includes the development of a great variety of infra-
structure.13 A government institution wishing to clear land for develop-
ment in the public interest in principle has to file a request to agree with 
land clearance through the NLA to the District-Head/Mayor of the Dis-
trict/Municipality where the land is located.14 Next, it must be checked 
9 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 15/1975 concerning Provisions for a 
Land Clearance Procedure (Permendagri No. 15/1975 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan menge-
nai Tatacara Pembebasan Tanah). Years later a separate regulation was promulgated for 
land clearance at the Sub-District level, as far as it involved plots of no more than 5 hec-
tares (Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1985 on a Land Clearance Pro-
cedure for Development Projects on the Sub-District Level (Permendagri No. 2/1985 ten-
tang Tatacara Pengadaan Tanah untuk Keperluan Proyek Pembangunan di Wilayah 
Kecamatan)).
10 Art. 1 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1976 on the Use of the Proce-
dure for Land Clearance in the Government’s Interest for Land Clearance by Private 
Parties (Permendagri No. 2/1976 tentang Penggunaan Acara Pembebasan Tanah untuk 
Kepentingan Pemerintah bagi Pembebasan Tanah oleh Pihak Swasta) in conjunction with 
Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 15/1975 on Provisions regarding the 
Procedure for Land Clearance (Permendagri No. 15/1975 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan 
mengenai Tata-cara Pembebasan Tanah).
11 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993 on Land Clearance for Development Activities in the 
Public Interest (Keppres No. 55/1993 tentang Pengadaan Tanah bagi Pelaksanaan Pembangun-
an untuk Kepentingan Umum); Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 1/1994 on Imple-
menting Provisions of Presidential Decision No. 55/1993 (Permen Agraria / Kepala BPN 
No. 1/1994 tentang Ketentuan Pelaksanaan Keppres No. 55/1993).
12 Art. 24 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
13 Art. 5(1) Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
14 Art. 6(1) Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 1/1994.
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whether the envisaged land use is in accordance with the General Spatial 
Plan or, if no General Spatial Plan is available, another spatial plan. Only if 
this is the case, the District-Head/Mayor can agree to the request.15
As soon as the District-Head/Mayor has agreed, the government insti-
tution wishing to clear the land can start negotiations with title holders. For 
land clearance involving plots of less than one hectare, it can enter into 
direct negotiations with title holders.16 Otherwise, it must achieve consen-
sus with title holders through a more formal procedure of musyawarah.17 
The process of musyawarah must be organised by the Land Clearance Com-
mittee (Panitia Pengadaan Tanah or, in the vernacular, the committee of 
nine).18 In Municipalities it comprises nine senior officials, encompassing 
the Mayor, the Heads of the different Municipal Services, the Head of the 
District/Municipality's Land Office, the Sub-District Head (Camat) and the 
City Quarter Head (Lurah) in question.
Compensation (ganti kerugian) can come in any form agreed upon by 
the parties.19 Calculation of the compensation must be based on the real or 
actual value of the land, with attention being paid to its Sale Value as a Tax 
Object (Nilai Jual Obyek Pajak or NJOP), the market value of the buildings 
on the land as estimated by the Municipal Building Service, and the market 
value of the crops on the land as estimated by the Municipal Service for 
Agriculture.20 Compensation must be aimed at such level that the living 
conditions of the people are not affected, which means that they must be 
able to resettle on a similar site.21 Implementing legislation also provides 
guidelines for the level of compensation that landholders with a semi-for-
mal right (colonial adat ownership right) or formal right other than an 
ownership right are to receive. Those with a semi-formal right are to receive 
90 per cent of the compensation to be received by those who have a regis-
tered ownership right. Landholders holding a construction right (hak guna 
bangunan or HGB) are to receive 80 per cent. Finally, those who have not 
15 Art 7(2-3) Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 1/1994 in conjunction with Art. 4 
Decision No. 55/1993.
16 Art. 23 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
17 Art. 1, 9, 10, 16 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
18 Art. 8, 10 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
19 Art. 13 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
20 Art. 15 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
21 Art. 16(4) Regulation of the Head of NLA No. 1/1994. This provision corresponds with 
the General Elucidation of GR No. 39/1973 on the Procedure for the Arrangement of 
Compensation by the High Court related to the Revocation of Rights on Land and the 
Buildings Erected on It (PP No. 39/1973 tentang Acara Penetapan Ganti-Kerugian oleh Peng-
adilan Tinggi Sehubungan dengan Pencabutan Hak-Hak atas Tanah dan Benda-Benda yang 
Ada Diatasnya), which states that the position of the title holder should decline neither 
from a social nor an economic perspective. The influential academic Boedi Harsono 
argues that the principle set out in this Decision should be considered as a general prin-
ciple, not only applicable in case of compulsory land clearance but also in case of volun-
tary land clearance (Harsono 2005:413/454). See also: Sumardjono 2005:76-7.
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extended the duration of that right but still use or allow someone to use the 
land receive 60 per cent.22
If, after repeated deliberations, the parties have failed to reach an agree-
ment, the Land Clearance Committee decides on the matter. In case title 
holders oppose the committee’s decision, they can file an appeal to the 
Governor.23 If the title holders still disagree with the compensation offered, 
the Governor is to follow the procedure for compulsory land clearance as 
elaborated in Law No. 20/1961.24
The procedures as set out above apply to title holders. For those who 
use land without permission from the title holder (informal landholders, 
squatting the land), Law No. 51/1960 applies.25 The law forbids such use 
and even makes it a criminal offence.26 It also grants the District-Head/
Mayor discretionary power to evict these informal landholders, thus taking 
form in compulsory land clearance.27 Nonetheless, their interests and their 
plans of use and purpose are to be taken into account. This could lead to 
compensation in the form of ‘assistance/sympathy money’ (uang 
santunan).28 The Land Clearance Committee determines the amount of 
assistance/sympathy money on the basis of the District-Head/Mayor’s 
directives.29
Landholders can start judicial proceedings in relation to land clearance 
by the state. Before 1991 judicial proceedings should always be initiated at 
a General District Court on the basis of a tort claim, which was hard to sub-
stantiate. Since the establishment of Administrative Courts in 1991, admin-
istrative law proceedings can be commenced there as far as it concerns gov-
ernment decisions to expropriate landholders and pay compensation on 
the basis of Law No. 20/1961 and decisions to evict landholders, demolish 
their houses, and pay assistance/sympathy money on the basis of Law No. 
51/1960.30 The Administrative Courts have no jurisdiction to rule over 
decisions on the location of land clearance in the framework of Presidential 
Decision No. 55/1993 (and its successors, discussed in section 5), since such 
22 Art. 17 Decision of the Head of NLA No. 1/1994.
23 Art. 20 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
24 Art. 21 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
25 Law No. 51/1960 regarding the Prohibition to Use Land without Permission of the Title 
Holder (UU No. 51/1960 tentang Larangan Pemakaian Tanah Tanpa Izin yang Berhak atau 
Kuasanya).
26 Art. 2, 6(1), under a Law No. 51/1960.
27 Art. 4 Law No. 51/1960.
28 Art. 20 Regulation of the Head of NLA No. 1/1994. Notably, the decision speaks of 
assistance/sympathy money, not compensation (ganti kerugian, literally meaning com-
pensation for damages). It thus denies that it involves damages and that there is a right 
to compensation.
29 Art. 21 Regulation of the Head of NLA No. 1/1994.
30 As noted above, Law No. 51/1960 creates broad discretionary power for the District-
Head/Mayor whether or not to evict landholders, demolish their houses and pay 
assistance/sympathy money. Therefore, the Administrative Courts must take a reticent 
attitude when reviewing the substance of such decisions.
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decisions are not individual, or decisions of the Land Clearance Committee 
and the appellate decisions of the Governor on the level of compensation in 
the framework of this same presidential decision, since these decisions are 
not binding (Bedner 2001:155-8).
The above shows that legislation pertaining to land clearance by the 
state contains few safeguards to protect landholders. The authorities have a 
broad discretion to determine for what purpose land is cleared. They have 
no legal obligation to explore feasible alternatives. Legislation contains 
some procedural protections and offers legal remedies, but it does not for-
mulate such obligations as genuine consultation with affected landholders, 
adequate and reasonable notice prior to land clearance, the provision of 
information on the proposed eviction and on the alternative purpose for 
which the land is to be used, or the provision of legal aid. The right to prop-
er compensation is not guaranteed. The Municipal Building Service that 
estimates the market value of the buildings is obviously not independent. 
This also applies to the Land Clearance Committee that decides over com-
pensation in case no agreement can be reached. Legislation does not guar-
antee a right to adequate alternative accommodation. Informal landholders 
in particular are little protected. Law No. 51/1960 provides no standards 
whatsoever in what case such occupation is treated as a criminal offence 
and in what case a perpetrator receives assistance/sympathy money.
As discussed in Chapter 4, kampong dwellers in Bandung have always 
enjoyed a high degree of administrative recognition. Most landholders, 
even informal landholders, have been living on the land for decades, which 
means that the state has for a long time condoned non-formal land tenure. 
During the New Order, land clearance as a single enforcement measure, for 
instance because a landholder resided on land without the permission of 
the right holder or because they lacked permits to reside on the land, was 
indeed rare. The Indonesian state usually cleared land if it was needed for 
specific development activities.
Insofar as the above legislation could still theoretically protect land-
holders in case the state wished to clear land needed for development 
activities, this was not the case in practice, as is evidenced by an extensive 
body of (international) literature.31 While Soeharto’s ‘developmentalist’ 
regime proved economically successful, it had little regard for the interest 
of indigenous communities, peasants, and the urban poor. Neither was 
such development always in the public interest. In a context of rampant 
KKN, Soeharto and his cronies exploited the country increasingly for per-
sonal gain. Backed by the military, authorities generally undertook land 
clearance without prior or with short notice. They intimidated those affect-
ed and seldom paid appropriate compensation. Land clearance often 
involved human rights violations, with perpetrators rarely punished.
31 See for instance Lucas 1992; Fitzpatrick 1997; Lucas 1997; Fitzpatrick 1999; Bachriadi & 
Lucas 2001; Ganie-Rochman 2002.
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The authorities made little effort to justify their actions. In practice, 
they abused the concept of public interest so badly that they interpreted it 
to include such items as golf courses (Lucas 1997:235-42). So as the distinc-
tions among development, the public interest, and commercial activities 
were irrevocably blurred, political and business elites gained at the expense 
of the vulnerable.
Even when land clearance was in fact justified by a genuine public 
interest, the aforementioned procedures were not always followed (Fitz-
patrick 1999:82-8). Authorities sometimes reverted to other provisions facil-
itating land clearance. For instance, on the basis of (municipal) building 
regulations, as an enforcement measure, buildings can be demolished if 
they are constructed without a permit. Sometimes such enforcement meas-
ures were taken to actually clear land for development activities, constitut-
ing a clear case of misuse of power.
As far as the procedure for voluntary land clearance as set out in the 
1993 Presidential Decision and its predecessors were applied, it often took 
on compulsory characteristics. Consensus was rarely reached, and often 
the City Quarter Head was ‘convinced’ to side with the power holders in 
negotiations. Intimidation was common, whether from the municipal 
administration, security forces, or hired thugs. To refuse meant being peril-
ously labelled a communist. That land clearance practices violated the civil 
and political rights of those affected was undeniable. Between July 1994 
and September 1996, for instance, the National Human Rights Commission 
recorded 891 incidents of human rights violations related to land clearance 
(Lucas & Warren 2000:223). These figures shed critical light on New Order 
Pancasila-democracy, where state-society harmony was assumed, and con-
flict and upholding individual rights was ignored.
When compensation was paid, its amount and form were typically 
inadequate. In practice, the land’s Sales Value as a Tax Object was often a 
fraction of the actual market value; the Sales Value as a Tax Object was also 
usually frozen prior to land clearance to keep compensation low. Other-
wise it was assessed on an ad hoc basis without any explanation. Such 
assessments put title holders at a disadvantage, for the Land Clearance 
Committee was staffed by government officials.
Informal landholders had it worse. As discussed above, they were not 
entitled to compensation. Often they not even received the aforementioned 
assistance/sympathy money. It made no difference how long the land in 
question had been in possession or whether land taxes had been paid faith-
fully. In practice this proved discriminative against the socially or economi-
cally disadvantaged. Registered land is of higher value than unregistered 
land, but as discussed in Chapter 4, it is exceedingly difficult for these peo-
ple to register land (Fitzpatrick 1999:81-2).
In the mid-to-late New Order, meaningful resistance to the above prac-
tices originated through rights-oriented NGOs like the Legal Aid Institute 
(Lembaga Bantuan Hukum or LBH) (Lev 2000b) and other organisations that 
followed suit. In this way, a NGO network coalesced, sometimes gaining 
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press and the attention of the international human rights movement. When 
Soeharto endorsed the policy of openness in 1989, students joined the 
resistance against land clearance, mainly in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Ban-
dung, which then spread to other cities.
NGOs and students tended to oppose land clearance that affected peas-
ants, rather than the urban poor. 32 For one thing, massive infrastructure 
projects in rural areas sometimes displaced thousands or tens of thousands, 
while urban cases generally involved smaller projects, affecting fewer peo-
ple per cases. Ideologically, the activists were influenced by ‘structural’ and 
‘dependency’ theories that prioritized peasants and the working class as 
potentially strategic political forces. The former were engaged through 
labour conflicts, while the latter were romanticized as the receptacles of a 
pure or authentic Indonesia. In either of these conceptions, the urban poor 
fell through the cracks.
Legal activists typically would approach people and offer assistance. 
They thus became important mediators in translating land claims into legal 
and political action. Legal action came in the form of litigation against land 
clearance (and other actions that led to the loss of property) and the level of 
compensation. Commonly they would commence proceedings in court, 
which could be a General District Court or, from 1991, an Administrative 
District Court, depending on the object of the claim (Bedner 2001).
Litigation rarely prevailed. Judges were susceptible to bribes from the 
well-to-do and equally susceptible to executive interference. When rulings 
did favour the claimants, they were hardly implemented (Nusantara & 
Tanuredjo 1997; Butt 1999). The notorious reputation of the courts weak-
ened their authority in society. This, along with high moral standing, in 
part explained the rising popularity of the National Human Rights Com-
mission. However, as noted in Chapter 3, it could only observe and investi-
gate the implementation of human rights, give (non-binding) opinions, 
judgements and advice to government bodies on the implementation of 
human rights, so in the end not much changed for those concerned.
In their protest campaigns, activists still often pursued a legal discourse. 
They would not argue that property rights were being violated, but mostly 
referred to broader rule of law principles, including democracy and human 
rights. They often had no choice, since many of the land clearance cases 
involved land that had been occupied without permission from the title 
holder and as discussed above, the law offered little protection in such case. 
But there was a strategic reason too. Since land clearance practices so clearly 
exemplified New Order excesses, attention to undemocratic rule and 
human rights violations formed the ultimate mode to destabilise the regime.
Combined with NGO-coordinated litigation, student activists ‘lived in’ 
in communities, mobilized, and organized protests (Aspinall 2005:116-25). 
32 Thus, in urban areas LBH was mostly concerned with the status of petty traders, labour 
rights, wages, and conditions (Eldridge 1995:101).
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Such campaigns did not always immediately present firm demands. Only 
after dialogue with officials or politicians proved fruitless would activists 
organise demonstrations. Physical confrontations with security forces, the 
destruction of property, and the arrest and prosecution of demonstrators 
was common (Aspinall 1996:41-4).
When in mid-1994 the period of political openness came to an end, 
NGOs like LBH continued their activities in relation to land, but the stu-
dent movement generally shifted their focus from direct organisation of 
peasants and the urban poor to ‘elite’ issues like corruption at the national 
level and the presidency. This was not only the result of a generational suc-
cession, but in part also a clear strategic shift. Some had come to the conclu-
sion that mobilizing people in land disputes was useless. Only a few 
groups, especially in Central and East Java, continued to be involved in 
resistance against land clearance (Aspinall 2005:127-9).
NGOs and students had an influence on the course of land disputes, 
but rarely enough to prevent land clearance. Under the repressive New 
Order, it was typically satisfying for legal aid and student activists if the 
political intent of their struggle was understood by the powers-that-be.
6.3 Practice of land clearance by the state in Post-New Order 
Bandung
As discussed in Chapter 3, land law reform has been limited in post-1998 
Indonesia. Like most land related legislation, the 1993 Presidential Decision 
and other land clearance related legislation initially remained in force. This 
raises the question whether the general reforms and the RALs have 
changed practices of land clearance by the state.
For one thing, the risk for kampong dwellers in Bandung to have their 
land cleared by the state as a single enforcement measure is still relatively 
small. The municipal government has stepped up its effort to enforce the 
municipal building regulation. So in 2003 its target was to impose enforce-
ment measures with regard to 1,000 buildings, for instance because the 
buildings are built on land without the permission from the title holder or 
built without a building permit.33 Notably, these landholders receive no 
compensation at all. However, this effort is still just a drop in the ocean: 
as dicussed in Chapter 4, according to the estimation of an official of the 
Municipal Building Service, in the whole of Bandung 35-40 per cent of all 
buildings have been constructed without a building permit and according 
to our own survey, in kampongs this percentage amounts to 95 per cent.34
33 ‘Disbang Tertibkan 1.000 Rumah’, Pikiran Rakyat, 17 november 2003.
34 Personal communication of an official of the Municipal Building Service, 17 January 
2005.
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While the risk for kampong dwellers to have their land cleared by the 
state as an enforcement measure remains limited, this risk has increased in 
the framework of land clearance for development in the public interest. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the municipal government wishes to restructure 
kampongs it qualifies as ‘slum areas’. It has also selected the eastern out-
skirts of the city in Sub-District Gede Bage as an alternative city-centre. 
This is all part of a broader policy, inspired by regional autonomy, to pro-
mote economic growth and generate tax revenues. Increasing cooperation 
with Jakarta, which includes enhanced transportation systems, might 
attract more investors. To achieve this, the municipal government has initi-
ated several infrastructure projects (Pemerintah Kota Bandung 2004a:2-39).
In this context, Bandung's municipal government has regularly applied 
the procedure for voluntary land clearance for development in the public 
interest as set out in Presidential Decision No. 55/1993. From 1998 to 2002 
alone, it initiated at least twenty of such procedures, totalling some 
1,630,000 m2 or 163 hectares of land.35
A major infrastructure project in the first years of the Post-New Order 
was the construction of the 2.147 kilometre Pasupati flyover, with a 300 
meter cable stayed bridge, between the eastern and western part of the 
city.36 The road and fly-over would enable urban traffic to flow easily from 
East to West Bandung. Today, these extensions feed into the new Cipula-
rang tollway that connects Bandung to Jakarta. Funding for the project was 
provided by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development in the form 
of a US$ 33 million loan and Rp 142.9 billion (about US$ 14 million) support 
from the national budget.37
The central government coordinated the construction of the Pasupati 
flyover with assistance of its provincial counterpart. The main task of the 
municipal government was to monitor and facilitate the project – in other 
words, to clear the needed land. For this purpose it formed a Technical 
Team, consisting of about twenty officials.38 A subsequent Land Clearance 
Committee comprised nearly the same officials.39
The plan to construct the Pasupati flyover was already coined in 1931 
by the Dutch town planner Karsten in his Autostrada programme. The plan 
was included in Bandung’s subsequent 1971, 1985, and 1996 spatial plans. 
35 This estimation is based on the Decisions of the Mayor of Bandung available at the 
Municipal Legal Bureau. This actual figure is possibly higher.
36 The flyover is called Pasupati because it connects the streets called Jalan Pasteur and 
Jalan Surapati.
37 Internal documents of Bandung Municipality and the Ministry of Housing and Region-
al Infrastructure, Directorate General on Urban and Rural Management, Directorate 
Metropolitan Cities, on file with the author.
38 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 631/SK.062-Bag.Huk/1996.
39 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 631/SK.121-Bag.Huk/1996.
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Bandung’s Mayor could thus give permission to clear land for the project. 
This permission was given in January 1996.40
Land that was to be cleared for the flyover mostly involved land in the 
kampongs in City Quarter Taman Sari, of which the history and contempo-
rary characteristics were discussed in Chapter 2. It initially involved an 
area of about 23,500 m2, a little less than half of what would ultimately be 
needed for the project. The area held 519 families, 114 sidewalk shops 
(warung), and a market.41 Some Rp 32 billion (about $ 3 million) was allo-
cated from the provincial and city budgets, funding that was however not 
readily available.42
As discussed in Chapter 2, like most kampongs in Bandung, the affect-
ed kampongs in Taman Sari had a predominantly informal status in terms 
of land tenure and land use. Formal, semi-formal, and informal tenure 
were represented. Some private land was informally leased to third parties. 
There was public land too, which comprised state land controlled by the 
municipal government (hereafter municipal land). Some residents held 
permits and paid retributions to use this land. Indifferent of tenure status, 
most had paid the Land and Building Tax for decades, held identity cards 
(Kartu Tandu Penduduk or KTP), family cards (Kartu Keluarga or KK) and 
were formal receivers of water and electricity. The kampongs were com-
posed of recognised Neighbourhoods and Blocks. Anticipating on the Pas-
upati project, the government prevented many of the non-formal landhold-
ers from registering their land.
Early 1996, the Land Clearance Committee started negotiations with 
landholders. Apparently the municipal government did not expect any 
problems. In December 1996, one official confidently stated that the land 
clearance process was nearly completed.43 Little did he know that soon 
Soeharto would fall and that the process would take another seven and half 
years.
The Land Clearance Committee initially offered Rp. 225,000-325,000 
per m2 to landholders with a formal land right and 90 per cent of this figure 
to those with a semi-formal land right.44 This was well below market value, 
which was estimated to be Rp 1.1-1.7 million per m2. Not surprisingly, the 
majority of landholders were reluctant to accept the offer. However, it is 
said that some felt intimidated and were even forced by officials to sign 
papers.45
40 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 593/SK.071-Bag.Huk/1996.
41 Internal documents, Bandung's municipal government, on file with the author.
42 ‘Proyek “Paspati” akan Dimulai’, Pikiran Rakyat, 10 October 1998.
43 ‘Masalah Pembebasan Lahan Kini Hampir Tuntas, Tender Jalan Layang, April 1997’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 23 December 1996.
44 No formal documentation could be found on the first offer of the Land Clearance Com-
mittee, but several residents mentioned this amount.
45 ‘Dewan Duga Ada Pemyimpangan, Pimpro “Pasti” Dinilai Tidak Transparan’, Pikiran 
Rakyat, 15 February 2000.
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In August 1997, the municipal government devised a resettlement plan 
for 300 families residing on municipal land, both permit holders and infor-
mal landholders. They would be moved to a ‘more representative location’ 
at the city’s outskirts at Cisaranten Kulon, near the soon-to-be city-centre, 
Gede Bage.46 There they could build a house on municipal land, for which 
they would have to pay land use retribution to the municipal govern-
ment.47 To permit holders, compensation for their buildings, not the land, 
would be offered.48 The amount of compensation was deemed non-negoti-
able. Meanwhile, informal landholders were to receive no assistance/sym-
pathy money at all.
Needless to say, these offers were met with little enthusiasm. Residents 
did not want to move, let alone to Cisaranten, which they considered too 
far away from their livelihoods.
Following Soeharto’s resignation, the municipal government contin-
ued the land clearance process and the New Order rhetoric. With respect to 
the Pasupati project, Mayor Wahyu Hamijaya reportedly said: “Every 
development project requires sacrifices, and victims need to be conscious 
and patient. This is so each project can be realised without putting aside the 
public interest.”49 In early 1999, the municipal government still thought the 
land clearance process would be completed by 2000, although at that time 
only 15 per cent had been cleared.50
Consistent with the general Reformasi movement, resistance against 
land clearance soon took serious form though; one senior municipal offi-
cial called it people “going over the top” (“kebablasan”).51 Residents now 
had the courage to protest land clearance. In late 1998, residents, an NGO 
called Perisai, and members of the Forum of Student Activists of the 
nearby Bandung Islamic University (Forum Aktivis Mahasiswa Universitas 
Islam Bandung or FAMU) formed the Communication Forum for those 
Concerned with the Victims of Pasupati (Forum Komunikasi Peduli Korban 
46 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 593/SK.443-Bag.Huk/1997.
47 To acquire the land for relocation, a plot as large as 4.3 Ha, the municipal government 
initiated a land clearance procedure for development in the pubic interest in July 1999 
(See Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 593/SK.319/Bag.Huk/99). The land was 
owned by a company, with which the municipal government reached agreement over 
sale of the land within a month. It paid a compensation of Rp 125,000 m2 for the land 
(See Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 376/1999).
48 Since their permits had expired and could not be renewed, they would not receive any 
compensation for the land. It must have been for this reason that the Committee for the 
Release of Rights on Land and/or Buildings Owned/Controlled by Bandung Munici-
pality (Panitia Pelepasan Hak atas Tanah dan/atau Bangunan Milik/Dikuasai Pemerintah Kota 
Bandung) was not involved in the procedure.
49 ‘Untuk Mengatasi Kemacaten di Kodya Bandung, Pembangunan “Paspati” Dilaksana-
kan 1998/1999’, Pikiran Rakyat, 14 August 1998.
50 ‘Rp 142,9 Miliar untuk Paspati’, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 April 1999.
51 Personal communication, Bandung, 20 October 2004.
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Pa -supati or FKPKP).52 With the support of FKPKP, the residents of Taman 
Sari insisted that the project be annulled. After this proved unfeasible, they 
turned their attention to increased compensation, which was conceived 
as ganti untung, literally meaning fortunate compensation, as opposed 
to ganti rugi, the common term for compensation (damages), which with 
the experience of New Order practices was equated with improper com-
pensation.
Starting in May 1999 FKPKP, usually joined by a handful of students 
from the Bandung Islamic University as well as tens and sometimes even 
hundreds of residents from Taman Sari, organized a series of demonstra-
tions in front of the city hall and West Java's provincial government build-
ing. In Jakarta, they held rallies at the Kuwait Embassy, People's Repre-
sentative Council, the Department of Public Works, and the popular protest 
destination Hotel Indonesia Square (Bundaran HI). At some of these occa-
sions people were arrested.53 The demonstrations were covered by the 
regional and the national press, including television stations.
The municipal government initially responded to the demonstrations 
with amazement. Mayor Aa Tarmana wondered: “when its boundaries 
were established, none of the residents who were hit by the project protest-
ed. Even the neighbourhood leadership agreed. So why act like this now? 
The Pasupati project is not in the interest of the municipal government, but 
for the public interest in an effort to solve the problem of traffic jams.” In 
response, a member of FKPKP conveyed what most of his fellow protesters 
probably felt: “this project is a New Order product. At that time people 
would not dare to determine whether things said to be true were really 
true. Times have changed.”54
As the municipal government did nothing to accommodate the 
demands of the people, demonstrations continued. In June 2000 they 
reached a climax, when a group of hundred protesters occupied the May-
or’s office. Their demands were clear: annul the project. The occupation 
lasted twelve days, with members of the police and fire brigade finally 
expelling the protesters. They remained on the grounds of the city hall, 
52 Some of the students lived in Taman Sari. It is said that they had been approached by 
the residents just after Soeharto’s fall. Most students were afraid to support the people 
(personal communication of a former UNISBA student, Bandung, 25 December 2004). 
The NGO was rather obscure. It was formed by the students and someone who claimed 
to be a lawyer. Except for the residents, nobody seemed to know the NGO. The lawyer 
was a controversial person in the kampong community. See also footnote 84.
53 ‘Soal “Paspati”, Dengarkan Suara Rakyat’, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 May 1999; ‘FKPKP “Du -
duki” Gedung Sate’, Pikiran Rakyat, 3 June 1999; ‘Warga Protes, Duduki Kantor Guber-
nur’, Kompas, 3 June 1999.
54 ‘Walikota Aa Tarmana: ”Paspati Bukan untuk Kepentingan Pemda!”‘ Pikiran Rakyat, 19 
May 1999.
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however, and days later reoccupied the Mayor’s office. This time for ten 
days, after which they left the premises voluntarily.55
The demonstrations provoked a reaction from the Municipal Council, 
albeit not by giving explicit support to the demonstrators. Some legislators 
distrusted the protestors‘ intentions, believing that certain parties had insti-
gated the occupations to stir unrest. Some members of the Municipal Coun-
cil argued that many of the protestors were not even affected by the 
project.56 One councillor suggested that some 70 per cent of those affected 
by the project did not oppose the construction.57 Instead, the Municipal 
Council focused on the way in which the municipal government was han-
dling the case. It wanted the project postponed so that the rationale behind 
its construction could be better ‘socialised’.58 Members of the Municipal 
Council felt that the land clearance process was conducted in an opaque 
and corrupt manner. It was reported that landholders received less com-
pensation than indicated in official documentation.59 The councillors also 
emphasised that they did not have the right to stop the project; this was the 
Mayor’s authority.60 However, as the demonstrations went on, the Council 
concluded that it would be hard to continue with the project, which should 
therefore be reconsidered.61
The Municipal Council’s stance drew criticism from various sides. For 
instance, AMS, which as discussed in Chapter 5 forms one of Bandung’s 
most powerful hoodlum groups, denounced the Municipal Council for 
its apparent inability to voice the people’s aspirations, thereby implicitly 
throwing their support behind the Mayor.62 Later the organisation criti-
cised the Municipal Council for requesting the Mayor to postpone the 
project, which it qualified as a blunder and not in accordance with the 
law.63 In fact, the AMS threatened to storm the Mayor’s office to expel 
55 ‘Pendudukan Balaikota Berakhir, Demo Pindah’, Pikiran Rakyat, 18 June 2000; ‘Warga 
Kembali Menduduki Balaikota’, Pikiran Rakyat, 20 June 2000; ‘Pengunjuk Rasa Heng-
kang dari Balaikota’, Pikiran Rakyat, 1 July 2000.
56 ‘Demo Proyek “Pasti” Tidak Murni?’, Pikiran Rakyat, 9 June 2000; ‘Wali Kota Nyaris 
Bentrok dengan Warga’, Kompas, 29 June 2000.
57 ‘Dewan Ingin “Pasti” Diteruskan, Penangguhan Proyek tersebut Cacat Hukum’, Pikiran 
Rakyat, 14 June 2000.
58 ‘Proyek “Paspati” Ditunda’, Pikiran Rakyat, 1 July 1999.
59 ‘Dewan Duga Ada Pemyimpangan, Pimpro “Pasti” Dinilai Tidak Transparan’, Pikiran 
Rakyat, 15 February 2000.
60 ‘Dipertanyakan, Penggunaan Dana Rp 27,9 Miliar, Dewan Desak Pemda Kota Hentikan 
Proyek Pasupati’, Pikiran Rakyat, 1 February 2000.
61 ‘Proyek Paspati Makin Kabur, Aa Tarmana: Jika Masyarakat Menolak. Pemda Tidak 
akan Memaksa’, Pikiran Rakyat, 9 February 2000.
62 ‘Warga “Menduduki” Balaikota, Memuntut Proyek Pasteur-Surapati Dibatalkan’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 7 June 2000.
63 ‘Warga Duduki Balaikota, Proyek Jalan Layang di Bandung Ditangguhkan’, Kompas, 12 
June 2000; ‘“Pasti” Akhirnya Ditangguhkan, Pembebasan Tanah dan Ganti Rugi Dihen-
tikan’, Pikiran Rakyat, 12 June 2000.
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the demonstrators.64 It was widely believed that the municipal government 
offered this group money to do so. The Regional Secretary (and future 
Mayor) Dada Rosada admitted that he was under pressure (from organisa-
tions he refused to specify) to give Rp 100 million to end the occupation. He 
claimed to have rejected the ‘request’.65
Despite the support of hoodlum groups, the municipal government 
gradually acquiesced to FKPKP’s demands. It agreed that there would be 
no forced relocation and that relocation should lead to better socio-eco-
nomic conditions for those afflicted.66 A week following the occupation, 
Mayor Aa Tarmana officially postponed the project indefinitely.67
FKPKP’s success was short lived, however. The Municipal Council 
wanted the project to go forward; it said its main concern was to guard 
against the deterioration of the residents’ socio-economic position.68 The 
Municipal Council successfully lobbied Tarmana to reverse his decision.69 
They devised a new strategy to involve NGOs and affected residents.70 The 
Municipal Council also established a Special Committee for the Pasupati 
Project, which in practice would play an insignificant role though.71 Mean-
while the municipal government continued to demolish houses in Taman 
Sari.72
Conditions were still not favourable to the municipal government. The 
demolition of houses in Taman Sari provoked more demonstrations.73 At 
one of these occasions five students were arrested for provocation.74 Mean-
while, the municipal government was put under pressure by the Kuwait 
fund, which required construction activities to be initiated before Decem-
64 ‘Stop Pendudukan Balaikota, Warga: Kami Tetap Bertahan, Hingga “Pasti” Dibatalkan’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 17 June 2000.
65 ‘Warga Kembali Menduduki Balaikota’, Pikiran Rakyat, 20 June 2000.
66 ‘Proyek Paspati Makin Kabur, Aa Tarmana: Jika Masyarakat Menolak. Pemda Tidak 
akan Memaksa’, Pikiran Rakyat, 9 February 2000.
67 Letter of the Municipal Council of Bandung No. 600/191/DPRD of 8 June 2000; Instruc-
tion of the Mayor of Bandung No. 006/2000.
68 ‘Dewan Ingin “Pasti” Diteruskan, Penangguhan Proyek tersebut Cacat Hukum’, Pikiran 
Rakyat, 14 June 2000; ‘Proyek “Pasti” Tetap Berlanjut’, Pikiran Rakyat, 29 August 2000.
69 ‘Cabut Segera SI No. 006/2000, Instruksi Walikota Itu Menghalangi Proyek Pasti’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 8 November 2000.
70 ‘Perencanaannya Tak Sentuh Aspek Sosial, Ekonomi dan Budaya, Proyek “Pasti” akan 
Direvisi’, Pikiran Rakyat, 11 July 2000.
71 ‘Warga Memblokir Perempatan Jl. Aceh-Jl. Merdeka, Aksi Menentang “Pasti” Nyaris 
Sulut Bentrokan’, Pikiran Rakyat, 26 July 2000.
72 ‘Penentang “Pasti” Demo Bawa Senjata’, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 September 2000. See Letter 
of Bandung's Municipal Building Service No. 640/115-Disbang. In the letter residents 
who had received compensation were requested to demolish their house within two 
weeks, otherwise the Municipal Building Service would do so.
73 ‘Kecewa Jawaban Pansus, FKPKP Bakar Ban’, Pikiran Rakyat, 10 August 2000.
74 ‘Pembangunan Jalan Layang Bandung Terbengkalai’, Pikiran Rakyat, 4 October 2000.
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ber 2001, or the loan would be cancelled.75 As of early 2001, 144 of the 519 
families or less than 28 per cent of the people had accepted the govern-
ment’s ‘offer’. Most of them were formal landholders.76
In accordance with the new strategy it had devised with the Municipal 
Council, the municipal government in February 2001 formed a Manage-
ment Team, not unlike the Technical Team formed in 1996. The new team 
would not just monitor the project, but more actively assist the Land Clear-
ance Committee and ‘socialise’ the project, in particular the relocation 
plans.77 At the same, the Technical Team was renamed the Relocation Team 
– popularly known as Team 40 – and its tasks reformulated. Organisations 
involved in the Relocation Team included LPM-ITB, a research institute of 
the Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung or ITB), as 
well as three grassroots organisations that had been established shortly 
after New Order regime collapsed, M2PT, Fordamasta, and Ko-operasi Ser-
ba Usaha (KSU) Amanah.78 Their most important task was to assist in the 
‘socialisation’ of the project. Some members, however, feared cooptation 
and were wary supporting relocation. Others were motivated by the fee 
allegedly promised for each family persuaded to resettle to Cisaranten.79
The efforts of the Relocation Team – which included a field visit to 
Ci-saranten and communication sessions with politicians and officials – 
resulted in improved compensation, thereby in part satisfying the resi-
dents’ demands.80 Those residing on municipal land would not be forced 
to move to Cisaranten, but could opt for financial compensation. Informal 
landholders would also receive compensation. Those relocated to Cisarant-
en were offered a usage right (hak pakai) to a land plot of between 40-80 m2, 
75 This only became clear after an interview with the Kuwait Ambassador in October 
2001. See: ‘Aksi Pro-Kontra Warnai Pemancangan Tiang Pertama “Pasupati”, Pemkot 
Diminta Segera Bebaskan Semua Lahan’, Pikiran Rakyat, 31 October 2001.
76 Internal document, Bandung Municipal Building Service, on file with the author.
77 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 620/Kep.088-Bag.Huk/2001. The Technical 
Team’s role had already been reformulated on the basis of a Decision of the Mayor of 
Bandung in 2000 (Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 377/2000), which was 
annulled by the 2001 Decision.
78 LPM-ITB is short for Social Servitude Body of the Bandung Institute of Technology 
(Lembaga Penabdian kepada Masyarakat Institut Teknologi Bandung), M2PT for Discussion 
Assembly for the Development of City Quarter Taman Sari (Majelis Musyawarah Pem-
bangunan Kelurahan Taman Sari). This organisation is a merger of 17 Working Groups 
(Kelompok Kerja or Pokja) in City Quarter Taman Sari. Fordamasta means Public Forum 
of City Quarter Taman Sari (Forum Masyarakat Kelurahan Taman Sari). ‘Kooperasi Serba 
Usaha (KSU) Amanah’ means Business Cooperation Amanah. It was a government 
funded organisation. Some members of FKPKP suggested that the grassroots organisa-
tions had actually been established for the Pasupati project (personal communication, 
Bandung, 24 December 2004).
79 Personal communication of a Neighbourhood Head, Bandung, 18 September 2004.
80 Report of the visit prepared by the Relocation Team (‘Laporan Singkat Kunjungan War-
ga Masyarakat Tamansari yang Terkena Proyek Jalan Layang Pasupati ke Tempat 
Relokasi di Cisaranten Kulon (Warga RW 11-15), Jumat 27 April 2001’).
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which later could be turned into an ownership right. The compensation 
also included a soft loan with a maximum term of 20-years for a house in 
Cisaranten of a predefined size and some additional subsidies and bene-
fits.81
The municipal government’s carrot approach was accompanied by 
measures with the stick, as the police stepped up pressure on demonstra-
tors. After a demonstration in March 2001, three members of FKPKP were 
obligated to report to the police twice a week.82 Residents who still refused 
compensation said that intimidation, death threats, and physical confronta-
tions by hoodlums were commonplace.83
Soon, the carrot and the stick took their desired effect. FKPKP demon-
strations began to dwindle, especially after one prominent informal leader 
of the resistance accepted the municipal government’s offer.84 Others fol-
lowed suit.
By late 2002, about fifty families – mostly informal landholders – still 
held out. The municiapl government began to realise the project would not 
meet a newly planned deadline, which was completion before the Second 
Asia-Africa Conference would be held. The Municipal Council thereupon 
promised to allocate more funds for land clearance, but also called upon 
the municipal government to better coordinate the project.85
81 The offer was later fixed in Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 593/Kep.119-
Huk/2002. The lawyer of the NGO Perisai claimed that he had done the negotiations 
on behalf of the residents that led to this Decision (personal communication, Bandung, 
6 October 2004). The size of the houses was 2 x 18 m2, 2 x 24 m2, or 2 x 36 m2. In housing 
terms, houses of this size are called ‘Small Houses’ (Rumah Sederhana or RS, Type 70 and 
45), which are 70-22 m2, or ‘Very Small Houses’ (Rumah Sangat Sederhana or RSS, Type 
36), which are 21m2 or less.
82 ‘Buntut Demo Penolakan Proyek “Pasti”, Aktivis Dikenai Wajib Lapor’, Pikiran Rakyat, 
24 March 2001. According to the Police, the reason for this measure was that the protest-
ers had violated Art. 160 of the Criminal Code, which forbids inciting public expres-
sions.
83 Personal communication, Bandung, 19 September and 16 November 2004.
84 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 475/Kep.1228-Huk/2001. See also Decision of 
the Mayor of Bandung No. 475/Kep.127-Huk/2002, No. 648/Kep.1249-Huk/2001 No. 
593.82/Kep.1271-Huk/2001, No. 593.82/Kep.710-Huk/2002, No. 475/Kep.877-
Huk/2002, No. 475/Kep.928-Huk/2002, No. 475/Kep.1338-Huk/2002, No. 477/
Kep.1345-Huk/2002. It must be noted that financial compensation was very low. One 
resident received as little as Rp. 1,095,000 for his house. In an interview the informal 
leader said that he distrusted the outsiders supporting the protest, including a ‘fake-
lawyer’. He insinuated that they were actually paid by the municipal government (per-
sonal communication, Bandung, 29 September 2004). Others claimed that it was the 
informal leader who got a fee from the municipal government for each resident he 
would convince to move to Cisaranten (personal communication of NGO members, 
Bandung, 24 December 2004).
85 ‘Jadwal Proyek Pasupati Kemungkinan Besar Molor, Pembebasan Tanah Lamban’, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 10 April 2002; ‘Proyek Pasupati agar Tepat Waktu, Pelaksana dan Pem-
kot Jangan Saling Jatuhkan’, Pikiran Rakyat, 15 May 2002.
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The municipal government improved its offer by offering bigger plots 
and (greater) financial compensation – even to informal landholders, who 
were legally not entitled to any compensation.86 After this offer, the Head 
of the Regional Planning Agency threatened to evict without any compen-
sation if those staying on continued to object.87 Meanwhile, construction of 
the fly-over continued apace, although the completion date was pushed to 
2004 and additional funding had to be asked from the central government 
due to the unforeseen costs.
In the meantime residents who had already moved to City Quarter 
Ci saranten began to voice their dissatisfaction with their new settlement. 
They felt betrayed by the municipal government, since contrary to its 
promises it had still not issued formal titles for their houses and had failed 
to provide facilities. The residents therefore protested at various state insti-
tutions, including the municipal government and the Provincial Assembly 
of West-Java.88 Four months later the Municipal Council agreed that the 
land would be given to them. The residents would still have to take out a 
loan for their houses.89
In late 2003, the Land Clearance Committee reached agreement with 
thirty-eight holdouts in Taman Sari. Holders of private land, whether they 
had formal rights or not, received Rp. 672,500 m2 for their land. And every-
one, whether residing on private or public land, holding a formal, semi-
formal, or informal land right, received Rp. 988,000 m2 for their respective 
buildings. This left about a dozen residents who refused to move. In Febru-
ary 2004, the municipal government announced that it was preparing an 
appeal to the provincial Governor. At the same time it once more offered 
the same amount of compensation that other residents had received.90 The 
threat of the appeal did not have much effect. In April 2004 the project 
again had to be delayed because some of the needed land had still not been 
acquired. It took a few extra months of negotiations to reach agreement 
with these final residents over compensation.91
In June 2005, two months after the (postponed) Asia-Africa conference, 
the Pasupati fly-over finally came into operation. At the opening ceremony 
the following month, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stated that 
Indonesia needed more toll roads to stimulate economic growth. In so 
doing, he stressed that the government would not sacrifice the people’s 
economy for the interests of the rich, and, as importantly, that the govern-
ment would not behave arbitrarily in land clearance procedures.92
86 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 593/Kep.1696-Huk/2002.
87 ‘Pemkot Akan Ambil Langkah Tegas?’, Pikiran Rakyat, 11 December 2003.
88 ‘Warga “Pasupati” ke DPRD Jabar’, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 January 2004.
89 ‘Tanah untuk Warga yang Terkena Proyek Pasupati’, Kompas, 9 June 2004.
90 ‘Pemkot Siapkan Banding ke Gubernur Jawa Barat’, Pikiran Rakyat, 7 February 2004.
91 ‘Pembangunan Pasupati Terhambat Pembebasan Lahan’, Kompas, 8 April 2004.
92 ‘Presiden Akui Sarana Jalan Tol Kurang, Lalu Lintas Ekspor-Impor Terhambat’, Kompas, 
13 July 2005.‘Presiden 36 Bukan untuk Semena-mena’, Kompas, 13 July 2005.
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6.4 Land clearance by the state, tenure security, and the rule  
of law
Post-New Order land clearance practices in Bandung show that the legal 
and de facto tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers remain lim-
ited. They still risk involuntary removal, without due process of law and 
payment of proper compensation. At the same time, it is higher than dur-
ing the New Order years, which suggests that post-New Order reforms 
have benefited kampong dwellers who are confronted with the state wish-
ing to clear land. Notably, for those who hold out, the level of compensa-
tion is practically indifferent of tenure status.
The above situation can again be explained by Indonesia’s rule of law 
at the local level still being weak. This weakness is first of all the result of 
land clearance related legislation itself. As was discussed above, it contains 
few safeguards to protect landholders.
In practice, Bandung’s municipal government refused to abide by the 
law. The plan to construct the Pasupati flyover was included in Bandung’s 
1996 General Spatial Plan and Detailed Plan. The Mayor was thus allowed 
to give permission to clear land for the project. The justifications for land 
clearance, still planned in the New Order, were also legally sound.93 The 
construction of a fly-over is an activity for which the procedure for land 
clearance for development in the public interest can be applied. However, 
when the municipal government initiated land clearance in 1996, negotia-
tions took the form of compulsory land clearance. Very few residents were 
willing to move, whatever they were offered. They had been very clear 
about this from the beginning. The municipal government nonetheless con-
tinued to pressure residents to give up their land. The initial compensation 
offered by the municipal government was not in accordance with legal 
standards. Compensation was a fraction of the market value of the land 
and far below its social or economic value. As noted above, most of the 
residents worked in the informal sector and were therefore dependent on 
living close to the city centre for their livelihood; they could not afford an 
increase in travel costs. Informal landholders were offered nothing.
After Soeharto’s fall, the municipal government had difficulty doing 
away with their New Order rhetoric and mindset. Prioritising public inter-
est over individual rights, it still offered low compensation. After it proved 
unfeasible to clear the land, the municipal government reluctantly assigned 
community development NGOs to sell the project through ‘socialisation’, 
showing they refused to really seek genuine consultation with those affect-
ed.
93 A related matter that is worth to discuss here is whether the municipal government has 
explored feasible alternatives for the development project, also in terms of its location. 
Unfortunately I could not find any information regarding this matter.
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The Pasupati case also shows that the end of the New Order has 
brought with it freedoms for kampong dwellers to resist land clearance. 
The call for ganti untung is emblematic of this change. It denotes the possi-
bility of changing power relations between state and society in Bandung. 
The general political openness of the reform period helped to spark resi-
dents organizing and subsequent demonstrations.
It is notable that the residents organised the protests with little support 
from traditional intermediaries like (rights-oriented) NGOs and the stu-
dent movement. Local NGOs played a minor role at best, while established 
NGOs such as the Legal Aid Institute were never involved. Many of these 
NGOs remain focused on agrarian or environmental issues. The Bandung-
based Consortium for Agrarian Renewal, discussed in Chapter 3, and the 
NGOs organised in the ‘Bandung Bermartabat’ People’s Coalition, dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, are illustrative. One of the few NGOs supporting 
urban poor in land disputes is the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC). Howev-
er, it only operates in Jakarta and surrounding suburbs (Edwin 2003:223-7).
Several reasons explain the limited involvement of NGOs in land dis-
putes affecting the urban poor. To name a few, as noted above, ‘structural’ 
and ‘dependency’ theories that influenced NGOs and the student move-
ment generally considered not the urban poor but peasants and the work-
ing class as potentially strategic political forces. Although no longer direct-
ed influenced by the previously mentioned theories, the traditional focus of 
NGOs on these groups never really changed. Past experiences of direct 
involvement in urban land disputes have shown how difficult it can be to 
organise the urban poor. For one thing, peasants and indigenous communi-
ties typically enjoy stronger communal ties than urban communities and 
stronger ties to the land. In addition, it seems easier to be funded by inter-
national NGOs if one champions indigenous rights than the urban poor.
The role of students was constrained too. Some supported the resi-
dents, but this did not take the form of mass support. While under the New 
Order students at ITB had played a major role in resistance, very few got 
involved in the Pasupati case, although the university is a stone’s throw 
from Taman Sari. Kampong dwellers were backed by a dozen of students 
from UNISBA. Indeed, few students in Indonesia take interest in land dis-
putes or social miscalls in general nowadays. Following Soeharto’s fall, the 
student movement soon thereafter withered away; it lost its unity over a 
single, identifiable enemy in the form of Soeharto. Some remnants remain, 
but it focuses on more populist issues (Prasetyo, et al. 2004).
Another factor for students and NGOs playing a minor role was that in 
the early post-Soeharto state the hopes of the residents were pinned on pol-
iticians. They have assumed the roles of communicators and aggregator of 
interests that NGOs had fulfilled under the New Order (Hadiwinata 
2003:114-5). Illustratively, the residents sought help from legislators at the 
city, provincial, and even national levels.
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This development of the urban poor seeking support from politicians 
in land disputes appears a positive development, exemplifying Indonesia’s 
democratisation process. However, in the Pasupati case politicians at most 
paid lip service to the residents’ cause. ‘Protecting the little people’ (rakyat 
kecil) is an easy and clever way to gain electoral support, especially from 
the urban poor. Other interests may have been at work too; the problem of 
KKN in the regional councils discussed in Chapter 5 is indicative.
There are also new challenges for those who dare to protest land clear-
ance. The military is no longer directly involved in the land clearance pro-
cess, but kampong dwellers fell victim of intimidation practices committed 
by some of the hoodlum organisations discussed in Chapter 5. Since these 
groups operate outside the law, it is harder to hold them accountable than 
regular government entities. That in some cases the municipal government 
funds some of these groups’ activities, and that they have close connections 
with the police certainly exacerbates the situation. While the media widely 
covered the Pasupati case, residents felt that the reporting favoured the 
municipal government. Some reports, for instance, contained misleading 
or false information. Again, a combination of positive incentives and fear 
may have influenced their viewpoints.
The residents of Taman Sari were unaware of the full extent of their 
rights. In the discourse between them and the politicians, there was scarce 
reference to human rights. And when there was, this terminology was used 
superficially, without reference to the Constitution or concrete laws, and 
(therefore) rather took form of a call for political favouritism. Likewise, 
members of the Municipal Council stated that the urban poor should 
receive money out of a sense of humanity (manusiawi), not because they 
have a right to compensation.
The residents did not take their case to the courts.94 Our survey indi-
cates that they associate the courts with high costs, partly due to corrup-
tion. The urban poor do file complaints with the National Human Rights 
Commission, but few are from Bandung.95 It must be noted that the Com-
mission’s reputation has worsened since 1998. People are also aware that it 
does not have much power. Nonetheless, many urban poor continue to file 
complaints with the Commission, perhaps also because they hardly have 
access to regular dispute mechanisms. The role of the National Ombuds-
man Commission (now called the Ombudsman) in land clearance cases is 
negligible.
94 This is not to say that Administrative Courts play no role in land disputes. In fact, the 
majority of cases brought to Bandung's Administrative District Court in the Post-New 
Order are land cases, namely 50 per cent in 1998, 51 per cent in 1999, 61 per cent in 2000, 
50 per cent in 2001, 53 per cent in 2002, and 59 per cent in 2003. In absolute terms, the 
number of land cases has more than doubled in this period (34 in 1998 versus 73 in 2003). 
However, these cases generally involve land registration rather than land clearance dis-
putes. (Data drawn from the archive of Bandung's Administrative District Court) 
95 Internal documents of the National Human Rights Commission.
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NGO involvement does not guarantee litigation either. Their advocacy 
strategies are typically non-litigation methods. As a commentator of UPC 
noted: “Based on the organisation’s own experiences […] litigation is not a 
reliable method of problem solving. The legal system and bureaucracy are 
explicitly biased in favour of interests of the state and the capitalists. Non-
litigation advocacy is therefore preferable, through negotiations with deci-
sion makers, opinion-leading campaigns in the mass media and demon-
strations and rallies” (Edwin 2003:227).
Despite these countervailing forces, the resistance garnered by the 
kampong dwellers of Taman Sari was relatively successful. The Pasupati 
project was nearly cancelled and negotiating eventually led to improved 
compensation. It was said that the value of the land even increased as a 
result of the land clearance process, because there was more demand for 
the land from people who felt that they could profit from future land clear-
ance.96 Ultimately, compensation still remained below the social and eco-
nomic value of the land and buildings. Meanwhile, as noted above, resi-
dents in Cisaranten have had a tough time. Travel costs to the city-centre 
are high, jobs – even informal one – on the outskirts of Bandung are scarce, 
and many remain unemployed.97 If they could, most would opt to return to 
Taman Sari.98
A final question that rises is whether Pasupati forms a representative 
case for the practice of land clearance by the state in the Post-New Order 
for (urban) Indonesia. Again it is hard to generalise. Kompas daily stated 
that as a result of the delays in the land clearance process the construction 
of the Pasupati fly-over took more time than any fly-over that was built in 
that period, such as in cities like Medan, Surabaya, and Makassar.99 This 
may be explained by the governments of these Municipalities being more 
repressive than Bandung’s municipal government. In 2006, Human Rights 
Watch reported about excessive use of force by the Jakarta administration 
to clear out urban slums (Human Rights Watch 2006). It thus appears that 
involuntary removal without due process of law and proper compensation 
is still common.
Regional differences in the practice of land clearance, it seems, can to a 
large extent be explained by its current political character. It depends on the 
local power balance whether the urban poor succeed in preventing land 
clearance or at least in negotiating proper compensation. This also means 
that it would be wrong to even conclude that the little improvement, since 
the end of the New Order, of the tenure security of Bandung’s urban poor is 
structural. The practice of land clearance can change easily. An interviewed 
96 Personal communication of a RT Head, Bandung, 12 September 2004.
97 Personal communication of an NGO member, Bandung, 9 August 2004; personal com-
munication of a relocated resident, Bandung, 29 September 2004.
98 Personal communication of a Neighbourhood Head, Bandung, 18 September 2004.
99 ‘Membangun Pasupati, Membangun Kepercayaan…’, Kompas, 19 December 2002.
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senior official of Bandung’s municipal government stated that it had to be 
more careful in land clearance procedures because an increasing number of 
guardian institutions had been established, like Administrative Courts, the 
National Human Rights Commission, and the National Ombudsman Com-
mission. Due to political circumstances, such caution was particularly 
required in the first years of the Post-New Order. However, he also sug-
gested that a case like Pasupati would not reoccur, for he expected that the 
municipal government had learned its lesson and would take a firmer 
stance in future cases.100
6.5 Recent reforms related to land clearance by the state
The increasing difficulties to clear land in at least some parts of Post-New 
Order Indonesia, as the Pasupati case illustrated, made the central govern-
ment decide to take action. At a real estate summit in January 2005, Real 
Estate Indonesia (REI), a developers’ interest group, expressed its concern 
about the many stalled infrastructure projects due to land clearance related 
problems.101 It therefore urged the government to revise existing legislation 
pertaining to land clearance. On 3 May 2005 President Yudhoyono respond-
ed by passing a new regulation on land clearance for development in the 
public interest, Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005, replacing Presidential 
Decision No. 55/1993, which was considered no longer relevant for con-
temporary Indonesia.102
Though enacted in the Post-New Order, in some respects the new pres-
idential regulation is more ‘draconian’ than its New Order predecessor. It 
redefines the concept of public interest to mean not an interest of ‘the peo-
ple’ (masyarakat) but of ‘the larger part of the people’ (sebagian besar lapisan 
masyarakat).103 This narrowing of scope is accompanied by a broadening of 
the criteria of development activities for which land can be cleared in the 
public interest. Exemplary of this change is the inclusion of toll roads. Yet 
the list of activities is truly exhaustive now.104 A request to allocate land for 
development activities in the public interest can now directly be filed to the 
District-Head/ Mayor, who only agrees if the development activities are in 
accordance with the General Spatial Plan or another available plan. Next, 
100 Personal communication, Bandung, 20 October 2004.
101 Good examples of current projects in which land clearance led to high costs and long 
delays are the construction of the Eastern Flooding Canal (BKT) in DKI Jakarta and the 
Jatigede dam in Sumedang District.
102 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005 on Land Clearance for Development in the Public 
Interest (Perpres No. 36/2005 tentang Pengadaan Tanah bagi Pelaksanaan Pembangunan 
untuk Kepentingan Umum).
103 Art. 1(5) Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
104 Art. 5 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
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the government institution wishing to clear the land must try to achieve 
consensus with title holders (or the representatives appointed by them) 
through musyawarah. In this process, the Land Clearance Committee still 
plays a central role.105 For land clearance involving plots of less than one 
hectare, the government institution wishing to clear the land can still enter 
direct negotiations with title holders.106
The compensation offered is based on an estimation of the value of 
land, which is now done by an independent Land Value Estimation Body 
(Lembaga Penilai Harga Tanah) or by a Land Value Estimation Team (Tim 
Penilai Harga Tanah) on the basis of the Sales Value as a Tax Object or the 
actual value with the Sales Value as a Tax Object taken into account, and of 
buildings and crops, which is done by officials of the regional govern-
ment.107 Compensation should offer a chance to improve socio-economic 
conditions and have a better life.108 It can not only come in the form of 
financial compensation, but also alternative land and/or accommoda-
tion.109
If from a spatial planning perspective, the development activities can-
not be realised elsewhere, the negotiation process is limited to ninety days, 
after which the Land Clearance Committee decides the amount and type of 
compensation and stores this compensation at the General District Court of 
the District/Municipality where the land is located.110 If title holders 
oppose the decision of the Land Clearance Committee, an appeal can be 
filed to the District-Head/Mayor (or the Governor or Minister of Home 
Affairs, as the case will be), who will then take a new decision. If title hold-
ers still disagree and the development activities cannot be realised else-
where, the procedure for compulsory land clearance as elaborated in Law 
No. 21/1961 is to be followed. To informal landholders, Law No. 51/1960 
remains applicable.
President Yudhoyono’s regulation drew a firestorm of criticism. NGOs, 
student, farmer, and urban poor groups, political parties, the People’s Rep-
resentative Council, the National Human Rights Commission, and even 
the Indonesian Assembly of Ulamas (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) 
derided the regulation.111 In July 2005, a number of NGOs requested the 
Supreme Court to declare the regulation null and void, since they consid-
ered it in violation with the spirit of the BAL.112 This criticism successfully 
forced the government to amend the regulation, which it did with the 
105 Art. 8-9 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
106 Art. 20 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
107 Art. 15 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
108 Art. 1, under 11 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
109 Art. 13 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
110 Art. 10 Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005.
111 ‘DPR Minta Revisi, Komnas HAM Minta Cabut’, Kompas, 14 June 2005.
112 ‘Perpres No 36/2005 Potensial Picu Konflik’, Kompas, 18 May 2005.
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promulgation of Presidential Regulation No. 65/2006, which was further 
specified by Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007.113
Presidential Regulation No. 65/2006 strongly limits the public interest 
development activities for which land can be cleared. In addition, it explic-
itly states that the infrastructure which is developed should be govern-
ment-owned (in the future).114 On the basis of Regulation of the Head of the 
NLA No. 3/2007 the government institution wishing to clear land is 
required to submit a proposal to the District-Head/Mayor at least one year 
before initiating land clearance.115 If the proposal is agreed to, the decision 
determining the location of land clearance should be publicly announced 
within fourteen days and be ‘socialised’ among the people.116 The decision 
is valid, in case of a plot of less than 25 hectares, for one year, between 20-50 
hectares, for two years, and more than 50 hectares, for three years. The 
validity of the decision can only be extended once for another year if at 
least 75 per cent of the land has been cleared.117
Compensation is still determined by an independent Land Value Esti-
mation Body or by a Land Value Estimation Team, with the Sales Value as a 
Tax Object still playing an important role.118 In addition, several other fac-
tors are to be taken into account, including the location of the land, its sta-
tus, its allocation, accordance of land use with spatial plans, available infra-
structure, and other factors that determine the value of land.119
The time limit for negotiations is now extended to hundred twenty 
days.120 If after several meetings with the Land Clearance Committee still 
75 per cent of the title holders refuse to accept the land to be cleared and the 
project can be realised at another location, the institution requiring land is 
to propose an alternative location.121
In Chapter 3, reference was made to the launching, in October 2009, of 
the National Strategy on Access to Justice. This Strategy may also have an 
impact on land clearance by the state. Key policy recommendations not 
only include those discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, but also strengthening 
113 Presidential Regulation No. 65/2006 on the Revision of Presidential Regulation No. 
36/2005 (Perpres No. 65/2006 tentang Perubahan atas Perpres No. 36/2005); Regulation of 
the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007 on Implementing Provisions of Presidential Regula-
tion No. 36/2005 as revised by Presidential Regulation No. 65/2006 (Peraturan Kepala 
BPN No. 3/2007 tentang Ketentuan Pelaksanaan Perpres No. 36/2005 sebagaimana telah 
Di ubah dengan Perpres No. 65/2006).
114 Art I, referring to Art. 5 Presidential Regulation No. 65/2006.
115 Art. 4 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007.
116 Art. 8 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007.
117 Art. 6 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007.
118 Art. 27 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007. A Land Value Estimation Team 
is appointed by Decision of the District-Head/Mayor in the event no independent Land 
Value Estimation Body exists (Art. 1(3-4) Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 
3/2007).
119 Art. 28 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007.
120 Art. I, referring to Art. 10 Presidential Regulation No. 65/2006.
121 Art. 19(4) Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007.
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the reform agenda for justice institutions, including supervisory commis-
sions, to improve professionalism and ethics in the police, public prosecu-
tion service and courts; formulating a comprehensive legal aid system; 
guaranteeing the constitutional right of poor people to defend and fight for 
their legal rights without discrimination; making legal services affordable 
and equally available for all; create dispute resolution mechanisms for land 
(and natural resources) disputes that protect the right of poor and disad-
vantaged groups, and transform conflicts into schemes of partnership 
among stakeholders, and; strengthen efforts to develop and promote 
paralegalism across Indonesia.122
The Indonesian government soon took a first step in the formulation of 
a comprehensive legal aid system. In October 2009 Laws Nos. 48/2009, 
49/2009 and 51/2009 were enacted.123 On the basis of these laws, each per-
son who is involved in a (civil or administrative) court case has the right to 
receive legal aid. To this aim, in each court a legal aid station must be estab-
lished. Legal aid is to be provided at each judicial level until the court deci-
sion is final. The state bears the costs of a case of those who are not capable 
to bear the costs themselves. Such persons should provide as evidence a 
letter from the local government office of the City Quarter where they 
reside, stating that they are financially incapable.124
A final initiative worth to mention here is the establishment, by Presi-
dent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in December 2009, of a Task Force for the 
Eradication of Judicial Mafia (Satuan Tugas Pemberantasan Mafia Hukum or 
Satgas PMH).125 The Task Force, which is directly responsible to the Presi-
dent, has a coordination, evaluation, correction and monitoring task to 
make the efforts of various institutions to eradicate KKN in the judiciary 
more successful.
In sum, the reforms are definitely a step forward. Presidential Regula-
tion No. 65/2006 puts a limit on the activities for which a government insti-
tution can clear land for development in the public interest. It also provides 
formal and semi-formal landholders with more procedural protections, by 
formulating the obligations of genuine consultation with affected landhold-
ers, adequate and reasonable notice prior to land clearance, the provision of 
information on the proposed eviction and on the alternative purpose for 
which the land is to be used. The right to proper compensation is better 
guaranteed by the establishment of independent Land Value Estimation 
122 This description was derived from the LEAD page at www.undp.org.
123 Law No. 48/2009 on Judicial Power (UU No. 48/2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman); Law 
No. 49/2009 on the Second Revision of Law No. 2/1986 (UU No. 49/2009 tentang Perubah-
 an Kedua atas UU No. 2/1986); Law No. 51/2009 on the Second Revision of Law No. 
5/1986 (UU No. 51/2009 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas UU No. 5/1986).
124 Art. 56-7 Law No. 48/2009; Art. I, under 25 (Art. 68A-C) Law No. 49/2009; Art. I, under 
32 (Art. 144C-144D Law No. 51/2009).
125 Decision of the President No. 37/2009 on the Task Force for the Eradication of Judicial 
Mafia (Keputusan Presiden No. 37/2009 tentang Satuan Tugas Pemberantasan Mafia Hukum).
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Bodies/Teams, which not only take account of the Sales Value as a Tax 
Object, but also various other factors when determining the value of land. 
As a result of the enactment of Laws Nos. 48/2009, 49/2009 and 51/2009, at 
least on paper, landholders who wish to seek legal remedies have better 
access to the judiciary, which as a result of the efforts of the Task Force for 
the Eradication of Judicial Mafia may also develop toward impartiality and 
independence. However, there is still no obligation for the authorities to 
explore feasible alternatives in consultation with landholders prior to land 
clearance. In addition, the right to adequate alternative accommodation is 
not guaranteed. In relation to informal landholders the law still creates 
broad discretion for the Mayor to determine whether in case of land clear-
ance, they receive any ‘assistance/sympathy money’ and if so, how much.
Further reforms can be expected. This is evidenced by the 2010-2014 
National Legislative Programme, which for instance announces the intro-
duction of bills on land expropriation in the public interest and on legal aid. 
Meanwhile, general judicial reforms continue. In October 2010, the 
Supreme Court announced Blueprints for Judicial Reform 2010-2035 (Cetak 
Biru Pembaruan Peradilan 2010-2035), which form an elaboration of the 2003 
Blueprints discussed in Chapter 3.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has described the law and practice of urban land clearance by 
the state in the New Order and the Post-New Order. During the New 
Order, legislation on land clearance by the state created a broad discretion 
for the authorities to determine for what purpose land was cleared. They 
also had no legal obligation to explore feasible alternatives. Procedural pro-
tections were limited. The right to proper compensation and the right to 
adequate alternative accommodation were not guaranteed. As for informal 
landholders the law gave authorities broad discretion to determine wheth-
er and, if so, how much compensation is due. In practice omnipotent state 
authorities, supported by security forces and hired civil militias, interpret-
ed the law at their own will, forcing landholders off their land against little 
or no compensation. This led to human rights violations, without perpetra-
tors being held accountable. From the 1970s LBH and other rights-oriented 
NGOs opposed these practices by litigation. By the end of the 1980s they 
were joined by the student movement. They jointly pursued strategies of 
litigation and political mobilisation in which they often used a legal dis-
course. Though causing some effect, both strategies generally could not 
prevent the urban poor losing their land.
Despite ambitious legal reforms, in the Post-New Order the legal and 
de facto tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers remain limited. 
Legislation pertaining to land clearance initially remained in force after 
1998. Land clearance as a single enforcement measure, for instance because 
of a landholder residing on land without the permission of the right holder 
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or lacking permits to reside on the land, is still rare. However, the Pasupati 
case shows that if land is needed for development in the public interest, 
which is often the case in Post-New Order Bandung, kampong dwellers 
still risk involuntary removal without due process of law or proper com-
pensation. However, they now succeed in negotiating higher compensa-
tion than during the New Order years, which suggests that post-New 
Order reforms have benefited kampong dwellers who are confronted with 
the state wishing to clear land. Notably, for those who hold out, the level of 
compensation is practically indifferent of tenure status. However, such 
compensation still remains below the social and economic value of the land 
and buildings, forcing people to move far away from their sources of 
income.
The authorities still refuse to abide by the law. They try to force kam-
pong dwellers out of their homes while offering low compensation. Indo-
nesia’s new local democracy provides some counterweight. While support 
of NGOs and the student movement remains limited, kampong dwellers 
now dare to resist land clearance and demand better compensation. This 
resistance takes form in political mobilisation, organising street protests. 
Kampong dwellers refer little to the law or human rights. Neither do they 
use litigation methods. They are helped by the media, paying much atten-
tion to the protests, even though they appear to draw a biased picture. In 
addition, hoodlum groups still launch intimidation campaigns. Despite 
these countervailing forces, the urban poor prove able to achieve relatively 
beneficial outcomes.
As a result of the difficulties of local governments in at least some parts 
of Post-New Order Indonesia to clear land, a number of development 
activities have run aground. In 2005, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
therefore passed Presidential Regulation 36/2005 on land clearance for 
development in the public interest. The regulation was heavily criticised 
and therefore revised by Regulation No. 65/2006, which contains more 
safeguards. In addition, Laws No. 48/2009, 49/2009 and 51/2009 concern-
ing Legal Aid were enacted. The reforms are definitely an improvement. 
However, there is still no obligation for the authorities to explore feasible 
alternatives in consultation with landholders prior to land clearance. Land-
holders are not sure to receive alternative accommodation. In relation to 
informal landholders the law still creates broad discretion for the District-
Head/Mayor to determine whether in case of land clearance, they receive 
any ‘assistance/sympathy money’ and if so, how much.
7.1 Introduction1
Land clearance can not only be conducted by the state, but also by private 
parties, usually developers, who need land for the realisation of commer-
cial projects. Just as land clearance by the state, such commercial land clear-
ance relates directly to the land tenure security of the urban poor, taking 
form in involuntary removal from the land on which they reside, without 
due process of law or even payment of proper compensation.
In view of the above, this chapter discusses the law and practice of 
commercial land clearance during the New Order and takes a close look at 
the practice of commercial land clearance in Post-New Order Bandung. In 
doing so, it focuses on the legality of the permit issued for commercial land 
clearance and, just as Chapter 6, the nature of the negotiation process, and 
the level of compensation offered. It also emphasises the nature of resist-
ance – including the role of legal norms and institutions -, the response to 
such resistance, and the effect.
This chapter comprises six sections. The next one establishes the legal 
framework pertaining to commercial land clearance and describes com-
mercial land clearance practices and resistance during the late New Order. 
It is followed by an overview of legal reforms in relation to commercial 
land clearance. Section 7.4 forms the major part of this chapter, presenting 
the land clearance process for the development of the Paskal Hyper Square, 
Bandung’s biggest business centre to be. This case is further evaluated in 
the light of past reforms from a rule of law perspective in Section 7.5, after 
which the chapter concludes.
1 An earlier version of this chapter will be published as: Reerink, G.O. (Forthcoming), 
‘Dealing with the Urban Poor, Changing Law and Practice of Commercial Land Clear-
ance in Post-New Order Bandung’, In: A. Lucas & C.A.B. Warren (ed.), Land for the Peo-
ple: State Policy and Agrarian Conflicts in Indonesia, Athens: Ohio University Press.
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7.2 Commercial land clearance under the late New Order
In the first decades after independence, commercial land clearance 
remained unregulated in Indonesia. It was simply a matter between pri-
vate parties, without interference by the state. This changed in the 1970s. 
Following the New Order’s ‘developmentalist’ shift to state-led industriali-
sation and large-scale exploitation of natural resources as well as the enact-
ment of the two laws on foreign and domestic investment in 1967 and 1968 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Minister of Home Affairs in 1974 promulgated 
Regulation No. 5/1974 on the disposal of land for commercial interest, with 
particular reference to housing and industrial estates.2 The regulation’s aim 
was to enhance economic growth by meeting developers’ need for land.3 
To that purpose it created a permit mechanism, which – theoretically at 
least – took account of spatial planning law and the ‘social function’ of land 
as formulated in the BAL.
Although the 1974 regulation was not primarily meant to protect land-
holders, it did contain some provisions that could potentially contribute to 
this. The Mayor could for instance mediate in case problems arose in the 
negotiating process. He could even cancel a permit in case the land clear-
ance process was not implemented the way it should or not within a certain 
time limit.4
As discussed in Chapter 6, soon after the promulgation of the 1974 reg-
ulation, the Minister of Home Affairs promulgated Regulation No. 2/1976, 
which declared the procedure on voluntary land clearance for develop-
ment in the public interest applicable to commercial land clearance if this 
was determined to be in the interest of the government.5 Developers were 
thus enabled to call on the assistance of the authorities in commercial land 
clearance. The regulation resulted in an unclear distinction between public 
interest and commercial interest.
2 Law No. 1/1967 on Foreign Investment; Law No. 6/1968 on Domestic Investment; Reg-
ulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 5/1974 on Provisions for the Disposal and 
Delivery of Land for Business Interests (Permendagri No. 5/1974 tentang Ketentuan-keten-
tuan mengenai Penyediaan dan Pemberian Tanah untuk Keperluan Perusahaan).
3 General Consideration, under c BAL.
4 See for instance Art. 11(3 and 5) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 5/1974.
5 Art. 1 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1976 on the Use of the Proce-
dure for Land Clearance in the Government’s Interest for Land Clearance by Private 
Parties (Permendagri No. 2/1976 tentang Penggunaan Acara Pembebasan Tanah untuk 
Kepentingan Pemerintah bagi Pembebasan Tanah oleh Pihak Swasta) in conjunction with 
Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 15/1975 on Provisions regarding the 
Procedure for Land Clearance (Permendagri No. 15/1975 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan 
mengenai Tata-cara Pembebasan Tanah).
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Although the legal basis for commercial land clearance changed con-
stantly, the permit mechanism remained pivotal.6 A permit that played a 
central role was the site permit (izin lokasi), which allowed a developer to 
try and clear land in a designated area for a specific purpose through mu-
syawarah, the traditional process of discussion and deliberation. This proce-
dure had to be followed with regard to all types of landholders, including 
informal landholders, and under the supervision of the authorities that had 
issued the permit, for instance on the basis of reports and site visits.7
From the late 1980s, a number of significant developments took place 
in commercial land clearance law. First, in an effort to increase oil-inde-
pendent economic growth, the Indonesian government introduced a series 
of deregulation measures, enacting separate regulations on commercial 
land clearance for housing development and the development of industrial 
estates in 1987 and 1989 respectively.8 In 1992, the 1974 regulation was 
finally replaced by Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/1992, which 
was to improve and speed up the permit granting process for commercial 
6 See Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 3/1987 on the Allocation and Grant-
ing of a Right on Land for the Need of Housing Development Companies (Permendagri 
No. 3/1987 tentang Penyediaan dan Pemberian Hak atas Tanah untuk Keperluan Perusahaan 
Pembangunan Perumahan); Presidential Decision No. 53/1989 on Industrial Areas (Kep-
pres No. 18/1989 tentang Kawasan Industri); Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 
3/1992 on the Procedure for a Company to Obtain a Land Banking Facility, Site Permit, 
Granting, Extension, and Renewal of the Right of Land and the Issuance of a Certificate 
(Peraturan Kepala BPN No. 3/1992 tentang Tata Cara bagi Perusahaan untuk Memperoleh 
Pencadangan Tanah, Izin Lokasi, Pemberian, Perpanjangan dan Pembaharuan Hak atas Tanah 
serta Penerbitaan Setipikatnya); Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1993 as elabo-
rated by Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 22/1993 on Operational Directives on the 
Granting of a Site Permit for the Implementation of State Minister of Agrarian Affairs/
Head of the NLA Regulation No. 2/1993 (Keputusan Kepala BPN No. 22/1993 tentang 
Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Pemberian Izin Lokasi dalam Rangka Pelaksanaan Peraturan Kepala 
BPN No. 2/1993); Decision of the Head of NLA No. 21/1994 on the Procedure to Obtain 
Land for Companies in the Framework of Investment (Keputusan Kepala BPN No. 
21/1994 tentang Tata Cara Perolehan Tanah bagi Perusahaan dalam Rangka Penanaman 
Modal).
7 Compare Art. 11(3) Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 5/1974 and Annex, 
under B Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 22/1993 on Operational Directives on the 
Granting of a Site Permit for the Implementation of State Minister of Agrarian Affairs/
Head of the NLA Regulation No. 2/1993 (Keputusan Kepala BPN No. 22/1993 tentang 
Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Pemberian Izin Lokasi dalam Rangka Pelaksanaan Peraturan Kepala 
BPN No. 2/1993). Notably, the Annex only requires the developer to state his willingness 
to pay compensation or offer an alternative site to ‘title holders’, not to others, such as 
informal landholders. See however Art. 6(9), which requires a developer wishing to 
obtain a land right on state land to first clear it of garapan (occupation by cultivation) 
and other forms of occupation.
8 Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 3/1987. For a discussion of the main 
provisions of this regulation, see Struyk, et al. 1990:129-34; Presidential Decision No. 
53/1989.
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land clearance by simplifying procedures.9 In 1993, the 1992 regulation was 
replaced by yet another regulation, Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 
2/1993, which centralised the authority to issue site permits from the pro-
vincial Governor to the NLA.10
The deregulation policies significantly contributed to commercial land 
development becoming one of the country’s prime investment sectors. It 
not only became easier for developers to obtain the permits required for 
land clearance; the banking sector and thus the credit market for housing 
also expanded. After a dip in the early 1990s, further deregulation policies 
ensured that land development was again booming by 1993 (Winarso & 
Firman 2002:488-91).
The above developments resulted in more landholders being affected 
by commercial land clearance. This also led to land clearance practices 
coming under increasing public scrutiny. Another development, part of the 
general policy of ‘openness’ as a response to increasing criticism of the 
New Order regime, involved legal reforms that potentially supported the 
interests of landholders. So in 1990, the Head of the NLA sent a circular let-
ter to the Land Offices at the provincial level, requesting them to establish 
separate Supervision and Control Teams for Commercial Land Clearance 
(Tim Peng awasan dan Pengendalian Pembebasan Tanah untuk Keperluan Swasta, 
also called Tim Wadal) at the district/municipal level. Consisting of gov-
ernment officials only, the teams had the task to monitor the land clearance 
process and enforce related norms.11 Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 
6, in 1993 the 1975 Regulation on Land Clearance for Development in the 
Public Interest was replaced by Presidential Decision No. 55/1993. Annul-
ling Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 2/1976, the 1993 deci-
sion no longer allowed developers to apply the procedure for land clear-
ance for development in the public interest for commercial purposes.12
9 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/1992. The regulation implemented Presiden-
tial Decision No. 33/1992 on the Procedure for Investment (Keppres No. 33/1992 tentang 
Tata Cara Penanaman Modal).
10 Art. 3 and Annex, under D Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1993. The Regula-
tion was elaborated by Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 22/1993 and Decision of 
the Head of NLA No. 21/1994 on the Procedure to Obtain Land for Companies in the 
Framework of Investment (Keputusan Kepala BPN No. 21/1994 tentang Tata Cara Perolehan 
Tanah bagi Perusahaan dalam Rangka Penanaman Modal).
11 Circular Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 580.2-5568.D.III, dated 6 December 1990. See 
also Art. 47 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 1/1994 and Circular Letter of the 
Head of the NLA No. 500-1988, 29 June 1994, section 5. The teams were called Supervi-
sion and Control Teams for Land Preparation (Tim Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Peng-
adaan Tanah). The establishment of these Teams should have been (re-)regulated by 
Decision of the Head of the NLA, but such a decision was never enacted. Consequently, 
the establishment of the Teams remained based on the earlier discussed Circular Letter 
of the Head of the NLA No. 580.2-5568.D.III, 6 December 1990.
12 Art. 24 Presidential Decision No. 55/1993.
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Landholders could initiate judicial proceedings against the Head of the 
Land Office issuing the site permit. As discussed in Chapter 6, before 1991 
proceedings against the state should be initiated at a General District Court 
on the basis of a tort claim, which was hard to substantiate. Since in 1991 
Administrative Courts have been established, administrative law proceed-
ings can be commenced there. General District Courts obviously still hold 
jurisdiction over disputes between landholders and developers over the 
sale of land and/or buildings.
Though containing some safeguards to protect landholders, legislation 
pertaining to commercial land clearance could hardly contribute to this. 
The mechanism to monitor commercial land clearance was ineffective, 
because authorities could only issue warnings if a developer harmed the 
interests of landholders.13 Legally, there was however nothing to prevent 
the government, after having issued several warnings, from suspending, 
revoking, or refusing to renew a permit.
Insofar as commercial land clearance law could theoretically protect 
landholders, this was not the case in practice, as several case studies, most-
ly from Jakarta, show. The permit mechanism had little meaning. Knowing 
that land speculators – frequently officials who knew (or others who had 
been informed by them) about a development plan – were active and that 
once a site permit had been issued land prices would rise, some developers 
started to acquire land before obtaining a permit. To speed up the process, 
they often employed their own middlemen (calo) (Leaf 1991:153-4). Devel-
opers (also) continued to acquire land after the term of their permit had 
already expired. Others simply never took the trouble to obtain a permit. 
Not that the authorities strictly adhered to the rules: frequently they issued 
permits that were not in accordance with spatial plans (Firman & Dhar-
mapatni 1994).
Holding a site permit or not, developers commonly pressured land-
holders to give up their land at very low compensation rates. A site permit 
facilitated this process. Landholders were often made to believe that the 
permit formed a right to claim the land (Sumardjono 1999:16). Some devel-
opers limited residents’ access to land, for instance by building walls 
around plots of those who refused to sell their land. They were also deliber-
ately disturbed by construction activities (Suyanto 1996:47).
Although it was common knowledge that landholders were pressured 
to give up their land rights, the authorities did little to prevent this. Accord-
ing to Firman, many authorities regarded the permit procedure as a means 
to collect fees rather than a system to control commercial land clearance 
(Firman 1996:1041). In fact, authorities often assisted developers by lending 
their coercive power. Developers could deploy officials or even security 
13 Compare Circular Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 580.2-5568.D.III; Annex, under E 
Decision of the Head of the NLA No. 22/1993 and Circular Letter of the Head of the 
NLA No. 460-572-DII, dated 21 February 1995. See also Sumardjono 1999:22-4.
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forces to intimidate landholders. In combination with the large number of 
permits that were issued and the continuous extension of such permits, 
many landholders thus had to live in uncertainty for a long time. Authori-
ties also assisted developers in commercial land clearance by applying 
alternative procedures to get people off their land. Developers generally 
preferred to follow the procedure for land clearance for development in the 
public interest (Struyk, et al. 1990:137-40), and municipal governments 
often applied this procedure for commercial land clearance, even after 
1993, when legally this was no longer possible. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
they abused the concept of ‘public interest’, extending it to include such 
items as golf courses (Lucas 1997:235-42). In order to clear land occupied by 
informal landholders, municipal governments proved willing to apply the 
procedure as set out in a 1960 law on the prohibition to use land without 
permission of the title holder.14 In other instances authorities reverted to 
municipal building regulations, on the basis of which they could demolish 
buildings erected without a building permit, without the obligation to 
compensate. Though constituting a clear abuse of power, some municipal 
governments justified the use of these regulations by the fact that they had 
not yet enacted implementing regulations regarding commercial land 
clearance (Struyk, et al. 1990:136).
The aforementioned conditions resulted in landholders accepting 
improper compensation. Not knowing that there was a plan to develop the 
land commercially, they accepted offers from speculators and front men 
that, had there been no development plan, sometimes seemed reasonable. 
The urban poor, always short on cash and often knowing little about mar-
ket prices, were all the more inclined to do so. Many appeared unaware of 
the negative consequences of having to move to another place in the long 
term. As soon as it had become common knowledge that a developer held a 
site permit, the value of the land tended to rise. Yet landholders could not 
benefit from this, because the developer holding the site permit had an 
exclusive right to develop the area (Ferguson & Hoffman 1993:62-3). A sur-
vey in the late 1990s on land conversion on the fringes of Bandung showed 
that two thirds of the landholders had sold their land for the purpose of 
commercial development, despite low compensation offers, primarily 
because they believed they had no choice but to release it (Firman 2000:15). 
Compensation was particularly low if alternative procedures were applied 
to clear the land, such as the procedure for land clearance for development 
in the public interest. Informal landholders that were evicted on the basis 
of the 1960 law on the use of land without permission of the right holder 
often received no compensation at all.
Though repression was strong, some landholders dared to resist the 
above practices – particularly after 1989, when the period of political open-
ness set in (Lucas 1997:243). From then on, rights-oriented NGOs, which 
14 Law No. 51/1960. For a discussion of this law, see Chapter 6.
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were already active in land disputes, were joined by the student movement 
(Lucas 1992:90). However, as discussed in Chapter 6, they tended to con-
centrate their attention on land clearance that affected peasants, rather than 
the urban poor. Where NGOs and the student movement had an interest in 
a case, they could seldom prevent commercial land clearance. Compensa-
tion was almost invariably inadequate. In this way, Struyk, et al. conclude 
that during the New Order, small landholders partially subsidised the cost 
of urban development (Struyk, et al. 1990:139).
7.3 Legal reforms related to commercial land clearance
As discussed in Chapter 3, after 1998 limited land law reforms were initi-
ated. Some of these reforms were related to commercial land clearance. Just 
a month after Soeharto’s fall, there already were indications that the gov-
ernment wanted to bring an end to the past practices of commercial land 
clearance. In June 1998 the Head of the NLA sent a letter to the Land Offices 
at the provincial level, asking them to remind permit holders whose site 
permits could no longer be extended because the term of their permit had 
already expired and who had not started development activities, that these 
permits were null and void and could no longer be used for land clearance. 
Henceforth, permits to clear remaining land would only be issued to those 
who were ”really serious and acted in good faith”.15 A few days later, the 
Head of the NLA sent another letter, in which he referred to deviations in 
past commercial land clearance practices and required the Land Offices to 
include several new provisions in allocated site permits, namely that the 
site permit would not reduce the rights of landowners16 in the area for 
which the permit had been issued; that it would be forbidden to limit 
access of people in the area; that the permit holder had the obligation to 
protect the wider public interest as well as that of local people, and; that 
there was an obligation to create an enclave or consolidate land for those 
landowners who did not want to give up their rights. Representatives of 
landowners would now have to be involved in the permit granting proce-
dure through the organisation of a coordination meeting. In case of field 
monitoring, officials of the NLA should identify the occurrence of informal 
tenure as well as examine the willingness of landowners to give up their 
rights. Finally, the Land Offices at the district/municipal level should still 
provide services to those landowners who had not yet given up their 
rights.17
The above letters suggested a new stance of the government toward 
commercial land clearance. They did not, however, ultimately lead to better 
15 Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 462-2033, dated 26 June 1998.
16 Please note, the letter explicitly refers to landowners, not landholders generally.
17 Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 462-2083, dated 30 June 1998.
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protection of landholders confronted with developers wishing to clear their 
land. This was mainly due to the promulgation of Regulation of the Head 
of the NLA No. 2/1999, effectively replacing the 1993 regulation.18 In 
accordance with the spirit of regional autonomy, the regulation acknowl-
edges that not the Head of the NLA but the District-Heads/Mayors hold 
the authority to issue site permits.19 With regard to the interests of landhold-
ers, the regulation is ambivalent.
To start with the positive changes, landholders are now to be consulted 
before a site permit is issued. The purpose of this consultation is to inform 
them about the investment plan, its spatial effect, and the plan to clear the 
land as well as to resolve problems related to that matter; give title holders 
the opportunity to ask for clarification about the investment plan and look 
for alternatives to resolve related problems; collect direct information from 
the people regarding social and environmental aspects, and; to allow them 
to propose alternatives regarding the form and amount of compensation to 
be paid by the developer.20
To avoid any misunderstanding about the rights attached to the permit, 
the regulation clarifies that as long as a developer has not reached agree-
ment with a right holder regarding the transfer of the land, all rights and 
interests regarding the land are to be maintained, including the right to 
obtain a land certificate, to use the land in accordance with the General 
Spatial Plan, and to transfer the land to private parties (non-developers).21 
So a permit holder is required to respect the interests of others on land that 
has not yet been cleared, not to close or limit people’s access around the 
location, and protect the public interest.22 At the same time officials must 
keep providing their services to these landholders.23
Aside from these positive changes, Regulation of the Head of the NLA 
No. 2/1999 again creates an ineffective mechanism to monitor commercial 
18 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999 on Site Permits (Peraturan Menteri Agra-
ria/Kepala BPN No. 2/1999 tentang Izin Lokasi). The regulation does not annul the earlier 
discussed Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1993, which means that formally 
the regulation is still applicable. See also Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 110-424 
(Surat Menteri Agraria/Kepala BPN No. 110-424 tentang Penyampaian PMA No. 2/1999), 
which explains the aims of Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999.
19 The NLA’s role is now limited to collecting all required documents and preparing a 
coordination meeting with related bodies.
20 Art. 6 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999. In the explanatory letter, the 
Head of the NLA explains that this form of public participation should lead to people 
supporting the land clearance process (Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 110-424, 
under 7).
21 The Head of the NLA explains that this provision is needed because in the past there 
had been misconceptions about this matter (Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 110-424, 
dated 10 February 1999, under 1 and 4).
22 Art. 8(2-3) Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999.
23 Letter of the Head of the NLA No. 110-424/4, under 4. Interestingly, the Head of the 
NLA qualifies a refusal to provide such services not as a professional decision, but a 
private decision of that official, for which an official is personally responsible.
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land clearance and enforce related norms. In fact, it fails to refer to any con-
crete form of supervision, for instance by the previously discussed Supervi-
sion and Control Teams for Commercial Land Clearance. In addition, the 
regulation does not refer to any sanctions that can be imposed on develop-
ers who fail to respect the interests of landholders.
The regulation contains some other bad news for landholders. Many 
landholders cannot benefit from any of the above potentially protective 
provisions, as the regulation refers to an extensive list of commercial land 
clearance cases in which no site permit is required. This exemption for 
instance applies to land needed for non-agricultural investment of less than 
one hectare, a size most urban development projects will not pass.24 A 
developer is only required to inform the NLA about the development plan, 
after which he can directly start acquiring the land. This does not mean that 
the developer needs no permits at all to realise a project. This requires other 
permits, such as the land allocation and use permit and building permit, 
which can only be obtained if in accordance with spatial plans.25 Further 
details on the site permit procedure should be regulated by the District 
Head/Mayor.26
As discussed in Chapter 3, on the basis of the 1999 RALs, part of the 
authorities in the land sector was transferred from the central government 
to the Districts/Municipalities. Their authority to issue site permits, as 
granted by Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999, was thus recon-
firmed. It must be noted, however, that District-Heads and Mayors felt free 
to depart from the regulation’s intent. Though referring to it, the imple-
menting decision of the Mayor of Bandung makes no reference to the con-
sultation procedure. So contrary to what the regulation requires, the Mayor 
can issue a site permit without the prior involvement of landholders.27
Despite its ambivalence with regard to the position of landholders and 
its lack of legislative status, Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999 
still provides more safeguards than previous legislation related to commer-
cial land clearance. It may thus contribute to tenure security of the urban 
poor, particularly in combination with the general reforms discussed in 
Chapter 3. The following section takes a close look whether, and if so how, 
practices of commercial land clearance have changed in Post-New Order 
Bandung.
24 Art. 2(2), under f Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999.
25 See in case of Bandung as for the use permit Art. 7(1) Law No. 4/2002 on the Land Use 
Permit (Perda No. 4/2002 tentang Izin Peruntukan Penggunaan Tanah) and the building 
permit Art. 41(1) Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 14/1998 on Buildings in the 
Municipal Region Level II Bandung (Perda Kotamadya Bandung No. 14/1998 tentang 
 Bangunan di Wilayah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Bandung).
26 As far as no such regulation has been implemented, the 1993 regulation remains in force 
(Art. 7 Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999).
27 Decision of the Mayor of Bandung No. 170/1999.
196 Chapter 7
7.4 Practice of commercial land clearance in Post-New Order 
Bandung
In the first years of the Post-New Order, clearance of urban kampong land 
for commercial purposes was limited. Indonesia’s economic crisis affected 
the urban economy, in particular the manufacturing and property sector. 
As a result, land development activities slowed down. Business, offices, 
and condominium construction projects came to a standstill and land that 
had been acquired for commercial development remained unutilised (Fir-
man 2002:234-6). As happened on plantation land across Indonesia, some 
land in the fringes of large cities was re-occupied by people who had earlier 
given it up (Firman 2000:17-8).
The period of economic decline did not last long; within two years 
Indonesia’s economy showed signs of recovery. In Bandung this was evi-
denced by the initiation of a considerable number of commercial develop-
ment projects. Malls, factory outlets, upper-class real-estate complexes and 
luxury hotels are built, particularly since the opening in 2005 of the Cipu-
larang toll road between Jakarta and Bandung and the connecting Pasupati 
flyover, which leads to an increasing functional relationship between the 
two cities. To realise these projects, there is again a great appetite for land. 
This appetite has actually increased compared to the New Order years.
Developers appear particularly interested in land that is held informal-
ly. This includes land that is situated alongside railway tracks. Most impor-
tantly, it is state land (tanah negara) managed by the state owned Indonesian 
Railway Company (PT Kereta Api Indonesia or PT KAI) that is mostly occu-
pied by urban poor who have no (or no longer have) formal claims on the 
land, in theory making it relatively easy and cheap to clear. In addition, this 
land is centrally located, flat and therefore easy to build on.
PT KAI itself is also interested in developing the railway land, as it is in 
need of new revenue streams. In 1997 the World Bank launched the Railway 
Efficiency Project, which led to the reorganisation of PT KAI. This included 
the establishment of a property division, which should realise higher finan-
cial returns on the company’s assets. In 2004 it started documenting the 
houses that had been built on its land as a first step to making this asset 
commercially productive.28 In 2007 a law was enacted which requires the 
government to stop subsidizing PT KAI and to give private companies 
access to the railway network.29 Finally, the revenues from ticketing have 
decreased significantly in recent years, particularly as a result of the previ-
ously mentioned opening of the toll road between Jakarta and Bandung, 
making it quicker to travel between the two cities by car than by rail.
28 ‘Rumah di Lahan PT KA Akan Didata’, Pikiran Rakyat, 7 June 2004.
29 Law No. 23/2007 on the Railways (UU No. 23/2007 tentang Perkereta Apian).
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To meet its financial needs, PT KAI now undertakes Public-Private 
Partnerships (Kerjasama Operasi, hereafter PPP) with developers, to which it 
grants construction rights on its land for a period of 34 years, that is 4 years 
for the development of the project and 30 years for its exploitation. PT KAI 
argues that this not only serves the company itself and developers, but also 
the common good. It can continue providing public transport which the 
exploitation of its assets cross-subsidises. Besides, the project is said to sup-
port the municipal government in spatial management as well as attracting 
investors.30
Developers who conclude a PPP agreement with PT KAI are required 
to clear the land themselves. “I therefore look for strong developers, who 
are able to get this done”, the Head of the Property Division clarified.31
7.4.1 The Paskal Hyper Square project
The first project involving the development of railway land in Bandung on 
the basis of a PPP, forming a model for the many projects on PT KAI land to 
come, is the Paskal Hyper Square project, for which PT KAI signed an 
agreement with PT Citra Buana Prasida (PT CBP) on 25 April 2003.32 PT 
CBP would develop Bandung’s biggest business centre, consisting of shop 
houses, a trade centre, shopping mall, serviced apartments, and a five-star 
hotel, involving an investment of Rp. 350 billion (about US$ 35 million).33 
The project was to be realised on a plot of about 16.5 hectares in City Quar-
ters Kebunjeruk (Neighbourhood 4) and Ciroyom (Neighbourhood 1), Sub-
District Andir, West Bandung.
The plot on which the project was to be realised was not vacant. Over 
several decades migrants occupied and subdivided the land and built 
houses, which resulted in the area turning into densely populated kam-
pongs. Most residents had moved in after 1975, but the oldest residents had 
been living there for more than 50 years. They generally worked in the 
informal sector as street hawkers, trading goods, or offering small services 
on the city-centre.34 The central location of their kampong was thus impor-
30 ‘Ex. Stasiun Bandunggudang Untuk KSO’, article from website of PT KAI, 16 April 
2004; ‘Penyewa Lahan PT KA Demo’, Pikiran Rakyat, 15 May 2004.
31 Personal communication of the Head of the Property Division of the Indonesian Rail-
way Company, 9 January 2005.
32 See Decision of the CEO of PT KAI No. U/A.35/KL401/KA-2003 and the PPP agree-
ment, both dated 25 April 2003. The Minister of State Companies had approved the 
plan for a PPP by Letter No. S-560/M/MBY/2002, dated 28 August 2002.
33 ‘Dirut PT KA Resmikan Proyek “Paskal Hyper Square”’, article from website of PT KAI, 
23 September 2004; ’Proyek Bandung Super Block Dimulai Tahun Ini’, Business Indone-
sia, 27 May 2004.
34 For population data and more information on the socio-economic and physical charac-
teristics of the kampongs in Ciroyom, see Appendix II and III (p. 244-5).
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tant for their livelihood. At the start of the project almost 1,500 houses, in 
which up to 10,000 people resided, were located on the land.35
The majority of the residents were informal landholders, squatting the 
land. Some ‘bought’ or ‘leased’ the land from so-called oknum, employees 
of PT KAI or outsiders who passed themselves off as employees of PT KAI 
and kept these revenues for themselves.36 Since the 1980s, most residents 
signed short-term contracts with PT KAI granting them official lease rights 
(hak sewa). The contracts contained a provision requiring the residents to 
unconditionally clear and transfer the land in case the company would 
need it. If the residents refused to meet this obligation, they would be evict-
ed by force. Since the 1990s the contracts were no longer renewed.37
PT CBP was exempted from the requirement to obtain a site permit, 
since PT KAI already owned the land and PT CBP implemented the invest-
ment plan of PT KAI. PT CBP did require a land allocation and use permit 
as well as a building permit. In November 2002, the Mayor therefore issued 
a land use agreement (persetujuaan pemanfaatan ruang).38 This ‘permit in 
principle’ (izin prinsip) forms a first step to obtain these permits and 
allowed PT CBP to start clearing the land. The permit did contain a provi-
sion, requiring PT CBP to pay residents proper compensation for buildings, 
as well as a clause, stating that in the event PT CBP did not fulfil prevailing 
legal requirements, the agreement could be cancelled. The ‘permit in prin-
ciple’ was extended in June 2004 – a few months after the new General 
Spatial Plan had been enacted, which actually stipulated that in West 
Bandung development of housing, trade, and services should be limited.39
35 The media reported that Kebonjeruk consisted of 393-434 and Ciroyom of 1,042-1,200 
houses. See ‘Soal Rencana Pembangunan Superblok di Tanah PT KAI, Warga Tuntut 
Wali Kota Turun Tangan’, Kompas, 18 May 2004; ‘PT KA Minta Kesadaran Warga Kem-
balikan Tanahnya’, Kompas, 17 May 2004; ’PT KAI Tak Berkewajiban Bayar Ganti Rugi, 
Warga Kebon Jeruk Tolak “Superblock”’, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 May 2004. It is hard to esti-
mate the exact number of people that resided on the land because some residents had 
not formally registered at the City Quarter office and/or were circular migrants. The 
number mentioned here was derived from media reports. See ‘Ratusan Warga Ciroyom 
Demo PT KAI Bandung’, Detik, 14 May 2004; ‘Bandung Squatters Reject Eviction’, Jakar-
ta Post, 15 May 2004; ‘Penyewa Lahan PT KA Demo’, Pikiran Rakyat, 15 May 2004; 
‘Paskal Hyper Square Didemo Warga’, Detik, 24 January 2007.
36 Personal communication of two residents of Ciroyom, Bandung, 11 August 2008 and 14 
August 2008 respectively.
37 ‘Warga Tolak Pembangunan Bandung Gudang PT KA’, Republika, 17 April 2004.
38 Letter of the Mayor of Bandung No. 340/252.7-Bappeda, dated 12 November 2002.
39 Letter of the Mayor of Bandung No. 593/1766-Bappeda, dated 28 June 2004; Art. 14(2), 
under c Bylaw of Bandung Municipality No. 2/2004.
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7.4.2 Land clearance in Kebonjeruk
In order to facilitate the land clearance process, PT KAI and PT CBP formed 
a land clearance team (Tim Terpadu Pengosongan Lahan Ex. Emplasemen 
Stasiun Bandung Gudang), which consisted of employees of both compa-
nies.40 In May 2003 this team ‘socialised’ their plan among local officials 
and community leaders. It underlined that residents were under contrac-
tual obligation to give up the land. They should in fact be grateful that they 
had been allowed to reside on the land for such a long time at such low cost 
and were certainly not entitled to any compensation. Yet ‘out of humanity’ 
the developer offered a nonnegotiable sum of assistance/sympathy mon-
ey (uang santunan) of Rp. 60,000/m2 for non-permanent, Rp. 110,000/m2 
for semi-permanent, and Rp. 210,000/m2 for permanent buildings (about 
US$ 6–21/m2).41
Although residents felt pressure to accept the developers’ offer, most 
immediately rejected it. They did not want to give up the land on which 
some people had been residing for more than 50 years, let alone “for the 
realisation of a commercial project that only benefited the elite.”42 Besides, 
residents were generally of the opinion that the offer was too low as it did 
not enable them to buy a comparable dwelling.43 They were also afraid to 
lose their source of income. Some of the residents were willing to move, 
provided that they received real compensation instead of nominal ‘assist-
ance/sympathy money’. This could come in the form of cash or new 
accommodation. Those who wanted money asked for compensation many 
times higher than the ‘assistance/sympathy money’ offered, namely 
Rp. 1-1.5 million/m2 (about US$ 100-150/m2).44
To enforce their claims, the residents established a community associa-
tion called the People’s Aspiration Team (Tim Aspirasi Masyarakat), consist-
ing of a large group of formal and informal community leaders. The team 
soon started to organise street protests, which were initially aimed at con-
vincing the developer to cancel the project altogether. When this proved 
unfeasible, the Team organised street protests to get support from the 
municipal government, the Municipal Council, and, through the media, 
the wider public. At this stage the residents proved sufficiently unified to 
40 ‘Ex. Stasiun Bandunggudang Untuk KSO’, article from website of PT KAI, 16 April 
2004; ‘Warga Tolak Pembangunan Bandung Gudang PT KA’, Republika, 17 April 2004.
41 ‘Takut Digusur, Warga Resah’, Pikiran Rakyat, 14 April 2004; ‘Ex. Stasiun Bandunggu-
dang Untuk KSO’, article from website of PT KAI, 16 April 2004; ‘PT KAI Tak Berkewa-
jiban Bayar Ganti Rugi, Warga Kebon Jeruk Tolak “Superblock”’, Pikiran Rakyat, 29 May 
2004.
42 ‘Penyewa Lahan PT KA Demo’, Pikiran Rakyat, 15 May 2004; ‘Soal Rencana Pembangun-
an Superblok di Tanah PT KAI, Warga Tuntut Wali Kota Turun Tangan’, Kompas, 18 May 
2004; ‘Jika Penggusuran untuk “Superblock” Dilanjutkan, Warga Kebonjeruk Ancam 
Gelar Tenda di Atas Rel’, Pikiran Rakyat, 4 June 2004.
43 ‘Penyewa Lahan PT KA Demo’, Pikiran Rakyat, 15 May 2004.
44 ‘Warga Tolak Pembangunan Bandung Gudang PT KA’, Republika, 17 April 2004.
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organise as a group. They did not look for assistance from NGOs or the 
student movement. Nor did the latter offer assistance.
The team felt that litigation was no option. As a former Neighbourhood 
Head argued: “People do not have ownership rights. They know if it 
becomes a legal process they will lose. Then the judge will ask: ‘where is 
your certificate?’”45 In their protests, residents also avoided legal discourse. 
So instead of referring to a right to compensation, the residents legitimated 
their demands by pointing to the hardship they would have to cope with if 
the developer did not offer real compensation.
There were grounds for litigation though. It was rumoured that PT KAI 
had never taken the trouble of obtaining an official state management right 
(hak pengelolaan) on the land concerned, on which the colonial ‘Staatsspoor-
wegen’ used to have European land rights. As discussed in Chapter 4, Pres-
idential Decision No. 32/1979 sets a time limit for the registration of former 
European rights; all of those should have been registered before 1980. If 
not, the land reverts back to the domain of the state.46 Kampong dwellers 
occupying such state land have in principle a priority right over third par-
ties to request a (new) land right. As far as PT KAI did hold an official state 
management right on the land, it arguably qualified as neglected land. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, land qualifies as neglected land if it is deliberately 
not used in accordance with its physical condition or with the form and 
goal of the right to which it is subject or not well taken care of. Rights to 
land that is classified as neglected land, become forfeited, after which the 
land reverts back to the domain of the state and kampong dwellers occupy-
ing such land can request new land rights.47
The protests were widely covered by the media, but did not provoke 
the public response residents were hoping for. Several members of the 
Municipal Council called upon the municipal government not to issue the 
permits required for construction activities until the negotiations had end-
ed and offered to support residents in the negotiations. Residents were 
sceptical about their intentions though. The municipal government ulti-
mately did nothing beyond making false promises. The Mayor said he 
would construct tenement buildings for the residents, but this proposal 
never materialised. He did also not respond to the call of members of the 
Municipal Council to postpone the issuance of permits.
Despite the lack of support, residents managed to delay the land clear-
ance process. In order to avoid any further delays, PT CBP adopted a new 
strategy. First, it decided to clear the land in successive stages. The first 
stage involved land clearance in Kebonjeruk for the construction of the 
shop houses (first zone); the second and third stages involved land clear-
45 Personal communication of a former Neighbourhood Head, Bandung, 11 August 2008.
46 Art. 1 and 5 Presidential Decision No. 32/1979 in conjunction with Art. 55(1) Law No. 
5/1960.
47 Art. 3, 4, 8 Government Regulation No. 36/1998 in conjunction with Art. 27(a, under 3), 
34(e), and 40(e) BAL.
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ance in Ciroyom for the construction of the apartments (second zone) and 
hotel (third zone) respectively. Next, the developer subjected the residents 
of Kebonjeruk to divide-and-rule and intimidation practices. The develop-
er sidelined the People’s Aspiration Team by secretly commencing direct 
negotiations with individual residents. It particularly focused on influen-
tial residents, who were offered high compensation and also cash, a motor-
cycle, and even a house if they convinced other residents to give up their 
land.48 Residents were harassed – typically at night – by people visiting 
them and telling them in an intimidating manner that they should give up 
their land, but they were not physically harmed. Several residents claimed 
they faced demands to sign a blank paper, which they had refused.49 
Employees of PT CBP, their front men, and members of the hoodlum group 
GIBAS were said to be responsible for these practices.50
The developer’s approach proved successful. Various influential resi-
dents were co-opted, and over time more residents were willing to negoti-
ate. Even members of the Forum started to back PT CBP. Several residents 
claimed that these Forum members had been bribed by the developer.51 
Under these conditions, community unity was replaced by an atmosphere 
of suspicion. By September 2004 land clearance in Kebonjeruk was accom-
plished, three months later than originally planned. To celebrate this, the 
CEO of PT KAI organised a special ceremony, at which occasion he thanked 
PT CBP for clearing the land and turning the area “into a more representa-
tive location.”52
Despite – or as PT CBP argued, as a result of – the residents’ resistance, 
compensation remained low. ‘Ordinary’ residents were offered ‘assistance/
sympathy money’ and, depending on their cooperativeness, a so-called 
bonus of about 30 per cent of that sum, and some other minor fees.53 Resi-
dents who needed time to move received part of the money and the rest as 
soon as their building had been demolished. The residents could choose to 
demolish their house themselves or leave this to PT CBP. In any event, they 
48 Personal communication of a resident of Kebonjeruk, Bandung, 17 July 2006; a local 
official, Bandung, 24 July 2006; and another resident of Kebonjeruk, Bandung, 26 July 
2006.
49 ‘Rumahnya Akan Dibangun Mal dengan Santunan Hanya Rp 250.000-m2 2.000 KK di 
Lahan Milik PT KAI Bandung’, Pelita, 25 October 2009. See also Ruling of the Bandung 
General District Court No. 424/PID/B/2008/PN.BDG discussed below.
50 Personal communication of a resident of Ciroyom, Bandung, 19 July 2006; another resi-
dent of Ciroyom, Bandung, 10 August 2008; a member of the People’s Protection Team, 
Bandung, 14 August 2008.
51 Personal communication of a former member of the Forum, Bandung, 19 July 2006. The 
former forum member acknowledged that he had received higher compensation than 
ordinary residents.
52 ‘Dirut PT KA Resmikan Proyek “Paskal Hyper Square”’, article from the website of PT 
KAI, 23 September 2004.
53 Personal communication of a resident of Ciroyom, Bandung, 11 July 2006; a resident of 
Kebonjeruk, Bandung, 26 July 2006; an associate of a legal aid organisation, Bandung, 
19 August 2008.
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were under the contractual obligation to leave within two weeks after the 
‘assistance/sympathy money’ had been paid.54
Obviously, the compensation was insufficient to buy another house at a 
similar location. Most people moved away to the outskirts of the city, such 
as Buah Batu, or out of Bandung to their place of origin, such as Banjaran, 
Padalarang, Cipatat, Soreang, Cicalengka, and Garut, where they could 
afford to live. Only a few households found accommodation in the vicinity 
– usually a rented house.55 Not surprisingly, all interviewed residents of 
Kebonjeruk felt victimised, as they lost their home and often also their live-
lihood, without receiving sufficient compensation to replace all this.
7.4.3 Land clearance in Ciroyom, second zone
In February 2005 PT CBP initiated the second stage of land clearance in 
Ciroyom. Initially, the process unfolded just as it had in Kebonjeruk. The 
developer held on to its offer to pay Rp. 60,000/m2 for temporary build-
ings, 110,000/m2 for semi-permanent and Rp. 210,000/m2 for permanent 
buildings (about US$ 6–21/m2).
Like the residents of Kebonjeruk, those of Ciroyom (again) rejected the 
offer. They renamed the community association to Kebonjeruk-Ciroyom 
Reject Eviction Forum (Forum Tolak Penggusuran Kebonjeruk-Ciroyom or 
Forum TPKC), consisting of new community leaders, and organised new 
street protests. Unlike what the name of the forum suggests, the residents 
realised it would be hard to prevent eviction. The main concern was now to 
obtain real compensation.
The street protests had some effect. Hearing about the negotiations in 
Ciroyom, the newly elected Municipal Council asked the municipal gov-
ernment not to issue the required permits for construction activities before 
the negotiations between PT CBP and the residents had been completed. 
One member of the Municipal Council, Aat Safaat Hodijat (Golkar), 
argued that although the residents were not the owners of the land, they 
should be protected. “Their compensation should not be too low, leaving 
people in misery,” he stated.56 The municipal government ignored this call, 
however.
Residents again refrained from litigation and avoided legal discourse. 
They acknowledged that legally they were in a weak position, but asked PT 
CBP to act on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The residents 
hoped they would have a better fate than those of Kebonjeruk, who were 
54 Personal communication of a resident of Kebonjeruk, Bandung, 17 July 2006; and a 
former community leader, Bandung, 11 August 2008.
55 Personal communication of a resident of Ciroyom, Bandung, 11 July 2006; and a resi-
dent of Kebonjeruk, Bandung, 26 July 2006.
56 ‘Pemkot Jangan Dulu Keluarkan IPPT’, Pikiran Rakyat, 22 February 2005.
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now living in further poverty. All they wanted were sufficient means to 
afford a similar place to live.57
Meanwhile PT CBP took up its divide-and-rule and intimidation prac-
tices again and with success. This time the role of hoodlum groups was 
limited – likely because their assistance had proved ineffective. As in 
Kebonjeruk, the developer found it easier to co-opt influential residents, 
including members of the Forum. Many people in consequence gave up 
their land, and by December 2005 only 47 households in the second zone, 
occupying in total 6,877 m2 of land, still refused to accept the offer of PT 
CBP.58
The last residents did not give up easily. As a replacement of the co-
opted Forum, they established the smaller People’s Rescue Team (Tim 
Penyelamat Warga), consisting of a handful of (new) neighbourhood heads.59 
It was formally registered as an association to avoid being accused of prov-
ocation. The Team also consisted of a ‘militia’ that coped with the police, 
the army, and hoodlums. It tried to negotiate a compensation rate of Rp 
800,000 (about US$ 80/m2) for all residents, irrespective of the quality of 
buildings or number of floors.60
When PT CBP failed to acquire the last plots of land, PT KAI requested 
the assistance of the Prosecutor-General of West-Java, Holius Hosen, to 
‘mediate’ in the dispute.61 He was willing to do so – some residents sus-
pected, because he had been bribed by the developer – and ordered family 
heads to discuss the matter.62 The order obviously worried the residents, 
who felt intimidated by the involvement of this new party. Still, about 10 
residents dared to reply with a refusal to attend.63 Other residents did 
attend, at which occasion they handed the Prosecutor-General a letter stat-
ing their willingness to give up the land, provided that they received prop-
er compensation. If no such compensation would be offered, they wanted 
to stay and lease the land from PT KAI or the developer for the price that 
they used to pay.64 The Prosecutor-General was not accommodating, how-
ever.
57 ‘Pembebasan Lahan Milik PT KA untuk “Superblock”, Warga Tuntut Santunan yang 
Wajar’, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 February 2005; ‘Pemkot Jangan Dulu Keluarkan IPPT’, Pikiran 
Rakyat, 22 February 2005.
58 ‘Kajati Jabar Diminta Tengahi Sengketa Tanah, Terkait Pengosongan Lahan Seluas 6,877 
m2’, Pikiran Rakyat, 14 December 2005.
59 Referring to the number of Neighborhood Heads of which the Team was composed, it 
was also called Team of Five (Tim Lima).
60 Personal communication of a member of the People’s Protection Team, Bandung, 14 
August 2008.
61 See Letter of the CEO of PT KAI No. HK-214/XII/2/KK-2005.
62 Personal communication of a member of the People’s Protection Team, Bandung, 14 
August 2008.
63 ‘Warga Ciroyom Resah Terima Surat dari Kajati’, Galamedia, 24 March 2006.
64 ‘Kajati Jabar Diminta Tengahi Sengketa Tanah, Terkait Pengosongan Lahan Seluas 6,877 
m2’, Pikiran Rakyat, 14 December 2005.
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Meanwhile, the residents continued with street protests. In March 2006, 
they gained support from members of the Provincial Assembly, who sent a 
letter to the Prosecutor-General, questioning the land clearance process. 
The Prosecutor-General replied that “the demand of residents for compen-
sation could not be agreed to, as there was no legal basis for it and there 
was no report of any transfer of right.”65 Apparently this answer satisfied 
the members of the Provincial Assembly; they undertook no further action.
Basically the Prosecutor-General’s ‘mediation’ effort failed. PT CBP 
thereupon reported residents to the police for unlawful land occupation, 
embezzlement/swindle, and slander. The developer also started civil pro-
ceedings against some residents, requesting a court order to demolish their 
houses. Some residents received a warning and an announcement that 
their houses would be demolished.
Faced with this new challenge, the residents started to look for support 
from legal aid organisations. As they were convinced that the dispute ulti-
mately could only be won by political means, however, they deliberately 
looked for party-affiliated legal aid organisations.66 The first organisation 
that assisted the residents was the legal aid organisation of the National 
Awakening Party (Lembaga Hukum dan HAM Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or 
Lakum HAM PKB). Later, the representative of PKB’s legal aid organisa-
tion was believed to be too close with the developer and was replaced by a 
commercial lawyer, who four months later was in turn replaced for the 
same reason by a legal aid organisation that has connections with the Indo-
nesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrat Indonesia-Perjuangan 
or PDI-P).
The legal aid organisations could not prevent residents being prosecut-
ed. In July 2006, a resident of Ciroyom was fined Rp. 25,000 (about US$ 2.5) 
and sentenced to five days imprisonment for unlawful occupation.67 Next, 
the local police, PT CBP, and members of GIBAS demolished his buildings, 
including a building that later turned out to be someone else’s. The action 
provoked fierce protests from residents and the perpetrators were reported 
to the Regional Police – to no avail.68 In September 2006, the house of anoth-
er resident was demolished, based on a court order in a civil proceeding of 
a year before.69
65 Letter of the West-Java Prosecutor-General No. B-1336/O.2/Gph/04/2006.
66 Personal communication of a member of the People’s Protection Team, 14 August 2008.
67 Ruling of the Bandung General District Court No. 282/CR/PID/2006/PN.BDG. The 
resident was condemned on the basis of Art. 6(1), under b Law No. 51/1960.
68 ‘Ratusan Warga Hadang Pembongkaran’, Seputar Indonesia, 15 May 2006; personal com-
munications of associates of GPI, 11 August 2008; a member of the People’s Protection 
Team, 14 August 2008.
69 The execution was covered by Metro TV, a national news channel. See ‘Eksekusi Rumah 
di Bandung Diwarnai Adu Mulut’, www.metrotvnews.com.
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The prosecutions did still not silence resisting residents. In 2007 they 
asked the support from the Islamic Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam 
or GPI), some of whose members were part of the kampong community. 
With their support, residents organised new street protests.70 For months 
negotiations were in a deadlock. The resisting residents of the second zone 
finally came to an agreement with PT CBP in August 2007. They received the 
compensation they had demanded of Rp. 800,000/m2 (about US$ 80/m2).71
Despite the agreement, as of mid-2008 PT CBP had not managed to 
clear all land in the second zone. One of the residents refused to demolish 
his house because he had only received the original ‘assistance/sympathy 
money’ offered and not the bonus the parties had finally negotiated. PT 
CBP reported the resident to the police, after which he was arrested, taken 
into pre-trial detention, and prosecuted for embezzlement and swindling.72 
The prosecutor demanded a sentence of one year imprisonment minus pre-
trial detention. The court concluded that the case was not of a criminal law, 
but of a private law nature, but that there was no contractual breach on the 
side of the resident, and therefore acquitted thim.73 Some believe that the 
political connections of the legal aid organisation contributed to this result, 
which its associates strongly deny.
7.4.4 Land clearance in Ciroyom, third zone
Before completing land clearance in the first and second zones, PT CBP had 
already been acquiring some land in the third zone. Nonetheless, to the end 
of 2007 many of the 183 households or about 1,600 people had not given up 
their land. With the support of GPI, the remaining residents continued with 
street protests, although solidarity remained fragile. Suspected of being too 
close with the developer, several members of the People’s Rescue Team 
were removed.74
With the elections coming up in 2008, residents adopted a new strategy. 
In April 2008, the residents of the third zone announced they would lodge 
blank votes in the West-Java Governor elections. They blamed the candi-
dates for having no moral commitment to their fate.75 The threat had little 
effect. One of the candidates promised to visit the community, but did not 
70 ‘Paskall HyperSquare Didemo Warga’, Detik, 24 January 2007.
71 Personal communications: associates of GPI, 11 August 2008; member of the People’s 
Protection Team, 14 August 2008.
72 Art. 372 and 378 of the Penal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana).
73 Ruling of the Bandung General District Court No. 424/PID/B/2008/PN.BDG. The 
Public Prosecutor filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, thus bypassing the Court 
of Appeal. At the time of writing, a ruling is still awaited.
74 Personal communications, two members of the People’s Protection Team, 14 August 
2008.
75 ‘Warga RW 01 Ciroyom Pilih Golput’, Tribun Jabar, 11 April 2008; ‘Rumah Digusur, 
Ribuan Warga Ciroyom Ancam Golput di Pilkada’, Detik, 11 April 2008; ‘Selama Ini ami 
Tak Terdengar’, Tribun Jabar, 12 April 2008.
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keep his promise. Later it turned out that the action was not supported by 
all residents; a majority actually did vote.76
In August 2008 the remaining residents of Ciroyom threatened to lodge 
blank votes in the mayoral elections. This time, the candidates took the res-
idents’ threat seriously. Two of the three candidates visited the community, 
including the incumbent candidate, Dada Rosada. Notably, his partner can-
didate for Vice-Mayor was Ayi Vivananda, one of the founders of the legal 
aid organisation that supported the community. On that occasion Dada 
Rosada finally promised not to issue permits required for the construction 
activities to PT CBP in both the second and third zones until the negotia-
tions had been completed.77
The latest strategy of the residents of Ciroyom finally seems successful. 
PT CBP has realised the Paskal Hyper Square project in the first zone, where 
it has built a shopping mall and shop houses. Most shop houses, sized 60-105 
m2, have been sold at Rp 1-1,815 billion (about US$ 100,000-181,500) each 
– a square meter price of up to 288 times the ‘sympathy/assistance mon-
ey’ some residents were offered and still 21 times the compensation some 
resisting residents received.78 At the time of writing construction activi-
ties in the second zone have yet to begin. Land clearance in the third zone 
continued for several month, but stopped in the course of 2009. The future 
of the project is uncertain. It seems that Dada Rosada, who won the elec-
tions, has kept his word not to issue the required permits. Furthermore, it is 
rumoured that business partners of PT CBP have been scared off by the long, 
difficult, and relatively costly land clearance process. In any event, in view 
of the sobering experiences in this ‘model’ project, developers may have 
lost interest in initiating other projects on railway land in the near future.
7.5 Commercial land clearance, tenure security, and the rule 
of law
Post-New Order commercial land clearance practices in Bandung show 
that the legal and de facto tenure security of low-income kampong dwell-
ers, particularly if they are informal landholders, remain limited. They still 
risk involuntary removal, without due process of law and payment of 
proper compensation. At the same time, they succeed in negotiating higher 
compensation than during the New Order years and forcing developers to 
(partly) cancel projects, which suggests that post-New Order reforms have 
benefited low-income kampong dwellers who are confronted with a devel-
oper wishing to clear land.
76 ‘Ancaman Ribuan Warga Ciroyom Golput Tak Terbukti’, Detik, 13 April 2008.
77 Personal communications, two members of the People’s Protection Team, 14 August 
2008.
78 Data derived from developer’s brochure, on file with the author.
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Aside from positive changes, Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/ 
1999 again creates an ineffective mechanism to monitor commercial land 
clearance and enforce related norms. In addition, many landholders cannot 
benefit from any of the regulation’s potentially protective provisions, as it 
refers to an extensive list of commercial land clearance cases in which no 
site permit is required. In any event, District-Heads and Mayors, who were 
required to regulate further details on the location permit procedure, felt 
free to depart from the regulation’s intent.
Apparently it is still common for authorities to issue permits that are 
not in accordance with spatial plans. This was already illustrated by the 
Punclut case discussed in Chapter 5. Site permits were issued for real estate 
development in this protected conservation and water catchment area 
before the General Spatial Plan, which did not allow such development 
activities, had been revised. The General Spatial Plan was actually revised 
to legalise these site permits. In case of the development of the Paskal 
Hyper Square no site permit was required, but the ‘permit in principle’ that 
was extended in June 2004 was in fact not in accordance with the revised 
General Spatial Plan, which stipulated that in West Bandung development 
of housing, trade, and services should be limited.
Developers also still commonly pressure the urban poor to give up 
their land, while offering low compensation. Aside from being subjected to 
divide-and-rule tactics by PT CBP, residents of Ciroyom were intimidated 
by members of the hoodlum organisation GIBAS. As noted in Chapter 5 
and 6, since the fall of Soeharto, new groups have emerged in Bandung. 
Some are affiliated with and supported by the municipal government or 
political parties, others are loyal to whomsoever is willing to pay. Many of 
these organisations are now involved in land related disputes, yet GIBAS 
has one of the most notorious reputations (Honna 2006:87-8).
Authorities fail to protect kampong dwellers against the above practices. 
Even when residents started to organise street protests and the media began 
to report the developer’s tactics pressuring residents to give up their land, 
the municipal government refused to offer support. It could have cancelled 
the developer’s ‘permit in principle’, as it did not fulfil prevailing legal 
requirements, such as paying residents proper compensation for buildings.
Authorities’ willingness to assist developers in commercial land clear-
ance can be explained by the fact that they have vested interests in the suc-
cess of development projects – particularly since the implementation of 
regional autonomy. By using its new permit granting authority, the munici-
pal government can redevelop kampongs it classifies as ‘slum areas’, an 
ambition expressed in the Municipality’s most recent General Spatial Plan 
(see Chapter 5).79 More importantly, because of the new fiscal relations 
79 See Art. 14(2c) By-law of Bandung Municipality No. 2/2004 on the General Spatial Plan 
of Bandung Municipality (Perda Kota Bandung No. 2/2004 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang 
Wilayah (RTRW) Kota Bandung).
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between Jakarta and the regions, the municipal government gains extra 
revenue from commercial land development. Issuing permits generate 
regional retributions in the form of Regionally Generated Revenues. 
Besides, commercial land development increases the value of land, which 
in turn yields increased government tax income. It also results in extra 
Regionally Generated Revenues through advertising, parking, hotel and 
restaurant taxes. This again shows that the effects of administrative decen-
tralisation and new fiscal relations between Jakarta and the regions are not 
necessarily positive. If democratic control fails, financial return is easily 
prioritised over social issues. Evidence is lacking, but corruption may play 
a role too. Issuing permits likely brings in extra-legal fees, which end up in 
the pockets of the municipal leaders, politicians, and officials.80 The involve-
ment of the Prosecutor-General also raises questions.
Indonesia’s new local democracy – also fostered by political decentrali-
sation – partly compensates for the previously discussed state of affairs. 
Kampong dwellers now dare to resist commercial land clearance. The resi-
dents of Ciroyom organised street protests and used their right to vote to 
put political pressure on the executive. These acts were covered by the 
media, albeit only in the initial stage of the protests and not extensively. 
The Municipal Council and Provincial Assembly gave some support. In an 
interview, several members of the Municipal Council said they often han-
dled commercial land clearance cases they considered ‘inhumane’. Their 
support is what one member of the Municipal Council called “legal protec-
tion by political means.”81 However, some residents were suspicious about 
their intentions, which, considering the continuous reports on legislative 
corruption, does not come as a surprise. In any event, the influence of the 
Municipal Council and Provincial Assembly was limited vis-à-vis the exec-
utive. The Mayor was only willing to act when he risked losing votes.
The student movement remained absent, as initially did (rights-orient-
ed) NGOs. In this case, a religious youth organisation served as champions 
protecting the little people (rakyat kecil). Rights-oriented NGOs only 
became involved after the residents asked for support. Notably, these legal 
aid organisations were party-affiliated. Subsequent resistance was more 
successful, but it remains unclear to what extent their political connections 
have contributed to this.
The residents did not initially opt for a litigation strategy and even 
avoided legal discourse. Instead, they presented their demand for better 
compensation as a moral claim. By doing so, residents put themselves in a 
vulnerable position, depending ultimately on political favouritism. Resi-
80 See also Pemerintah Kota Bandung 2004b, a joint research project of the Municipal 
Research and Development Office (Kantor Penelitian & Pengembangan) and a consultan-
cy firm in which the problem of corruption in relation to permits is explicitly acknowl-
edged.
81 Personal communication of members of the Bandung Municipal Council, 20 December 
2004.
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dents’ choice of this approach is understandable, particularly given the 
level of reputed corruption in the judicial system. There are indications that 
they were unaware of the full extent of their rights. But the deliberate 
choice to ally with NGOs that had political connections indicates that resi-
dents had little trust in the law and legal institutions.
The residents’ lack of trust in the law and legal institutions was soon 
affirmed. The military are no longer (directly) involved in land clearance, 
but the police, the public prosecutor, and even the Prosecutor-General 
proved willing to lend their coercive force to developers. Residents were 
intimidated by warnings, threats, and orders to report. Some became vic-
tims of arrest and prosecution. On the basis of Law No. 51/1960 on the use 
of land without permission of the right holder, several people were sen-
tenced to fines and imprisonment and their property was destructed. 
Reports of unlawful acts by the developer and the police were ignored.
Despite these countervailing forces, the resistance garnered by the resi-
dents of Ciroyom was relatively successful. Negotiation eventually led to 
improved compensation and eventually the Paskal Hyper Square project 
was partly cancelled. Ultimately, compensation still remained below the 
social and economic value of the land and buildings. As a result, most resi-
dents moved away to the outskirts of the city or out of Bandung to their 
place of origin. It is unclear what are their living conditions, but consider-
ing the distance from labour opportunities, it is likely that these conditions 
have further declined.
A final question that rises is whether Paskal Hyper Square forms a rep-
resentative case for the practice of commercial land clearance in the Post-
New Order for (urban) Indonesia. This is difficult to say; as far as known, 
no research has been conducted on this topic. However, considering the 
fact that, as discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, there are regional differences in 
practices of spatial planning and land clearance by the state, it is likely that 
this is also the case in relation to commercial land clearance, particularly as 
far as the role of district/municipal governments in this process is con-
cerned. At the same time, it is likely that despite these regional differences, 
involuntary removal without due process of law and adequate compensa-
tion is still common.
Recently, new legislation has been enacted that may have a positive 
effect for low-income kampong dwellers who are confronted by developers 
wishing to clear that land on commercial land clearance. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, in April 2007 a new Spatial Management Law was enacted. On 
the basis of Article 73 of this law, officials issuing permits that are not in 
accordance with spatial plans can now be sentenced to maximum five 
years imprisonment or fined up to Rp. 500 billion (about US$ 50 million) 
besides being dishonourably discharged. This stipulation may lead to 
stricter compliance in the issuance of (site) permits. In addition, the new 
legislation guaranteeing the right to subsidised legal aid and the establish-
ment of the Task Force for the Eradication of Judicial Mafia, discussed in 
Chapter 6, may also benefit landholders who wish to seek legal remedies. 
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Finally, the National Strategy on Access to Justice will lead to further 
reforms, which may also have an effect on commercial land clearance.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the changing law and practice of commercial 
urban land clearance in the New Order and the Post-New Order. During the 
New Order, the legal basis for commercial clearance changed frequently. 
Basically, however, legislation created a permit system, in which the loca-
tion permit was central; allowing a developer to start negotiations with 
landholders in a designated area on the basis of traditional deliberation. 
After the 1980s, two developments occurred. First, as part of a policy to 
stimulate oil-independent growth, the New Order regime introduced a 
series of deregulation policies, which contributed to commercial land devel-
opment becoming one of the country’s prime investment sectors. Second, as 
part of its policy of ‘openness’, the regime took measures purportedly to 
protect landholders. The measures held only a weak imperative, since there 
was no provision for authorities to impose severe sanctions against compa-
nies that failed to meet their obligations to landholders. In practice kam-
pong dwellers were forced by developers, who could generally rely on the 
government’s support, to give up their land for low compensation. Though 
repression was strong, some kampong dwellers dared to resist the above 
practices – particularly after 1989, when the period of political openness set 
in. In doing so, they rarely got support from rights-oriented NGOs and the 
student movement, which had little interest in commercial clearance of 
urban kampong land. If NGOs and the student movement happened to 
have an interest in a case, they often became important intermediaries in 
translating land claims into legal and political action. Yet, the results of 
resistance by the urban poor were generally disappointing.
The reforms that were implemented after 1998 were also related to 
commercial land clearance law. Several circular letters suggested a new 
stance of the government toward commercial land clearance. They did not, 
however, ultimately lead to better protection of landholders confronted 
with developer wishing to clear their land. This is mainly due to the enact-
ment of Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999. Apart from posi-
tive changes, it again creates an ineffective mechanism to monitor commer-
cial land clearance and enforce related norms. In addition, many 
landholders cannot benefit from any of the regulation’s potentially protec-
tive provisions, as it refers to an extensive list of commercial land clearance 
activities for which no site permit is required. In any event, District-Heads 
and Mayors, who were required to regulate further details on the location 
permit procedure, felt free to depart from the regulation’s intent.
The Pascal Hyper Square case shows that, just as in case of land clear-
ance by the state, in case of commercial land clearance kampong dwellers 
still risk involuntary removal without due process of law or proper com-
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pensation. Commercial developers particularly appear interested in land 
that is held informally, such as land alongside railway tracks. They contin-
ue to pressure the urban poor to give up their land at low compensation 
levels. However, kampong dwellers now sometimes succeed in forcing 
developers to cancel projects or to negotiate higher compensation than dur-
ing the New Order years. Such compensation still remains below the social 
and economic value of the land and buildings, which means commercial 
land clearance has adverse consequences for kampong dwellers in terms of 
work and income.
Instead of protecting kampong dwellers against the practices of devel-
opers, the authorities actually assist them. Because of regional autonomy 
and, possibly, KKN, they have a clear interest in the success of develop-
ment projects. Indonesia’s new local democracy partly compensates for 
these conditions. Kampong dwellers dare to resist commercial land clear-
ance through political mobilisation, organising street protests and even 
using the right to vote to put political pressure on the executive. Kampong 
dwellers call in party-affiliated legal aid organisations, but legal strategies 
are avoided. Despite regular countervailing forces, this strategy proves rel-
atively successful.
Meanwhile, new legislation has been enacted that could have a positive 
impact on commercial land clearance practices. A stipulation in the newly 
enacted 2007 Spatial Management Law imposes sanctions to officials who 
issue permits that are not in accordance with spatial plans. This stipulation 
may lead to stricter compliance in the issuance of (site) permits. In addi-
tion, the new legislation guaranteeing the right to subsidised legal aid and, 
finally, the National Strategy on Access to Justice is expected to lead to fur-




As discussed in Chapter 1, according to the dominant approach to the pro-
vision of tenure security to the urban poor, referred to as the ‘functional 
approach’, land registration can be functional in fulfilling various develop-
ment goals. To shortly repeat this line of reasoning, formal landholders are 
believed to enjoy legal tenure security and thus perceive to have less possi-
bility of involuntary removal than informal landholders, and if involuntary 
removal occurs, they have a greater possibility to receive proper compensa-
tion. Furthermore, it is suggested that land registration could contribute to, 
for instance, housing consolidation. After all, it is likely that landholders 
who perceive to have less risk of involuntary removal invest more in their 
land than if they perceive this risk to be higher. Land registration may also 
enable the land market and improve access to credit. The land certificate 
makes land easy to transfer and can be used as a collateral. Housing con-
solidation, an enabled land market and improved access to credit may in 
turn contribute to slum eradication, poverty alleviation, and social justice.
Although land registration programmes continue to be implemented in 
(urban) Indonesia on a large scale, few evaluations have been conducted on 
the effects of land registration with regard to perceived tenure security, 
housing consolidation, enabled land markets, and access to credit. The 
existing research consists of two World Bank assigned evaluations of the 
Land Administration Project (LAP) by Hardjono (1999) and Smeru (2002), 
already discussed in Chapter 4, and an independent study by Winayanti 
and Lang (2002).2 The studies give valuable insights into the effects of land 
registration and alternatives on perceived tenure security and housing con-
solidation, but all three have methodological limitations. First, one could 
question whether the effects of the LAP would be discernible immediately 
after (Hardjono 1999) or just three years after (Smeru 2002) the programme 
was implemented; particularly with regard to housing consolidation, 
which requires significant financial resources. Second, the study by Winay-
1 I wish to express my gratitude to Jean-Louis van Gelder, who assisted me with the anal-
ysis of the survey data. An earlier version of this chapter was published as Reerink, 
G.O. & J.L. van Gelder (2010), ‘Land Titling, Perceived Tenure Security, and Housing 
Consolidation in the Kampongs of Bandung, Indonesia’, Habitat International 34(1), 
p. 78-85.
2 The study by Winayanti and Lang (2002) was based on qualitative research in the low-
income kampong Penas Tanggul, in City-Quarter Cipinang Besar Selatan in East Jakarta.
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anti and Lang (2002) concentrated on a single kampong, which may or may 
not have been representative of the broader situation. The studies by Hard-
jono and Winayanti and Lang were also entirely qualitative, and lacked a 
statistical basis to assess accurately the significance of any apparent 
impacts of land registration on perceived tenure security and housing con-
solidation. Although Smeru (2002) did conduct a more representative and 
quantitative study, as in Hardjono’s (1999) study no distinction was made 
between semi-formal and informal tenure, thus ignoring potential differ-
ences in effects of land registration on these two tenure categories.
The present chapter builds on the studies mentioned above, examining 
the relations between tenure category, perceived tenure security and hous-
ing consolidation using the results of the survey that was conducted in 
seven kampongs in Bandung.3 It thus assesses whether land registration 
and particularly land registration programmes, in their present set-up, 
strengthen the perceived tenure security of kampong dwellers and contrib-
ute to housing consolidation.
The chapter is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the 
perceived tenure security of Bandung’s urban poor by looking at their per-
ceived legitimacy of tenure, their perceived possibility of involuntary 
removal, and their perceived possibility to receive compensation entitled 
to. Section 8.3 focuses on the changed perceptions of tenure security since 
the end of the New Order. The correlations between tenure category, per-
ceived tenure security, and housing consolidation are assessed in Section 
8.4, after which the chapter concludes.
8.2 Tenure status and perceived tenure security
In relation to the effects of land registration on perceived tenure security, 
the two World Bank assigned evaluations are rather positive. According to 
Hardjono (1999), participants of the LAP “almost invariably said that they 
feel more secure about their rights to land.” This perception could be relat-
ed in large part to a decrease in ‘external’ threats: participants argued that 
“there is now no possibility of [them] being evicted from their land against 
their will for development projects of any kind” (Hardjono 1999:30). 
According to Smeru (2002), about 70 per cent of the participants believed 
that they now enjoyed greater tenure security, “as a land certificate now 
recognises their ownership rights” (Smeru 2002:25-6).
3 Participants with formal tenure included landholders who had registered their land 
through a land registration programme and who had registered their land themselves. 
As all survey results discussed in this chapter were identical for both these categories of 
participants, they were combined into a single category.
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Winayanti and Lang (2002) argue that perceived tenure security does 
not always have to be based on property title, but that there are alterna-
tives. The semi-formal and informal landholders in the kampong in East 
Jakarta where they conducted their research perceived their tenure to be 
relatively secure because of a government policy of condoning non-formal 
tenure and providing public services, in conjunction with a high level and 
unity of community organisation and the support that landholders 
received from civil society groups. Yet, despite having de facto tenure secu-
rity, these landholders were still hoping for legal recognition to further 
strengthen their tenure security (Winayanti & Lang 2002).
All of the above studies used a single indicator to assess the perceived 
tenure security of the different types of landholders in kampongs. To get a 
better understanding of the correlations between tenure status and per-
ceived tenure security, in the current research we considered the differences 
of perceived tenure security between the three tenure categories by using 
three indicators: we asked respondent landholders about perceived legiti-
macy of tenure, perceived possibility of involuntary removal, and per-
ceived possibility to receive proper compensation. We also asked them 
about changed perceptions of tenure security since the end of the New 
Order. What follows is a discussion of the results.
8.2.1 Perceived legitimacy of tenure
The first indicator of perceived tenure security refers to the perceived legit-
imacy of tenure – that is, whether landholders think that the authorities 
agree with them residing on the land they occupy. Participants’ responses 
to this question are presented in Table 8.1, and indicate that a higher per-
centage of both formal and semi-formal landholders believed that the 
authorities agreed with their residence than did informal landholders (90 
per cent for formal and semi-formal landholders versus 70 per cent for 
informal landholders).4 The results indicate that landholders falling into a 
legally stronger tenure category have stronger convictions that the authori-
ties agree with their residence, while landholders with informal tenure are 
less confident of agreement, and more likely reply ‘maybe agrees’. Yet it is 
noteworthy that a large majority of informal landholders still thought that 
the authorities agreed with their residence, and that the difference between 
formal and semi-formal households is negligible.
4 Results from the Chi-square test indicate that, with respect to perceptions about gov-
ernment agreement (that government agreed with residence, maybe agreed, or did not 
agree), relative frequencies of the three answers were significantly different between 
tenure categories (χ2 = 27.142, df = 4, p < .001).
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Yes 88.9% 91.6% 70.1%
Maybe 7.1% 5.3% 26.4%
No 4.0% 3.2% 3.5%
Note: a n = 100, b n = 95, c n = 145
Participants who reported that the authorities agreed with their residence 
were asked why they believed this to be the case. As Table 8.2 shows, the 
possession of land related documentation was the primary reason given by 
most formal landholders (91.2 per cent). The possession of such documen-
tation was also mentioned as a primary reason given by a large percentage 
of semi-formal (66.7 per cent) and, surprisingly, informal landholders (47.2 
per cent). For semi-formal and informal landholders, the length of occupa-
tion (which according to Winayanti and Lang can contribute to de facto ten-
ure security) was another important reason to believe that the authorities 
agreed with their residence (around one third of the respondents). Servic-
ing (another factor often assumed to contribute to de facto security) was 
much less frequently mentioned (less than 5 per cent of respondents across 
tenure categories).








Because I have land related 
documentation 91.2% 66.7% 47.2%
Because I have been  
occupying this land for a 
long time 4.4% 31.1% 36.8%
Because the authorities 
provide public services 3.3% 2.2% 4.7%
Other 1.1% 0% 11.3%
Note: a n = 91, b n = 90, c n = 106
8.2.2 Perceived possibility of involuntary removal
As a second indicator, participants were asked whether they believed there 
was a possibility of involuntary removal within the next five years. As 
Table 8.3 shows, both formal and semi-formal landholders perceived a pos-
sibility of involuntary removal, but much less often than did informal land-
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holders.5 It should however be noted that more than 76 per cent of the 
informal landholders perceived no possibility of involuntary removal 
within the next five years, despite their informality.







Possibility 5.3% 6.9% 23.6%
No possibility 94.7% 93.1% 76.4%
Note: a n = 100, b n = 95, c n = 145
We asked those landholders who thought involuntary removal was possi-
ble to specify what they believed might cause it. Land clearance by the state 
for development in the public interest was most often mentioned by all 
types of landholders. In addition, land clearance by developers was men-
tioned by several semi-formal landholders, and land clearance (by authori-
ties) for occupying land without permission from the title holder was men-
tioned by several informal landholders. These findings demonstrate that 
involuntary removal is perceived by landholders from all tenure categories 
to be driven primarily by the state.
8.2.3 Perceived possibility to receive compensation entitled to
As a final indicator, participants were asked whether in case of involuntary 
removal, they believed they would receive the compensation assumed to be 
entitled to according to law. As Table 8.4 shows, a higher percentage of for-
mal landholders perceived they would receive such compensation than 
semi-formal and informal landholders.6 It should however be noted that 
more than 89 per cent of semi-formal and 87 per cent of the informal land-
holders also perceived to receive such compensation.








Yes 98 % 89.4 % 87.2 %
No 2 % 10.6 % 12.8 %
Note: a n = 100, b n = 94, c n = 141
5 Results of the Chi-square test indicate that the difference in perceived security between 
tenure categories is significant (χ2 = 19.908, df = 2 p < .001).
6 Results of the Chi-square test indicate that the difference in perceived security between 
tenure categories is significant (χ2 = 8.771, df = 2 p < .001).
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Notably, the survey also reveals that landholders have wrong assumptions 
about the compensation they are entitled to according to law. A high per-
centage of semi-formal (87 per cent) and even informal landholders (44.1 
per cent) believed that they were entitled to full compensation for land and 
buildings. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, in case of land clearance for 
development in the public interest, the first category of landholders are 
only entitled to up to 90 per cent of the compensation received by formal 
landholders and as for the second category of landholders, the determina-
tion of compensation is at the discretion of the Mayor. Their perceived ten-
ure security is thus further strengthened by a lack of knowledge about for-
mal compensation rates.
8.3 Changed perceptions of tenure security since the end of the 
New Order
The survey also included questions on participants’ changed perceptions 
of tenure security since the end of the New Order. So participants were 
asked how according to them, the possibility of involuntary removal and 
the possibility to receive proper compensation had changed since the end 
of the New Order. As Table 8.5 shows, of all categories of landholders most 
believed the possibility of involuntary removal was still the same. How-
ever, they had a tendency to believe that this possibility had become bigger.







Possibility is smaller 16 % 14.6 % 14.4 %
Possibility is the same 43.6 % 48.3 % 46.2 %
Possibility is bigger 40.4 % 37.1 % 39.4 %
Note: a n = 94, b n = 89, c n = 132
As Table 8.6 shows, at the same time all categories of landholders believed 
the possibility to receive proper compensation in case of involuntary 
removal had become bigger.








Possibility is smaller 7.3 % 3.2 % 9.6 %
Possibility is same 37.5 % 38.3 % 48.6 %
Possibility is bigger 55.2 % 58.5 % 41.8 %
Note: a n = 96, b n = 94, c n = 146
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8.4 Housing consolidation
To investigate whether investment in housing (as indicated by the level of 
housing consolidation) was associated with tenure status, we tested for dif-
ferences in the means of housing consolidation scores between tenure cate-
gories. Housing consolidation was measured on the basis of a composite 
score which represented the quality of the three defining elements of a 
dwelling; namely the floor, the walls and roof. For each element a three-
point index of consolidation was used, with a score of 1 indicating low con-
solidation, and 3 representing high. The scores were combined into a com-
posite score that could range from 3 (indicating low consolidation) to 9 
(indicating high consolidation).
As Table 8.7 shows, there were differences in levels of housing consoli-
dation between the different tenure categories.7 The results confirm the 
findings discussed in Chapter 2, namely that in general, houses in kam-
pongs in Bandung are already reasonably consolidated. At the same time a 
distinction can be made between houses of formal, semi-formal, and infor-
mal landholders. Landholders in formal tenure situations lived in more 
consolidated housing than informal landholders.8 There were, however, no 
significant differences in degree of housing consolidation between formal 
and semi-formal landholders. The difference between semi-formal and 
informal landholders was marginally significant.9
The question rises whether these differences in degree of housing con-
solidation between tenure categories cannot be explained by other factors, 
such as differences in household income. There were indeed such differ-
ences. Formal landholders had significantly higher incomes than informal 









M (SD) 8.78 (.52) * 8.56 (.80) */** 8.32 (1.00) **
Household income (x 1,000)2
M (SD) 1.730 (1.461) * 1.401 (1.211) */** 1.256 (1.255) **
Note: a n = 100, b n = 95, c n = 145 1 Rated as a score from 3 to 9, with 3 representing the lowest 
level of consolidation and 9 representing the highest ; 2 Household income in Indonesian 
Rupiahs (Rp. 10,000 ≈ USD 1); *, ** Means in the same row that do not share a superscript 
asterisk differ at p <.01.
7 F(2, 337) = 9.420, p < .001).
8 Tukey’s HSD, p < .001.
9 p = .071.
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landholders, but again no significant differences in income were found 
between formal and semi-formal landholders, nor between semi-formal 
and informal landholders.10
As a final step in the analysis we employed a regression analysis, using 
legal tenure category, perceived possibility of involuntary removal, and 
household income as predictors of housing consolidation, to be able to 
determine the unique contribution of each predictor to levels of housing 
consolidation (Table 8.8).11
Table 8.8 Regression of tenure category, perceived possibility of involuntary removal, 
household income on housing consolidation
Predictor variables B SE B ß
Tenure category
– Formal vs. semi-formal
.18 .12 .10
– Formal vs. informal .37 .11  .22**
Perceived possibility involuntary 
removal
.32 .12  .14*
Household income .07 .00  .15**
Note. R = .30, R2 = .09, SE (.82); * p < .05, ** p < .01
For tenure category, the regression analysis confirms the findings present-
ed in Table 8.7: dwellers with formal tenure live in significantly more con-
solidated dwellings than do informal dwellers, but again no difference was 
found between formal and semi-formal dwellers. Therefore, formal land-
holders can be differentiated from informal landholders with respect to 
their level of investment in housing, but there were no such differences 
between formal and semi-formal landholders. The results also show the 
perceived possibility of involuntary removal is an independent indicator of 
housing consolidation that is not explained by legal category. At the same 
time the effect for tenure category on housing consolidation cannot be 
explained by differences in household income between tenure categories. 
In other words, formal landholders may invest more in their housing than 
informal landholders because of differences in tenure category, while irre-
spective of tenure category, landholders enjoying perceived tenure security 
and/or having (relatively) high household incomes may invest more in 
their housing than landholders enjoying less or no perceived tenure secu-
rity and/or having lower household incomes.
10 An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test demonstrated that these differences were signifi-
cant (F(2,337) = 3.939, p < .05). To examine potential differences between particular cate-
gories, post-hoc tests using Tukey’s HSD were employed. The results revealed significant 
differences in income only between the formal and informal tenure categories (p < .05).
11 Due to its categorical nature, tenure status was dummy-coded.
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8.5 Conclusion
This chapter assessed to what extent formal, semi-formal, and informal 
landholders in kampongs in Bandung enjoy perceived tenure security and 
looked at the effect of land registration (through land registration pro-
grammes) on housing consolidation. Registration programmes generally 
operate under the assumption that landholders with property title enjoy 
greater tenure security than landholders dealing with ‘extra-legal’ tenure 
situations, and as a result are also more willing to invest in their housing.
The perceived tenure security of landholders with a property title was 
higher than that of informal landholders. However, no such differences 
were found between landholders with title and semi-formal landholders. 
These findings, in combination with the observations that semi-formal 
(and informal) dwellers often cited their land related documentation and 
length of residence as reasons for the legitimacy of their tenure, support the 
idea that perceived tenure security is enhanced not only by land registra-
tion, but also by increasing de facto tenure security.
The perceived tenure security of landholders has changed since the end 
of the New Order. Of all categories of landholders most believed the possi-
bility of involuntary removal was still the same. Another large minority of 
landholders believed that this possibility had become bigger. At the same 
time of all categories of landholders most believed the possibility to receive 
proper compensation in case of involuntary removal had become bigger, 
with another large minority believing this possibility was still the same.
Several factors uniquely contribute to housing consolidation. Tenure 
category is a significant independent predictor. Landholders with formal 
tenure lived in somewhat more consolidated dwellings than those with 
informal tenure. But again, no significant differences were found between 
formal and semi-formal landholders. Perceived possibility of involuntary 
removal and household income are also significant independent predictors 
of housing consolidation. In other words, kampong dwellers with formal 
or semi-formal tenure, who enjoy a high level of perceived tenure security 
and/or have a high household income tend to invest more into their hous-
ing than those with informal tenure, who enjoy a lower level of perceived 
tenure security and/or have a lower income.

9.1 Introduction
This book has presented the results of a socio-legal study assessing to what 
extent Indonesia’s urban poor enjoy land tenure security under different 
tenure arrangements; particularly in the context of decentralisation and 
other post-New Order reforms to the rule of law. Given the weaknesses 
identified in some previous studies on tenure security, this study’s analyses 
distinguished explicitly between three categories of land tenure security, 
namely formal, semi-formal, and informal land tenure, based on the status 
of each of these arrangements according to state law. This study also distin-
guished between legal, de facto, and perceived tenure security. Fieldwork 
was conducted in Bandung, capital of West-Java Province and Indonesia’s 
third largest city (2.3 million inhabitants).
The first two sections of this final chapter summarise the main findings 
of the research, and address the study’s primary questions about land ten-
ure security under different tenure arrangements. The chapter then focuses 
on the study’s other research questions, including: the socio-economic ben-
efits of different approaches to obtaining tenure security under Indonesia’s 
contemporary rule of law environment (Section 9.4); policy recommenda-
tions to enhance tenure security for the urban poor (Section 9.5); and the 
study’s contributions to the international development debate on tenure 
security (Section 9.6). The final section gives suggestions for further 
research.
9.2 Land tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers
Bandung and Indonesian cities generally contend with a ‘challenge of urban 
poverty’ in the form of kampongs. Kampongs have developed mainly as a 
result of a combination of substantial migration flows and a failure of sub-
sequent governments to effectively regulate these settlements. Kampongs 
house low-income people, and are largely informal in terms of land tenure 
and land use. Most settlements are, however, reasonably consolidated. In 
addition, among and within these settlements there are various degrees of 
legality. Even so, conditions in kampongs remain adverse, and it is unlikely 
this will change in the future unless further measures are taken. In recogni-
tion of this challenge it is significant that the Indonesian government has 
formulated a National Strategy for Poverty Reduction, in which the right 
to adequate housing and the right to secure land tenure play a central role.
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The success of any approach to managing tenure security depends on 
the enforceability of property and/or human rights. This requires a rule of 
law environment, in which the urban poor are protected against arbitrary 
behaviour by the state or private parties. During the New Order period this 
was not the case. This period featured a combination of i) a ‘developmen-
talist’, central-authoritarian and frequently corrupt New Order state; ii) a 
(marginalised) BAL granting a strong role to that state; and iii) implement-
ing legislation which was either lacking or, as far as it was in place, reflect-
ed an extreme ‘integralist’ interpretation of key-concepts of the BAL. 
Together these resulted in the central government retaining strong discre-
tionary powers in the land sector, which could easily be abused in the name 
of ‘development’, and commonly were. After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, 
Indonesia initiated ambitious political and legal reforms. The right to ade-
quate housing is now explicitly acknowledged. Upon closer investigation, 
with respect to the land sector the reforms so far are disappointing. The 
implementing legislation of the 1999 and 2004 RALs has led to much confu-
sion, and has severely limited the scope of regional autonomy in the land 
sector. In addition, land law reform itself remains very limited. On the oth-
er hand, at least on paper, the rule of law environment in which land law is 
implemented has improved significantly. Compared to the New Order 
period, Indonesia’s urban poor thus appear better protected against arbi-
trary behaviour by the state and private parties.
Despite the reforms, low-income kampong dwellers in Bandung and 
likely in other cities enjoy only limited legal tenure security, even if their 
land is registered. Few formal (and semi-formal and informal) landholders 
have the permits they need to legally reside on their land. In addition, few 
formal landholders appear to perform derivative registration after a change 
in the tenure situation of the land. Finally, the land administration system is 
dispossessory in nature, due to weaknesses in the legal framework as well 
as maladministration. Under the BAL, a land certificate is not conclusive, 
but only forms strong evidence regarding a land right. The NLA has a noto-
rious reputation as a result of incompetence and corruption, with officials 
commonly issuing more than one certificate for the same plot of land.
The legal tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers also 
remains limited in relation to spatial planning, on the basis of which the 
Indonesian state can limit the exercise of land rights and claims. New legis-
lation on spatial management, of which spatial planning is a part, contains 
further safeguards that could protect the interests of landholders, but 
imposes few obligations to district/municipal governments to ensure pub-
lic participation and transparency. In addition, the role of the District/
Municipal Councils is diminished in spatial planning. Finally, the provin-
cial and central government’s role with respect to guidance and supervi-
sion initially also remained limited, although this role has increased since 
2004. In practice, the role of kampong dwellers in Bandung in spatial plan-
ning is still very limited. Not only do they rarely participate in this process, 
the municipal government also fails to invite them to do so. The Municipal 
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Council, higher levels of government, and even civil society equally fail to 
support kampong dwellers’ interests. Spatial planning is becoming more 
transparent, but there are still many deficiencies. The spatial plans that are 
enacted are detrimental to kampong dwellers, particularly for those who 
reside in settlements the municipal government qualifies as ‘slums’.
Finally, the legal tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers 
remains limited in relation to land clearance by the state or private parties. 
Legislation creates a broad discretion for district/municipal governments 
to determine for what purpose land is cleared. They have no legal obliga-
tion to explore feasible alternatives. Procedural protections are limited. 
Landholders are not guaranteed the right to proper compensation and the 
right to adequate alternative accommodation. As for informal landholders, 
legislation gives the Mayor broad discretion to determine whether, and 
how much, compensation is due. The regulation on site permits, which 
developers may need for land clearance, contains an ineffective mechanism 
to monitor commercial land clearance and enforce related norms. In addi-
tion, many landholders cannot benefit from any of the law’s potentially 
protective provisions, as it refers to an extensive list of cases in which no 
site permit is required. In any event, district/municipal governments feel 
free to depart from it.
While the legal tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers is 
limited, the de facto tenure security of semi-formal and even most informal 
landholders in Bandung is surprisingly strong, in the sense that they enjoy 
a considerable degree of administrative recognition. They possess land 
related documentation (which semi-formal landholders could use for land 
registration), many have been residing on the land for decades, and the 
majority of these landholders are formal receivers of public utilities, such 
as water and electricity, and hold identity cards.
Land clearance as a single enforcement measure, for instance because 
landholders reside on land without the permission of the right holder or 
because they (or formal landholders) lack permits to reside on the land, was 
and is still rare. However, if land is needed for development in the public 
interest or for commercial purposes, which is more than ever the case in 
Post-New Order Bandung, kampong dwellers still risk involuntary removal 
without due process of law or proper compensation. Commercial develop-
ers particularly appear interested in land that is held informally. At the same 
time, landholders succeed in negotiating higher compensation than during 
the New Order years, which suggests that post-New Order reforms have 
benefited kampong dwellers who are confronted with the state or develop-
ers wishing to clear land. Notably, this study found that tenure status is not 
always a predictor for the level of compensation received.
This study found that formal landholders in kampongs in Bandung 
enjoy stronger perceived tenure security than informal landholders. How-
ever, no such differences are found between formal landholders and semi-
formal landholders. Semi-formal (and informal) landholders often cited 
their land related documentation and length of residence as reasons for the 
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legitimacy of their tenure. Perceived tenure security has decreased since 
the end of the New Order with regard to protection against involuntary 
removal, while it has increased with regard to the level of compensation. 
The housing of landholders with formal tenure is somewhat more consoli-
dated than that of landholders with informal tenure. However, again no 
significant differences are found between formal and semi-formal land-
holders. Housing consolidation also depends separately on perceived ten-
ure security and household income.
9.3 Rule of law development at the local level
The limits of low-income kampong dwellers’ legal, de facto, and perceived 
tenure security can be explained to a large extent by Indonesia’s rule of law 
still being weak at the local level. This problem persists despite the coun-
try’s ambitious reform programme. Regional autonomy, one of the major 
reform initiatives, has in part actually had a negative effect on the tenure 
security of low-income kampong dwellers.
It is clear that to this day Indonesian land law does not offer effective 
protection to (low-income) landholders against arbitrary behaviour of the 
state and private parties. This not only applies to informal and semi-formal 
landholders, who often have difficulties meeting evidence requirements to 
register their land in the first place, but even to formal landholders. The 
1960 BAL has not been revised. In relation to urban land tenure, most 
required implementing legislation has now been enacted, but it still reflects 
an ‘integralist’ interpretation of key-concepts of the BAL. This results in the 
government retaining strong discretionary powers in the sector of land, 
which can easily be abused. Paradoxically, when it comes to the protection 
of landholders against the arbitrary behaviour of private parties, such as 
commercial developers wishing to clear land, the state is granted a limited 
role.
To add to the legal confusion, regional autonomy legislation has creat-
ed a contradictory framework regarding the division of authorities in the 
land sector between the central government, the Provinces, and Districts/
Municipalities. Both the 1999 and 2004 RALs devolve full authority over 
land matters to the regions. However, implementing legislation maintains 
the NLA’s authority over some parts of these matters.
When implementing the above legislation, authorities use their broad 
discretionary powers as they see fit, turn the contradictory legal system to 
their advantage, or simply operate outside the law. Instances of maladmin-
istration, including KKN, are widespread within the bureaucracy.
Post-New Order reforms, and particularly regional autonomy, have 
contributed to the above circumstances. Because of administrative decen-
tralisation, district/municipal governments need extra funds to finance 
devolved authorities. Political decentralisation and other reforms that were 
meant to strengthen democracy at the local level required new (extra-budg-
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etary) revenues for the district/municipal governments to finance political 
support. In Bandung at least, this has resulted in a municipal government 
eager to facilitate the development of the services industry, so it can raise 
land related taxes and revenues (which, as a result of the new fiscal rela-
tionship between Jakarta and the regions, support the municipal budget) 
without taking much account of the interests of low-income kampong 
dwellers.
Internal checks and procedures within the administration, which could 
potentially prevent the above situation, remain limited. As far as they are in 
place, they are often not implemented and therefore usually ineffective. 
There is no formal procedure for interested parties to apply for administra-
tive review of a decision. The 1999 RALs did establish a mechanism ena-
bling the central government and provincial government to supervise and 
control the district/municipal governments. The central government and 
provincial government can for instance annul municipal legislation related 
to spatial planning. On the basis of the 2004 RALs, municipal spatial plans 
should be evaluated by the provincial Governor and the relevant Ministers 
respectively before they can be enacted. In practice, supervision by the pro-
vincial government appears to be very weak and the central government 
takes a lenient attitude.
Indonesia’s new democracy partly compensates for the above condi-
tions. Whereas kampong dwellers seem disinterested in spatial planning, 
they clearly understand the implications of land clearance and now dem-
onstrate a willingness to resist such efforts. Surprisingly, in such resistance 
traditional intermediaries like (rights-oriented) NGOs and the student 
movement play a limited role. Kampong dwellers largely depend on com-
munity-based organisations, based on strong community leadership. They 
seek support from politicians in land disputes, organising street protests 
and offering petitions. Kampong dwellers even use their right to vote to 
put political pressure on the executive. In doing so, they draw considerable 
media attention.
It would go too far to conclude on the basis of the above that there is 
substantive democracy in Bandung. Despite democratic reforms, the con-
tents of laws and policies are still not determined by public consent. Par-
ticipation and transparency in lawmaking processes remain limited. In the 
event that local politicians do support the urban poor, this takes the form of 
political patronage. The role of counter forces, such as hoodlums, is strong. 
Funded by the municipal government and commercial developers, they 
intimidate protesters and their backers. Media coverage often appears 
biased towards the more powerful side of any dispute. Journalists, particu-
larly freelance reporters and/or those working for regional dailies, are 
sometimes bribed and/or fear to write in a critical way.
Despite the current disadvantages of adopting political strategies in 
land disputes, kampong dwellers tend not to choose litigation as a strategy, 
and even avoid legal discourse. Though kampong dwellers have the poten-
tial to base their demands on the law, these instead generally take form of a 
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moral claim: the dwellers ask for support “out of humanity”. They also 
explicitly call in the help of party-affiliated legal aid organisations, who can 
serve as brokers. Kampong dwellers thus are in a vulnerable position, 
depending on political favouritism.
The preference for adopting a political strategy to land disputes, 
instead of a legal, litigation-oriented strategy, can to a large degree be 
explained by kampong’s dwellers limited knowledge of and lack of trust in 
the law and legal institutions. The police, public prosecution and particu-
larly the judiciary are strongly distrusted by low-income kampong dwell-
ers. Our survey revealed that they believe courts are not independent or 
impartial and litigation is expensive, partly due to corruption. The role of 
alternative institutions of dispute settlement is also limited. The National 
Human Rights Commission is well-known and has a good reputation 
among low-income kampong dwellers in Bandung, however the fact that it 
is located in Jakarta forms a considerable barrier. Equally, low-income kam-
pong dwellers in Bandung would not turn to the National Ombudsman 
Commission. This institution is still unknown, but even if it were known, 
the same problem of distance would likely apply.
Many legal institutions in Indonesia do indeed continue to carry ques-
tions of bias, suggesting that litigation may be ineffective. Despite strong 
allegations of corruption regarding the drafting, enacting, and revision of 
Bandung’s new General Spatial Plan, which led to administrators and poli-
ticians being placed under severe scrutiny by the media, a local watchdog 
NGO and the public, no administrators or politicians were ever investigat-
ed or prosecuted. Instead, the police and the prosecution service pressured, 
arrested, and prosecuted kampong dwellers who resisted land clearance by 
commercial developers. The few times the courts did play a role in the cas-
es discussed in this book, their rulings were generally unfavourable to 
kampong dwellers.
We caution that the above findings are based on a limited number of 
case studies, conducted in a single city. Whether these findings are repre-
sentative of broader (urban) Indonesia is difficult to confirm, because little 
other research has been conducted. However from the research available, it 
appears that involuntary removal without due process of law and proper 
compensation is still common in Indonesia. Although there are some posi-
tive examples, it is clear that in policymaking processes at the local level 
generally, citizens and particularly the urban poor still play a limited role. 
In relation to land clearance by the state, there are examples of city authori-
ties, such as those of Jakarta, Medan, and Surabaya, being more repressive 
than Bandung’s municipal government. Based on reports in the national 
media, it appear that involuntary removal without due process of law and 
proper compensation also still often occurs, to accommodate commercial 
land clearance. Partly as a result of decentralisation there may however be 
regional differences.
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9.4 Indonesia’s current approaches to attaining land tenure 
security
The findings of this research call into question the effectiveness of Indone-
sia’s current approaches to increasing tenure security of the urban poor. 
The dominant approach is mass land registration through programmes 
such as the National Land Registration Project (Proyek Operasi Nasional 
Agraria or PRONA), Regional Land Registration Projects (Proyek Operasi 
Daerah Agraria or PRODA), and the Land Administration Project (LAP). 
The LAP’s aim is not only to accelerate land registration, but also to 
improve the legal-institutional framework for land administration, which 
included a systematic review and drafting of land laws and regulations, 
and training of NLA staff. This combination of land registration on the one 
hand and legal and institutional reform on the other hand also plays a role 
in the successor of the LAP, the Land Management and Policy Management 
Project (LMPDP), which was launched in 2004. The LMPDP adds two com-
ponents, namely developing a Land Information System (LIS) and provid-
ing training and capacity building to all local governments.
It proves hard for landholders to perform sporadic registration; that is, 
to register land at their own initiative rather than through systematic land 
registration programmes. This difficulty is a result of several factors, 
including the stringent evidence requirements for the registration of semi-
legal rights, a lack of political will to register rights of informal landholders, 
high costs and unwieldiness of the registration process as a result of poor 
administrative performance and even maladministration, and related neg-
ative perceptions of landholders regarding the registration process.
Certain obstacles are overcome by systematic land registration pro-
grammes; however, the reach of these programmes is limited. The LAP was 
only implemented in locations where registration is relatively easy, which 
means that locations where many low-income dwellers reside were 
ignored. As well, some of the obstacles associated with sporadic land regis-
tration remained present during systematic registration programmes; par-
ticularly the stringent evidence requirements for initial registration (which 
form an obstacle particularly for those with the lowest incomes) and more 
importantly, a lack of political will to grant new rights to informal land-
holders. This also means that semi-formal landholders participate in land 
registration programmes while informal landholders practically do not.
Because only semi-formal landholders participate, the socio-economic 
benefits of land registration programmes are very limited. As discussed 
above, informal landholders in many respects often enjoy significantly less 
tenure security than formal and semi-formal landholders. Furthermore, the 
contribution of land registration to housing consolidation is marginal and 
only occurs if informal tenure is formalised. This implies that registration 
programmes in Bandung and likely other Indonesian cities have so far 
been targeting the wrong group; as the people who may benefit most from 
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registration programmes, namely landholders with informal tenure, rarely 
find themselves among their beneficiaries.
In addition, land registration is not a prerequisite for tenure security 
and housing consolidation. As noted before, semi-formal (and informal) 
landholders often cited their land related documentation and length of res-
idence as reasons for the legitimacy of their tenure. Not only land registra-
tion, but also increasing de facto tenure security can thus enhance per-
ceived tenure security. Perceived tenure security, in turn, is enough for 
kampong dwellers to consolidate their housing. Alternative approaches in 
which land registration plays no (immediate) role may thus also be helpful.
The other components of programmes such as the LAP/LMPDP, 
including a systematic review and drafting of land laws and regulations, 
training NLA staff, developing a Land Information System, and supporting 
capacity building for local governments, appear to be urgently needed. 
Current land law offers only partial protection. So far however, land law 
reforms remain limited. The World Bank has acknowledged that the insti-
tutional development component of the LAP has been a failure. Maladmin-
istration within the NLA is still pervasive. A Land Information System 
could lead to a more accurate land register, an efficient and therefore cheap-
er use of land data, and in turn lower registration costs, with the registra-
tion process becoming less unwieldy. It appears that the performance of 
local governments in the land sector could improve significantly.
9.5 Policy suggestions
On the basis of the above findings, several policy suggestions can be made. 
These suggestions relate firstly to the dominant functional approach to 
attain tenure security. The findings of this research suggest this should 
change from a functional approach to a rights-based approach. In addi-
tion, this section includes suggestions regarding legal and institutional 
reforms. In closing, the importance of legal empowerment initiatives is 
underlined.
9.5.1 Toward a rights-based approach
Considering the fact that non-formal tenure can, but in practice does not 
always offer tenure security, the most important suggestion is to change 
from a predominantly functional approach to a rights-based approach, in 
which land registration plays a role only at a later stage. Rights-based 
approaches generally combine protective administrative or legal measures 
against evictions with the provision of basic services and credit facilities. In 
the case of Indonesia, basic services and credit facilities are already provid-
ed, for instance through the National Community Empowerment Pro-
gramme. Protective administrative or legal measures are still needed. Such 
measures could take various forms, but a straightforward approach would 
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be formal condoning, which means that the competent authorities issue a 
decision stating they will not enforce a violation of prevailing land tenure 
and land use related legislation. Formal condoning would be in line with 
key recommendation referred to in the National Strategy on Access to Jus-
tice, to recognize and protect rights to ensure poor communities can safe-
guard their rights to land.
As was noted above, kampong dwellers enjoy a high degree of admin-
istrative recognition. This type of informal condoning has already been 
shown to enhance the perceived tenure security of low-income kampong 
dwellers. In particular, the possession of land related documentation con-
tributes to perceived tenure security, in the sense that kampong dwellers 
believe that the authorities agree that they reside on the land legitimately. 
Perceived tenure security contributes to housing consolidation. By formal-
ising the condoning process, the legal, de facto, and perceived tenure secu-
rity of kampong dwellers will likely increase further, which in turn would 
stimulate housing consolidation.
Formal condoning is unknown in Indonesia. This legal figure is known 
in Dutch administrative law, to which Indonesian administrative law is his-
torically related.1 In Dutch administrative law, formal condoning is only 
possible if a violation of prevailing legislation will end soon. The decision 
to condone is thus a temporary measure. It is also an individual decision; 
third parties, including legal successors, cannot benefit. Conditions can be 
attached to the decision. Finally, interested parties can (object and) appeal 
to the decision at the Administrative District Court.
The legal figure of formal condoning could also be introduced in Indo-
nesian administrative law in relation to land tenure or land use. A decision 
to condone can be issued if it is legally possible and actually planned that 
land certificates and permits to reside on the land are provided in the near 
future. A decision to condone may thus (first) require a qualification of land 
as neglected land and/or a revision of municipal spatial plans.2 As a condi-
tion, a time limit for the landholder to register the land or obtain the 
required permits to reside on the land could be attached to the decision. 
Others claiming a right to the land, or who believe that otherwise their inter-
ests are affected by the decision to condone, can appeal to the Administra-
tive District Court. The decision to condone residence can be based on Land 
and Building Tax documentation, which almost all kampong dwellers have 
and which provides relatively accurate information on the size of plots and 
the dwellings on it and the person(s) having an interest in the property. This 
information is sufficient to guarantee a basic level of tenure security.
1 A common example is municipal governments issuing decisions to condone people 
permanently residing in holiday homes that on the basis of the municipal spatial plan 
can only be used for temporal residence.
2 Rights to be annulled should include usage or management rights that have been grant-
ed to public entities and that are not used for the purpose for which they have been 
granted.
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Obviously, formal condoning may not be possible in all cases. The non-
forfeited rights of landholders whose land has been occupied without per-
mission should of course be respected. And there will always be locations 
that are objectively unsustainable for residence. In such cases, kampong 
dwellers should be provided with adequate alternative accommodation. 
These dwellers will thus become formal landholders without the interme-
diate step of formal condoning.
Kampong dwellers whose residence is formally condoned can become 
formal landholders after several years through land registration. Consider-
ing the fact that kampong dwellers contend with obstacles to registration 
their land at their own initiative, and that these obstacles are in part over-
come by land registration programmes such as the LAP/LMDP, it would be 
useful to continue with these programmes. However, since the effect (in the 
long term) of the programmes on tenure security is marginal, their set-up 
should be revised considerably. First, the programmes should focus particu-
larly on the tenure position of informal landholders. In this framework, the 
Indonesian government should consider redistributing state land, just as it 
does in the framework of the National Agrarian Renewal Programme, but in 
this case focusing on urban land. Second, the programmes should not only 
provide land titles, but also all required permits to kampong dwellers, so 
they meet public law requirements to reside on land. Separately, the prob-
lems of limited derivative registration and the dispossessory nature of Indo-
nesian land law should be addressed (to be discussed in Section 9.5.2 below).
In order to contribute to legal, de facto or perceived tenure security of 
low-income kampong dwellers, a successful rights-based approach 
requires a rule of law environment, which is still not available in Indonesia. 
The above approach should therefore be combined with interventions that 
strengthen the rule of law at the local level. These interventions should 
include both legal and institutional reforms and initiatives aimed at legal 
empowerment.
9.5.2 Legal and institutional reforms
Legal and institutional reforms should consist of land law reforms, regional 
autonomy reforms and general reforms. Such reforms would be in line 
with key recommendations referred to in the National Strategy on Access 
to Justice.
Land law reform
Legal and institutional reforms should first involve an integrated revision 
of land law, as required by People’s Consultative Assembly Directive No. 
IX/MPR/2001 and Presidential Decision No. 34/2003, in accordance with 
the right to adequate housing as guaranteed by the Amended 1945 Consti-
tution and the ratified International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Considering the fact that to this day, the BAL forms the 
233Conclusion
general framework of land law in Indonesia, the revision of land law 
should start with a review of this law. Such a review will probably lead to 
the conclusion that the BAL requires amendment or perhaps even whole-
sale revision. Our research findings however give little reason to draw such 
a conclusion. The BAL grants the state a strong role in the land sector and it 
has repeatedly been shown in this book that this seriously affects the tenure 
security of low-income kampong dwellers. Yet, this does not mean the role 
of the state should be reformulated. Given the many problems Indonesia’s 
land sector is facing, there is reason to retain a strong role for the state. 
However, there should be clear limits to this role. So far, this has not been 
the case. Implementing legislation, which reflects an extreme ‘integralist’ 
interpretation of key concepts of the BAL, is still in force. This legislation 
should be revised or annulled. Below is an overview of the most important 
land law reforms needed.
• Land Registration and Licensing
Recently, there have been significant reforms in relation to land registration 
and licensing, consisting of the enactment of new legislation on topics as 
various as minimum services standards, registration costs and neglected 
land and the introduction of the People’s Service for Land Registration pro-
gramme. These reforms make it potentially easier for low-income kam-
pong dwellers to register their land at their own initiative. However, in 
order to strengthen land tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers, 
further steps should be taken, creating accessible land registration and per-
mitting systems, and allowing any type of landholder to perform initial 
and derivative registration and to obtain the permits needed to legally 
reside on land. This requires a revision of Government Regulation No. 
24/1997 and Government Regulation No. 11/2010. Law No. 25/2009 and 
Government Regulation No. 13/2010 may have to be revised too.
In order to make the land registration system accessible for semi-formal 
landholders wishing to perform initial registration, the Indonesian govern-
ment could consider softening evidence requirements further. Admittedly, 
the replacement of Government Regulation No. 10/1961 by Government 
Regulation No. 24/1997 already resulted in considerable improvement. 
However, there is room to further accommodate the needs of semi-formal 
landholders, without harming the interests of third parties. In particular, the 
possibility to register land on the basis of non-documentary evidence could 
be broadened, allowing semi-formal landholders to register their right if the 
land has been in their possession (or the possession of possible predeces-
sors) for a period shorter than the current required period of 20 years. Under 
the BAL, a third party can dispute the right of a formal landholder during 
the five years after the certificate has been issued, still leaving such a claim-
ant sufficient time to challenge a new formal landholder’s right.
In order to make the land registration system accessible for informal 
landholders wishing to perform initial registration, it should become easier 
for them to obtain new rights. Informal landholders occupying state land 
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should have a priority right to request a new land right, also if this land is 
not former European land that failed to be registered before 1980. Non-
state land that has been occupied uninterruptedly for a certain period of 
time (for instance 10 years if in good faith, 20 years if not), should qualify as 
neglected land by virtue of the law.
Despite the enactment of new legislation on registration costs, for most 
kampong dwellers costs to register land at their own initiative may still be 
too high. In that case, more legislative revisions may be required, leading to 
a further limitation of registration costs. Obviously, offering further special 
financial arrangements for low-income groups would involve considerable 
costs for the Indonesian government. These costs could to a large extent be 
covered by a more efficient and therefore cheaper use of the land data 
already available. Indonesia has a state-of-the-art fiscal register that is used 
to collect Land and Building Tax. At present, the fiscal register is complete-
ly separated from the legal register, with the Department of Finance being 
responsible for the fiscal register and the NLA for the legal register. The 
contemporary tax system is based on the actual use of land and buildings, 
not on the legal status. The maintenance of two separate registers, however, 
only leads to the aggregation of double data. It would therefore be practical 
and economical to combine the fiscal and legal registers.
The combination of the legal and fiscal registers may also contribute to 
the registration process becoming less unwieldy. Part of the information 
needed for initial registration can then be drawn from the fiscal register, 
which will save time.
It may be the case that despite the enactment of the new legislation on 
minimum services standards, registration and licensing processes remain 
unwieldy. In that case, further legislative revisions may be required, lead-
ing to simple procedures, with requirements that can be met by low-income 
kampong dwellers, against modest fees, and with strict time limits, an 
excess of which would lead to the imposition of sanctions on the failing 
authorities.
• Spatial planning
Recently, legislation related to spatial planning has been reformed. This has 
led to more democratic control, strengthens the role of the provincial and 
central governments with respect to guidance and supervision in spatial 
planning, and requires public bodies, political parties, and non-govern-
mental organisations to make information publicly available. However, 
most obligations of district/municipal governments to ensure public par-
ticipation are still not clear and enforceable. In order to strengthen land ten-
ure security of low-income kampong dwellers in relation to spatial plan-
ning, further steps should thus be taken, supporting substantive public 
participation and transparency. This requires a further revision of the 2007 
SML (which the 2010-2014 National Legislative Programme recommends), 
Government Regulation No. 69/1996 and Regulations of the Minister of 
Home Affairs Nos. 8/1998, 9/1998, and 1/2008.
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Substantive public participation and transparency in spatial planning 
can be supported by formulating clear and enforceable obligations for 
regional governments. Regional governments could be required, during 
the plan’s design process, to organise a minimum number of discussions 
and seminars to which all parties whose interests are at stake are invited 
and at which all can participate. In addition, the public should be given the 
opportunity, during a fixed term of several weeks or months, to give sug-
gestions and opinions, which are to be used in the decision-making process. 
It would be helpful if regional governments are required to respond to these 
suggestions and opinions in written form, and in cases where they reject 
the suggestions and opinions, to explicitly justify this. The public could 
be granted the possibility to apply for review of a bylaw enacting a spatial 
plan, including the prior decision-making process, at the Administrative 
District Court. If in the framework of such a review it turns out that a region-
al government has failed to meet its obligations in relation to public par-
ticipation and transparency, the bylaw ought to be declared null and void.
• Land clearance by the state
Recently, legislation related to land clearance by the state has been 
reformed. The reforms are definitely a step forward, in that they limit the 
activities for which a government institution can clear land for develop-
ment in the public interest; provide formal and semi-formal landholders 
with more procedural protections; and guarantee the right to proper com-
pensation in better ways. In addition, the right to subsidised legal aid is 
guaranteed, which means that, at least on paper, landholders who wish to 
seek legal remedies also have better access to the judiciary. However, there 
is still no obligation for the authorities to explore feasible alternatives in 
consultation with landholders prior to land clearance. In addition, the right 
to adequate alternative accommodation is still not guaranteed. In relation 
to informal landholders the law still creates broad discretion for the Dis-
trict-Head/Mayor to determine whether, in cases of land clearance, the 
landholders receive any ‘assistance/sympathy money’ and if so, how 
much. In order to strengthen land tenure security of low-income kampong 
dwellers in relation to land clearance by the state, further steps should thus 
be taken, providing further protections and guarantees. This requires a 
revision of Law No. 20/1961 (which the 2010-2014 National Legislative 
Programme also recommends), as well as Presidential Regulation No. 
65/2006 and Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 3/2007; and, more 
importantly, annulment of Law No. 51/1961.
Prior to determining locations for land clearance for development in 
the public interest, there should be an obligation for the government insti-
tution requiring land to explore all feasible alternatives, in consultation 
with the affected landholders. The government institution could be obliged 
to discuss these alternatives and explicitly justify the choice for a certain 
location, in the proposal which it is required to submit to the District-
Head/Mayor. It would be advisable to grant the public the possibility to 
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apply for judicial review of the decision regarding the location of land 
clearance, including the prior decision-making process, at the Administra-
tive District Court. If, in the framework of such a review, it turns out that a 
government institution requiring land has failed to meet its obligation to 
explore all feasible alternatives in consultation with the affected landhold-
ers, and/or has failed to discuss these alternatives and justify the choice for 
a certain location in the proposal, the decision ought to be declared null 
and void.
It may be helpful if the use of land without permission from the title 
holder is no longer considered a criminal offence, but a private dispute 
between the informal landholder and the title holder. A title holder wishing 
to clear his land could still apply for a civil court order. Informal landholders 
who have occupied the land for a certain period of time should be able to par-
ry such an application on the claim that the land qualifies as neglected land 
(see above). In cases in which the application is awarded, it is recommend-
ed that informal landholders be guaranteed proper compensation. They 
should also be granted the right to adequate alternative accommodation.
• Land clearance by developers
Recently, new legislation has been enacted that potentially has a positive 
effect for low-income kampong dwellers who are confronted by developers 
wishing to clear their land. A stipulation in the newly enacted 2007 SML 
imposes sanctions to officials who issue permits that are not in accordance 
with spatial plans. This stipulation should lead to stricter compliance in 
regard to the issuance of (site) permits. In addition, the new legislation 
guarantees the right to subsidised legal aid. However, in order to strength-
en the land tenure security of low-income kampong dwellers in relation to 
commercial land clearance, further steps should be taken, providing fur-
ther protections and guarantees. This requires a revision of the Regulation 
of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999 on site permits.
It would be advisable to limit the list of commercial land clearance cas-
es in which no site permit is required, so landholders who are confronted 
with urban development projects can benefit from the potentially protec-
tive provisions contained in Regulation of the Head of the NLA No. 2/1999. 
In order to strengthen the supervision of commercial land clearance pro-
cesses, the Supervision and Control Teams for Commercial Land Clearance 
or similar bodies could be re-established. In addition, administrative sanc-
tions could be introduced, which would be imposed if a developer violates 
prevailing legislation and/or permit requirements. Such sanctions could 
include incremental penalty payments, administrative coercion, a with-
drawal of the permit, or administrative fines. The sanction of incremental 
penalty payments implies that the District-Head/Mayor can order the 
developer to comply with the permit conditions. If the developer does not 
comply within the given period of time, the operator will incur penalties. 
The sanction of administrative coercion implies that the District-Head/
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Mayor has the opportunity and authority to restore the situation, and 
charge the developer for the costs incurred. It would be helpful if landhold-
ers were also granted the option to request the District-Head/Mayor to 
enforce prevailing legislation and/or permit requirements. Following such 
a request, the District-Head/Mayor would be required to make a decision, 
within a fixed term of several weeks, as to whether to enforce the legisla-
tion. Landholders should also have the possibility to apply for review of 
the decision at the Administrative District Court.
Regional autonomy reforms
The 2004 RALs have led to administrative recentralisation. This has also 
involved a stronger role for Provinces to supervise and control the exercise 
of devolved authorities by the Districts/Municipalities, which appeared to 
be needed. However, the division of authorities in the land sector between 
the central government, Provinces, and Districts/Municipalities would 
benefit from being clarified. This would require a revision of the 2004 RALs 
(which the 2010-2014 National Legislative Programme also recommends), 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007, and Presidential Regulation No. 
10/2006.
The 2004 RALs stipulate that the regions hold the mandatory authority 
over all land matters. Government Regulation No. 38/2007 confirms this, 
but at the same time limits the regions’ functions in the land sector to nine. 
By contrast, Presidential Regulation No. 10/2006 stipulates that the NLA 
holds a non-limited number of 21 functions. Obviously, this inconsistency 
should be altered. This begs the question as to how authority over the land 
sector should best be divided between the central government, Provinces 
and Districts/Municipalities. Our research findings do not provide a defin-
itive answer to this question. It is, however, clear that whatever authority 
the Districts/Municipalities are granted over land matters, the higher lev-
els of government should retain a strong role of control and supervision.
As a final note, it should be acknowledged that the enactment and 
implementation of the 1999 RALs and 2004 RALs have had negative side 
effects, not least in the land sector. In particular, because of the new fiscal 
relations with the central government, Districts /Municipalities feel the 
incentive to one-sidedly focus on economic growth. This has resulted in 
Districts/Municipalities attempting (often successfully) to enact bylaws on 
the regional budget, taxes and revenues and spatial management that con-
travene the public interest or higher legislation. Controlling these negative 
side effects does not require regional autonomy reforms. The 2004 RALs 
already contain sufficient mechanisms to prevent such issues from occur-
ring. All bylaws are evaluated by the relevant Ministers and the Governor 
respectively. After their enactment, bylaws can be annulled by the Minister 
of Home Affairs. However, these mechanisms should be applied more 
effectively than is presently occurring; which may require general reforms.
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General reforms
The research findings presented in this book show that general reforms are 
needed which assist government institutions to abide by the law, support 
substantive democracy, and create independent and impartial institutions 
of dispute settlement to which every aggrieved person has access.
• Assistance for government institutions to abide by the law
As noted above, a new law on minimum services standards has recently 
been enacted. This law will likely contribute to government institutions 
abiding by the law. This also applies to the land law reforms suggested 
above. However, more reforms are needed, including strong measures 
against maladministration (particularly KKN) within the NLA and the 
regional governments. Such measures may consist of capacity building 
measures, a strengthening of budget control capabilities of the Supreme 
Audit Board, and a strengthening of anti-corruption monitoring and law 
enforcement capabilities of the Corruption Eradication Commission.
• Substantive democracy at the local level
As noted above, a new law on transparency of public information has 
recently been enacted, which will likely contribute to the development of a 
substantive democracy at the local level. Further reforms which remain to 
be undertaken include strong measures against money politics and other 
forms of KKN within the regional representative bodies. In addition, there 
is a need for strict (election) budget control of political parties and individ-
ual politicians. To this aim, the monitoring and law enforcement capabili-
ties of the General Elections Committee should be strengthened. Political 
parties should also be required to provide information regarding the allo-
cation and use of funding that originates from public donations and/or for-
eign donations.
• Independent, impartial, and accessible institutions of dispute settlement
As noted above, new legislation has recently been enacted which guaran-
tees the right to subsidised legal aid. In addition, the new law on minimum 
services standards requires the establishment of representative offices of 
the Ombudsman at the provincial and district/municipal levels. But again 
more reforms are needed. These reforms should include strong measures 
against KKN within the judiciary. Such measures may consist of capacity 
building measures in accordance with the Supreme Court Blueprints, and a 
strengthening of anti-corruption monitoring and law enforcement capabili-
ties of the Corruption Eradication Commission and the Task Force for the 
Eradication of Judicial Mafia. In order to create better access to institutions 
of dispute settlement, a law on legal aid should be enacted, which the 2010-
2014 National Legislative Programme also recommends.
In relation to land, accessible Administrative Courts are particularly 
needed. This can be achieved by broadening the courts’ jurisdiction to 
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include certain decisions of a general nature, at least bylaws enacting spa-
tial plans, so that these plans are able to be reviewed not only against acts 
of parliament, which currently the Supreme Court can do, but also against 
higher legislation generally. In addition, the possibility for the courts to 
review on the basis of general principles of proper administration should 
be extended.
9.5.3 Legal empowerment
Strengthening the tenure security of the urban poor finally requires initia-
tives aimed at legal empowerment. These initiatives should focus on 
increasing legal awareness, access to legal aid and counsel, and other activ-
ities that can overcome legal obstacles.
Activities to increase legal awareness could be part of the National 
Community Empowerment Programme, which is implemented in almost 
every urban kampong in Indonesia. In relation to land matters, kampong 
dwellers should inter alia be made aware of: i) the importance of (deriva-
tive) registration and to hold permits to reside on land; ii) the procedures to 
register land and obtain permits; iii) the existence of land registration pro-
grammes and of special financial arrangements, available within the frame-
work or outside these programmes, for low-income people; iv) the impor-
tance of spatial planning and their rights to participation and transparency; 
v) their rights, including the legal remedies available, in cases of land clear-
ance by the state or private parties.
Kampong dwellers should not only be made aware of legal processes 
and their rights and obligations in such processes, but also be provided 
with legal aid and counsel. As discussed above, the right to subsidised 
legal aid is now guaranteed in cases where kampong dwellers start judicial 
proceedings. However, kampong dwellers should also have access to legal 
aid and counsel outside the court system. Therefore, NGOs like the Legal 
Aid Institute should be supported. Such support should expressly not be 
offered to party-affiliated legal aid organisations, which, although poten-
tially very effective in protecting the urban poor, may be challenged on 
questions of methods and intentions.
Other activities that can be initiated to overcome legal obstacles are 
community organising, group formation, political mobilisation, and use of 
media. Civil society organisations can play a major role in such activities.
9.6 Contribution to policy theory
The research findings from this book may contribute to the international 
development debate on tenure security. Firstly they show that, at least in the 
Indonesian context, the term ‘slum’, which is widely used in the interna-
tional debate, is inaccurate; and that its use is often dangerous. As discussed 
above, most settlements in Bandung are reasonably consolidated, and 
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among and within these settlements there are varying degrees of legality. 
This means ‘slums’ do not exist in their typical form in Bandung; and likely 
hardly exist in any Indonesian city. Nonetheless, the Indonesian govern-
ment often qualifies kampongs as slums. On the basis of Bandung’s latest 
General Spatial Plan, settlements that are qualified as slums are to be 
restructured, not only by the construction of condominiums, but also, after 
relocation of residents, of shopping malls. This illustrates what dramatic 
and harmful consequences the qualification of kampongs as ‘slums’ can 
have. Use of the term should therefore be avoided; or only used with 
extreme caution.
The findings of our research also confirm that it is inaccurate to catego-
rise tenure status in dichotomous terms of ‘legal’ versus ‘extra-legal’ tenure. 
In Indonesia at least, there is a continuum of tenure categories with varying 
degrees of legality. In order to compare different tenure arrangements, in our 
research we distinguished between three categories, based on the status of 
each of these arrangements according to state law. This categorisation was 
appropriate to answer the research questions addressed in this book.
In order to understand the effects of approaches to strengthen the ten-
ure security of the urban poor, a distinction should be made between legal, 
de facto, and perceived tenure security. There can be a (wide) gap between 
the tenure security offered by the law, and the tenure security that the 
urban poor enjoy in actual practice. In addition, the urban poor base their 
investments in housing on perceptions of tenure security, which can be 
based on legal and on de facto tenure security.
It follows from the above that directly equating formal tenure with ten-
ure security and informality with insecurity is too simplistic, and can be 
incorrect. Legal tenure does not equate with security by definition, nor is 
non-legal tenure always insecure. In fact, informal landholders may enjoy 
significant de facto tenure security. This also means that land registration 
does not inherently lead to legal tenure security for landholders and that, at 
least for the time being, it may be enough to strengthen the de facto tenure 
security of landholders. Perceived tenure security can be based on de facto 
tenure security, and this may be enough for landholders to invest in their 
housing.
The findings of this research also confirm that, whether or not land reg-
istration plays a role in approaches to strengthening the tenure security of 
the urban poor, the success of such approaches depends on the rule of law 
environment in which they are implemented. If the rule of law is weak, 
rights that are granted to landholders cannot be enforced. Tenure security 
thus requires at least the basic rule of law elements to be in place, such as 
government institutions that abide to the law, a substantive democracy, 
and independent and impartial institutions of dispute settlements to which 
every aggrieved person has access. Therefore, approaches to strengthening 
the tenure security of the urban poor should be part of an integrated pack-
age of measures that are not restricted to land policies, but also focus on 
general reforms toward the rule of law.
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Decentralisation in the land sector has the potential to support the ten-
ure security of the urban poor, however the effectiveness of such support 
depends on the type of decentralisation implemented, and the specific cir-
cumstances surrounding the situation. Our research findings show that, in 
Bandung at least, political decentralisation has been predominantly posi-
tive; but the combination of administrative and fiscal decentralisation has 
had a negative effect on the tenure security of kampong dwellers. It appears 
that at least in cases where decentralisation involves a far-reaching type of 
decentralisation, such as devolution, this should be combined with control 
and supervision mechanisms between the executive, legislative and judi-
cial branches of government and between different government levels.
9.7 Suggestions for further research
As discussed in Chapter 1, the research presented in this book has certain 
limitations. Due to time constraints and the sensitivity of the topic central 
to this study, research was conducted in Bandung only, and involved a lim-
ited number of cases that focus on ‘external’ risks of involuntary removal. 
During fieldwork, data analysis and the writing process, new develop-
ments emerged which have not been fully addressed in this book. While 
these limitations do not reduce the relevance of this research, these new 
developments highlight the benefits of continuing and broadening the 
scope of such research, to investigate these emerging issues.
The author recommends that further research could focus on ‘internal’ 
risks of involuntary removal. Matters that may be investigated include the 
type of disputes kampong dwellers contend with; the way they deal with 
these disputes; their outcome and of course the differences in relation to 
these matters between formal, semi-formal and informal landholders in 
terms of land tenure security.
It would also be valuable to investigate the effects of land registration 
on enabled land markets and access to credit. Questions in relation to the 
effects of land registration on enabled land markets may include whether 
formal, semi-formal and informal landholders sell their land and dwell-
ings, and if so, to whom and at what price. Questions in relation to the 
effects of land registration on access to credit may include whether these 
various types of landholders have access to credit, why they may not, and 
whether those with access to credit make use of this facility.
In order to verify whether the research findings presented in this book are 
representative of (urban) Indonesia more broadly, it would be relevant to con-
duct further research in other cities in Indonesia. The research could start with 
a focus group discussion with key experts, at which occasion several prob-
lems identified in this study could be discussed. The most thorough approach 
would involve studying spatial planning and land clearance cases in sev-
eral cities, and comparing these cases with the cases presented in this the-
sis, with an analysis of any differences and the reasons for these differences.
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In closing, it would be valuable and interesting to conduct research on 
the effects of the recent reforms enacted and announced, alongside the 
reforms suggested in this book. This requires longitudinal research in Ban-
dung, and particularly in the kampongs where research has been conduct-
ed for the present study.
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Appendix I Autonomous Villages in Bandung Municipality  
1906-1942
1906-1917 1917-1942
 1. Pasar 18. Padasoeka 
 2. Soeniaradja 19. Soekarasa
 3. Bandoengkoelon 20. Soekasari
 4. Regol 21. Pasirkaliki
 5. Lengkong 22. Tjibeureum
 6. Bandoengwetan 23. Tjidjerah
 7. Tjoblong 24. Tjigondewah
 8. Bloeboer 25. Tjigoegoertengah
 9. Soekadjadi (= Taman Sari) 26. Melong
10. Tjitjendo 27. Rantjamalang
11. Andir 28. Margahajoe
12. Astanaänjar 29. Batoenoenggal
13. Bodjongloa 30. Soekapoera
14. Tjiparaj 31. Lengkong
15. Pasawahan 32. Tjipagalo
16. Tjikawao 33. Boeahbatoe










Source: Stadsgemeente Bandoeng (1938), Orienteerende Nota van de Desa’s binnen de Stads-
gemeen te Bandoeng, Bandoeng: Commissie tot Voorlichting van de Inheemse Bevolking 
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Dit boek beschrijft de resultaten van een socio-legal onderzoek naar de 
vraag of arme stadsbewoners in Indonesië zeker kunnen zijn van het bezit 
van hun grond (tenure security), vooral tegen de achtergrond van de rechts-
statelijke hervormingen die na de val van President Soeharto in 1998 in 
Indonesië hebben plaatsgevonden.1 Op basis van dit onderzoek wordt 
geanalyseerd wat het praktisch effect is van internationale beleidsstrate-
gieën die gericht zijn op het vergroten van de zekerheid van grondbezit. 
Voorts worden in dit boek enkele beleidssuggesties gedaan. Ten slotte 
beoogt het een theoretische bijdrage te leveren aan het lopende internatio-
nale ontwikkelingsdebat over zekerheid van grondbezit. 
Analytisch kader en opzet van het onderzoek
Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijft hoe een groeiend aantal arme stadsbewoners in ont-
wikkelingslanden in sloppenwijken leeft. De fysieke, sociaaleconomische 
en juridische karakteristieken van deze wijken manifesteren zich in een 
vicieuze cirkel van stedelijke armoede. Van belang is de vraag hoe deze 
vicieuze cirkel te doorbreken. Hoewel in het internationale ontwikkelings-
debat over het algemeen wordt erkend dat dit een combinatie van strate-
gieën vereist, is er de laatste jaren bijzonder veel aandacht voor een aanpak 
die gericht is op het versterken van zekerheid van grondbezit. Daarin zijn 
grofweg twee soorten benaderingen te onderscheiden, de ‘functionele’ 
benadering en ‘alternatieve’ benaderingen.
De ‘functionele benadering’, die dominant is, legt nadruk op de beoog-
de gevolgen van de formalisering van grondbezit voor specifieke ontwik-
kelingsdoelen, zoals economische groei, armoedebestrijding en het verbe-
teren van levensomstandigheden in sloppenwijken. Om deze doelen te 
bereiken, achten voorstanders van deze benadering grondregistratie van 
essentieel belang. Registratie zou leiden tot meer juridische zekerheid en 
1 Zekerheid van grondbezit wordt kortweg gedefinieerd als bescherming van grondbe-
zitters tegen onvrijwillige ontruiming van hun grond, tenzij dit geschiedt conform een 
reguliere rechtsgang en met betaling van een behoorlijke schadevergoeding.
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daardoor niet alleen de arme stadsbewoner het vertrouwen geven om in 
zijn huisvesting te investeren en in staat stellen zijn grond te verhandelen, 
maar ook resulteren in een gemakkelijker toegang tot bankkrediet met 
grond en opstallen als onderpand. Naar het werkelijke effect van grond-
registratie is echter tot nu toe weinig onderzoek gedaan. Het onderzoek dat 
is gedaan, plaatst vraagtekens bij de effectiviteit van deze benadering.
Als gevolg van kritiek op de functionele benadering is er een groeiende 
aandacht voor ‘alternatieve benaderingen’ ter vergroting van zekerheid 
van grondbezit. Deze benaderingen leggen de nadruk op zekerheid van 
grondbezit, zoals deze wordt gegarandeerd in internationale mensenrech-
tenverdragen, in het bijzonder waar die deel uitmaakt van het recht op 
behoorlijke huisvesting (the right to adequate housing). Daartoe is het volgens 
de voorstanders van deze alternatieve benaderingen niet per se noodzake-
lijk om grond te registeren; het gaat in de eerste plaats om bescherming 
tegen grondontruiming, op basis van bestaande claims op grond.
Welke benadering ter versterking van de zekerheid van grondbezit van 
arme stadsbewoners ook wordt gekozen, het succes daarvan hangt af van 
de afdwingbaarheid van eigendomsrechten en/of mensenrechten. Beide 
vereisen een behoorlijk ontwikkelde rechtsstaat die arme stadsbewoners 
beschermt tegen de willekeur van de overheid of private partijen. Opval-
lend genoeg krijgt dit punt weinig aandacht in de literatuur over zekerheid 
van grondbezit.
In het licht van voorgaande overwegingen concentreert dit boek zich 
op de zekerheid van grondbezit voor arme stadsbewoners in Indonesië, 
gebaseerd op de uitkomsten van socio-legal onderzoek in de kampongs (tra-
ditioneel arme buurten) van Bandung, dat met 2,3 miljoen inwoners de op 
twee na grootste stad van Indonesië en hoofdstad van de provincie West-
Java is. Hierbij wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen formele, semifor-
mele (op basis van geïndividualiseerd adatrecht, het Indonesische gewoon-
terecht) en informele vormen van grondbezit enerzijds en juridische, 
feitelijke en gepercipieerde zekerheid van grondbezit anderzijds. 
Normatieve beoordelingen in deze studie worden gegeven vanuit het 
perspectief van de rechtsstaat. Daartoe wordt een definitie van rechtsstaat 
gehanteerd die bestaat uit verschillende elementen: procedurele elemen-
ten, materiële elementen en controlemechanismen. Voorts wordt een verge-
lijking gemaakt tussen de periode van de Nieuwe Orde (1965-1998), toen 
Soeharto aan de macht was, en de Post-Nieuwe Orde periode (vanaf 1998). 
Deze verhandeling is gebaseerd op zowel juridisch onderzoek als op empi-
risch veldwerk, verricht gedurende een periode van in totaal ongeveer 
anderhalf jaar. Daarbij is gebruik gemaakt van kwalitatieve en kwantitatie-
ve methoden: participerende observatie in twee kampongs in de wijken 
Taman Sari en Cibangkong, 140 interviews met diverse betrokkenen en een 
survey onder 420 huishoudens in zeven kampongs. Ook werden in deze 
veldwerkperiode duizenden krantenknipsels en honderden wetgevings- 
en beleidsdocumenten verzameld en bestudeerd.
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Kampongs in Bandung
Hoofdstuk 2 van dit boek geeft een beschrijving van de ontstaans- en ont-
wikkelingsgeschiedenis van kampongs in Bandung, van de maatregelen 
die de overheid heeft genomen om de levensomstandigheden in deze 
buurten te verbeteren en van het huidige karakter van kampongs. Hierbij 
wordt bij wijze van illustratie telkens ingezoomd op de ontwikkelingen in 
kampongs in Taman Sari, waar het langst veldwerk werd verricht. 
Ondanks tal van uiteenlopende maatregelen van opeenvolgende kolo-
niale en Indonesische overheden, zo laten onze survey-data zien, zijn de 
hedendaagse kampongs in Bandung nog altijd arme buurten, die vooral 
laagopgeleide mensen huisvesten, werkzaam in de informele sector, met 
lage inkomens. Hoewel kampongs er op het eerste gezicht vaak vervallen 
uitzien, bestaan de meeste uit permanente huizen met toegang tot openba-
re nutsvoorzieningen en een relatief goede infrastructuur. Wanneer wij de 
informele status van grondbezit en grondgebruik in de kampongs nader 
beschouwen, zien wij verschillende gradaties van informaliteit binnen en 
tussen deze kampongs. 
De Indonesische regering geeft nog altijd een hoge prioriteit aan de 
bestrijding van stedelijke armoede. Het recht op behoorlijke huisvesting en 
zekerheid van grondbezit worden hierbij tegenwoordig aangemerkt als 
twee belangrijke doelstellingen.
Het Indonesische grondenrecht in een veranderende rechtsstaat
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een algemeen overzicht van het grondenrecht tegen de 
achtergrond van de ontwikkeling van Indonesië als rechtsstaat. Het funda-
ment van het Indonesische grondenrecht zijn artikel 33 van de Grondwet 
van 1945 en de Agrarische Basiswet van 1960, de tijd van de Oude Orde 
onder de socialistisch georiënteerde President Soekarno. Ter bescherming 
van zwakke groepen benadrukt de wet dat grond een sociale functie heeft. 
De wet kent de staat daarom een ruime bevoegdheid toe in grondzaken. 
Deze bevoegdheid is voornamelijk gebaseerd op het in de grondwet gesti-
puleerde staatsbeschikkingsrecht (hak menguasai), dat de overheid, door 
middel van de Nationale Dienst voor Grondzaken (Badan Pertanahan Nasio-
nal), de bevoegdheid geeft grond zelf in beheer te houden dan wel rechten 
op grond aan individuen toe te kennen, deze rechten te beperken, of zelfs 
in te trekken.
In 1965 begon de Nieuwe Orde, een periode die werd gekenmerkt door 
stabiliteit en economische groei. President Soeharto bouwde een autoritair 
regime op dat berustte op de steun van het leger. Het regime voerde een 
ontwikkelingbeleid van staatsgeleide industrialisatie, intensivering van de 
landbouw en grootschalige exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Het 
Soeharto-regime werd in toenemende mate gekenmerkt door KKN, het 
Indonesische acroniem voor corruptie, collusie en nepotisme. De economi-
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sche en politieke kenmerken van het autoritaire regime weerspiegelden 
zich in de wetgeving. Zo werd het grondenrecht hervormd om grote inves-
teringen en exploitatie mogelijk te maken. Ondanks zijn socialistische doel-
stellingen, bleef de Agrarische Basiswet gehandhaafd; hiermee kon de cen-
trale overheid haar wil immers afdwingen. De territoriale reikwijdte van 
de wet en van zijn uitvoerende Nationale Dienst voor Grondzaken werd 
echter sterk beperkt door nieuwe wetgeving. Zo gaf de Boswet van 1967 
het Ministerie van Bosbouw het beheersrecht over alle bosgrond (meer dan 
de helft van Indonesië) en ook de Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening van 1992 gaf 
de overheid nieuwe bevoegdheden. Het regime introduceerde voorts op 
enkele deelterreinen uitvoeringsregelgeving die in strijd was met de letter 
en geest van de Agrarische Basiswet. Onder deze omstandigheden beschik-
te de uitvoerende macht over sterke discretionaire bevoegdheden, waar-
van zij daadwerkelijk gebruik maakte ter realisatie van haar doelstelling 
van ‘ontwikkeling’– zulks dikwijls ten koste van de zekerheid van grond-
bezit van gewone burgers.
De val van Soeharto in 1998 was het startschot van een ambitieus her-
vormingsprogramma dat tot doel had de autoritaire staat te ontmantelen. 
De Indonesische regering startte ook een nieuw economisch beleid, evenals 
een gerichte campagne tegen KKN. De Grondwet van 1945 werd viermaal 
geamendeerd en uiteenlopende regelgeving werd gewijzigd of ingevoerd. 
Dit leidde, althans op papier, tot meer democratie, een duidelijke scheiding 
van machten en een betere bescherming van mensenrechten. Het recht op 
behoorlijke huisvesting wordt nu expliciet erkend. Afgezien van de consti-
tutionele hervormingen waren de twee Regionale Autonomie Wetten van 
1999, die in 2001 van kracht werden en in 2004 werden gewijzigd een 
belangrijk hervormingsinitiatief. Deze wetten regelden de overdracht van 
taken, bevoegdheden, beslissingsmacht en middelen van de centrale over-
heid naar lagere overheden, met name naar het niveau van de districten/
steden. Uitvoeringsregelgeving heeft de reikwijdte van deze decentralisa-
tiewetten echter sterk beperkt. Zij leidde bovendien tot grote onduidelijk-
heid, niet in de laatste plaats in de grondsector. Het grondenrecht zelf is 
intussen nauwelijks veranderd, ondanks de breed gedragen steun voor 
fundamentele hervormingen. Hierin zijn dan ook nog altijd restanten van 
de ideologieën en belangrijke leerstukken uit de periodes van Geleide 
Democratie en Nieuwe Orde terug te vinden. Niettemin is al met al – in 
ieder geval op papier – de rechtsstatelijke omgeving waarin het gronden-
recht wordt geïmplementeerd aanzienlijk verbeterd. 
Grondregistratie
Nadat aldus de achtergrond en context van het onderzoek zijn geschetst, 
gaat Hoofdstuk 4 in op de wetgeving en praktijk van de grondregistratie. 
In de koloniale periode genoten kampongs in steden als Bandung een grote 
mate van autonomie, wat betekende dat bewoners ook in relatie tot grond 
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hun eigen adatrecht konden toepassen. De Indonesische regering wees het 
koloniale rechtsdualisme echter af; in haar ogen was het discriminerend en 
belemmerde het de economische ontwikkeling. Dit was één van de belang-
rijkste redenen waarom in 1960 de Agrarische Basiswet van kracht werd. 
De wet moest leiden tot unificatie van het grondenrecht; in plaats van adat-
recht en Europees recht werden alleen nog in de wet beschreven rechten op 
grond erkend. Om bestaande rechten op te laten gaan in deze door de wet 
erkende rechten moest de grond worden geregistreerd. 
In praktijk blijkt het vooral voor kampongbewoners moeilijk grond te 
laten registeren. Hiervoor zijn verschillende verklaringen te geven, zo blijkt 
uit ons onderzoek. Hieronder zijn: i) de strenge bewijsvereisten die gelden 
voor de registratie van semiformele claims en die geen rekening houden 
met de complexe grondrelaties in stedelijke kampongs; ii) een gebrek aan 
politieke wil om rechten van informele grondbezitters te erkennen en te 
registeren; iii) wanbestuur van de kant van de Nationale Dienst voor 
Grondzaken, en; iv) daaruit voortvloeiende hindernissen en negatieve per-
ceptie van grondbezitters van het registratieproces.
In reactie op het trage tempo van grondregistratie heeft de Indonesi-
sche regering vanaf de jaren ‘80 verscheidene registratieprogramma’s als 
PRONA, PRODA en LAP geïnitieerd. Alleen al in Bandung hebben hon-
derdduizenden mensen aan deze programma’s deelgenomen. Uit onze 
analyse blijkt echter dat voornamelijk semiformele rechten worden gefor-
maliseerd. Veel kampongbewoners met informele claims – dit zijn vaak 
ook degenen met de laagste inkomens – worden niet bereikt. Kennelijk is 
de overheid ook in het kader van registratieprogramma’s niet bereid om 
deze bewoners rechten te geven. 
Het laatste deel van Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert de vraag in hoeverre kam-
pongbewoners juridische zekerheid genieten en grondregistratie, al dan 
niet op basis van de genoemde programma’s, hieraan bijdraagt. Uit de ana-
lyse volgt allereerst dat veel informele en vooral semiformele grondbezit-
ters vaak al enige mate van zekerheid van grondbezit genieten door een 
grote mate van bestuurlijke erkenning. Dit blijkt niet alleen uit het feit dat 
velen al decennia op een bepaald grondgebied wonen zonder enige vorm 
van interventie, de overheid door middel van kampongverbeteringspro-
gramma’s actief de infrastructuur in kampongs heeft verbeterd en bewo-
ners heeft voorzien van toegang tot water, elektriciteit en dergelijke, maar 
– belangrijker – uit het feit dat de overheid ook grondgerelateerde docu-
mentatie verstrekt. Een tweede belangrijke bevinding is dat grondregistra-
tie, zeker op de langere termijn, maar weinig bijdraagt aan juridische zeker-
heid, omdat i) een deel van de formele grondbezitters niet van plan is om 
in geval van overdracht van grond het kadaster hiervan in kennis te stellen, 
ii) de meeste nog altijd niet voldoen aan publiekrechtelijke vereisten om op 
grond te wonen en iii) het Indonesische grondenrecht hoe dan ook maar 
gedeeltelijke zekerheid biedt. Dit laatste is niet alleen het geval vanwege 




Juridische zekerheid van grondbezit is niet alleen afhankelijk van juridisch 
geldige titels, maar ook van de inhoud van ruimtelijke ordeningsplannen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat daarom in op de wetgeving en de praktijk van de ruimte-
lijke ordening, zowel gedurende de Nieuwe Orde periode als tijdens de 
Post-Nieuwe Orde periode. Ruimtelijke ordeningswetgeving die van toe-
passing was gedurende de Nieuwe Orde periode bood maar ten dele 
bescherming aan grondbezitters, zelfs als zij formele grondbezitters waren. 
De Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening van 1992 creëerde weliswaar een systeem dat 
de belangen van grondbezitters zou moeten borgen, maar uitvoerings-
regelgeving, vooral op het gebied van publieke participatie en transparan-
tie, kwam slechts gedeeltelijk tot stand. Voor zover deze regelgeving wel 
tot stand kwam, ontbraken hierin duidelijke en handhaafbare verplichtin-
gen van de overheid om de rechten van burgers in het proces van ruimte-
lijke ordeningte beschermen. 
In praktijk werden de belangen van grondbezitters zelfs nog minder 
geëerbiedigd dan op grond van bestaande regelgeving verplicht was. 
Grondbezitters werden niet vanaf het begin actief betrokken bij het ruimte-
lijkeordeningsproces; vaak speelden zij hierin geen enkele rol. De enige bij-
drage van de gekozen gemeenteraad was met een bestemmingsplan 
akkoord te gaan. Nadat een plan was vastgesteld, hadden burgers nauwe-
lijks inzage in een bestemmingsplan. De verplichte instemming door het 
provinciebestuur en de centrale overheid, met een plan geschiedde vaak 
pas jaren nadat het plan was vastgesteld. 
Na de val van President Soeharto werd nieuwe uitvoeringsregelgeving 
betreffende burgerparticipatie en transparantie vastgesteld. Deze bevat 
bepalingen die de belangen van grondbezitters verder kunnen beschermen. 
Toch legt zij weinig verplichtingen op aan het gemeentebestuur om burger-
participatie en transparantie te bevorderen. Bovendien werd de rol van de 
gemeenteraden op het terrein van de ruimtelijke ordening aanvankelijk 
kleiner. Ten slotte bleef de begeleidende en toezichthoudende rol van de 
provinciale overheid beperkt, al is deze vanaf 2004 weer groter geworden. 
Het proces van ontwerpen en vaststellen van het bestemmingsplan in 
Bandung laat zien dat burgers en zeker kampongbewoners daarin maar 
heel beperkt participeren en ook nauwelijks de kans krijgen van het 
gemeentebestuur dit te doen. Hun belangen, vooral die van zekerheid van 
grondbezit, worden ook niet behartigd door de gemeenteraad, hogere 
overheden of maatschappelijke organisaties. Het ruimtelijke ordeningsbe-
leid is bovendien niet volledig transparant, al zijn er de laatste tijd verbete-
ringen te zien. Dit resulteert in ruimtelijke plannen die nadelig zijn voor 
kampongbewoners, vooral voor degenen die wonen in kampongs die het 
gemeentebestuur als ‘krottenbuurten’ heeft gekwalificeerd. 
Paradoxaal genoeg is het voorgaande voor een belangrijk deel te ver-
klaren door de nieuwe financiële verhoudingen tussen Jakarta en de lagere 
overheden. Hierdoor ziet het gemeentebestuur ruimtelijk ordening primair 
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als een instrument voor economische groei, zonder rekening te houden met 
de directe belangen van gewone burgers die hierbij in het geding zijn. 
Gerelateerde KKN-praktijken en een groeiende rol van knokploegen in de 
stedelijke politiek dragen er ook aan bij dat burgers in ruimtelijke ordening 
feitelijk weinig tot niets te zeggen hebben. De vaagheid, overlap en incon-
sistentie van hogere regelgeving geven het gemeentebestuur vervolgens de 
kans om selectief een beroep te doen op die bepalingen die het nodig heeft. 
Zelfs als een bestemmingsplan in strijd blijkt met hogere regelgeving dan 
nog komt het gemeentebestuur hiermee weg vanwege het zwakke provin-
ciale toezicht en de inschikkelijke houding van de centrale overheid. Gewo-
ne burgers en maatschappelijke organisaties doen weinig om dergelijke 
praktijken te voorkomen en op te komen voor de belangen van getroffen 
kampongbewoners. NGO-activisten die zich wel tegen deze praktijken 
keren, worden geïntimideerd. Dat geldt evenzeer voor journalisten, die er 
uit professioneel lijfsbehoud voor kiezen niet al te kritisch te schrijven.
Grondontruiming door de overheid
Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt de wetgeving en praktijk van ontruiming door de 
overheid die de grond voor andere doeleinden nodig heeft, zowel gedu-
rende de Nieuwe Orde periode als in het Post-Nieuwe Orde tijdperk. 
Gedurende de laatste jaren van de Nieuwe Orde bood wetgeving inzake 
grondontruiming door de overheid weinig juridische zekerheid voor kam-
pongbewoners. Het Presidentieel Decreet van 1993 inzake grondontrui-
ming voor ontwikkeling in het algemeen belang was weliswaar een verbe-
tering ten opzichte van zijn voorganger, maar ook dit decreet vertoonde 
ernstige gebreken. Zo was de definitie van ‘algemeen belang’ ruim gesteld. 
Er bestond voorts geen verplichting voor overheden om alternatieven te 
bestuderen, procedurele bescherming was beperkt en het recht op een 
behoorlijke schadevergoeding of alternatieve huisvesting werd niet gega-
randeerd. In geval van informele grondbezitters had de burgemeester een 
ruime discretionaire bevoegdheid om te bepalen of hun een vergoeding 
toekwam en zo ja, hoe ruim die was. Het bevoegd gezag interpreteerde het 
begrip ‘algemeen belang’ zo ruim dat de procedure van grondverwerving 
voor ontwikkeling in het algemeen belang voor vrijwel ieder doel kon wor-
den gevolgd. Zo niet, dan deden de autoriteiten wel een beroep op andere 
bevoegdheden waarmee grond en huizen konden worden ontruimd. Als 
het bevoegd gezag toch de procedure van grondverwerving op basis van 
vrijwilligheid toepaste, dan had deze vaak een dwingend karakter. De 
hoogte en vorm van de schadevergoeding die werd uitgekeerd was door-
gaans inadequaat. Juist informele grondbezitters werden zwaar getroffen: 
vaak ontvingen zij helemaal geen compensatie. Het Bureau voor Rechts-
hulp – in Indonesië bekend als LBH, een NGO – en later ook de studenten-
beweging, verzetten zich tegen deze praktijk door het organiseren van juri-
dische en politieke acties, vooral gedurende de periode van openheid 
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(keterbukaan) (1989-1994), maar zij richtten hun aandacht doorgaans op de 
positie van boeren in plaats van op die van arme stadsbewoners. In som-
mige gevallen hadden zij invloed op het verloop van grondgeschillen, 
maar zelden was deze invloed zo groot dat zij grondontruiming konden 
voorkomen.
In de eerste jaren na de val van President Soeharto bleef de wetgeving 
inzake grondverwerving van staatswege ongewijzigd. In de praktijk komt 
ontruiming als een handhavingsmaatregel, bijvoorbeeld wegens ongeoor-
loofde occupatie of vanwege de overtreding van bouwregelgeving, nog 
steeds weinig voor. Als grond echter nodig is voor ‘ontwikkeling in het 
algemeen belang’, wat in Bandung tegenwoordig geregeld voorkomt, dan 
riskeren kampongbewoners nog altijd onvrijwillige grondontruiming zon-
der behoorlijke schadevergoeding. Zoals een casestudie naar het proces 
van grondontruiming in Taman Sari voor de ontwikkeling van de Pasupati 
flyover laat zien, slagen kampongbewoners er tegenwoordig echter in om 
door hardnekkig onderhandelen hogere schadevergoeding af te dwingen 
dan gedurende de Nieuwe Orde het geval was. Tussen deze volhouders 
blijkt er geen verschil op basis van het type van hun grondbezit: de hoogte 
van de schadevergoeding is voor allen gelijk. Deze vergoeding is echter 
nog steeds lager dan de sociaaleconomische waarde van de grond en 
dwingt kampongbewoners zich aan de rand van of zelfs buiten de stad te 
vestigen, ver van hun inkomstenbron.
Bovengenoemde gang van zaken wordt in de eerste plaats veroorzaakt 
door de genoemde tekortkomingen in de wetgeving. Bovendien weigeren 
overheden nog altijd zich aan de wet te houden. Zij trachten arme stads-
bewoners uit hun huizen te krijgen zonder behoorlijke schadevergoeding 
te bieden. De versterkte democratie op lokaal niveau compenseert deze 
omstandigheden enigszins. Hoewel de steun van het Bureau voor Rechts-
hulp en de studentenbeweging tegenwoordig beperkt blijft, durven kam-
pongbewoners zich nu zelf te verzetten tegen grondontruiming. Dit verzet 
krijgt vorm in politieke mobilisatie, zonder al te veel gebruik te maken van 
de beschermende werking die het recht kan bieden. Ook zien kampongbe-
woners af van procederen. De media besteden veel aandacht aan de protes-
ten, maar zij lijken in hun berichtgeving vaak op de hand van de overheid 
te zijn. Knokploegen intimideren demonstranten. Ondanks deze tegen-
krachten bereiken kampongbewoners echter relatief gunstige resultaten. 
Grondontruiming door projectontwikkelaars
Hoofdstuk 7 besteedt aandacht aan de wetgeving en praktijk van grondon-
truiming door projectontwikkelaars, ook hier zowel gedurende het tijdperk 
van de Nieuwe Orde als tijdens de Post-Nieuwe Orde periode. Gedurende 
de Nieuwe Orde veranderde de juridische basis voor grondontruiming 
voor commerciële doeleinden voortdurend. Er gold echter altijd een ver-
gunningensysteem, waarin de zogenoemde locatievergunning (izin lokasi) 
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een centrale rol speelde. Deze vergunning staat projectontwikkelaars toe in 
een bepaald gebied met grondbezitters onderhandelingen te beginnen. In 
de bovengenoemde periode van openheid nam het regime enkele maat-
regelen die grondbezitters zouden moeten beschermen. De maatregelen 
hadden weinig betekenis, aangezien overheden niet in staat waren om pro-
jectontwikkelaars die niet voldeden aan hun verplichtingen tegenover 
grondbezitters, sancties op te leggen. In de praktijk was het gebruikelijk dat 
projectontwikkelaars grondbezitters sterk onder druk zetten hun grond op 
te geven tegen een zeer lage vergoeding. De overheid, inclusief het leger, 
stond projectontwikkelaars hierin vaak bij.
Na de val van Soeharto werd de wetgeving inzake grondontruiming 
voor commerciële doeleinden gewijzigd. Dit leidde echter niet tot een alge-
mene verbetering. De bevoegdheden van toezicht en handhaving zijn nog 
altijd inadequaat. Veel kampongbewoners kunnen hoe dan ook niet van de 
beschermende werking van de wetgeving profiteren, omdat in veel geval-
len wettelijk geen locatievergunning is vereist. De Paskal Hyper Square 
case laat zien dat kampongbewoners, zeker bij informeel grondbezit, nog 
steeds kans lopen op onvrijwillige ontruiming zonder een reguliere rechts-
gang en een behoorlijke schadevergoeding. Daar staat tegenover dat kam-
pongbewoners tegenwoordig projectontwikkelaars dwingen hun plannen 
te herzien of een hogere vergoeding te betalen dan tijdens de Nieuwe Orde 
gebruikelijk was. Wel is deze vergoeding nog steeds lager dan de sociaal-
economische waarde van de grond.
Bovenstaande gang van zaken worden in de eerste plaats veroorzaakt 
door de gebrekkige wetgeving en door de nalatigheid van het gemeente-
bestuur kampongbewoners tegen dit soort praktijken te beschermen; het 
assisteert projectontwikkelaars soms juist. Als gevolg van de regionale 
autonomie en waarschijnlijk ook KKN heeft het gemeentebestuur er alle 
belang bij dat projecten slagen. Maar opnieuw compenseert de versterkte 
democratie op lokaal niveau deze omstandigheden enigszins. Ook tegen 
commerciële grondontruiming durven kampongbewoners zich nu te ver-
zetten door politieke mobilisatie. Zij organiseren straatprotesten, zoeken de 
steun van bureaus voor rechtshulp met politieke connecties en gebruiken 
zelfs hun stemrecht om het gemeentebestuur onder druk te zetten. Strate-
gieën waarin het recht een expliciete rol speelt, worden echter vermeden. 
Ondanks gebruikelijke tegenkrachten weten kampongbewoners op die 
manier redelijk gunstige uitkomsten te realiseren.
De perceptie van zeker grondbezit
Hoofdstuk 8 ten slotte gaat in op de laatste dimensie van het fenomeen 
zekerheid van grondbezit voor kampongbewoners, namelijk die van de 
gepercipieerde zekerheid. Daarbij is ook gekeken naar het effect van grond-
registratie op investeringsgedrag bij kampongbewoners met verschillende 
vormen van grondbezit. Uit onze survey-data blijkt dat kampongbewoners 
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over het algemeen een behoorlijke mate van gepercipieerde zekerheid 
genieten. De gepercipieerde zekerheid van formele en semiformele grond-
bezitters is ongeveer even sterk, die van informele grondbezitters veel min-
der. Formele grondbezitters baseren gepercipieerde zekerheid op het bezit 
van documenten inzake hun grond, terwijl veel semiformele en informele 
grondbezitters menen dat de overheid akkoord gaat met hun woonsituatie 
omdat zij er al lang wonen. Een grote meerderheid van de semiformele 
grondbezitters en een kleiner deel van de informele grondbezitters baseren 
dit vertrouwen eveneens op het bezit van documentatie over hun grond.
Ongeacht de vorm van hun grondbezit geloven veel kampongbewo-
ners dat het risico van onvrijwillige ontruiming sinds het einde van de 
Nieuwe Orde is toegenomen. Tegelijkertijd hebben veel kampongbewo-
ners het idee dat de hoogte van de vergoeding sindsdien is gestegen.
Om te weten te komen of registratie leidt tot meer investeringen in 
huisvesting hebben we de correlatie gemeten tussen vormen van grond -
bezit en de kwaliteit van huisvesting van respondenten. Zoals hierboven 
besproken, bestaan de meeste kampongs in Bandung uit permanente hui-
zen. Toch kan er een onderscheid worden gemaakt naar de vorm van 
grondbezit; deze laatste factor blijkt samen te hangen met investeringen in 
huisvesting. De huisvesting van formele grondbezitters is van significant 
betere kwaliteit dan die van informele grondbezitters. Echter, benadrukt 
moet worden dat huisvesting van formele en semiformele grondbezitters 
van ongeveer gelijke kwaliteit is. Voorts zullen, ongeacht de vorm van 
grondbezit, kampongbewoners met een sterke perceptuele zekerheid en/
of een hoger inkomen meer investeren in hun huisvesting dan diegenen die 
een dergelijke zekerheid niet voelen en/of niet over een dergelijk inkomen 
beschikken.
Conclusie
Op grond van het voorgaande concludeert Hoofdstuk 9 dat vraagtekens 
zijn te plaatsen bij de effectiviteit van de huidige benaderingen, in Indone-
sië, die gericht zijn op de versterking van de zekerheid van grondbezit voor 
arme stadsbewoners. De dominante benadering, die bestaat uit registratie 
van grond door middel van registratieprogramma’s, schiet haar doel voor-
bij. Informele grondbezitters die het meest baat zouden hebben bij die pro-
gramma’s, kunnen hieraan namelijk nauwelijks deelnemen. Daarnaast 
leidt een certificaat niet per definitie tot meer zekerheid van grondbezit. 
Bovendien blijkt registratie niet van beslissende invloed op investeringsge-
drag. Zolang kampongbewoners zelf zekerheid ervaren (percipieren), zul-
len zij evengoed in hun huisvesting investeren. Deze gepercipieerde zeker-
heid hoeft niet op juridische zekerheid gebaseerd te zijn; feitelijke zekerheid 
is voldoende. 
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Als beleidssuggestie vloeit uit dit onderzoek dan ook voort de keuze 
voor een alternatieve benadering waarin in eerste instantie de feitelijke 
zekerheid van kampongbewoners wordt versterkt. Dit kan bijvoorbeeld 
door middel van formele gedoogbeschikkingen ten aanzien van grondbe-
zit en –gebruik. Na verloop van tijd kan worden overgegaan tot grondre-
gistratie door middel van registratieprogramma’s, waarbij de opzet van 
deze programma’s echter wel moet worden aangepast. Ten eerste moeten 
zij vooral gericht zijn op informele grondbezitters. Bovendien moeten 
grondbezitters niet alleen grondtitels krijgen, maar ook de nodige vergun-
ningen om op de grond te mogen wonen. Los daarvan moeten de proble-
men van beperkte herregistratie en de diverse zwakke punten in het Indo-
nesische grondenrecht worden aangepakt. 
Het is van belang dat bovengenoemde beleidsmaatregelen ge paard 
gaan met verdere hervormingen ter versterking van de Indonesische 
rechtsstaat. Het gaat hierbij om juridische en institutionele hervormingen 
als ook zogenoemde legal empowerment maatregelen, maatregelen van 
beneden af met als doel de armen juridisch mondig te maken. De juridische 
en institutionele hervormingen moeten in de eerste plaats gericht zijn op 
het grondenrecht, dat zoals gezegd nog nauwelijks is hervormd. Daarnaast 
zijn hervormingen in de regionale autonomie en algemene rechtsstatelijke 
hervormingen nodig; deze zouden ertoe moeten leiden dat lokale overhe-
den zich beter aan de wet houden, de democratie op lokaal niveau verder 
wordt versterkt en kampongbewoners toegang hebben tot onafhankelijke 
instellingen voor geschillenbeslechting. Voorlichting en rechtshulp moeten 
kampongbewoners meer bewust maken van hun rechten en plichten ten 
aanzien van grondbezit en –gebruik.
Uit het onderzoek zijn ook conceptuele lessen te trekken. In de eerste 
plaats wordt bevestigd dat grondbezit in kampongs in Indonesië en waar-
schijnlijk in de meeste ontwikkelingslanden niet zwart-wit kan worden 
ingedeeld als legaal versus niet-legaal. Er bestaan doorgaans gradaties van 
legaliteit. Ook moet zorgvuldig worden omgegaan met het begrip zeker-
heid van grondbezit, dat voor analytische doeleinden in ieder geval moet 
worden benaderd vanuit drie dimensies: juridische, feitelijke en perceptu-
ele zekerheid. Kampongbewoners kunnen bijvoorbeeld een hoge mate van 
perceptuele zekerheid genieten zonder dat sprake is van juridische zeker-
heid. Het is voorts simplistisch om formeel grondbezit gelijk te stellen met 
zekerheid van grondbezit en informeel grondbezit met onzekerheid. Infor-
mele grondbezitters kunnen bijvoorbeeld een hoge mate van feitelijke 
zekerheid genieten. Welke benadering ter versterking van zeker grondbezit 
van arme stadsbewoners ook wordt gekozen, het succes van deze benade-
ring is afhankelijk van de mate waarin de rechtsstaat functioneert. Zonder 
rechtsstaat kunnen rechten immers niet worden gehandhaafd. Dit betekent 
ook dat benaderingen niet enkel gericht moeten zijn op grondbeleid, maar 
deel uit moeten maken van bredere hervormingen ter versterking van de 
rechtsstaat.

Buku ini memaparkan hasil dari penelitian yang berdasar pada pertanyaan 
apakah kaum miskin perkotaan mempunyai kepastian tenurial (tenure secu-
rity), terutama dengan latar belakang reformasi politik dan hukum yang 
terjadi setelah jatuhnya Presiden Soeharto pada tahun 1998.1 Berdasar-
kan penelitian ini akan dianalisis manfaat dari berbagai pendekatan yang 
mengarah pada peningkatan kepastian tenurial. Selain itu akan diberi 
beberapa usulan kebijakan. Pada akhirnya, buku ini bermaksud memberi 
masukan teoretis pada perdebatan internasional yang sedang berlangsung 
me ngenai kepastian tenurial.
Kerangka penelitian
Bab 1 memaparkan kehidupan masyarakat miskin perkotaan yang kian 
bertambah dan hidup di daerah kumuh di berbagai negara berkembang. 
Bentuk fisik, sosial-ekonomi dan hukum dari daerah ini berlangsung 
dalam lingkaran setan kemiskinan. Pertanyaan yang penting adalah bagai-
mana menyudahi lingkaran ini. Walaupun diakui dalam perdebatan inter-
nasional bahwa hal ini memerlukan kombinasi dari beberapa strategi, 
namun tahun-tahun terakhir ini justru banyak perhatian pada pendekatan 
yang mengarah pada peningkatan kepastian tenurial. Dalam hal ini secara 
garis besar terdapat dua macam pendekatan, pendekatan ‘fungsional’ dan 
pendekatan ‘alternatif’. 
Pendekatan ‘fungsional’, yang dominan dalam hal ini, menekankan pada 
dampak dari formalisasi pemakaian tanah untuk tujuan pembanguna n 
dalam hal tertentu, seperti pertumbuhan ekonomi, penanggulangan 
kemiskinan dan perbaikan kondisi kehidupan di daerah-daerah kumuh. 
1 Kepastian tenurial diartikan sebagai perlindungan bagi pemakai tanah (dalam bentuk 
formal, semiformal ataupun informal) terhadap pengosongon secara paksa atas tanah 
mereka, kecuali jika terjadi melalui proses hukum sebagaimana mestinya dan pem-
bayaran ganti rugi yang layak.
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Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, para pendukung dari pendekatan ini 
menganggap pendaftaran tanah begitu penting. Pendaftaran tanah menga-
rah pada kepastian hukum, oleh karena itu bukan saja kepercayaan yang 
dapat diberikan kepada penduduk perkampungan untuk melakukan 
investasi tempat tinggal dan jual-beli tanah mereka, namun juga memper-
mudah perolehan kredit dari bank dengan tanah dan bangunan sebagai 
jaminannya. Namun sampai saat ini masih sedikit penelitian yang telah 
dilakukan untuk mengetahui dampak dari pendaftaran tanah. Penelitian 
yang pernah dilakukan menuai tanda tanya dalam hal keefektifan pende-
katan ini.
Kritik pada pendekatan ini mengakibatkan munculnya pendekatan 
‘alternatif’ dalam rangka peningkatan kepastian tenurial. Pendekatan 
kedua ini menekankan pada kepastian tenurial. Hal ini dijamin dalam per-
janjian-perjanjian internasional tentang hak asasi manusia, khususnya hak 
atas perumahan yang layak (right to adequate housing). Menurut pendukung 
dari pendekatan ini, tidaklah begitu penting untuk mendaftarkan tanah; 
yang diperlukan adalah menghindari penggusuran, yang didasarkan pada 
tuntutan tanah yang ada.
Pendekatan apa pun yang dipilih dalam rangka peningkatan kepas-
tian tenurial, keberhasilannya bergantung pada perlindungan terhadap 
hak milik dan/atau hak asasi manusia. Dua pendekatan tersebut men-
syaratkan negara hukum yang substansial dan dapat melindungi kaum 
miskin  perkotaan dari kesewenang-wenangan pemerintah dan sektor 
swasta. Kendati demikian, hal ini mendapat sedikit perhatian dalam 
kepustakaan tentang kepastian tenurial.
Berdasarkan pertimbangan-pertimbangan di atas, buku ini memu-
satkan perhatian pada kepastian tenurial bagi kaum miskin perkotaan di 
Indonesia, yang didasari dari hasil penelitian sosio-legal di beberapa kam-
pung di kota Bandung, yang merupakan ibukota Provinsi Jawa Barat dan 
kota terdua terpadat (2,3 juta penduduk) di Indonesia. Di satu sisi, dalam 
buku ini akan dibedakan antara bentuk-bentuk pemakaian tanah, yakni 
secara formal, semiformal (hak milik adat), dan informal dan sisi lainnya 
yaitu dari segi kepastian yuridis, nyata dan perseptual. Penilaian-penilaian 
normatif dari studi ini akan dilihat dari pandangan negara hukum. Defi-
nisi negara hukum yang diterapkan terdiri dari: unsur-unsur prosedural, 
unsur-unsur material dan mekanisme pengawasan. Selain itu, akan diban-
dingkan antara masa pemerintahan Orde Baru (1965-1998) ketika Presiden 
Soeharto berkuasa dan periode Reformasi. Tulisan ini berdasarkan pene-
litian hukum dan penelitian lapangan yang berjalan selama kurang lebih 
satu setengah tahun. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dan 
kuantitatif: observasi langsung di beberapa kampung di Kelurahan Taman 
Sari dan Cibangkong, 140 wawancara dan survei terhadap 420 kepala kelu-
arga di tujuh kelurahan. Dalam penelitian lapangan ini juga dikaji ribuan 
kliping koran dan ratusan dokumen legislasi dan kebijakan.
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Perkampungan di Bandung
Sebagai latar belakang dan penjelasan konteks penelitian ini, bab 2 mema-
parkan sejarah kelahiran dan perkembangan perkampungan di Bandung, 
berbagai tindakan yang telah diambil pemerintah dalam rangka memper-
baiki kondisi kehidupan di daerah perkampungan ini dan corak kehidup-
an setempat di masa kini. Mengenai hal ini akan dipusatkan perhatian 
pada perkembangan kampung di Kelurahan Taman Sari, di mana peneli-
tian lapangan memakan waktu paling lama.
Biarpun ada bermacam tindakan yang telah dilakukan oleh pemerintah 
kolonial dan Indonesia, survei menunjukkan masih adanya kemiskinan di 
perkampungan Bandung, yang menampung orang-orang berpendidikan 
rendah, mereka yang bekerja di sektor informal dan berpendapatan ren-
dah. Walaupun pada dasarnya seringkali rumah-rumah di perkampungan 
tersebut terlihat kumuh, banyak rumah-rumah permanen yang dapat dite-
mui dengan akses sarana publik dan memiliki prasarana yang relatif baik. 
Ketika ditelaah lebih jauh mengenai status informal dari pemakaian tanah, 
ditemukan berbagai tingkat formalitas di dalam dan diantara kampung-
kampung tersebut.
Pemerintah Indonesia masih memberi prioritas dalam penanggul ang an 
kemiskinan kota. Hak atas perumahan yang layak dan kepastian tenurial 
menjadi tujuan yang begitu penting.
Hukum agraria Indonesia dan negara hukum yang sedang berkembang
Bab 3 menjelaskan secara umum mengenai hukum agraria berdasarkan 
latar belakang perkembangan negara Indonesia sebagai negara hukum. 
Dasar dari hukum agraria Indonesia adalah Pasal 33 Undang-Undang 
Dasar (UUD) 1945 dan Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria (UUPA) tahun 
1960, yang disahkan pada periode Orde Lama dibawah kepemimpinan 
Presiden Soekarno yang cenderung sosialis. Demi melindungi kaum ter-
tindas, butir undang-undang ini menekankan bahwa tanah mempunyai 
fungsi sosial. Oleh karena itu, undang-undang ini mengakui bahwa negara 
memiliki kewenangan besar dalam perihal agraria. Kewenangan ini teru-
tama didasari oleh hak menguasai oleh negara yang diatur dalam UUD 
1945. Hak ini memberi kewenangan pada negara untuk menguasai tanah 
dengan langsung atau untuk membagikan hak-hak atas tanah kepada indi-
vidu, membatasi hak-hak tersebut atau bahkan membatalkannya.
Pada tahun 1965 dimulai periode Orde Baru, yang dikenal dengan 
kemapanan dan pertumbuhan ekonomi. Presiden Soeharto membangun 
pemerintahan otoriter yang menerima dukungan kuat dari tentara. Rezim 
ini menanamkan kebijakan pembangunan industri, intensifikasi pertanian 
dan eksploitasi sumber daya alam dalam skala besar. Pemerintah Soehar-
to pada akhirnya semakin dikenal dengan praktek Korupsi, Kolusi dan 
Nepotisme (KKN). Ciri khas politik dan ekonomi dari rezim ini tercermin 
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pada peraturan dan perundangan. Hukum agraria berubah haluan demi 
menghalalkan segala bentuk penanaman modal dan eksploitasi. Walaupun 
dengan tujuan sosialisnya, UUPA tetap dipertahankan; sehingga pemerin-
tah pusat dapat memaksakan kehendaknya. Namun, jangkauan wilayah 
dari undang-undang ini dan Badan Pertanahan Nasio nal (BPN) sebagai 
pelaksana sangat dibatasi oleh peraturan baru. Undang-Undang tentang 
Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Kehutanan tahun 1967 memberi hak kepada 
Kementerian Kehutanan untuk menguasai seluruh kawasan hutan (lebih 
dari setengah wilayah Indonesia) dan Undang-Undang Penataan Ruang 
(UUPR) tahun 1992 memberi pemerintah kebi jakan baru. Lebih-lebih, rezim 
ini memperkenalkan peraturan pelaksanaan di beberapa bagian yang ber-
lawanan dengan apa yang tercantum dan tersi rat dalam UUPA. Dengan 
begitu, kekuasaan pelaksana memegang kewe nangan diskresi yang kuat, 
yang benar-benar dipakai untuk mewujudkan tujuan pembangunan – ini 
seringkali mengorbankan kepastian tenurial rakyat jelata.
Kejatuhan Soeharto pada tahun 1998 merupakan titik balik segala peru-
bahan yang bertujuan melucuti kekuasaan otoriter. Pemerintah baru memu-
lai suatu kebijakan ekonomi alternatif dan kampanye melawan KKN. UUD 
1945 diamandemen sebanyak empat kali dan berbagai peraturan direvisi 
atau disahkan. Ini mengarah, setidaknya hitam di atas putih, pada demokra-
si yang meluas, pemisahan jelas kekuasaan dan perlindungan yang lebih 
baik dalam hal hak asasi manusia. Kepastian tenurial yang merupakan bagi-
an dari hak atas perumahan yang layak, diakui secara jelas. Selain amen-
demen UUD 1945, dua Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Daerah tahun 1999, 
yang mulai berlaku pada tahun 2001 dan direvisi pada 2004, merupakan ini-
siatif reformasi yang penting. Undang-undang ini mengatur pengalihan ber-
bagai tugas, kewenangan, kekuatan putusan dan sumber daya dari pemerin-
tah pusat ke pemerintah daerah. Namun, peraturan pelaksanaannya sangat 
membatasi jangkauan undang-undang desentralisasi ini. Terlebih lagi, hal ini 
menjurus kepada ketidakpastian, juga di bidang pertanahan. Sementara itu, 
hukum agraria pun tidak mengalami perubahan, walaupun ada dukungan 
luas untuk perubahan ini. Hal ini berarti, sampai sekarang sisa-sisa ideologi 
dan dogma penting masa Demokrasi Terpimpin dan Orde Baru masih bisa 
ditemukan.Walaupun begitu, secara garis besar – setidaknya di atas kertas – 
lingkungan negara hukum di mana hukum agraria dijalankan cukup mem-
baik. 
Pendaftaran tanah
Setelah sejumlah pemaparan latar belakang dan konteks dari penelitian 
ini pada bab sebelumnya, Bab 4 menjelaskan perihal legislasi dan praktek 
pendaftaran tanah. Di masa kolonial, perkampungan di kota-kota seperti 
Bandung menikmati besarnya otonomi, yang berarti bahwa penduduk 
dapat menerapkan hukum adat masing-masing dalam perihal masalah 
tanah. Pemerintah Indonesia meniadakan praktek hukum kolonial ini; di 
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matanya hal ini merupakan suatu bentuk diskriminasi dan dapat meng-
hambat pertumbuhan ekonomi. Ini adalah satu dari banyak alasan menga-
pa UUPA disahkan pada tahun 1960. Undang-Undang ini menggiring pada 
penyatuan hukum agraria; bukan lagi hukum adat dan hukum Eropa yang 
diakui, melainkan hanya hak-hak tanah yang diakui oleh UUPA. Supaya 
hak-hak yang ada menjadi hak-hak yang diakui oleh UUPA, tanah harus 
didaftarkan. 
Pada kenyataannya, begitu sulit untuk mendaftarkan tanah yang dimi-
liki terutama bagi para penduduk perkampungan. Dari hasil penelitian, 
terdapat berbagai penjelasan dibalik masalah ini, yaitu: i) keharusan tun-
tutan bukti-bukti yang berlaku untuk pendaftaran tuntutan semiformal 
yang mengacuhkan hubungan antara tanah dan penguasanya yang rumit 
di perkampungan kota; ii) kurangnya kehendak politik untuk mengesah-
kan dan mendaftarkan hak pemakai tanah informal; iii) ketidakmampuan 
kepengurusan di pihak BPN, dan; iv) hal itu menimbulkan kendala dan 
persepsi negatif bagi para pemakai tanah dalam proses pendaftaran.
Sebagai reaksi dari lambatnya proses pendaftaran tanah, pemerintah 
Indonesia memulai beberapa program pendaftaran tanah sejak 1980, seperti 
Program Operasi Nasional Agraria (PRONA), Program Operasi Daerah 
Agraria (PRODA) dan Proyek Administrasi Pertanahan (PAP). Di Bandung 
terdapat ratusan ribu peserta untuk program-program tersebut. Namun tam-
pak dari hasil analisis terutama hak semiformal yang diformalisasi. Banyak 
dari penduduk kampung dengan tuntutan informalnya – mereka yang biasa-
nya berpendapatan rendah – tidak terjangkau oleh program ini. Rupanya 
pemerintah dalam hal ini belum sanggup memberikan hak pada warganya.
Bagian terakhir dari Bab 4 menganalisis pertanyaan sejauh mana pen-
duduk perkampungan dapat menikmati kepastian yuridis dan apakah 
pendaftaran tanah, melalui program-program di atas, membawa kepastian 
tersebut atau tidak. Hasil dari analisis itu, pertama-tama banyak pema-
kai tanah informal dan khususnya semiformal menikmati cukup banyak 
kepastian tenurial karena pengakuan administratif yang kuat. Ini ternyata 
tidak hanya karena banyaknya penduduk perkampungan yang menguasai 
tanah tanpa diganggu, pemerintah melalui program perbaikan perkam-
pungan memperbaiki prasarana dan menyediakan akses pada air, listrik 
dan lainnya, namun yang lebih penting lagi karena pemerintah mengelu-
arkan dokumen yang terkait dengan tanah. Temuan kedua yang penting 
adalah bahwa pendaftaran tanah, dalam jangka panjang, hanya memberi 
sumbangan kecil pada kepastian yuridis, hal ini dikarenakan: i) sebagian 
pemakai tanah formal tidak berencana untuk mendaftarkan ulang tanah 
mereka dalam hal peralihan hak atas tanah; ii) kebanyakan dari mereka 
masih belum dapat memenuhi tuntutan hukum publik untuk dapat 
me nempati tanah, dan; iii) bagaimana pun juga hukum agraria Indonesia 
tidak memberi kepastian yuridis secara penuh. Yang terakhir ini bukan 
hanya dikarenakan ketidaksempuraan peraturan perundangan namun 
juga pelaksanaannya yang gagal oleh pemerintah.
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Penataan ruang
Kepastian yuridis pemakaian tanah tidak hanya bergantung pada sertifikat 
yang berlaku secara hukum, namun juga pada rencana tata ruang. Bab 5 
berbicara mengenai legislasi dan praktek penataan ruang, pada masa Orde 
Baru dan pasca Orde Baru. Legislasi penataan ruang yang berlaku selama 
masa Orde Baru tidak begitu melindungi pemakai tanah, bahkan pema-
kai tanah formal. UUPR sebetulnya menciptakan suatu sistem dimana 
kepentingan para pemakai tanah dapat dilindungi, namun dalam pera-
turan pelaksanaan, terutama dalam hal partisipasi masyarakat luas dan 
transparansi, hanya sebagian dari hal ini yang terwujud. Sejauh peraturan 
ini berjalan, di dalamnya tidak terdapat kewajiban yang jelas dan dapat 
dilaksanakan oleh pemerintah untuk melindungi hak-hak warga dalam 
proses penataan ruang. 
Pada kenyataannya, kepentingan dari pemakai tanah kurang dihor-
mati dari yang seharusnya menurut peraturan. Dari awal para pemakai 
tanah tidak dilibatkan secara aktif dalam proses penataan ruang; bahkan 
seringkali mereka tidak mendapatkan peran apapun. Satu-satunya sum-
bangan dari pemerintah kota terpilih adalah menyetujui suatu rencana tata 
ruang. Setelah tersusunnya sebuah rencana, masyarakat tidak dapat meli-
hat langsung rencana tata ruang tersebut. Penyetujuan akan rencana oleh 
pemerintah provinsi dan pemerintah pusat yang wajib dilakukan, sering-
kali baru dikeluarkan beberapa tahun setelah rencana tersebut ditetapkan.
Setelah jatuhnya Presiden Soeharto, disusun kembali peraturan 
pelaksanaan tentang partisipasi masyarakat dan transparansi. Hal ini 
meng andung pasal-pasal yang dapat melindungi kepentingan pemakai 
tanah. Walaupun begitu, kewajiban bagi pemerintah kota atas pencanang-
an partisipasi masyarakat dan transparansi sangat terbatas. Lagipula peran 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) dalam hal penataan ruang 
menjadi semakin kecil. Dan akhirnya, peran pemerintah kota dalam hal 
pembinaan dan pengawasan sangat terbatas, meskipun mulai tahun 2004 
peran ini bertambah. 
Proses dari perancangan dan penetapan rencana tata ruang wilayah di 
Bandung memperlihatkan bahwa masyarakat dan penduduk perkampung-
an pada khususnya hanya bisa berpartisipasi secara terbatas dan hampir 
tidak diberi kesempatan oleh pengurus kota untuk terlibat dalam proses 
itu. Kepentingan mereka, terutama dalam hal kepastian tenurial, tidak 
diunggulkan oleh pemerintah kota, pemerintah yang lebih tinggi atau 
pun organisasi-organisasi kemasyarakatan. Lagipula kebijakan penataan 
ruang tidak sepenuhnya terbuka, walaupun begitu hal ini telah membaik 
di tahun-tahun terakhir. Dalam hal ini, penataan ruang menghasilkan keru-
gian bagi penduduk perkampungan, terlebih bagi mereka yang tinggal di 
daerah yang digolongkan oleh pengurus kota sebagai daerah kumuh.
Hal di atas cukup paradoksal dan dapat diperjelas oleh hubungan 
ke uangan baru antara Jakarta dan pemerintah daerah. Oleh karena itu, 
pemerintah kota melihat penataan ruang terutama sebagai alat untuk 
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pertumbuhan ekonomi, tanpa menghiraukan kepentingan langsung dari 
masyarakat awam yang terancam karena hal ini. Praktek KKN dan tum-
buhnya peran preman pada politik perkotaan juga berdampak kepada 
masyarakat yang dalam hal penataan ruang sedikit bahkan sama sekali 
tidak dapat mengungkapkan pendapat. Ketidakjelasan, ketumpangtin-
dihan dan inkonsistensi legislasi memberi pemerintah kota kesempatan 
untuk menggunakan secara selektif ketentuan yang diperlukan. Bahkan 
jika suatu rencana tata ruang wilayah berlawanan dengan peraturan yang 
lebih tinggi, maka pemerintah kota tidak akan dicecar, dikarenakan oleh 
lemahnya pengawasan pemerintah provinsi dan sikap pemerintah pusat 
yang cenderung ikut-ikutan. Masyarakat awam dan organisasi-organisasi 
kemasyarakatan tidak bertindak banyak untuk menghindari praktek- 
praktek semacam ini dan untuk berpihak pada kepentingin penduduk 
 perkampungan yang menjadi korban. Para aktivis lembaga swadaya 
masyarakat (LSM) yang melawan praktek semacam ini diintimidasi. Hal 
ini berlaku juga bagi para wartawan, yang demi kelangsungan hidup –
kepastian kerja!- memilih untuk tidak terlalu kritis dalam tulisannya.
Pengosongan tanah oleh pemerintah
Bab 6 menjabarkan legislasi dan praktek pengosongan tanah oleh 
pemerintah untuk tujuan lain, di masa Orde Baru dan pasca Orde Baru. 
Selama tahun-tahun terakhir pemerintahan Orde Baru, legislasi tentang 
pengosongan tanah yang ditawarkan pemerintah membawa kurangnya 
kepastian yuridis bagi penduduk perkampungan. Keputusan Presiden 
tahun 1993 tentang Pengadaan Tanah bagi Pelaksanaan Pembangunan 
untuk Kepentingan Umum secara luas merupakan perbaikan jika 
dibandingkan dengan pendahulunya, namun keputusan ini pun 
menunjukkan kekurangan yang sesungguhnya. Seperti itulah kandungan 
arti ‘kepentingan umum’ yang dijabarkan. Lagipula tidak ada kewajiban 
bagi pemerintah untuk mengkaji alternatif, perlindungan prosedural pun 
begitu terbatas dan hak untuk mendapatkan ganti rugi atau tempat tinggal 
layak pengganti tidaklah dijamin. Dalam hal pemakai tanah informal, 
walikota mengambil diskresi untuk memastikan apakah mereka menerima 
uang santunan atau tidak, jika ya, berapa harga yang akan diberikan. 
Dalam prakteknya, pihak berwenang menginterpretasikan konsep 
‘kepentingan umum’ begitu luas sehingga prosedur pengadaan tanah bagi 
pelaksanaan pembangunun untuk kepentingan umum bagi tujuan apa pun 
dapat terlaksana. Jika tidak, pemerintah menggunakan berbagai kewenang-
an yang bertujuan untuk mengosongkan tanah dan membongkar rumah. 
Jika prosedur untuk pengadaan tanah bagi pelaksanaan pembangunun 
untuk kepentingan umum diikuti, prosedur ini bersifat memaksa. Bentuk 
dan besarnya ganti rugi yang diberikan biasanya tidak memadai. Lebih 
parahnya, pemakai tanah informal seringkali tidak mendapat kompensasi. 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) bersama beberapa gerakan mahasiswa 
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melawan praktek ini dengan mengorganisir aksi-aksi hukum dan politik, 
terlebih pada periode keterbukaan (1989-1994), namun mereka biasanya 
lebih mengarahkan perhatian pada petani, bukan pada kaum miskin perko-
taan. Di beberapa kasus mereka dapat mempengaruhi berjalannya sengketa 
tanah, namun jarang sekali pengaruh ini menjadi begitu besar sehingga 
dapat mencegah pengosongan tanah.
Di tahun-tahun pertama setelah jatuhnya Presiden Soeharto, legisla-
si tentang pengosongan tanah masih tetap berlaku. Dalam prakteknya, 
pe ngosongan tanah untuk melaksanakan hukum, misalnya karena pema-
kaian tanah tanpa izin atau pelanggaran peraturan bangunan, jarang ter-
jadi. Namun jika tanah diperlukan untuk kepentingan umum, seperti yang 
terjadi di Bandung saat ini, maka penduduk perkampungan menghadapi 
risiko pengosongan tanah secara paksa tanpa ganti rugi yang memadai. 
Kasus dari pengosongan tanah di Taman Sari untuk pengembangan jalan 
layang Pasupati menunjukkan keberhasilan penduduk perkampungan, 
walaupun harus melalui proses perundingan tanpa henti, untuk menerima 
ganti rugi yang lebih besar dari yang biasa diterima pada masa Orde Baru. 
Diantara mereka yang bertahan tidak ada perbedaan antara bentuk pema-
kaian tanah (formal, semiformal, informal): besar ganti rugi yang diterima 
berjumlah sama untuk semua. Namun ganti rugi ini masih saja lebih ren-
dah jika dibandingkan dari nilai sosial-ekonomis tanah. Hal ini memaksa 
para penduduk perkampungan untuk tinggal di pinggiran bahkan di luar 
kota, jauh dari (tempat) sumber penghasilan mereka. 
Berbagai permasalahan di atas merupakan masalah dari kecacatan 
peraturan perundang-undangan. Lagipula pemerintah seringkali menolak 
untuk berpegang teguh pada peraturan perundangan. Pemerintah men-
coba mengusir penduduk miskin kota dari rumah-rumah mereka tanpa 
menberi ganti rugi yang layak. Masalah tersebut terkompensasi dengan 
demokrasi di tingkat lokal yang berkembang. Pada saat ini dukungan dari 
LBH dan gerakan mahasiswa terbatas, namun penduduk perkampungan 
mulai berani melakukan perlawanan sendiri terhadap pengosongan tanah. 
Pelawanan ini berbentuk mobilisasi politik, tanpa banyak memanfaatkan 
hukum yang sebenarnya bisa melindungi penduduk tersebut.
Pengosongan tanah oleh pengembang swasta
Bab 7 mencurahkan perhatian pada legislasi dan praktek pengosongan 
tanah demi kepentingan para pengembang swasta, juga di periode Orde 
Baru dan semasa pasca Orde Baru. Perubahan dasar hukum untuk kepen-
tingan lahan usaha berubah terus-menerus pada masa Orde Baru. Berlaku 
semasa itu suatu sistem perizinan, dimana izin lokasi menjadi begitu pen-
ting. Izin ini memberikan lampu hijau bagi para pengusaha untuk memulai 
tawar-menawar dengan para pemakai tanah. Di masa keterbukaan seperti 
yang telah disebut di atas, pemerintah telah mengambil beberapa tindakan 
demi melindungi para pemakai tanah. Tindakan-tindakan tersebut tidak 
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mempunyai arti banyak, karena pemerintah tidak dapat memberi sanksi 
pada pengembang yang tidak dapat memenuhi kewajiban mereka terhadap 
para pemakai tanah. Pada kenyataannya, seringkali para pengembang 
memaksa para pemegang tanah untuk menyerahkan tanah mereka yang 
lalu diganti dengan harga rendah. Pemerintah, termasuk tentara, seringkali 
berada di belakang para pengembang ini. 
Semenjak jatuhnya Soeharto peraturan perundangan tentang pe- 
ngosongan tanah demi kepentingan para pengembang direvisi. Ini tidak 
mengarah pada perbaikkan secara umum. Tindakan-tindakan pengawasan 
dan pelaksanaan hukum masih tidak memadai. Bagaimana pun juga, 
banyak dari penduduk kampung tidak dapat menikmati perlindungan 
hukum, karena dalam banyak hal izin lokasi tidak diperlukan. Kasus dari 
Paskal Hyper Square memperlihatkan bahwa penduduk perkampungan, 
terutama yang menguasai tanah secara informal, berisiko digusur secara 
paksa tanpa proses hukum sebagaimana mestinya dan pembayaran ganti 
rugi yang layak. Di sisi lain, penduduk perkampungan pada saat ini bisa 
memaksa pengembang untuk mengubah rencana pembangunannya atau 
untuk membayar imbalan yang lebih besar dari yang biasa diterima pada 
masa Orde Baru. Namun jumlah imbalan ini tetap lebih rendah dari nilai 
sosial-ekonomi tanah sebenarnya.
Hal di atas pertama-tama disebabkan oleh ketidaksempurnaan legislasi 
dan kegagalan pemerintah kota untuk melindungi penduduk perkampung-
an melawan praktek semacam ini; justru pemerintah seringkali memberi 
bantuan pada pengembang. Sebagai akibat otonomi daerah dan mungkin 
juga praktek KKN, pemerintah kota memiliki kepentingan agar proyek 
pembangunan berhasil. Dan lagi-lagi, masalah tersebut terkompensasi 
dengan demokrasi di tingkat lokal yang berkembang. Juga dalam hal pe-
ngosongan tanah untuk kepentingan komersial, penduduk perkampungan 
berani melawan melalui mobilisasi politik. Mereka mengorganisir berba-
gai protes jalanan, mencari dukungan dari kantor bantuan hukum yang 
memiliki koneksi politik dan bahkan menggunakan hak suara mereka sen-
diri untuk menekan pemerintah kota. Strategi di mana hukum memainkan 
peran utama dihindari. Walaupun selalu ada kekuatan penentang, pendu-
duk perkampungan mengetahui bahwa dengan cara ini dapat mewujud-
kan hasil yang cukup baik.
Persepsi kepastian tenurial
Pada akhirnya, Bab 8 akan mengungkap dimensi akhir fenomena kepas-
tian tenurial, yaitu kepastian perseptual. Dalam hal ini dilihat juga efek 
dari pendaftaran tanah dan sikap penanaman modal pada penduduk 
perkampungan dengan berbagai bentuk pemakaian tanah. Dari hasil sur-
vei menunjukkan bahwa secara umum penduduk perkampungan dapat 
menikmati kepastian perseptual ini dengan cukup tinggi. Kepastian per-
septual pemakai tanah formal dan semiformal hampir sama kuatnya, 
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sedangkan kepastian perseptual pemakai tanah informal lebih rendah. 
Pemakai tanah formal mendasari kepastian perseptual dengan dokumen-
dokumen terkait dengan tanah yang mereka miliki, sementara itu banyak 
dari pemakai tanah semiformal dan informal mengira bahwa pemerintah 
setuju akan kependudukan tanah mereka karena lamanya mereka tinggal 
di sana. Hampir semua dari pemakai tanah semiformal dan sebagian kecil 
dari pemakai tanah informal mendasari kepercayaan ini juga pada kepemi-
likan dokumen-dokumen terkait dengan tanah.
Apapun bentuk dari pemakaian tanah mereka, banyak dari penduduk 
perkampungan yang percaya bahwa risiko pengosongan tanah meningkat 
sejak berakhirnya masa Orde Baru. Bersamaan dengan itu, banyak pula 
penduduk perkampungan yang menyangka bahwa imbalan yang diterima 
naik jumlahnya.
Untuk mengetahui apakah pendaftaran tanah mengarah pada pening-
katan investasi tempat tinggal, diukur korelasi antara bentuk pemakaian 
tanah dan kualitas dari tempat tinggal para responden. Seperti telah dibi-
carakan di atas, perkampungan di kota Bandung terdiri dari rumah-rumah 
permanen. Walaupun begitu, dapat dibedakan kualitas rumah tinggal res-
ponden berdasarkan bentuk pemakaian tanah; faktor terakhir ini ada kait-
annya dengan investasi tempat tinggal. Bangunan bagi pemakai tanah for-
mal jauh lebih baik kualitasnya dibandingkan tempat tinggal bagi pemakai 
tanah informal. Namun, perlu ditekankan bahwa bangunan pemakai tanah 
formal dan semiformal kurang lebih berkualitas sama. Selain itu, apapun 
bentuk dari pemakaian tanah, penduduk perkampungan yang memiliki 
kepastian perseptual tinggi dan/atau pendapatan lebih tinggi, akan ber-
investasi lebih banyak daripada mereka yang kepastiannya lebih rendah 
dan/atau tidak berpenghasilan sebanyak itu. 
Kesimpulan
Pada Bab 9 diambil kesimpulan bahwa pertanyaan ditujukan bagi efekti-
vitas dari pendekatan-pendekatan yang berlaku, di Indonesia, yang dida-
sari pada peningkatan kepastian tenurial bagi kaum miskin perkotaan. 
Pendekatan yang berpengaruh, terdiri dari pendaftaran tanah lewat ber-
bagai program pendaftaran tanah hampir tidak memiliki manfaat. Pema-
kai tanah informal, yang memiliki paling banyak kegunaan atas program, 
jarang sekali bisa ikut serta dalam program tersebut. Selain itu, kepemili-
kan sertifikat tanah belum tentu dapat meningkatkan kepastian tenurial. 
Lagipula terbukti bahwa pendaftaran tidak memengaruhi secara nyata 
sikap penanaman modal. Selama penduduk perkampungan mengalami 
sendiri kepastian perseptual, mereka akan berinvestasi pada tempat ting-
gal. Kepastian perseptual ini tidak perlu didasari oleh kepastian yuridis; 
kepastian nyata sudah mencukupi.
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Bagaimana pun juga, sebagai usulan kebijakan, penelitian ini menja-
tuhkan pilihan pada pendekatan alternatif dimana kepastian nyata pen-
duduk perkampungan meningkat. Ini dapat terjadi melalui keputusan 
formal yang memperbolehkan pemakaian tanah (dalam bahasa Belanda 
disebut ‘gedoogbeschikking’). Seiring berjalannya waktu, hal ini dapat 
mengarah pada pendaftaran tanah melalui program-program pendaftaran, 
dimana perancangan program itu harus disesuaikan. Pertama, program-
program tersebut harus mengarah pada pemakai tanah informal. Lagipula 
bukan hanya sertifikat tanah yang perlu diterima oleh para pemakai tanah, 
namun juga izin- yang diperlukan agar bisa menempati tanah tersebut. 
Terlepas dari itu semua, masalah keterbatasan pendaftaran ulang dan ber-
bagai titik lemah dalam hukum agraria Indonesia harus dituntaskan.
Penting, tindakan kebijakan yang disebut diatas dilakukan secara 
bersamaan dengan perubahan lebih lanjut dalam rangka peningkatan 
negara hukum Indonesia. Perubahan ini berpusat pada reformasi hukum 
dan kelembagaan dan juga yang dikenal dengan tindakan legal empower-
ment, tindakan paling dasar yang bertujuan agar kaum miskin bersuara 
secara hukum Reformasi hukum dan kelembagaan haruslah pertama-
tama mengarah pada hukum agraria, yang seperti telah disebutkan ham-
pir tidak mengalami perubahan. Di samping itu, diperlukan reformasi di 
bidang otonomi daerah dan reformasi umum menuju negara hukum; hal 
ini seharusnya dapat menghasilkan pemerintahan lokal yang berpegang 
teguh pada peraturan perundangan, demokrasi di tingkat lokal meningkat 
dan penduduk perkampungan menjadi lebih sadar akan hak dan kewajib-
an mereka dalam hal pemakaian tanah.
Dari penelitian ini dapat pula diambil beberapa pelajaran konseptual. 
Pertama-tama, dapat dibenarkan bahwa bentuk pemakaian tanah di 
perkampungan di Indonesia dan kemungkinan juga di banyak negara 
berkembang lainnya tidaklah dapat dilihat secara hitam-putih seperti 
legal versus tidak legal. Biasanya berlaku berbagai tingkat legalitas. Juga 
harus diperhatikan mengenai pengertian dari kepastian tenurial, dalam 
perihal tujuan analitis perlu didekati oleh tiga dimensi: kepastian yuridis, 
nyata dan perseptual. Contohnya, penduduk perkampungan dapat saja 
menikmati kepastian perseptual tanpa adanya kepastian yuridis. Selain itu, 
terlalu mudah menyamakan pemakaian tanah formal dengan kepastian 
dan pemakaian tanah informal dengan ketidakpastian. Pendekatan apa 
pun yang dipilih demi peningkatan kepastian tenurial bagi kaum miskin 
perkotaan, keberhasilan dari pendekatan ini bergantung pada sejauh mana 
negara hukum berfungsi. Tanpa adanya negara hukum mustahil hukum 
dapat dipertahankan. Ini berarti pula bahwa pendekatan-pendekatan ini 
tidak berfokus pada kebijakan tanah saja, namun harus menjadi bagian 
dari reformasi lebih luas demi peneguhan negara hukum.
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Today, about 1 billion people are estimated to live in ‘slums’ worldwide. This 
number will only grow and urban poverty worsen unless radical measures are 
taken. While it is generally acknowledged in the international development 
debate that breaking the circle of poverty requires multiple strategies, there is 
renewed attention for approaches that centre on the issue of tenure security. 
This means landholders are protected against involuntary removal from the land 
on which they reside, unless through due process of law and payment of proper 
compensation. The prevailing approach to the provision of tenure security is land 
registration. And while the land registration approach currently dominates policy, 
there has been little research into the effects of registration, particularly in urban 
areas. What research has been conducted, contests the benefits of this approach. 
As a result, we witness increasing interest in alternative approaches which gener-
ally combine protective administrative or legal measures against eviction with the 
provision of basic services and credit facilities.
The author describes and analyses the extent to which formal, semiformal, and 
informal tenure arrangements that can be found in kampongs (typical low-income 
settlements) in Indonesia provide tenure security to the country’s urban poor, 
particularly since 1998, when Indonesia embarked on an ambitious political 
and legal reform programme. The author reviews the current legal framework 
that applies to urban land tenure in Indonesia. In addition, based on rich mate-
rial that was acquired through empirical research in the city of Bandung, there 
are a number of case studies presented in which the urban poor’s tenure security 
was put to the test. Finally, drawing on statistical data, the author analyses the 
urban poor’s perceptions regarding their tenure security and whether and, if so, 
how this influences their housing investment behaviour. Following this analysis, 
the author evaluates the socio-economic benefits of current approaches to 
attaining tenure security. And with these findings, there are policy suggestions 
and contributions to theory formation presented to further the current inter-
national development debate on tenure security.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of Leiden University. The study is a part of the Law School’s research 
programme on Securing the rule of law in a world of multilevel jurisdiction 
and was conducted as part of a research project of the Van Vollenhoven Insti-
tute for Law, Governance, and Development.
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